"REMEMBER, COMRADE, YOU, AFGHANISTAN..."*

AFGHANISTAN HAS WRITTEN A TRAGIC PAGE IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAST DECADE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S EXISTENCE

A. Y. URNOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Throughout history, the USSR's relations with Afghanistan have remained traditionally friendly. In 1919. The Soviet Union was the first to recognize Afghanistan; in February 1921, a Treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries, and in June 1931, a Treaty of Neutrality and mutual non-aggression, which was repeatedly extended - the last time shortly before the sharp turn in the history of our southern neighbor-in December 1975.

Over the years, the internal political changes that have taken place in Afghanistan have not hindered the development of bilateral relations. Afghanistan was one of the first "third world" states visited by Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin years. In the late 1950s, it ranked 3rd among recipients of Soviet economic aid, second only to India and Egypt.¹

The length of the border between the two countries exceeded 2 thousand km, which in itself made Afghanistan important from the point of view of the security interests of the Soviet Union. This significance increased in connection with the Soviet-Chinese conflict and the victory of Islamic fundamentalists in Iran.

THE REVOLUTION IS OUT OF TIME

Since the mid-1960s, the left-wing movement in Afghanistan has been represented by two political parties - Khalq ("People") and Parcham ("Banner"), which were formed as a result of the split of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) created in 1965.

"Khalq", which was headed by M. Taraki, was closely connected with the army environment and relied more on the largest ethnic group of the country - the Pashtuns. B. Karmal was at the head of the "Parcham", in which another major ethnic group, the Tajiks, enjoyed considerable influence. There were many progressive-minded intellectuals and representatives of bourgeois circles in its ranks. Both parties operated legally and had their own representatives in the parliament. The Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU maintained contacts with "Khalq" and "Parcham", a number of leaders and activists of which were trained in the USSR. It was not without our help that the two parties merged in 1977, recreating the PDPA, which began to speak out from anti-Western, anti-Chinese and pro-Soviet positions.

On April 10, 1978, one of the leaders of the PDPA, M. G. Khaybar, was killed. His funeral resulted in a powerful protest demonstration that demonstrated the strength of the left-wing movement. Prime Minister M. Daoud ordered the arrest of Taraki, Karmal, and a number of other PDPA leaders. The party was ready for an armed rebuff. On April 27, 1978 (hence the name "April Revolution"), Daoud's government was deposed.

After taking power, the PDPA proclaimed the formation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Number one in the state and party leadership was Taraki, second-Karmal.

The fact that the friends were leaning towards military action against the government was known in Moscow long before April 1978. The Soviet position on this issue was cautious. The PDPA leadership was advised not to rush things, citing the lack of a revolutionary situation in the country. Later, Taraki confessed to G. M. Kornienko, then the first deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, that the PDPA deliberately did not notify the Soviet representatives of the upcoming coup out of fear that Moscow would dissuade it from armed action.²

So, it was not the USSR that pushed the PDPA to take decisive action, but the repressions that fell on the party. But when the coup took place, Moscow was the first to recognize the new Afghan regime.

In December 1978, Taraki, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, paid a visit to Moscow. The Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed, article 4 of which stated that the USSR and the DRA "will consult and, with the consent of both sides, take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries."³. A year later, this article served as the legal basis for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

At first, the prevailing opinion among the Moscow authorities was that under the leadership of the PDPA, the party would immediately be destroyed in the West . -

* Lyrics from a song by Soviet Afghan veterans.

whether to call it" communist "- Afghanistan can become a "second Mongolia". Reality soon overturned these hopes.

The objective situation did not contribute to the perception of left - wing, and even more so, socialist ideas by the Afghan society. This was hindered by such Afghan realities as the low level of socio-economic development of the country, the patriarchal way of life, the backwardness and conservatism of the majority of the population, its ethnic heterogeneity, the influence of the Islamic religion, the role of the clergy, etc.

The new government had to take all this into account, showing political flexibility and the ability to find compromise solutions. The PDPA government, however, acted hastily, "slashing from the shoulder". The transformation program it launched was unnecessarily radical. The government's reliance on forceful methods of governance and reform did not add to its popularity.

Moscow's advice to pursue a more balanced policy and expand the social base of the authorities in Kabul was not very listened to.

