The REVELATION of God in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is the judging but also reconciling presence of God in the world of human religion, i.e., in the realm of man's attempts to justify and sanctify himself in the face of an arbitrary and arbitrary conception of God. In this respect, the Church is the place of true religion as long as it lives by grace through grace.

1. The problem of religion in theology

The event of divine revelation must be understood and interpreted as it is attested in the Church of Christ on the basis of St. John the Baptist. The Scriptures. This particular connection, within which theology must work, prompts us to answer the question of how God could (and did)come to man in his revelation, we gave a clear answer: both the reality and the possibility of this event are the existence and action of God alone, and above all, of God the Holy Spirit. Both a reality and an opportunity! We can only distinguish between them for the sake of clarity, but we must also understand that we must look for both in God, and only in God. Therefore, we should not take this distinction too seriously. We cannot fix the reality of revelation in God and then discover it.-

For the original, see: Barth K. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik. Bd. 1. Hbd. 2. 6. Auflage. Zurich, 1975- S. 304 - 310, 313 - 325, 327-331, 335 - 338, 342 - 343, 353 - 359, 362 - 383, 387 - 389, 393 - 395. Translation and publication rights in Russian are kindly provided by TVZ Theologischer Verlag Zurich AG.

page 233
need in a person. We can't attribute an event to God and then attribute the event tool and meeting place (Anknilpfungspunkt) to a person. We cannot regard divine grace as something particular, nor human fitness and willingness to accept it as something general: God as matter, and man as form. Similarly, we cannot see the event of revelation as an interaction between God and man, between grace and nature. On the contrary, if we want to remain faithful to the Holy Scriptures as the only reliable evidence of revelation, we must adhere to the statement that this event, as an event that happens to a person, is a closed circle: not only the objective, but also the subjective element of revelation, not only its relevance, but also its potentiality, is a self-contained element. the existence and operation of an exclusively self-revealing God.

But since revelation is really an event that happens to man, an event that, in any case, has the form of a human condition, experience, and activity, we are here confronted with the problem of human religion. The revelation of God through the Holy Spirit is real and possible as the determination (Bestimmung) of human existence. If we deny it, how can we think of it as a revelation? But if we do not deny this, we must admit that it also has the appearance and characteristics of a human phenomenon, historically and psychologically understood. We can examine its essence, structure, and value in the same way that we examine certain other human phenomena, we can compare it with other phenomena of a more or less similar type, we can comprehend it and judge it on the basis of this comparison. But the problem area in which we find ourselves here is the area of religion. We have tried, as logically and accurately as possible, to present the reality and possibility of revelation as divine reality and possibility. But could we do this without saying-no less clearly and definitely - about the meeting of man and God, about their communion, about the Church and the sacraments, about some special existence and behavior of man in the presence of God? But in talking about this, we were talking about human things that may be peculiar but not unique; they are striking but quite comprehensible; and they are all similar in some basic way. And, as it may seem, in this aspect, what we call revelation is necessarily presented as a revelation.

page 234
only as a special case of the general one, which is called "religion". "Christianity" or" Christian religion " is nothing more than a predicate for a subject that may have other predicates. This is a species of a certain genus, which has other species. Separately and along with Christianity, there are Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Shintoism and all the various variants of animistic, totemic, ascetic, mystical and prophetic religions. Once again, we will have to deny revelation as such if we deny that Christianity - in this human aspect - can be compared with other human things, and that it is - from this point of view-peculiar, but certainly not unique. We must accept this fact calmly and calmly: when we are about to grasp the revelation of God as revelation and recognize it as such, we are confronted with this human element that cannot be overlooked and cannot be called by any other name. And this human element, as a certain specific area of human condition, experience and activity, as one of the worlds within the world of people, is also usually present in general.

In the same way, it seems that a person usually and generally - one might say even necessarily - feels that he is facing certain forces that have power over his life, over the world, and influence them. Even at the most primitive levels of familiarity with nature, people seem to have understood that there is a spirit (or spirits) and its (their) actions. As far as we can see, human culture in general and human existence in particular have always and everywhere been associated by people with something ultimate and final, something that is at least a powerful rival for their own will and power: both culture and human existence were determined (at least in part) by reverence for something distinctly greater, for something Different (even-completely Different), relatively Higher (even-absolutely Higher). It seems that there has always and everywhere been an awareness of the reality and possibility of initiation (Weihe) or even sanctification (Heiligung) of human life on the basis of individual or collective aspiration, which almost always and everywhere correlated with an event coming from outside. As a result, the idea of the object and purpose of this aspiration, or of the source of the event, was always and everywhere reduced to the image of the deities; and almost always and everywhere the image of god was more or less clearly outlined in the background.-

page 235
the greatest and only deity. Where and when did a person not realize his duty to worship God or gods in the form of a particular cult: creating images or symbols of the deity, offering sacrifices, repenting, praying, establishing traditions, games and sacraments, forming communities and churches? Similarly, where and when was man not sure that the voice of the deity had already been spoken, and now it was necessary to listen to it and, moreover, to investigate its meaning? The Vedas of the Hindus, the Avesta of the Persians, the Tripitaka of the Buddhists, the Koran of the Muslims - are they not "bibles" to their followers in the same sense that the Old and New Testaments are to us? Are there at least some basic elements and themes of the worldview of all religions (the beginning and end of the world, the origin and nature of man, morality and religious law, sin and redemption) are they not identical to certain elements and themes of Christian teaching? And isn't Christian "piety", in its highest and most beautiful forms, on a par with other forms of piety, even in the highest place? And what are the criteria by which we should determine this very place for him?

If we assume that all this exists outside and alongside of "Christianity," then we are admitting that in his revelation God has indeed entered a realm in which his own reality and possibility are surrounded by a sea of more or less adequate, but in any case basically correct, parallels and analogies in the Bible. human reality and opportunity. The revelation of God is the actual presence of God, but also His concealment in the world of human religion. When God reveals himself, the divine particular is hidden in the human general, the divine content in the human form, and, consequently, the divine unique is hidden in something purely humanly peculiar. Since (and to what extent) revelation is the revelation of God to man; God himself and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and consequently the incarnation of the Word, can also be viewed from this perspective, in the concealment that is undoubtedly communicated to the Word along with true humanity: considered as a religious phenomenon, as a unit in this series, as a special case within the framework of general observation and experience, as one of the contents of the human form, which may have other contents, and in which the divine uniqueness of this content cannot be recognized directly. <...>

page 236
If we do not want to deny the revelation of God as a revelation, we must not turn away from the fact that it can also be viewed from the point of view from which it can, under certain circumstances, be denied as a divine revelation. Indeed, revelation can and even should be considered also as "Christianity", and therefore also as a religion, and therefore also as a human reality and possibility. In this section, we will show further what exactly we mean by this "also". But first we need to carefully consider the question that arises from the statement of this fact, and, in addition, to investigate the fundamental components of the two possible answers to this question.

