Islamism, political Islam is a multi-million-strong, multi-layered, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional phenomenon that has a significant impact not only on political and social processes in the Muslim world, but also on the entire system of international relations. Moreover, Islamists include groups of Muslims who think differently and act in different ways-from supporters of "popular Islam" and the peaceful introduction of certain sharia norms, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, which pursues a flexible domestic and foreign policy, to Al-Qaeda terrorists and other supporters of the establishment of a world caliphate by force, and mercenaries hiding behind green the banner of Islam. Entire countries are also called "Islamist" - Sudan, Iran and-wrongly - even Saudi Arabia, which is closely connected with the West.

Given the complexity, diversity and dynamism of this phenomenon, our magazine opens the subheading "Islamization, Islamism and Extremism".

The following articles are published: P. A. Rassadin "Political Islam and Religious minorities in the Arab East", V. M. Akhmedov "The Army and ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle East" and A. A. Razlivaev " Turkey. Revival of religious communities".

One of the key trends of modern societies in the Arab East is attempts to Islamize them (both in politics and at the cultural and everyday level). This process is causing growing concern among the ruling and largely westernized Arab-Muslim elites. However, representatives of minority religious (primarily Christian) communities are most concerned about the growing influence of Islam, especially given the popularity of Islamic concepts in public life.

While still holding important cultural, socio-economic, and political positions in a number of Arab countries, minorities have almost completely lost their ability to influence key government decisions, with the possible exception of Lebanon.

This raises an extremely important and directly practical question: how was the beginning of the twenty-first century? - during the period of noticeable aggravation of contradictions on the religious and ethno-political basis in the Arab East, the interaction and coexistence of so-called political Islam (public forces that build and promote their political program based on the principles of Islam and religious propaganda) and representatives of minority religious communities is carried out?

The Middle Eastern states that emerged from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 20th century faced a number of serious internal contradictions from the very first days of their existence. Being based on the dominance of certain ethno-confessional forces, they were unable to develop a universal model of identity that would be acceptable to all citizens, regardless of their religious or ethnic origin1.

The socio-political institutions formed in these countries proved to be too inert and subsequently could not adequately adapt to the changing nature of inter-community relations. As a result, many nation-states that emerged with the assistance of European powers and in line with Western political concepts did not lead to the emergence of full-fledged nations. Outwardly integrated societies were divided into closed groups, each of which, apart from ethnic and cultural characteristics, retained its own vision of the country's history, political and economic development paths.

Of course, it is a confessional and ethnic group in itself.-

The population diversity of the Middle East countries is not a threat to the well-being or security of States, but it becomes a strong destabilizing factor when, against the background of deep cross-cultural differences, socio-political tensions that are natural for any society arise. It should also be taken into account that we are talking about a "non-Western" society, where one of the key principles is that representatives of various groups protect, first of all, their habitual way ^of life (a set of cultural and everyday practices), which, unlike political positions, rarely becomes the object of compromises2. Hence the additional acuteness of domestic contradictions, which over time not only create potential hotbeds of civil conflicts, but also contribute to the emergence and strengthening of difficult-to-overcome barriers at the domestic level.

WHAT IS MODERN ISLAMISM?

Islamism was born as a result of contradictions between the secular worldview that accompanied the socio-economic and political modernization of the Arab states in the XX century, and the traditional religious worldview of Islam. It became an accessible alternative to secular nationalism, which increasingly became the domain of only a narrow stratum of the Arab intelligentsia.³

At the same time, the Islamists did not abandon the ideas of regional unity developed by the ideologists of pan-Arabism. In their concept, the main changes were made to the platform of such unity, which became broader and was no longer based on an ethnic (Arab), but on a religious (Islamic) identity that unites the entire Islamic Ummah.

Hence the first serious contradiction. On the one hand, the emerging ideology really embraced a larger geographical area and almost the entire one and a half billion Muslim population of the world in general and living in the Middle East in particular. On the other hand, with this approach, almost 15 million members of non - Islamic Arab communities have been left out, whose representatives have been sounding the alarm about the washing out of the traditional Christian element from Arab societies since the second half of the 20th century and are seriously afraid of being again, as several centuries ago, in the position of second-class citizens.