As a result, not only those who had lost their power and wealth, but also a significant number of "ordinary" Afghans soon began to oppose the Government. The resistance movement, whose members became known as Mujahideen ("warriors for the faith"), became armed in nature.

External conditions are also unfavorable for the NDPA. The "April revolution" was met with hostility by the United States and the West in general, China, many Muslim states - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others. The ranks of the PDPA's internal and external enemies have closed in.

The Afghan opposition was quite diverse and consisted of Islamic parties and organizations of varying strength and influence, mostly of an ethnic nature. The Sunni "Alliance of Seven" formed in 1982 was based in Pakistan, and the so - called Shiite Eight was based in Iran. The leading role in the Alliance of Seven was played by the Pashtun-based Islamic Party of Afghanistan. The northern regions were represented by parties that united the Tajiks and Uzbeks who lived there.

The main rear base of the opposition was Pakistan. Many of the Afghan refugees who crossed there received military training and then returned to Afghanistan through mountain passes. There were caravans with weapons. Militant groups were also sent from China and Iran.

By mid-1979, the Mujahideen controlled much of the country's rural areas. In the Afghan army itself, the number of deserters grew, and there were cases when entire units moved to anti-government positions.

"WHERE DOES AMIN AFGHANISTAN LEAD?"

The weak point of the new government was the contradictions that persisted after the reunification of the PDPA and the struggle for influence between the Khalqists and Parchamists. The main role in inciting internal strife was played by Kh. Amin is a Khalqist who had plans to become a Muslim.

the first person in the party and the state.

People talk and write about Amin in various ways, including claims, though not proven, that he was a CIA agent. The point is, Amin was a master of intrigue. In May 1978, he first convinced Taraki that the Parchamists were disloyal. Many of them were arrested and their leaders were removed from the country: Karmal was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Najib, a member of the DRA Revolutionary Council and head of the PDPA's Kabul committee, was sent to Iran. They were soon accused of plotting an anti-government plot, removed from their posts, and stripped of their citizenship. Amin himself took the post of head of government, and in July - also the Minister of Defense.

Amin enjoyed some support in the USSR Defense Ministry, but in general, Moscow did not have much confidence in him. B. Khakimov, then working at the Soviet Embassy in the DRA (later Ambassador to Namibia and Portugal, director of the Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry), told me that among the Soviet employees in Kabul at that time there were lines of a song from a popular Soviet cartoon edited in relation to the Afghan situation: "Where does Amin Afghanistan lead? Big secret, big secret! " At a meeting in Moscow in early September 1979, Brezhnev personally warned Taraki that he should be on his guard with Amin.

The fateful day was September 14. On this day, Taraki invited Amin to his house for a conversation in the presence of Soviet representatives. The USSR Ambassador A. Puzanov assured Amin that he had nothing to fear. However, when he arrived at the palace, there was an unexpected shootout involving Taraki's guards. There are many versions of what happened. According to one of them, the reason was the refusal of Amin's guards to hand over their weapons. Amin was lucky to escape unharmed.

By this time, Amin had already managed to change the balance of power in the Afghan leadership in his favor. On the same day, Taraki was" voluntarily " released from all posts and placed under house arrest. Persecution of Taraki's supporters began, and in early October 1979, his sudden death was announced. In fact, despite the intercession of Brezhnev, on the orders of Amin, now chairman of the Revolutionary Council and General Secretary of the party, Taraki was strangled with a pillow.

Amin positioned himself as a firm revolutionary, asked to be received in Moscow, and several times raised the question of providing military assistance to Afghanistan. At the same time, statements were made about the desire to improve relations with the United States, and contacts were established with the PRC.

Despite the change in leadership, it was decided to continue cooperation with the PDPA regime, but Amin's personal trust was soon completely lost. The Mujahideen, meanwhile, were advancing and in December 1979 controlled about 70% of the country's 10 million-strong population, or about two-thirds of its population.⁴ Amin's opponents in the party and army, led by Karmal, called on the USSR to " save the Afghan revolution."

Moscow was faced with a difficult choice: let events take their course or intervene. But how? Remove Amin and put Karmal and his comrades in power? And then what? The power is on the side of the Mujahideen, and the PDPA, although renewed, is unlikely to stand alone in front of them. So, if we are to intervene, then by forces that can help the Kabul regime stop and push back the Mujahideen, i.e., go to the direct participation of the Soviet Army in the civil war.