The question that arises from the fact that the revelation of God can also be regarded as a religion among other religions is mainly the rather obvious question of whether theology as theology, the Church as the Church, and finally faith as faith can and will take themselves and their foundations seriously. Because there is a fairly high probability that they do not want to take themselves and their foundations seriously. The problem of religion is only a clear expression of the problem of man, who, meeting God and entering into communion with Him, may fall into temptation. Theology, the Church, and faith are asked to abandon their own subject and object, to become empty and empty, to become mere shadows of themselves. On the other hand, it is at this point that they gain opportunities to continue to pursue their true goals, gain confidence in their understanding, and, accordingly, protect their own name and strengthen themselves. But the choice we are discussing here is not about whether the revelation of God can also be considered as a human religion and, accordingly, as a religion among other religions. We have already seen that to deny this proposition is to deny the human aspect of revelation, and this is to deny revelation itself. But the question arises: how to interpret this provision and what is the scope of its application? Does it imply that what we (think) know about the essence and phenomenon of religion should be the criterion and explanatory principle on the basis of which God's revelation is interpreted; or, conversely, does it imply that we should interpret the Christian religion and all other religions on the basis of what the divine tells us a revelation? There is a significant-

page 237
There is a significant difference between understanding religion as a problem of theology and understanding it as just one of the problems within theology. There is a significant difference between understanding the Church as a religious community and understanding it as a place where even religion is "removed" in the broadest sense of the word. There is a significant difference between understanding faith as a form of human piety and understanding it as a form of God's judgment and grace, which is unconditionally and most closely related to human piety in all its forms. That's the choice we're talking about here.

We address one of the most difficult historical conundrums when we argue that in the case of modern Protestantism in the 19th and 20th centuries, which grew out of the seeds sown in the 16th and 17th centuries, all the most important decisions were made in accordance with the first mentioned alternatives. A fundamental characteristic of the theological thinking of modern Protestantism (directly related to its opinion and ideas about the Church and its life) was (and still is) that it, in the person of its most prominent representatives and most important trends, always saw and explained not religion through revelation, but revelation through religion.

The word " religion "was introduced as a strong contrast to the word" faith", which is so important for the Lutheran, Reformed and Catholic Churches, and the main thing here is a deistic criticism of the general Christian concept of revelation. Do we now want to claim that we are still in the realm of the Reformation?"1.

Thomas Aquinas spoke 2 about the general (moral) virtue . Sometimes (for example, in the prologue to Summa Theologica) he described the object of theology as Christiana religio (Christian religion), or as religio fidei (religion of faith). However, in doing so, he clearly had no Christian "religion"in mind. What we call this word, it seems, was not then known by this name. And the concept of religion, as a general concept that encompasses the Christian religion, like all others, was completely alien to Thomas. By su-

1. LagardeP. de. Deutsche Schriften. Goettingen, 1878. S. 17.

2. Aquinas Th. S. theol., II-II, q. 81 ff.

3. Ibid. q. 186, ff.

page 238
This problem was raised in the early Middle Ages by Claudius of Turin, John Scot Erigena, and Abelard. But it was not, and could not have been, of great importance until the Renaissance.

Calvin even mentions religio Christiana in the title of his main work in a completely humanistic manner. But in doing so, he does not want to make the adjective "Christiana" a predicate of something human in a neutral and universal sense. When Calvin writes 4: "This is the true and pure religion - faith combined with the fear of God, and fear implies voluntary worship and entails appropriate service in accordance with what is prescribed by the Law," then we are undoubtedly looking at a normative concept that Calvin drew from Scripture, and in which the general "is removed"in particular: religion is revealed, not the other way around. Calvin certainly attributed to fallen man the inalienable seed of this religion.5 But in addition, he said that this seed will not rise, and certainly will not bear fruit. Consequently, the concept of "religio" as a general and neutral form was not fundamental to Calvin's understanding and interpretation of Christianity. For him, religio was the essence of X, which receives content and form only when it is equivalent to Christianity, that is, when it is the same as Christianity. that is, in so far as revelation takes it into itself and forms it in its own image. <...>

It was only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, as a result of the so-called rational Orthodoxy movement, that a real catastrophe broke out in this and other respects, and a genuine and undisguised neo-Protestantism was born. As we can see, this happened thanks to two theologians: On the Reformed side, it was Solomon van Thiel (1643-1713)6, and on the Lutheran side, it was J. Franz Buddeus (1667-1729).7. Formally, Buddeus adjoined the system of Johann Wilhelm Bayer. However, the differences between them were enormous, and it is in the question that interests us! Dogmatics now begins quite openly and one-sidedly (for van Til, this is the complete dogmatics of natural theology, which forms the first and autonomous section-

4. Calvin. Instit., I, 2, 2.

5. Ibid. I, 3, 1.

6. Til van S. Theologiae utriusque compendium cum naturalis turn revelatae, 1704.

7. Buddeus J.F. Institutiones Theologiae dogmaticae, 1724.

page 239
It begins by presenting the concept and description of a general, natural, and neutral "religion," which, as a religio in se spectata (religion considered in itself), is a prerequisite for all other religions. "For just as it is natural for man to be endowed with reason, so it is natural for him to know that God exists and that He is to be worshipped."8. Both intellectual ability and knowledge of God? Van Til, being a convinced Cartesian, is ready to go even further, declaring that "the beginning from which natural religion should receive evidential force concerning what relates to God and His cult is the light of reason itself, [present] in the mind of man through concepts and general ideas, so that no one, if He is not a natural religion, will be able to prove the truth of what he is more or less intelligent and free from prejudice, and he cannot fail to recognize it as such. "9 The definition of this "natural religion" is as follows: "It is a kind of human zeal (studium), by which anyone, according to his own understanding, directs his faculties to the contemplation and worship of a particular deity, as far as he considers it appropriate for himself, so that this may happen." the deity returned his favor on occasion. " 10 Taking this "natural religion" as a basis, Buddeus asserts that man has knowledge of the supreme being ("the most perfect being that we call God"), and that it combines the perfection of knowledge, wisdom, and freedom; and that it is eternal and omnipotent, perfectly good and perfect. true, true, and holy, and the ultimate cause and guiding principle of the universe, certainly the only one; and that we must obey and answer to this being; and that it opens the way for us to the immortality of the soul and the highest reward; and that without its love we cannot be happy, for it alone is the highest good; and that it wants us to worship it in thought, word, and deed; and that it imposes certain duties on us in relation to ourselves, our neighbors, and finally to it, that is, to God. In the first part of his compendium, Van Til expands this natural theology into a comprehensive study of the nature and attributes of God, of creation and providence, of the natural moral law, of the immortality of the soul, and even of sin. And all this is a person

8. Buddeus. I, 1, 3.

9. Prael. 4, 1.

10. Prael. 2, 1.

page 240
he can learn "without much difficulty" 11, because " reason teaches all people perfectly, and these [propositions] are connected with each other in such a way that if someone is experienced in reasoning and endowed with a sound mind, he immediately agrees with it as soon as he thinks of it."12
Buddeus did not recognize the substantial verbum (word) or lumen internum (inner light) that many mystics spoke of, i.e., he did not formally recognize the existence of a second source of revelation.13 Nor did van Til allow anything of the sort: in the Dedicatio, he warned young theologians at every opportunity not to" confuse the beginning of reason and the beginning of faith, " since these principles are not equally confirmed by evidence. But what then of the "first science", man's initial knowledge of himself and of God, which he then defines and describes as the preamble to natural religion?14 Once we accept this knowledge, how long and why should we not say that this knowledge is not as firmly attested as that which we receive from revelation? Be that as it may, at least Buddeus did not immediately forget to make a move known to all proponents of natural theology: religio naturalis (natural religion) and its knowledge of God do not extend to eternal salvation, because man is not given, along with all these intuitions, the means to find communion with the highest good, God, and the ability to use these means correctly. Accordingly, he points out the need to supplement the religio naturalis with revelation 15. In van Til, we will eventually see the same move-towards the end of the first and at the beginning of the second part of his compendium. And yet, according to Buddeus, we must say of this religio naturalis that it contains notiones (concepts) that are "the foundations and beginnings of any religion." It is in accordance with these notiones that a person should be measured in relation to his religion. It is through them that we can recognize " religions that rely on revelation." And what contradicts these "concepts"?-