Minority communities in the Middle East, unlike Muslims, are not characterized by proselytism. The meaning of their behavioral model is to protect and preserve their own uniqueness, and the slogans put forward are not aimed at promoting any doctrine (although they may have just such a form), but at protecting the socio-political interests of the community, a specific way of life. ⁴ As far as Islam is concerned, even where Muslims are a minority, they operate in universal categories and seek to impose comfortable identities and social practices.

Another important feature is that the Muslim population easily lends itself to political mobilization, especially during periods of socio-political crises, when an ordinary member of society, trying to get psychological protection from shocks and uncertainty, usually turns to the mosque.⁵ The peculiarities of the Muslim religious doctrine allow us to voice and present almost any socio-economic contradictions in a religious and even civilizational format. And the mosque itself is significantly superior to the religious and religious-political structures of other communities in the effectiveness of working with the population.

The success of Islamization was facilitated by the use of ideas of social justice and the "Islamic alternative" in resolving chronic problems of domestic political, economic and humanitarian nature. Broad strata of the Muslim population were particularly impressed by the idea of creating a society united by a common perception of the" public good", the foundations of which should not be undermined by class, confessional, family or local structures.⁶

An important step for Islamists, from the point of view of political evolution, was their participation in the electoral process.

On the one hand, entering legal public politics did not bring large dividends to members of Islamist groups, and in some cases, even on the contrary, it demonstrated the weakness of Islamist forces over secular "anti - democratic" and "dictatorial" regimes, and provoked friction within the leadership of Muslim movements.⁷

On the other hand, involvement in the elections has strengthened the position of Islamist groups as an integral element of the political establishment in their States. In addition, in a number of countries, although initially not the most favorable positions in the struggle for power, Islamists were able to find a common language and cooperate with other forces, including secular nationalist organizations, which - as can be seen in the example of Lebanon - later significantly expanded their capabilities.

Another important element is the militarization of political Islam, which, oddly enough, took place in parallel with the attempts of a number of Muslim organizations to defend their interests through the ballot boxes.

The radicalization of Islamists was promoted primarily by the following factors:-

The arms conflicts that affected the Muslim world in one way or another in the last third of the twentieth century: in Afghanistan in 1979-89, in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982, in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo in the 1990s. the still unresolved Palestinian problem.

All this has led to the formation in the eyes of ordinary Muslims of the image of a common enemy - the West (including Israel) and the political forces supported by it (including within the Arab states themselves), which, if necessary, can be countered by force of arms.⁸

However, it is impossible to say that such radicalization clearly benefited the growing influence of political Islam. The result was twofold.

On the one hand, Islamism has gained additional moral and ideological support in Middle Eastern societies in the form of hundreds of thousands of sympathizers united in the struggle against the common "enemy" in all its manifestations, and has gained support for its policy of combining political and violent methods of struggle.

On the other hand, within the framework of Islamism, a marginal trend has emerged, represented by dozens of small, semi-independent groups that rely precisely on forceful opposition to political and ideological opponents. These new actors, as a rule, turn out to be capable only of destabilizing the situation, loud but ineffective actions that not only do not contribute to the practical implementation of the fundamental goals and principles of political Islam, but also incite contradictions between the main players in the Muslim sector.

All these trends are a general scheme for modern political Islam as a whole phenomenon, but at the level of specific trends and organizations, or even individual factions, it is impossible to speak of any unity of opinions and approaches.

Each group operates under unique socio-political conditions, has a specific ethno-confessional base, and has its own experience of interacting with secular Muslim communities, minorities, and the West. Hence the phenomenon of the existence of polar views and patterns of behavior practiced by Islamists not only in the region, but even within a single state.

ISLAMISTS, MINORITIES, AND THE NATION STATE

A clear example of acute political and ideological contradictions between representatives of the Islamic majority and non-Muslim religious communities is the approaches to the issue of the state, the implementation of state interests and sovereignty.