Let's look back a bit. In Moscow, the question of whether or not to send troops has been on the agenda since March 1979, when the Afghan leadership first formally asked us for military assistance. The reason was the bloody uprising in Herat. Savage mobs seized government officials, Soviet specialists, and their wives and children, flayed them alive, and gleefully carried the bloodied remains of their victims through the streets.

Yet neither this nor about two dozen other similar requests from Taraka were granted. However, in November-December, already under Amin, three battalions were sent to Afghanistan, including the "Muslim", which included Soviet soldiers dressed in Afghan uniforms.-

military personnel from Central Asian republics, and several special forces units ⁵. But these forces were only sufficient for limited security functions.

FATAL MISTAKE

For 8 months, refusing to send troops to Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership acted sensibly and far-sighted. But then the "either-or" situation came, and on December 12, the decision to send troops - they were called a "limited contingent" - was made. This suggests an analogy with the decision of the Americans to directly get involved in the Vietnam War, when they were faced with the question of whether to be the Saigon regime or not.

But motivation is one thing, and the need to calculate and anticipate the consequences of the decision being made, and soberly analyze the domestic and international situation, as well as our own capabilities, is another. After all, it was obvious that the PDPA government has no mass support in the country, there is no unity in it, and its policy is failing. The history and geography of Afghanistan, the internal political situation, the ingrained spirit of resistance among the Afghan people to outsiders who came to the country with a sword, the hostile environment, the support provided to the Mujahideen by the United States and its allies-all this pointed to the futility of attempts at a military solution.

In addition, for some reason they thought that the operation would not last long, that the Soviet troops would take control of urban centers, and the Afghan army would beat the Mujahideen in rural areas.

Finally, they did not take into account the fact that by invading Afghanistan, we will turn most of the Islamic world against us and give the West the opportunity to position itself as an opponent of interference in the internal affairs of the "third world" countries and a "friend" of Muslims.

The official Soviet-Afghan version, according to which on December 27, 1979, Amin was overthrown by the healthy forces of the PDPA and the military loyal to its cause, is true only in the sense that these forces replaced Amin in power in Kabul. The" dirty work " was done by Soviet soldiers-the Alpha group and the Muslim battalion. The Presidential Palace was stormed, and Amin was killed in a shootout. The new government was brought to Kabul from the USSR. Karmal became the head of the Rev Council, Prime Minister and General Secretary of the PDPA.

The unreality of hopes for an early victory over the Mujahideen by the Afghan army, despite the fact that Soviet troops would remain in the cities, limited to its logistics, became obvious by the spring of 1980. In March, joint military operations were launched against the Mujahideen, and with them our losses in killed and wounded began to grow.

Brave army amateur songs like " We will send all dushmans to paradise / There will be peace in the land of Afghanistan / Then we'll have a feast!" - they gave way to sad verses: "Caravans are coming from Pakistan / This means that Tulipan has a job to do."

"Black Tulip" was the name of a transport plane that delivered the bodies of dead Soviet soldiers to their homeland.

HOW DO I LEAVE?

When I was appointed deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee in the fall of 1986, Afghanistan became part of my "diocese", although the first deputy head of the department, Kornienko, remained the main curator.

The new Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, did not work well with this highly qualified diplomat. In the end, at a meeting of the Foreign Ministry Board, after Shevardnadze's critical tirade against the former Soviet foreign policy, Kornienko could not stand it and asked if the minister really believes that everything in the Foreign Ministry was bad before him. Shevardnadze complained to Gorbachev, and Kornienko was transferred to the International Department of the Central Committee to his old colleague and friend A. F. Dobrynin, who was elected secretary of the Central Committee and appointed head of the department after 24 years as the USSR Ambassador to the United States.

I had never been involved in Afghan affairs before, and it was an unpleasant discovery for me that the initiative is in the hands of the Mujahideen, and we are on the defensive. For the first time participating in an expanded meeting of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan of the CPSU Central Committee, she analyzed the situation, coordinated the actions of party and state structures, and made proposals to the Politburo on fundamental issues.-

I was surprised to hear the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, addressing one of those present, saying with some irritation:: "Well, what are you all saying about blocking the caravan routes from Pakistan? Don't you know that it's impossible to completely close the passes!?"