11. Buddeus. I, 1, 5.

12. Ibid. I, 1, 14.

13. Ibid. I, 1, 15.

14. Prael. 3.

15. Buddeus. I, 1, 16 - 18.

page 241
In principle, it cannot be a revelation, or it is a misunderstood revelation. According to Buddeus, natural religion teaches us two things: on the one hand, its insufficiency allows us to understand the necessity of revelation, and on the other hand, it shows us where to find true revelation. Buddeus was confident that he could convince us that natural religion and revelation never contradict each other, but are always in harmony. 16 Similarly, in van Til, natural theology culminates in the doctrine of the praeparatio evangelica (preparation for the gospel), in which: 1) the necessity of reconciliation between God and man is logically postulated from the preamble and data of natural religion; 2) again, the conditions of this reconciliation are deduced from the principles of natural religion; 3) finally, the religions of heretics, Jews, Muslims and Christians are compared with each other, and it is shown that the Christian religion meets the deduced conditions and, accordingly, is recognized as a revealed religion. "Natural theology... from these propositions, he examines all religions, so that it may be concluded that the Christian religion, although it comprehends mysteries beyond the capacity of natural knowledge, nevertheless agrees better with the light of reason than all other religions" (Praef. ad lect.). This is the program of Van Til and Buddeus, to the creation and presentation of which they put all their strength and abilities; and it was in their case that such a program was first proposed within the framework of Protestantism and not condemned as inconsistent with church teaching.

What was achieved here, in the course of a reversal that most of the leading theologians of that era helped to achieve, cannot be overstated, both in terms of the event itself and in terms of the gravity of the historical consequences. Thanks to these theologians, a clear and logical statement of what may have been the secret purpose and passion of all previous development has emerged. Human religion, the relation to God that we can possess and actually possess independently of revelation, is not an unknown but a well - known quantity, both as regards form and content; and as such it is something that must be recognized as having a central element-

16. Buddeus. I, 1, 16 - 18.

page 242
It is essential for any theological thinking. It actually forms the prerequisites, criteria, and necessary apparatus for understanding revelation. It shows us a question that is answered by all positive religions (including the religion of revelation), and it turns out that the Christian religion, as the most satisfactory answer to the question, has advantages over other religions, and therefore should rightfully be called revealed. The Christian element has now truly become a predicate of the neutral and universal human element, and with it the theological reorientation that has threatened since the Renaissance has ended. Revelation has now become a historical confirmation of what a person can know about himself and, consequently, about God, even without revelation. <...>

There is no need for a detailed account of the sad history of later Protestant theology. < ... > All the more or less radical and destructive movements in theology of the last two centuries are just variations on one simple theme, which was clearly expressed by van Til and Buddeus: not religion should be understood in the light of revelation, but revelation in the light of religion. The goals and programs of all the most important trends in modern theology can be summed up in this common denominator. Neo-Protestantism implies "religionism". <...>

Why should we view this movement negatively, as damaging the church's life, and, in the end, as destroying its heresy! Those who supported it (prominent neo-Protestant theologians and countless lesser figures) were always aware that, contrary to tradition and the tasks it served, they were free to explore the truth, even in relation to God and divine things, and yet they felt that their actions were legitimate and in accordance with their authority. And those who more or less strongly opposed them demonstrated the purely immanent nature of their opposition by simply refusing, on the whole, to go so far as to accept the consequences of the reversion of revelation and religion, even though it was clear that they themselves, albeit quite consistently, also belonged to this movement. From the usual conservative position, it was impossible to raise any serious objections to it. Thus, there was absolutely nothing to object to the basic premise that truth should be explored freely, even if it is not a matter of time.

page 243
in the field of theology. As two hundred years of theological history clearly shows, anyone who would deny it would inevitably (and not without reason) look pitiful. Even if he did represent the interests of the Church against this movement, he would be a bad and dangerous representative of the Church. And the very question of whether he was really representing her interests, or, in fact, howling with the wolves, would never have faced him in all its severity, as the situation demanded. The motive for resisting this reversion should in no way be fear of its consequences.

Nor should it be a fear of the reconstruction of dogma and biblical teaching that took place in the eighteenth century through the application of the criteria of religio naturalis (natural religion). It should not be fear of Kantian moralism, or Schleiermacher's "theology of feeling", or Feuerbach's "illusionism", or the biblical criticism of J. F. Strauss, F. H. Baur, Harnack, or Busse, or the relativism of the historical and religious school, etc. They are possible and relevant consequences of this reversion, and they are still active today, despite their relatively advanced age. But we cannot fear these consequences, and we cannot reject them - unless it is absolutely clear that we are not participating in this reversal of revelation and religion as such. More specifically, we are defenseless against modern "German Christians" unless we know how to defend ourselves against this movement, which was initiated by van Til and Buddeus (or rather, even their predecessors: Koenig, Quenstedt, Wendelin, and Burmann).

If we do not know this, if we challenge the particulars, not the whole, and only from the standpoint of conservatism, i.e., out of fear, and not from the standpoint of knowledge, then we have lost, no matter how good our intentions were, or how many local victories we won. It is not for the benefit of the Church to weaken and soften the heresy that has penetrated it: it is necessary to know the heresy, to fight it, to isolate it. If the horrific results of the reversion of revelation and religion were indeed the results of a free theological investigation of truth, then, however unusual or dangerous they might seem, the Church would have to recognize them as good and necessary, or at least as debatable and not destructive of the church-

page 244
a new community. But these results can and should be seriously resisted, not because they are unusual and dangerous, but because they are in no way the results of a free theological inquiry into truth. Resistance should not be directed against the free investigation of truth, but-precisely in the interests of such research - against the environment in which these results arise. And this environment is uncertainty in the understanding of revelation and, accordingly, the relationship between God and man; in other words, it is uncertainty, or the decline of faith. <...> This began in the XVII century, and became apparent in the next century. Theology fell victim to the absolutism with which the man of this age made himself the center, measure, and goal of all things. Yes, theology had to relate to this tendency in a certain way and investigate it sympathetically. But it certainly should not have participated in what it did when, in the Buddeus era, otro became openly " religionist." And here the main thing is not even what theology did, but what it did.she did not: the main thing is her weakness and her hesitation in relation to the very essence of the faith: in her theory and in her practice, she stopped considering the most important provisions of the Lutheran and Heidelberg confessions as indisputable axioms. The original and primary sin was unbelief, the belittling of Christ, which began from the very moment when He ceased to be perceived as our Only and All, and when we began to be secretly burdened by His dominion and consolation. Without denying the catechism, this theology believed that its task was to view man from some other point of view than that of the kingdom and dominion of Christ. It separated the piety of man from the Word of God addressed to him, and made this piety a separate and first chapter. Clearly, the danger was that this chapter could become autonomous and, in fact, dominant, eventually eclipsing the chapter on the Word of God. And this was the inevitable result of this denial, of a lack of firmness in the very essence of faith. The real catastrophe of Protestant theology was not what is usually imagined. This was not a retreat in the face of the growing self-awareness of modern culture. This was not an unconscious fascination with what philosophy, history, and the natural sciences claimed to be " free research."-

page 245
I eat the truth." This was not an unintentional transformation into somewhat inconsistent practical wisdom. By themselves, the modern way of looking at things, the modern self-consciousness of a person, etc., could not cause any harm. The real catastrophe was that theology lost its object-revelation in all its uniqueness. And having lost it, it has lost the seed of faith that it could use to move mountains, including the mountain of modern humanistic culture. That theology has indeed lost revelation is shown by the fact that it has been able to exchange it, along with its own birthright, for the concept of "religion."