For minority communities, the formation of Western-style nation States in the Middle East proved to be a turning point.

In the 1920s, minority groups generally recognized the borders of the new nation-states. As a result, the Arab communities of Druze or Orthodox Christians living on the territories of several States in the region currently do not pose a threat to State sovereignty, and the ties between them are purely cultural and domestic in nature.

Even more loyal positions are occupied by Christian Uniate communities (for example, the Maronites of Lebanon), who see nation-states as the most effective mechanism of protection against the "aggressive" Muslim environment. In Lebanon, social development has essentially led to a division of roles between representatives of the dominant ethno-confessional communities in areas such as government, the army, and the economy. The participation, or even monopoly, of minority representatives in one of these areas (ideally in government leadership) has become a reliable tool for overcoming the negative consequences of intercommunal competition, a guarantee of the survival and well-being of the community, regardless of its size or position in society.⁹

Islamic religious and political doctrine looks at statehood from a completely different angle and can be described using two concepts.

The meaning of the first of them - the Ummah - is an association of all Muslims of the world, which does not have clear territorial or ethnic borders. The second - daulya, often translated as "state" - refers to modern states that have such characteristics as territorial borders and sovereignty. However, a daulah in the Islamic state-legal system is a temporary administrative entity within the framework of a single global Muslim community.¹⁰ It is intended to serve the interests of the Ummah (its security and well-being), is authorized by the Ummah and is accountable to the Ummah as a whole, and not to its direct subjects or citizens.¹¹

The intensification of Muslim sentiment, accompanied by the promotion of Islamic approaches to solving socio-political problems, has not led to a radical improvement in the internal situation in the states of the region, the removal of barriers between various ethno-confessional communities, and the resolution of international conflicts in the area of the spread of Islam, primarily Arab-Israeli.

The triumph of the" Islamic alternative " did not happen, and neither did the complete collapse of nationalist trends. Instead of

* Daulya comes from the Arabic root, which means, in particular, a state of victory, prosperity, a temporary system of norms and rules, etc.

This resulted in a synthesis of purely Islamic concepts with elements of nationalism and the ideas of the national liberation struggle, which resulted in the emergence of specific players in the regional political arena.

There are three types of socio-political organizations that operate with varying degrees of "nationalism" and Islamic concepts of state and law.

The first is exclusively religious organizations, which organize their activities and receive public support through the promotion of a religious, in this case, an Islamic program. A good example is the international organization Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), which focuses on transnational Islam and the universality of Muslim values, lifestyles, and, most importantly, Islamic recipes for solving the problems of modern society. ¹² This organization was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. The party has been active in Egypt, ¹³ Jordan, Tunisia, Kuwait, Palestine and Western European countries, especially in Germany. Since the mid-1990s, Hizb al-Tahrir has also been active in the former Soviet Union.

Rejecting the specific institutions and unique socio-political practices of the states of the Arab East, Islamists propose a complete rejection of the existing state system, and subsequently of the national state (one of the key mechanisms for the "self - defense" of minorities) in favor of a unified Islamic society, as an option - in the form of a revived caliphate, as a solution to the pressing problems of modern society^..

The second type is the product of the aforementioned synthesis: organizations that combine commitment to the Islamic agenda (including declaring loyalty to the Islamic Ummah) and national interests. These are the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, as well as their sister Palestinian Hamas. Attempts to combine the two approaches are clearly visible in the election programs of both ¹⁵. In countries with an influential Christian element, such organizations try to demonstrate partnerships with religious minorities. However, in practice, unlike declarations, "friendly" steps towards minorities are quite difficult to implement.

Thus, like Hizb al-Tahrir, both the brotherhood and Hamas, on the one hand, advocate the use of Sharia law as the main source of law, and on the other hand, they do not indicate a clear position on the political rights of non - Muslims. In Egypt, the issue became particularly acute when, in the second half of 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood issued several drafts of the movement's program, in which references to the ban on appointing non-Muslims to high-level leadership positions in the state apparatus appeared and disappeared. ¹⁶

The problematic situation around organizations of this kind is precisely the need to balance between two vectors - Islamic (extending beyond the borders of national states) and national (aimed at solving internal problems of the national community).