At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Marshal said:: "For 7 years in Afghanistan, there is not a square meter left that a Soviet soldier has not set foot there. But as soon as he leaves somewhere, the enemy immediately comes and restores everything as it was. We lost the fight. The majority of the Afghan people are now following the counter-revolutionaries... 80% of the country's territory is in the hands of counter-revolutionaries. " ⁶

It was 1986, but the realization of the impasse came much earlier.

The official position that Moscow and Kabul held was as follows. Soviet troops were brought into the DRA legally, at the request of its Government, in connection with the large-scale military intervention and subversive activities carried out from outside. This undeclared war is being waged from the territory of third countries, primarily Pakistan. It is directed by the United States and the West. The USSR is ready to withdraw its troops, but within the framework of resolving the situation around Afghanistan, which will be guaranteed an end to interference in the affairs of this country in all its forms.

In May 1980, the PDPA Government asked Pakistan and Iran to enter into bilateral negotiations on normalization of relations. The need for a political settlement in Afghanistan was discussed in Brezhnev's letters to Reagan in March and May 1981. [⁷] In the fall of 1981, the Politburo of the Central Committee decided to organize a diplomatic process for a settlement that would allow the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. [⁸] In 1982, indirect Afghan-Pakistani negotiations began in Geneva with the mediation of the United Nations.

Having become General Secretary of the Central Committee in November 1982, Yu. V. Andropov, who was one of the initiators of the entry of troops and then became convinced of the perniciousness of this action, intensified the search for a settlement. "Help me get out of Afghanistan," he said to Pakistani President Zia ul - Haq, who arrived at the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev. In March 1983, in an interview with the UN Secretary-General, P. de Cuellar Andropov not only confirmed the desire of the USSR for a peaceful solution, but also recognized that the current situation negatively affects its international and domestic situation. In July 1983, Andropov warned Karmal not to expect an indefinite stay of Soviet troops in the country, and once again raised the question of expanding the social base of the regime.⁹

Expressing interest in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership did not lie at all. At the same time, however, he had to solve a problem comparable to the solution of the problem of "squaring the circle": withdraw the troops, and retain the power of the PDPA. The idea of crossing the "red line" and abandoning friends to their fate was unthinkable at that time. This gave the United States and its allies a " golden chance "to draw the USSR into a hopeless and exhausting war, to get even for Vietnam, to discredit the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world community, especially" in the third world", and to demoralize Soviet society.

Immediately after the entry of troops, Assistant to the President of the United States J. Carter's National Security adviser Z. Brzezinski visited Pakistan, where he agreed with President Zia ul-Haq on joint actions to increase assistance to the Mujahideen in the new situation. In early 1980, an agreement on "mutually reinforcing actions" against the USSR in Afghanistan was reached between the United States and China.¹⁰

In personal terms, M. Thatcher showed herself from an unexpected side. At one of the Foreign Ministry events, I found myself next to the then USSR Ambassador to Great Britain, N. M. Lunkov. He said that when the entry of troops took place, the Prime Minister

I invited him to my place. The ambassador expected a harsh condemnation, but instead Thatcher, as it seemed to him, sincerely and even sympathetically, reprimanded Moscow for its thoughtlessness, recalling the sad experience of the 3 wars that the British waged in Afghanistan. In short: "Where are you going?!" In real politics, London, like Washington, did not fail to take advantage of our fatal mistake.

In support of its policy, Washington, first of all the same Brzezinski, put forward the thesis that the introduction of troops into Afghanistan would be followed by the Soviet invasion of Pakistan and Iran, the USSR's exit to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and the creation of a certain anti-American axis Soviet Union-India-Afghanistan. ¹¹ In January 1980, Carter hastened to declare the Persian Gulf region a zone of vital US interests.

"There was not, as the ardent opponents of the USSR in the United States and in the White House itself claimed, some grandiose strategic plan to seize a new foothold on the way to the oil riches of the Middle East and gain a global advantage over the United States," writes A. F. Dobrynin, then the Soviet Union's ambassador to the United States12.

K. N. Brutentz, who was once first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, is even more explicit: "In strategic terms, within the framework of the struggle of superpowers, the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan can even be considered - no matter how strange it may sound-as defensive" ¹³. This was the logic of the Cold War.