Attempts to systematically compare revelation and religion (i.e., to interpret them as comparable domains, to draw boundaries between them, and to fix their relations with each other) always imply a complete misunderstanding of the situation. The intention may be, for example, to begin with religion (i.e., with man) and thus subordinate revelation to religion, so as to perhaps eventually dissolve it in it. Or, conversely, the intention may be to preserve the autonomy and even superiority of the realm of revelation through certain reservations and precautions. This, however, is a secondary issue. Whatever the solutions, they do not play a significant role. What is essential is that we place human religion on the same level as divine revelation and treat it in a similar way. We see religion as something that is in some ways equal to revelation. We can attribute to it an autonomous existence and status in relation to revelation. We can be interested in the relationship of these two entities and compare them with each other. And the fact that we can do this shows that our intention was to start with religion, which is to say, we can do it. that is, from man, not from revelation. Whatever we say later in this scheme about the necessity and truth of revelation will be nothing more than a melancholy recollection of a war that was lost in the beginning. All this will be nothing more than a blurring of the real message and content of revelation. In fact, it is better - for it is more instructive - to accept the logical consequences of our initial position, and to omit all further trouble concerning revelation. For if we think that revelation can in principle be correlated or compared with religion, we do not understand it as revelation. <...>

page 246
To sum up, we should not give up a single letter in the recognition that God - in his revelation - is present in the world of human religion. But we must emphasize that this means that it is God who is present. Therefore, our main task is to organize the concepts of "revelation" and "religion" in such a way that the connection between them would again look identical with the event that occurred between God and man, and in which God is God (i.e., the Lord and Master of man, who judges for himself and is God). the only one who justifies and sanctifies), and a man is a man of God (i.e., is a man in so far as he is adopted and accepted by God in His severity and goodness). And we speak of revelation as the" removal " of religion because we remember and use the Christological teaching of the assumptio carnis (taking of the flesh).

2. Religion as unbelief

The theological assessment of religion and religions should be distinguished, first of all, by great caution and restraint in their judgments and conclusions. It should consider, understand and accept the individual as a subject of religion with all seriousness. But it should not be a man apart from God, a human being in itself. This must be the person for whom (whether he knows it or not) Jesus Christ was born, died and resurrected. It must be a person to whom the Word of God is addressed (whether he has heard it or not). It should be a person for whom (whether he is aware of it or not) Christ is the Lord. Theology should see religion as a vital activity and way of expressing such a person. At the same time, it should not attribute to this vital activity and mode of expression a unique "essence", the so-called essence of religion, which can then be used as a kind of standard for comparing and comparing one human thing with another, distinguishing " higher "religion from" lower", "living" from "dead", " serious"from" not serious". Theology should not do this, not because of indifference or lack of interest in the diversity that we observe in this human sphere, nor because a preliminary definition of the" essences " of phenomena in this sphere is impossible or unnecessary in itself, but because we should

page 247
to know the essence of religion from the standpoint of divine revelation, and this circumstance does not allow us to use - except unintentionally-an immanent definition of the essence of religion. However, this does not mean that the revealed essence of religion is not suitable in form or content for distinguishing between good and evil, truth and falsehood within religious humanity. Revelation marks the Church as the place of true religion, but it does not follow that the Christian religion as such is the full essence of human religion, nor does it follow that the Christian religion is a true religion because it is fundamentally superior to all other religions. We cannot stress too strongly the connection between the truth of the Christian religion and the grace of revelation (we should say again: the Church lives through grace and grace, and it is in this respect that it is the place of true religion). And if this is so, then the Church can no more boast of its "essence" (i.e., the perfection with which the "essence" of religion is fulfilled in it) than other religions to which this essence can be attributed. We cannot distinguish and separate the Church from other religions on the basis of a general concept of the essence of religion. <...>

We begin by saying that religion is unbelief; religion is a matter - we must say it bluntly-of an ungodly person. <...> In the light of what was said earlier, this statement should not be interpreted as an exclusively negative assessment. This is not a judgment of science or philosophy about religion based on some prior negative judgment about the essence of religion. It's not just about other people and their religions. On the contrary, first of all, it should concern us as adherents of the Christian religion. In this statement, the judgment of divine revelation is formulated in relation to all religions. It can be interpreted and explained, but it cannot be derived from anything other than revelation, nor can it be proved by phenomenology or the history of religion. Since this formulation only reproduces the judgment of God, it does not imply a rejection of any human values, any challenge to all that is true, good, and beautiful, which, on closer acquaintance, we find in almost all religions, and which we naturally expect-in much greater abundance-to find and support. in our own religion, if we are in any way firm about it.

page 248
we stick to it. It is simply that God takes a person, judges and condemns them. This, of course, shakes us to the very foundations, to the very heart. But where this happens, there is no room for sadness and pitiful lamentations about the lack of recognition of the relative greatness of man. <...>

In order to understand that religion is really unbelief, we must look at it from the point of view of revelation, as it is attested in the Holy Scriptures. And there are two points that should bring final clarity to this issue.

1. Revelation is the self-suggestion and self-revelation of God. Revelation meets man when it is assumed and confirmed that all man's attempts to know God by his own efforts are completely and utterly futile: not because of theoretical necessity, but because of practical and actual necessity. In revelation, God informs man that He is God, and that as such, He is his Lord. By telling him this, he is telling him something completely new, something that a person without revelation does not know, and about which he cannot inform either himself or others. It must be said that he could have done this, of course, since revelation simply states the truth. If it is true that God is God, and as such He is Lord to man, then it is also true that man relates to Him in such a way that He could know Him. But this is precisely the truth that is inaccessible to man until it is revealed to him. If a person can really know God, then this ability must be rooted in the fact that he really knows Him in so far as God has offered and revealed himself to him. And then this ability is not based on the (quite true) fact that man could know God. Between "he could "and" he can "there is an absolutely decisive" he cannot", which can be eliminated and transformed into its opposite only by revelation. The truth that God is God and that He is our Lord, and the further truth that we could know Him as God and Lord, can only reach us through the truth itself. And this" reaching us with the truth " (Zuuns-Kommen der Wahrheit) is revelation. The revelation that reaches us is not in a neutral state, but, as the coming of truth, consists in an action that relates to it in a special, very specific way. It reaches us precisely as religious people, that is, it reaches us when we try to know God on the basis of what we believe in God.-