And if Islamic rhetoric provides significant support for the Muslim "street" and major foreign religious authorities, and contributes to the influx of" sponsored " funds, then national discourse is the key to real political power and international relations outside the Muslim world.

It is important for such movements not only to preserve their "Islamic face" (in particular, to have a field of maneuver in polemics with other Islamist movements) and not to lose their sources of funding, but also to actively participate in the political life of the country. Hence the clearly secondary importance of relations with minorities, which are rather opportunistic in nature.

The third type is currently represented only by the Lebanese Hezbollah ("Party of Allah"). This type can be called, rather, a special case of the previous model, which arose in the specific conditions of coexistence of more than a dozen and a half confessional communities in Lebanon. This organization, which declares the liberation of the territory of the Lebanese Republic from Israeli occupation as a priority task, simultaneously has a specific long-term Islamist program. However, it is also a full-fledged ethno-political movement that defends the interests of the Lebanese Shiite community within the framework of the system of political confessionalism in Lebanon.

An example of the secondary role of the Islamic factor in this case is the so-called mutual understanding concluded in February 2006 between Hezbollah and the Christian "Free Patriotic Movement", which in its spirit clearly contradicts the religious and political principles of Islam. Clearly directed against the coalition, where the Sunni-Druze-Maronite Mustaqbal movement plays a central role, it violates the injunction against alliances between Muslims and non-Muslims against other Muslims.¹⁷

An even more striking example is the recognition (contrary to the well-known postulates ¹⁸) by Hezbollah Islamists of Christian presidents and ministers who hold their posts in accordance with the provisions of the 1943 Pact of National Accord.In Lebanon, political associations between different religious segments of society are often the only possible condition for political survival. So, 2 opposing blocks - "March 8" and

The " March 14 "parties, which fought for victory in the recent parliamentary elections in June 2009 , are excellent proof of this. The first brings together mainly representatives of the Shiite Hezbollah and Maronite Christians led by General M. Aoun, and the second-Sunnis, Druze and Christians.

EXCEPT FOR SCRAP - THERE IS NO RECEPTION?

The political activity of Islamists (both legal and illegal) causes serious concerns in the multi-confessional societies of the Arab East, not only among minorities, but also among the Europeanized secular wing of the same Sunni and Shiite communities. Paradoxically, the main target of concern is precisely "nationalist" Islam, whose supporters, thanks to the skillful use of nationalist, pan-Arab and Islamic rhetoric, enjoy broad support on the Middle East "street".

While pursuing their national (and in the case of Hezbollah, their religious) agenda, they participate in parliamentary elections and sometimes serve in their own governments. And the universal slogan of opposing Israel justifies the existence of paramilitary structures within some groups.

Finally, according to Islamic doctrine (of course, this is not publicly declared), such paramilitary groups consider it possible "in the interests of the Ummah" to neglect the interests of national states. The most striking examples of such a policy are Hezbollah's own decision (without a national consensus) to continue armed actions against Israel, which led to the war in the summer of 2006.

The main negative effect of such actions, even if they lead to any practical achievements, is that representatives of minority communities get the impression that the central authorities are unable to control the behavior of Islamists. In Lebanon, for example, at the height of the crisis surrounding the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the summer of 2007, the Maronite Christian community was seriously talking about the danger of "the seizure of power by radical Islamist groups, the introduction of Sharia law and the de facto restoration of Dhimmi status* for religious minorities"¹⁹.

Developing this idea, Christian politicians and political scientists emphasize that in the XXI century, relations between Muslims and "protected" communities will definitely not be the same as, for example, during the heyday of the Umayyad Caliphate (661 - 750). Then the Muslim authorities felt a certain dependence on Christians, who made up the majority of the population, and, observing all the rules prescribed by Sharia, generally behaved very flexibly with non-Believers. Modern Islamists, if they were in a dominant position, would no longer "mess around" with Christians. ²⁰ There is a danger of falling not only under the legal restrictions provided for by Sharia law, but also facing more serious persecution of the culture and way of life that Christians are accustomed to.