For the Washington Hawks, this fatal mistake was a real gift.

How do Brzezinski's ideas about turning Afghanistan into an "Asian Finland"look in this light? He made his first statement in this regard even before the appearance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.¹⁴ In February 1980, in a conversation with Dobrynin, Brzezinski returned to the question of a neutral Afghanistan. The price is the removal of Karmal's "communist" government and a quick (one or two months) withdrawal of Soviet troops. In this case, that is, after achieving its two main goals in Afghanistan, Washington was ready to give guarantees of non-interference in the affairs of this country. According to Dobrynin, what Brzezinski said "could serve as a basis for serious negotiations on an Afghan settlement." ¹⁵ But for us, the conditions put forward by Brzezinski looked too capitulative.

In October 1980, Brzezinski no longer insisted on replacing the Karmal regime if Afghanistan accepted the status of a non-aligned State. The deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops is no more than a year. If necessary, UN troops or neutral countries of Kabul's choice can be used instead to protect the existing regime. According to Dobrynin, " the approximate scheme of settlement,... As stated by Brzezinski, it deserved more careful consideration on our part. It could start negotiations. " ¹⁶

Perhaps we should have started negotiations on Afghanistan's neutrality. Brzezinski's October "scheme" was more flexible and, unlike the February one, could in principle become an acceptable basis for negotiations. But the train had already left. The proposal was announced a month before the presidential election, which Carter clearly lost and, ultimately, lost to Reagan.

Reagan, on the other hand, came to power with the slogan "America gets on a horse!" and set out to foment conflict and provide large-scale support to the Mujahideen so that the "evil empire" would sink even deeper into the Afghan quagmire.¹⁷

Washington did not even think about any settlement agreements. At the Geneva talks, Pakistan followed his course.

THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW TROOPS AND CHANGE THE LEADER IN AFGHANISTAN

By the time Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet leadership was no longer concerned with leaving or not leaving, but with how and when to leave and what to leave behind.

The official position of the USSR remained the same. In his book Perestroika and New Thinking, Gorbachev attributed the PDPA's establishment of power in Kabul not to external interference, but to internal reasons. Afghanistan was an extremely backward country, he wrote, and therefore " naturally, there were people among the Afghans who wanted to help the people escape from the Middle Ages, modernize state and social relations." And then: "We would like to return the Soviet troops to their homeland as soon as possible. In principle, this issue is resolved. But it is linked to the need for a political settlement around Afghanistan. " ¹⁸

All true, but Gorbachev began by stepping up military operations against the Mujahideen in the hope that they would be seriously pushed back, or at least demonstrate that Moscow and Kabul have sufficient forces to prevent the opposition and its foreign patrons from dictating their terms.

This had a demoralizing effect on the Mujahideen, but not for long. They were encouraged by the supply of American anti-aircraft missiles "Stinger", which allowed to some extent bind the actions of our combat aircraft.

At the end of 1986, convinced that the military situation could not be reversed, the Soviet leadership made a final decision on the withdrawal of troops. "The strategic goal is to end the war and withdraw troops in one, maximum two years... We need to get out of there, " Gorbachev said at a Politburo meeting on November ^{13, 198619}

In the run-up to the ordeal that awaits Kabul, the issue of strengthening the leadership of the PDPA regime has become acute. Karmal did not fit the role of the head of the regime in the new conditions, either in terms of health or in terms of his strong-willed qualities. A stronger personality was required. It was Najibullah. In May 1986, he was elected General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, then Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.

Karmal resisted the resignation, but was forced to give in to pressure from Moscow and his colleagues. The pretext was the doctors ' insistence on his departure to the USSR for long-term treatment. Karmal really needed treatment, though. Arriving in Moscow, Karmal was met by V. A. Kryuchkov and the author of these lines. Kryuchkov at that time was Deputy Chairman of the KGB, headed the First Main Directorate (PSU), which oversaw foreign policy issues. Andropov's closest associate, who has been deeply involved in Afghan affairs since the April Revolution, maintained close personal ties with the leaders of the DRA, and played a significant role in Najibullah's nomination. It was expected that Karmal would meet him alone, but Kryuchkov felt that the KGB should not" stick out " in this story and agreed with Dobrynin about my participation in the meeting. Karmal tried to smile as he shook our hands, but it wasn't a happy smile.