page 249
of their own strength. Revelation, therefore, does not reach us in accordance with the activity that relates to it; but the activity that relates to it must be faith, the recognition of God's self-suggestion and self-revelation. We must understand that in the eyes of God, all our activities (even those aimed at achieving the best possible life) are useless, that is, we, by ourselves, are not able to comprehend the truth, to allow God to be God and our Lord. We must give up even trying to understand this truth. We must make up our minds, we must simply allow the truth to be proclaimed to us and, accordingly, accepted by us. But that's exactly what we can't do. The person who is actually reached by the truth will agree that he was not prepared for it to speak to him. A true believer will not say that he came to faith from faith, but will say that he came to it from unbelief, even though the attitude and activity with which he met revelation (and still meets it) is religion. For in faith it is revealed to him through revelation that human religion as such is a resistance to revelation. From the point of view of revelation, it is obvious that religion is a human attempt to anticipate what God wants to give and gives in his revelation. This is an unfortunate substitution of human handiwork for divine labor. The divine reality offered and revealed to us in revelation is replaced by the concept of God, which is wilfully and arbitrarily formed by man. "From this it is obvious that the human soul in all ages was like a forge in which idols are forged... The human mind has the audacious intention of expressing its own crazy fantasies about God in external forms. Therefore the spirit of man begets idols, and the hand brings them into the world. " 17 "Arbitrarily and wilfully" means here: "by their own human means", "according to their own human ideas, skills and energy". As soon as a person gives himself up to this enterprise, many different images of God immediately arise, but their meaning will always be the same. "God, while condemning the veneration of images, does not compare them with each other in order to determine which of them is more appropriate to Him and which is less. He rejects, without exception, all statues, paintings, and other images through which idolaters attempt to gain access to God.-

17. Calvin. Instit., I, 11, 8.

page 250
bring Him closer to you"18. And if we talk about the essence of this enterprise, then the ultimate principles of various philosophical systems are idols no less than the frightening supernatural images in the worldview of animistic religions, and a clearly expressed idea of God, for example, in Islam, is no less incomplete than the absence of a unitary idea or image of God in Buddhism or in ancient times. or contemporary atheist movements.

The image of God is always that visible or conceivable reality in which man (outwardly, or even in his very existence) accepts and asserts something unique, ultimate, and decisive, something that he believes determines and conditions him-in an absolute or at least relative sense. From the point of view of revelation, human religion is nothing more than a similar acceptance and affirmation, and as such it is an activity that contradicts revelation - contradicts it insofar as this truth comes to man only through truth. If a person tries to comprehend the truth himself, he tries to comprehend it a priori. And then he doesn't do what he should do when the truth reaches him. He doesn't believe me. If he believed, he would listen; but in religion, he speaks. If he believed, he would allow the gift to be brought to him; but in religion, he takes it himself. If he believed, he would allow God himself to speak in the name of God; but in religion, man seeks to understand God for himself. And so, with such a swing, religion contradicts revelation and is a concentrated expression of human unbelief, i.e., it is an expression of human faith.e. such an attitude and activity that is directly opposite to faith. It is an audacious, if pathetic, arrogant, if hopeless attempt to create something that a person could have created, but now cannot - or can only because (and if) God himself does this for him: knowledge of the truth, knowledge of God. We cannot, therefore, perceive this attempt as a harmonious cooperation of man and divine revelation, as if religion were something like an outstretched hand that God fills in his revelation. And, moreover, we cannot say that the obvious religious possibilities of man are, so to speak, a general form of human knowledge, which acquires its true and authentic content through the action of God.-

18. Calvin. Instit., I, 11, 1.

page 251
kroveniya. On the contrary, we observe a sharp contradiction here. In religion, a person runs away and locks himself away from revelation, having provided himself with some substitute for it, having previously refused what he should have received from God in revelation. "They do not perceive God as He has offered himself, but they imagine as God what they themselves have created in an arbitrary way."19 Of course, man has the ability to do this. But what he achieves and receives as a result is not the knowledge of God as God and Lord. And this is not the truth at all. This is a complete fiction that has nothing to do with God at all. This is the anti-god, who must first be recognized as such, and then, when the truth reaches him, is defeated. But as such, as a fiction, it can only be known when the truth reaches it. <...> Revelation is not connected with human religion, which is already present and practiced. It contradicts it, just as religion used to contradict revelation. It "removes" it, just as religion used to "remove" revelation. This is just as faith cannot be connected with false faith, but must contradict it and "remove" it as unbelief, as an act that opposes it. <...>

2. As God's self-suggestion and self-revelation, revelation is the act by which, by grace and grace, He reconciles man to himself. As a radical teaching about God, revelation is also a radical help from God that reaches us as those who are ungodly and unrighteous, and therefore cursed and condemned. And also in this respect, the statement that revelation makes about man is that man is not able to help himself, either in general or even in part. But again, it's also true that he doesn't have to be so helpless. Unrighteousness, impiety, cursing and condemnation are not integral parts of human nature and are not included in its concept. Man was created in the image of God, that is, to obey God and not to sin, to be saved and not to perish. But man has been determined to do this, not as a state in which he can still find himself, but as a state in which he is no longer, and from which he has fallen out by his own sin. But even this is a truth that man himself could not preserve: it is present to him only because it comes through the Revelation of the Holy Spirit.-

19. Calvin. Instit., I, 4, 1.

page 252
in the Bible, that is, in Jesus Christ, and it is explained in a completely new way - the oldest truth, presented in a new way. There is no way that a person can explain to himself that he is righteous and holy, and therefore saved, because if he speaks about himself, these words will be false. They are true only as revealed knowledge. They are true in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ was not at all the fulfillment and completion of all the various attempts of man to think of God and imagine Him in accordance with his own measure. But as the self-suggestion and self-revelation of God, revelation completely replaces and completely transcends all these attempts, turning them into the shadows that they are. In the same way, in so far as God reconciled the world to Himself through himself, He replaces all the various attempts of man to reconcile the world to Him, all human efforts for justification and sanctification, conversion and salvation. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ states that our justification, sanctification, conversion, and salvation were achieved and fulfilled once and for all in Jesus Christ. And our faith in Jesus Christ consists in recognizing, accepting, and affirming the fact that everything was actually done for us once and for all in Jesus Christ. He is the help that has reached us. He alone is the Word of God that has been spoken to us. There was an exchange of fortunes between Him and us: His righteousness and holiness became ours, and our sin became His; He died for us, and we were saved for Him. Revelation is based on this exchange (the"reconciliation" of 2 Corinthians 5: 19) (and there is no revelation if there is not this exchange). There would be no effective, redemptive self-offering and self-revelation of God if there were not a definite and decisive satisfactio (atonement) and intercessio Jesu Christi (mediation of Jesus Christ).