At the same time, despite the occasional panic moods, there are no real contradictions on religious and ideological grounds between Christians and Muslims today. Of course, there are numerous conflicts over power (in Lebanon), as well as economic and domestic differences (in Egypt, the Palestinian territories), which distort the picture of inter-communal interaction and foster an atmosphere of hostility and distrust, but they have nothing to do with religious practice.²¹

Fears in Christian communities across the region have also been heightened by the events in Iraq. There, marginalized minorities (such as the Christian Assyrian community), who in principle are unable or do not even try to compete with Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in the struggle for power and economic resources, have become targets of severe persecution by what is believed to be radical Islamist groups that declare their goal to create an "Islamic state"in Iraq²². However, a more thorough analysis shows that these attacks were often the work of either unorganized bandit groups or the Kurdish Peshmerga militia. The latter is essentially engaged in "ethnic cleansing", by various means squeezing out the non-Kurdish, including Christian, population from areas in northern Iraq claimed by the Kurdish authorities.²³

Despite the numerous efforts made by the national states of the Middle East and their secular, Westernized ruling elites in the confrontation with mass Islamist organizations, in our opinion, it is hardly possible to radically change the situation in the regional arena in favor of "moderate" forces at this stage.

Political Islam has become an integral part of the political life of almost all countries of the Arab East. We can agree that its practical achievements, especially in the socio-economic sphere, are still far from promising; however, we must admit that its ideological impact on the Muslim "street" remains very significant.

Against this background, the limited opportunities of disparate minority communities are even more pronounced. For a long time, politically active minorities received the necessary support from their Western counterparts.

* Dhimmi - a religious minority under the patronage of Muslim rulers.

patrons. By the middle of the twentieth century, only a few Christian communities maintained more or less stable ties with Europeans and Americans. For several more decades, they managed to position themselves as intermediaries between the West and the Arab-Muslim world.

However, by the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that there was no serious need for the West to maintain a "special relationship" with Christians in the Middle East. Moreover, the Westernized and dynamically developing young Muslim elite's preference for Christians was misunderstood by the Westernized and dynamically developing young Muslim elite.²⁴ This situation is clearly seen in the example of modern Lebanon, where the leader and, in fact, the "face" of a broad pro-Western coalition (the"Forces of March 14", which includes representatives of Sunni, Druze and a number of Christian communities) is a Sunni Muslim S. Hariri, and Christians objectively play the role of junior partners.

Another factor that significantly weakens the position of Christian communities is a deep intellectual and ideological crisis. Today, Christians (in particular, in Lebanon, where they remain active participants in political life) cannot develop a platform for achieving internal unity, nor a universal strategy for development and interaction with representatives of various Muslim movements.

It is important to take into account that the modern secular "moderate" Arab-Muslim elites in power in the Arab East, on the intellectual front, can also not oppose anything to the "Islamic alternative".

The only more or less weighty ideological argument is the attention of the ruling regimes to the Palestinian problem. However, the propaganda advantage of Islamists is also becoming more noticeable here. Against scrap - there is no reception.

In general, the main means of the authorities ' struggle against Islamists remains a powerful administrative resource, either in the form of strict legal restrictions or in the form of direct repression.

This raises a reasonable question: to what extent is such a policy justified?

Answering this question, first of all, it should be recognized that modern Islamism, represented by representatives of its main trend, is not an "absolute evil" and a threat to the existence of modern national states and the regional structure of the Middle East as a whole. Rather, this is an objective trend in the development of Muslim society, which, admittedly, has an increased conflict and destabilizing potential. And now this potential is becoming more and more serious, since there are no adequate mechanisms to counteract its strengthening.

The policy of constant restraining pressure on Islamists-with all the power of the coercion apparatus of modern Arab states - cannot be 100% effective. Limiting the influence of Islamists on the state leadership does not mean putting an end to the Islamist tendency as such, which, even under persecution, manages to find weak spots in the actions of the authorities.