The new leader of Afghanistan was called Najibullah ("The Nobility of Allah") from birth. In the early years of the revolution, he felt that such a name was not suitable for a party leader and asked to be called simply Najib. Prior to his promotion to the top post, Najib headed the Republic's Security Service and established himself as a man of strong will and a firm hand. After becoming chairman of the RS and General secretary of the PDPA, Najib returned to his full name, reasonably believing that this time it would benefit him as the head of a Muslim state.

The first time I saw Najibullah up close in a working setting was at his meeting with Gorbachev in the Kremlin in December 1986.

The fact that the troops will be withdrawn within 1.5-2 years, Najibullah was told that the issue was resolved and could not be reviewed. They stressed the need to reach agreements with the armed opposition based on a policy of national reconciliation and power sharing.

At the same time, Gorbachev assured Najibullah that the USSR intended to maintain allied relations with Afghanistan and provide the Afghan army with everything necessary. Najibullah basically agreed with everything and asked only clarifying questions.

The Soviet leadership tried to arrange the matter in such a way that neither Najibullah nor external forces would have the impression that the USSR was "abandoning" its friends. Najibullah was not ignored. Shevardnadze and Dobrynin visited Kabul in January 1987. I was among the escorts. It was not safe in the skies over Kabul. While landing, the plane, in case of an attack by "stingers", released several distracting targets. "They didn't shoot me down," Shevardnadze joked bitterly after landing.

They discussed the implementation of the concept of national reconciliation, political and diplomatic support for the Government of Afghanistan, and specified its needs. Najibullah behaved with dignity, in a businesslike manner.

I personally met Najibullah on the occasion of his 40th birthday. On the anniversary day - August 6, 1987-he was on vacation in Sochi, where I was instructed to go to convey to him the congratulations of Gorbachev and the entire Soviet leadership. After learning that Najibullah was interested in tennis, the Soviet leader sent him proper equipment.

In a conversation with me, the Afghan leader kept calm, did not express any complaints or reproaches. I had no doubt that the withdrawal of troops was absolutely necessary. And yet, as I sat face-to-face with Najibullah and his wife at the festive table, I couldn't help feeling uneasy and somehow personally guilty about this handsome and truly courageous man.

I recall his speech in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In it, Najibullah spoke about the" immortal feat " of Soviet soldiers-internationalists, and found the courage to publicly admit that "the word" Afghanistan"makes many Soviet mothers' hearts tighten." "We see our international duty to our great and noble friend, the Soviet Union, and to the mothers of great Russia in ensuring conditions for the speedy return of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to their homeland," Najibullah said.²⁰

(The ending follows)

^{Vasiliev A.} 1 Russia in the Near and Middle East: from Messianism to Pragmatism. Moscow, Nauka, "Vostochnaya literatura", 1993, p. 72.

^{Kornienko G.} 2 Kholodnaya voina [Cold War]. Certificate of its participant, Moscow, Olma-Press, 2001, p. 237.

³ Istoriya vneshnoi politiki SSSR. 1945-1985 gg. m., Nauka, 1986, p. 495.

^{Brutents K. N.} 4 Thirty years on the Old Square. Moscow, International Relations Publ., 1998, p. 474.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 473-474.

⁶ In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1985-1991). Ed. 2-e ispr. and add. M., Gorbachev Foundation, 2008, p. 105.

^{Dobrynin A.} 7 Strictly confidential. Moscow, Author Publ., 1997, pp. 508, 514.

^{Kornienko G.} 8 Decree. soch., p. 250.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 251,252.

^{Dobrynin A.} 10 Edict. soch., p. 464.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 460.

¹² Ibid., p. 455.

^{Brutents K. N.} 13 Edict. soch., p. 477.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 455.

^{Dobrynin A.} 15 Decree. soch., p. 466.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 478.

^{Rusakov E. M.} 17 In the Pentagon's nuclear trap. Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya Publ., 1984, pp. 112-115.

¹⁸ Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira [Perestroika and new Thinking for our country and for the whole world]. Moscow, Publishing House of Political Literature, 1987, p. 184.

¹⁹ In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Edict. soch., p. 104.

²⁰ Seventieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Joint meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on November 2-3, 1987. Stenographic report, Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1988, p. 115.

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