Now we can see the second aspect, in which revelation is opposed to religion, and vice versa, religion must be opposed to revelation. For what is the purpose of all the attempts of religions to anticipate God, to replace His Word with the work of human hands, to make our images the image of the Only One (who is known only when He communicates knowledge about himself), images that are initially spiritual, then soulful, and finally visible? What does a religious person want when he thinks, believes and asserts that there is a unique, ultimate and final being, that there is a divine being, a deity, that there are gods and the only supreme God,

page 253
and when does he think that this being dominates him, predestines, prescribes and conditions him? Are the postulation of a God or gods, as well as the need for objectification (spiritual or physical) of the Primary, really conditioned by human experience of the actual superiority and dominance of certain natural or supernatural, historical or eternal necessities, powers and providences? Is this experience (or the postulate and need associated with it) really followed by a sense of helplessness and inadequacy in the face of this higher world, a desire to somehow gain its favor, attract it to your side, convince yourself of its favor, or, even better, to gain the opportunity to influence it, share its power and a high position, take part in its activities? Do human attempts to justify and sanctify themselves really follow attempts to think and imagine God? Or is it just the opposite situation? And, perhaps, the primary one is the vague desire of man to justify and sanctify himself, i.e., to establish and strengthen himself in the awareness of God. using your skills and powers to control your life, to negotiate with the world, and to make the world serve you. Isn't religion, with all its dogma, ritual, and way of life, the most primitive, or rather, the most profound and effective element of the technique by which a person tries to organize his life? Should not the experience of this higher world or the need to objectify it in the concept or image of God be considered only as an example of this attempt, i.e., as an ideal construction that is inevitable within the framework of this technique? Are not the gods only reflected images and a kind of guarantors of the needs and capabilities of a person who is really alone and left to himself, his desire, plans, creativity? Is it not true that sacrifice, prayer, austerity, and morality are things more fundamental than God and the gods? Who will give the answer? With these two possibilities, we go around in a circle, which can be considered as anything, but always with the same result. The only thing that cannot be doubted is that the practical content of religion is behavior and activity that does not fit in with divine revelation, but contradicts it. And in this case, in the same way, weakness and fears-

page 254
innovation, hopelessness and arrogance, imagination and whimsy are so close that they can hardly be distinguished from each other. Where a person desires what he desires in religion (i.e. justification and sanctification as his own work), he does not find himself - whether the concept and image of God are primary or secondary-on a direct path to God, which can then lead him to the goal on some higher level. same path. On the contrary, we shut ourselves away from God, we alienate Ourselves from Him, we oppose ourselves to Him. God, in his revelation, did not want man to try to arrange his own life, justify and sanctify himself. God in his revelation, God in Jesus Christ, is the One who takes upon himself the sin of the world, Who desires that all our cares should be laid upon Him, for He cares for us.

Faith in the New Testament sense implies not just overcoming, but "removing" human independence. It implies that a person's independence is built into the order of divine predestination. In faith, it loses its autonomy outside of this predestination and, consequently, its significance in resisting and disputing God. It loses its significance as the sphere of ultimate and genuine solution and, accordingly, loses the character of ultimate and genuine seriousness. The only ultimate and valid serious certainty for a believer is that which comes from Jesus Christ. Strictly speaking, the believer is no longer a subject: in his own subjectivity and together with his own, he becomes a predicate to the subject, Jesus Christ, through whom he is justified and sanctified, from whom he receives guidance and consolation. < ... > Sin is always unbelief. And unbelief is a person's belief in himself. And this belief always consists in making the mystery of his responsibility his own mystery, instead of accepting it as the mystery of God. And this faith is a religion. And it is contradicted by revelation, as confirmed by the New Testament, which is identical with Jesus Christ as God Who works in us for our sake. And this characterizes religion as unbelief. <...>

To summarize the above. A critical turn against religion in any case implies the discovery of its weakness and only its relative necessity. But if this turn takes the form of mysticism, then it cannot avoid combining a denial of religion with a completely unambiguous statement of it (and this statement is always the case). And if he tries to evade-

page 255
In this case, even if it does not want to do so, it cannot avoid, if not directly preparing, then at least opening up wide opportunities for new religious constructions. But this means that even in these two extremely basic forms, the critical turn against religion is not so radical and powerful as to understand how to explain - at least on a theoretical level-how it is supposed to achieve the negation of religion, its God and its law. The intentions and purpose are clear, but the path is not obvious. From a historical point of view, we should note that those religions that had the innate capacity to be both conservative and liberal have so far provided examples of significant resilience and survival in the face of mysticism and atheism. If a religion died, it died because of the victory of another religion, not because of some attack of mysticism or atheism. Accordingly, in fact, the weakness and limited necessity of religion are not so terrible in their consequences as they might be. In its weakness and limited necessity, religion is always present in various forms. And in the final analysis, mysticism and atheism can never show what and how it could have been otherwise, because their very existence is too closely linked to the existence of religion. <...> The real crisis of religion can only come from somewhere outside the enchanted circle of religion, from outside the place of its origin, i.e., from the outside.e. from the outside in relation to the person. Only in the context of a completely different opposition than that between religion and religious possibility (Vermogen), only in the light of faith, can the following judgment be made about the domain of religion and, consequently, about man as a whole: "Unbelief, idolatry, self-confidence!"and thanks to this, the person will finally stop rushing from one shelter to another. And this can only happen in divine revelation. But insofar as this is not the case in any other situation, religion and religions are at rest. Of course, some changes take place, but there is also a certain inertia, and therefore religion and religions are always here. Of course, mystics and atheists can, on occasion (when more or less significant historical changes are about to take place), produce a certain-very limited-concern that affects the inner life of religions only to the extent that positive expressions relate to it-

page 256
These are the beliefs and beliefs, the deities and laws that mystics and atheists criticize, but they all resemble the tides ' relation to the inner life of the ocean. And it is precisely in its extreme and pure forms (as far as they can be achieved at all) that this critical turn is definitely not dangerous for religion. < ... > "Withdrawal", which is a real and really dangerous attack on religion, resides in a completely different book, in comparison with which the books of mysticism and atheism can be described as completely harmless.

3. True Religion

According to the above conclusions, we can only speak of "true" religion in the same sense as we speak of a "justified sinner."

Religion cannot be true in and of itself. The revelation of God denies that any religion is true, i.e. that it contains true knowledge about God, teaches correctly about His worship, and also reconciles a person to Him. For as the self-suggestion and self-revelation of God, as the act of that peace which God himself has made between himself and men, revelation is a truth apart from which there is no other truth, and in relation to which everything else is error and falsehood. If by " true religion "we mean the truth that belongs to religion as such, to religion in itself, then this concept is just as incorrect as the concept of" good man", if by the goodness of a person we mean what a person achieves with the help of his own capabilities. No religion is true. It can only become true - insofar as it begins to correspond to what it claims and what it stands for. And it can only become true in the same sense that a person is justified, that is, by something that comes from outside: not from his own essence and his own being, but only by recognizing, accepting, and paying special attention to what is alien to his own essence and being that he cannot comprehend by his own powers what comes to him regardless of his own qualities or merits. Like a justified person, religion is a creation of grace. But grace is a revelation of God. No religion can stand up to him as a leader.

page 257
true religion. No man is righteous in his presence. It condemns us to death. But it can also bring the dead back to life, and lead the sinner to repentance. And likewise, in the same broader area where revelation shows the falsity of all religions, it can create a true religion. The" removal " of religion by revelation does not simply imply its negation, but simply a judgment that religion is unbelief. Religion can be" lifted up " in revelation, although the judgment about it will remain unchanged and correct. Revelation can support and shelter it. It can justify it, and, we must add at once, sanctify it. Revelation can accept a religion and mark it as true. And it doesn't just have to. How could we conclude that it can do this if it hasn't already done it? True religion exists, as do justified sinners. And if we follow this analogy clearly (although it is more than an analogy: in the broadest sense of the word, we are talking about the thing itself), we should not hesitate to say that the Christian religion is the true religion.