However, here the problem becomes a vicious circle: in the absence of an adequate intellectual alternative to Islamism, the vast majority of existing national governments are not ready to allow Muslim political organizations to participate in the process of power struggle without the risk of losing it. And given that the possession of power is directly linked to the preservation of the way of life and socio-economic well-being (this is especially true for such minority communities as, for example, for the Alawites in power in Syria), then the problem of containing Islamism really becomes a matter of life and death for some political forces.²⁵

The pronounced cross-border nature of the ideology of modern Islamism, which is sensitive to changes in the Middle East political situation in general, no longer allows us to precisely neutralize the hotbeds of political Islam exclusively within national borders.

This also leads to the failure of the popular Western thesis that it is possible to normalize the situation in the entire Middle East and North Africa through a combination of internal reforms and support for "moderate" forces in the states of the region. Rather, there is an inverse relationship: radicals from all political and religious movements, without exception, justify their existence and maintain their popularity by fighting the attempts of Westerners to influence the internal politics of Arab states.

SCENARIOS: NEGATIVE AND ACCEPTABLE

Taking into account the trends described above, it is possible to predict some elements of future relations between Islamists and ruling regimes and religious minorities.

A negative scenario involving, if not a deterioration, then at least a continuation of the current state of affairs is likely to contribute to the further radicalization of the political positions of Islamist "nationalists", as well as a significant spread of small paramilitary groups operating under the umbrella of the "Islamic international" in the context of the global economic crisis, which negatively affects the socio-economic situation in the situation in the region. Hence the growing moral and ideological (and possibly violent) pressure on minorities, their retaliatory radicalization, and the possible increase in inter-confessional domestic violence.

Scenario based on a possible regional settlement-

In terms of curbing the radicalization of Islamists in the context of regional conflicts, including the Middle East, this is not an unambiguously positive development.

Of course, on the one hand, it can lead to a general decrease in the degree of rhetoric of Islamist ideologues, a decrease in criticism of national regimes and their foreign policy, and a rejection of pan-Islamic, transnational slogans in favor of state interests. In turn, this would soften the hard line of the ruling elites, making them more tolerant of Islamists, etc. The ideal option is to remove the political agenda from religious teachings and switch to so-called post-Islamism. This phenomenon is already being observed in the Muslim communities of European countries, when an ordinary Muslim who fully feels like a citizen, a member of Western society, living in the world of high technologies, modern business and loyal to the Western state, remains a devout Muslim in everyday ^life and personal life26.

On the other hand, the disappearance of an external threat (primarily in the form of Israel) can lead to the re-targeting of militant Islamist organizations fighting against external forces (Hamas, Hezbollah) to the internal front and attempts to find new ideological justifications for their existence.

Removing the Palestinian issue from the agenda may also deprive many Muslim regimes, including those outside the Middle East, of significant ideological support and lead to a noticeable increase in internal political contradictions.

The average scenario of the situation may be based on the approval of trends towards a non-confrontational political settlement of the Middle East conflict, normalization of relations between Arab states and Iran in regional politics, as well as a broader dialogue in solving internal problems. As a result of this development, Islamists are unlikely to acquire the status of an equal participant in political life.

But there may be a kind of pluralization: the emergence of new opportunities for political discussions, intra-national dialogue, and the absence of prospects for Islamists to achieve a radical change of power through elections.²⁷ It is possible that this option would lead to the elimination or modification of the most odious points of the Islamist platform.

^{Kumaruswamy P. R.} 1 Who am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East // Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2006, N 1, p. 63.

^{Rassadin P. A.} 2 Lebanese confessionalism and Political Crises / / Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 2007, No. 10, p. 75.

^{Tibi B.} 3 The Challenge of Fundamentalism. Political Islam and the New World Disorder. Berkley, University of California Press, 2002, p. 68.

^{Karaman L. M.} 4 Religion, Politics and Mobilisation: A Theoretical Perspective with a Special Note on "the Indian Khilafat Movement" // Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2004. Vol. 3, N 1, p. 39, 43 - 44, 46.