In our argument that religion is unbelief, we did not consider the differences between Christianity and non-Christian religions. Our intention was to show that everything we say about other religions applies equally to Christianity. Based on this scheme, we have not mentioned the specific features of the Christian religion. In the light of the above judgment, we have not assigned Christianity any special place. Therefore, our discussion should not be taken as a kind of preliminary polemic directed against non-Christian religions, with the ultimate goal of asserting that the Christian religion is the true religion. If it were otherwise, our present task would be to prove that, unlike the non-Christian religions, Christianity is not guilty of idolatry and self-justification, that is, it is not guilty of self-justification. It is not unbelief, but faith, and therefore a true religion; or, what is the same thing, we would have to prove that Christianity is not a religion at all, but, in contrast to all other religions (including their mystical or atheistic self-criticism), it is in itself true and holy, and, as a result, it is not a religion at all. This is the immaculate and indisputable form of the community of God and man. However, to embark on this path would be to deny what we, on the contrary, affirm. And if

page 258
If we want the statement that the Christian religion is a true religion to be meaningful, then we must say that it is true only in so far as we hear divine revelation. But this statement, that it is true only in so far as we hear divine revelation, is a statement pertaining to faith. And a position of faith is necessarily a position that is conceived and expressed on the basis of faith and in faith, that is, when accepting and respecting what is said to us in revelation. It is precisely what is said in revelation that unconditionally determines its explicit and implicit content. However, the situation will be quite different if we try to justify the claim that the Christian religion is the true religion by applying the revelatory judgment that religion is unbelief only to other non-Christian religions, but not to Christianity, thus being able to separate and distinguish ourselves from them by doing so. judgments. On the contrary, it is our business, precisely as Christians, to apply this judgment first and foremost, and most consistently to ourselves, and to others, to non-Christians, only in so far as we recognize ourselves in them (i.e., only in so far as we see in them the truth of this judgment of revelation, which also applies to us), and, moreover, within the framework of the solidarity in which we, anticipating them, recognize ourselves. We accept them in repentance and hope, and submit to this judgment in order to become partakers of the promises of revelation. For at the end of the path that we must tread are precisely the promises made to those who have accepted God's judgment, who have allowed themselves to be led beyond their unbelief; there is faith in these promises, and in this very faith there is the reality of God's grace, which, of course, distinguishes our own, that is, the Christian religion, as true, from all others. And this highest goal can be achieved only on this path of complete humility. And this path would not be a path of complete humility if we did not set foot on it with a clear understanding that any "achievement" here can only consist in humbly and gratefully accepting what we would never have achieved if it had not been achieved in revelation before we set foot on it. this way.

Therefore, we must insist that at the very beginning of the knowledge of the truth of the Christian religion, we must be able to find out the truth of the Christian religion.-

page 259
the knowledge of the fact that this religion also falls under the judgment that religion is unbelief, and that truth is not obtained by any of its inner qualities, but only through the grace of God made known and operating in His revelation. However, this judgment specifically means the following: any practice of our faith (our Christian ideas about God and the divine, our forms of Christian societies and orders, our Christian morals, poetry and art, our attempts to give Christian life private and public forms, our strategy and tactics that meet the interests of our Christian cause, in short, everything). our Christianity, in so far as it is ours), is a human activity that we carry out and adapt to the achievement of all sorts of near and distant goals, and as such it is on the same level as human activity in other religions. This judgment means that all this Christianity of ours, with all its elements, is not what it should be and what it claims to be - an act of faith and, accordingly, an act of submission to divine revelation. What we observe here, in its own way, but no less seriously, is the same thing that we observe everywhere in the sphere of religions, i.e., unbelief, i.e., the opposite of divine revelation and, accordingly,idolatry and self-satisfaction; it is still the same helplessness and arbitrariness; it is still the same self-aggrandizement of man, the same self-aggrandizement of man. implying its deepest fall. <...>

Such relativization of the Christian religion does not imply, however, that the Christian faith becomes weak, vague, or light-hearted, or that the statement about the truth of the Christian religion loses its reliability and unambiguity. The Christian faith does not live at all in the Christian's awareness of his difference from the non-Christian. Of course, such awareness exists, it takes its place, has certain rights and is even necessary. However, it also has natural limits: one cannot say that a Christian must assert his own righteousness and holiness before God. Indestructible before man, this awareness is crushed before God; and just because it is crushed in the second case, it is indestructible in the first. <...>

The existence of true religion is an event in the act of God's grace in Jesus Christ. To be more precise, it is an event in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. But to be even more precise, this is an event in su-

page 260
the welfare of the Church and the children of God. The existence of the Church of God and the children of God means that true religion exists even in the world of human religions. In other words, there is a knowledge of God, a divine cult, and a concomitant human activity. All we can say about them is that they are damaged. They are an attempt based on lies and falsehoods, and committed by improper means. And yet, we must also say that they (in their corruption) achieve their goal. In spite of its origin in lies and untruth, in spite of the inefficiency of its means, God is truly known and worshipped properly, and the accompanying activity is the true activity of a person reconciled to God. The Church, the children of God and, consequently, the bearers of true religion live by the grace of God. Their knowledge and worship, their service to God in teaching, ritual, and life, are determined by the realization of divine goodness, which precedes all human thoughts, desires, and actions and removes any damage to human nature. For it leaves one with no other option but to believe and give thanks. And she teaches him to do it-not as his own accomplishment, but as something that is conditioned by her gift - and he who believes and gives thanks will never deny it. The Church and the children of God live according to this principle; and as long as they live in this way, they live by the grace of God. But the fact that they live like this is not a reason for the existence of the Church and the children of God. Nor is this what makes their religion true. From the point of view of their own activities as such, they do not rise in any particular way above the general level of religious history. They do not escape divine condemnation for idolatry and self-satisfaction. First of all, because throughout history their life of grace has rarely been anything other than an occasional obstacle to the effective implementation of the law of all religions (both in general and in their own domain). If the thoughts, desires, and actions of Christians as those who live by grace were really the criterion of their existence as the Church and children of God, then with what confidence could we affirm their existence as such and the truth of their religion! But we cannot affirm it on the basis of this criterion, because it is known that more or less clear and convincing examples of living in grace, as well as

page 261
The phenomenon of the religion of grace also appears in other areas of religious history. However, according to biblical criteria, we are not allowed to speak about the Church and the children of God, or about the existence of true religion in these other areas. Something very different is crucial to the existence of the Church and the children of God, and to the truth of their religion; and therefore it is also crucial to their life of grace, which is so problematic in itself: It is the fact that they live by the grace of God through His grace. This is what makes them who they are and what makes their religion true. This is what raises them above the general level of religious history. But the expression "through the grace of God" means: "through the reality of what" they clearly, though so problematically, live; "by means of the reality of what", presumably, people from other areas of religious history can also clearly, though more than problematically, live. "By means of reality" means: because beyond all human images, beyond all that people can think and desire in the sphere of their own religions (even if it is a religion of grace), regardless of their merits and merits, God acts in relation to them as a gracious God, anticipating their own thoughts, desires, and actions with his free goodness, generating faith and gratitude in them, and never giving them up. They are what they are, and their religion is the true religion, not because they have recognized Him as such and are acting accordingly, not because their religion is a religion of grace, but because God has graciously addressed them, because He is merciful (in spite of them). a clear but problematic religion of grace), because of the sympathy He feels for them, because of His free choice (whose only motive is this sympathy), because of the action of the Holy Spirit that He pours out on them. The Church and the children of God live by grace through His grace, and through His grace the former becomes the seat of true religion, and the latter the bearers of it. But we will see the concrete significance of this fact in its difference from any other, higher, religious principle that could be used to evaluate all human religions, only if it becomes clear to us that the expression "through the grace of God" is completely identical with the expression "through the name of Jesus Christ". < ... > Therefore, there are people, which are passed through

page 262
the grace of God is lived by His grace. Or, more specifically, through the name of Jesus Christ, they are those who believe in that name. As much as it is obvious in the case of Christians and the Christian religion, we must and can say that it is Christianity and Christianity alone that is the true religion. We must now consider and interpret this statement , in its specific basis, in accordance with four specific aspects.