^{Abu-Rabi' I. M.} 5 Contemporary Arab Thought. Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History. London, Pluto Press, 2004, p. 156.

^{Roy O.} 6 Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah. London. Hurst & Company, 2004, p. 61.

^{Ottaway M., Hamzawy A.} 7 Islamists in Politics: The Dynamics of Participation // Carnegie Papers. Middle East Program, 2008, N 98, p. 4.

^{Abu-Rabi' I. M.} 8 Op. cit., p. 18 - 19.

^{Horowitz D. L.} 9 Ethnic Groups in Conflict // Berkeley. University of California Press, 1985, p. 187.

^{Ibn Manzur, Muhammad ibn Akram.} 10 Lisan al-Arab. Beirut, Dar Sadir, 1997, vol. 2, p. 431.

^{Al-Barghouti T.} 11 The Umma and the Dawla. The Nation State and the Arab Middle East. London, Pluto Press, 2008, p. 56 - 66.

^{Roy O.} 12 Op. cit., p. 258 - 259.

¹³ In 1968, Hizb al-Tahrir carried out coup attempts in Jordan and Syria, which failed. One of its activists was a member of the group that assassinated Egyptian President A. Salat in 1981. Coup attempts were also carried out in Iraq and Tunisia. In 1994, 10 members of Hizb al-Tahrir were charged with planning the assassination of King Hussein of Jordan.

^{Tibi B.} 14 Op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁵ The Electoral Programme of the Muslim Brotherhood for Shura Council in 2007, Cairo, Egypt, 14.06.2007 - http://www.ikhwanweb.com; Hamas Election Manifesto for the Legislative Elections Held on 25 January 2006 // Tamimi A. Hamas. Unwritten Chapters. London, Hurst & Company, 2007, p. 274 - 294.

^{Ottaway M., Hamzawy A.} 16 Op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁷ "...Do not take Jews and Christians as friends: they are friends of one another." Koran, Sura 5, ayat 51. Translated from the Arabic by Yu. A. Krachkovsky. Rostov-on-Don, Feniks Publ., 2003.

¹⁸ "...And Allah will never set up a road against the believers." Qur'an, Surah 4, verse 141.

¹⁹ And such concerns were voiced in Lebanon during the confrontation between the army and the Fatah al-Islam group in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the north of the country. See: Rassadin P. A. Decree op. cit., p. 80.

^{Lybarger L. D.} 20 Identity and Religion in Palestine. The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories. Princeton and Oxford, 2007, p. 42.

^{Abdelhadi M.} 21 Identity and Status of the Palestinians in Israel. A Double Periphery in an Ethno-National State. Jerusalem, 2008; Al-An-baa markus al-shaheer bi "wazir i'alam al-qanisa" - li "Al-Masri Al-Ya'uma": nuani mashaqil, lyakinnaha la tasilu ilya hadd al-idtihad / / Al-Masri Al-Ya'uma, 21.09.2008.

²² Masihiyyah al-Iraq yahlyamun bi kantun / / Al-Watan Al-Arabi, 2008, N 1625, pp. 28-29.

²³ Tahjir mashihiyyah al-sharq: al-mu'amara al-kubra / / Al-Qifah Al-Arabi, 20.10.2008.

Mashihiyyu al-sharq wa fursa at-tafallut min al-khatr / / As-Safir, N 11135, 28.10.2008.

²⁵ In this case, Lebanon is an interesting exception. Due to the complex ethno-confessional structure of the population and, consequently, the permanent clash of agendas and lifestyles, the political system as a whole is conciliatory and inclusive. In order to develop an acceptable position for all participants in the political process (pro-Western Christians, Westernized Sunnis and Shiites, Shiites and Sunnis from Islamist movements, etc.), the most acute problems are brought to the negotiating table. Due to the diversity of opinions, coordination is extremely slow and difficult. However, the process itself indicates the possibility of more or less viable coexistence.

^{Roy O.} 26 Op. cit., p. 97 - 98.

^{Perthes V.} 27 Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World // Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004, p. 26.

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