1. In the relation between the name of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion, we are dealing primarily with the act of divine creation. This means that the existence of the Christian religion in its historical form, as well as its individual determinants, are not autonomous and have no basis for their existence in themselves. The name of Jesus Christ is the only thing that created the Christian religion: without It, it would never have existed. And we must understand this not only in historical terms, but also in relation to the present. The name of Jesus Christ creates the Christian religion: it cannot exist outside of It. For if we start talking about the Christian religion as a reality, it will not be enough to simply turn to the past, to the moment of its creation, and to its historical existence. We will need to think of it in the same way as our own existence and the existence of the world, as the reality that was created and is being created by Jesus Christ: yesterday, today and tomorrow. Outside of the act of its creation in the name of Jesus Christ, which is a creatio continua type of creation, and therefore outside of the Creator, it has no reality. < ... > The Christian religion is a predicate under the subject, which is the name of Jesus Christ. Without it, it is not just "something else": without it, it is absolutely nothing, and this fact cannot be hidden for a long time. It existed, exists, and will continue to exist only by virtue of the act of creation indicated by this name. And it is precisely on the basis of this act of creation that it, together with existence, obtains truth. In so far as it existed, exists, and will continue to exist through the name of Jesus Christ, it was, is, and will continue to be a true religion: a knowledge of God, a cult, and a service in which man does not stand alone, denying God, but walks in peace with God before Him. <...>

2. In the relation between the name of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion, we are also dealing with the act of divine election. The Christian religion does not have a reality of itself sa-

page 263
my. Considered in and for itself, it cannot be so. It is just an opportunity, along with many others. The Christian religion has not and does not bring anything of its own to the name of Jesus Christ that would make it in one sense or another worthy of being His creation and, on this basis, a true religion. If it is real, it is only through free choice, based on the compassion and unfathomable sympathy of God, and nothing else. In retrospect, we can certainly explain the necessary nature of the emergence of Christianity in the light of the development of Judaism, as well as in the light of the political, spiritual and moral climate in the Mediterranean of the imperial period. But in this way we will never deduce or explain the Christian religion in its reality. Seriously, from a historical point of view, we can only explain and deduce it from the contract made between God and the Jewish people. And we can do this with all accuracy and insight if we only explain and deduce it from the fulfillment of this contract in the name of Jesus Christ, from the revelation (as it was actually given, as it was accepted, and as it was believed), and, accordingly, under the premise of this name. That God was pleased to reveal himself in the name of Jesus Christ at this time, in this place, and in this way is something that is necessary in itself, and not in the circumstances and conditions that preceded that name. If the Christian religion is a reality, and not nothing, solely by virtue of the name of Jesus Christ, then this necessity is a free choice (from that day to this) of the mercy and compassion of God. Just as there is a creatio continua (permanent creation), so there is an electio continua( permanent election), which is better described as God's faithfulness and patience. <...>

3. In the relation between the name of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion, we are also dealing with the act of divine justification, or forgiveness of sins. We have already established that the Christian religion, as such, has no value in itself, by virtue of which it can become a true religion. Now we need to show even more clearly that the Christian religion - in itself and as such - is absolutely unworthy of being a true religion. And, as we have said, if it is such, it is only by divine election. Now we should say more precisely: it is such by virtue of

page 264
divine justification of sinners, divine forgiveness of sins. The structure of this religion (most clearly expressed in Protestantism) is definitely different from the others. And we can understand this only as an act of the name of Jesus Christ. But the Christian religion is not so fundamentally different from other religions that the judgment of divine revelation, according to which all religions are idolatry and self-satisfaction, can be avoided in relation to it. On the contrary, Christian history (whether it is the history of the Church as a whole or the history of the life of an individual child of God as a part of it) is always under this sign. The more carefully we study it (or, more accurately, the brighter the light of the revelation of holy Scripture illuminates it), the more obvious it is. As far as the whole is concerned, so far as the part is concerned, this is the story of sin. It is not justified in itself. It is sinful both in its form and in its origin. This concerns it no less than the history of Buddhism or Islam. The hands into which God has given himself and His revelation are by no means clean: they are very dirty. <...> There is a justification for the Christian religionjust justification, since it is based entirely on the justice of God, and is in no way conditioned by any of the qualities of the Christian religion itself. Therefore, it cannot be understood otherwise than as an act of forgiveness of sins. <...>

4. In the relation between the name of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion, we are also dealing with the act of divine sanctification. We have said that in order to find a basis for asserting the truth of the Christian religion, we must first turn away from it and turn to the fact of God (Gottestatsache), which is this basis; and accordingly, we must constantly return to this "primary"one. When we ask about the truth of the Christian religion, we should not - even casually-pay attention to anything other than this fact of God. We cannot try to find justification for the Christian religion in other facts, outside of the name of Jesus Christ, even in the inner or outer being-the Gerechtfertigtsein of the Christian religion itself and as such. However, this justification of the Christian religion in the name of Jesus Christ clearly implies a certain positive relationship between the two. Christianity differs from all other religions because of this name, it is created and shaped by it, it claims to serve

page 265
it becomes the historical manifestation and instrument of his revelation. We have compared the name of Jesus Christ to the Sun in its relation to the Earth. This could have been the end of it. But the Sun shines, and its light as such is not something alien and remote for the Earth. Without ceasing to be the light of the Sun, it becomes the light of the Earth, the light that illuminates the Earth. In this light, the Earth, which has no light of its own, is bright. It is not, of course, a second Sun, but it carries within it a reflection of the Sun's light; therefore, it is an enlightened Earth. And the same applies to the relationship between the name of Jesus Christ and the Christian religion. The very name is its justification. But it cannot be transcendent without being immanent to it, for only the Christian religion is justified by this name. And this means that it is marked and marked, marked and characterized by this name, and in a special, only appropriate way. In light of this justification, creation, and election in the name of Jesus Christ, the fact that it is the Christian religion and not any other cannot be neutral, indifferent, or insignificant. On the contrary, even though Christianity is the same religion as others, it is a significant and telling fact, it is a sign, it is a declaration. < ... > The Christian religion is a sacred space created by the Holy Spirit, in which God, whose Word has become flesh, constantly speaks by the signs of his revelation. And it is also the existence of a human being created by the same Holy Spirit, who hears God constantly speaking to him in his revelation. The Church and the children of God actually exist. The reality of their existence is quite modest, but it is always visible and significant in its visibility: This is a reality that is called upon and dedicated to the promulgation of the name of Jesus Christ. And this is the sanctification of the Christian religion.

Permanent link to this publication: