Article by A. V. Akimov, as well as his book " 2300 year. Global problems and Russia " arouse great interest. In the article, which in condensed form sets out the main (not all) content of the book, the author identifies three aspects of the topic of the future development of mankind. First, the demographic process itself, which is studied for a long-term perspective (three centuries), then the forecast of fuel and energy needs, where demographic series act as independent variables, as well as calculations of water and land resources to meet future food needs, and finally, various scenarios of civilizational interaction in the future in the light of the growing intensity of international relations. migration issues and with a focus on the interaction of European civilization with non-European ones.
The topics raised in the article are by and large inexhaustible, and we should thank the editorial board of the magazine "Vostok (Oriens)" for organizing the discussion on them. I was most interested in the first and last of the selected plots.
To begin with, I would like to recall that when Alexander Vladimirovich Akimov, invited to work at the Institute of Oriental Studies by the well-known Russian demographer Yaropolk Nikolaevich Guzevaty, made his first reports at the interdepartmental group on population problems in the early 1980s, it seemed to some of us who participated in the discussions that the demographic process and the forecast of its changes were too much they are strictly linked to socio-economic characteristics. The criterion of correlation of socio-economic and demographic variables chosen by the author and his former colleagues at the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute seemed somewhat conditional. It was about the ratio of the number of people employed outside of agriculture and the total population. Despite the criticism, A.V. Akimov remained true to his methodology, improved it over time, and made a large number of original calculations, the results of which are presented in addition to reports and articles in two well-deserved monographs [Akimov, 1992; Akimov, 2008].
It should be recognized that a thorough familiarization with the author's methodology removes questions about its mechanistic nature, the rigidity of relationships between socio-economic and demographic variables. As follows from the last book, the author identifies 23 typical modes of demographic development, in which the main place is occupied by the transition from a high level of fertility and mortality to a low one (the so-called demographic transition). At the same time, the state of economic underdevelopment, an indicator of which is the low employment of labor outside the agricultural sector (less than 150 people per 1000 inhabitants), corresponds to 11 real modes of natural population movement, found by analogy, according to historical precedents of countries and regions dating back to the second half of the XX century (development after the Second World War, in the). Six types (modifications of the main modes of demographic transition) were found to correspond to the intermediate state of the economy between low and high levels of development (from 150 to 250 people employed outside agriculture), and six more types of demographic development are inherent in a highly developed economy (more than 250 people) [Akimov, 2008, pp. 28-45].
Thus, the author's methodology does not imply automatic correlation between socio-economic and demographic parameters. Against the background of certain economic changes, there is a variety of options associated with the state-
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demographic policy and socio-cultural characteristics of a particular country or group of countries (region).
The author's calculations for the future show high accuracy: This can be stated based on a retrospective assessment of the available population estimates over the past years and on comparison of the obtained forecast estimates with others.
The main part of forecasts is made in the world on the basis of the age distribution method adopted by the UN Demographic Department, taking into account age survival rates and the birth rate. It is considered the most reliable method, especially when evaluating trends over a relatively short time period. Other leading demographic services around the world, such as the US Census Bureau, also use the age distribution method.
A.V. Akimov's methodology demonstrates the possibilities of other approaches to assessing the demographic future, which in itself can be attributed to significant scientific achievements. The value of the calculations made by the author is enhanced by the fact that while there is a general agreement of ideas about the world demographic evolution for the next few centuries, due to the fact that they are based on the theory of demographic transition, estimates for the next half-century differ somewhat. So, if, according to the average forecast of A. V. Akimov, the number of inhabitants on earth in 2050 will be equal to 10.7 billion. according to his real, logically adjusted scenario, the number will increase to 10.1 billion. according to the latest (correction of 2006) estimates of UN demographers, the number of people will reach 9.2 billion by the middle of the XXI century, and according to the calculations of 2002, which the author refers to in the article under discussion, it was estimated at 8.9 billion. a person according to the average, most likely scenario [World Population..., 2002].
The difference of 1 - 2 billion rubles. the problem may not be considered fundamental, but it is noticeable. The author himself notes that the UN forecast variants provide for slower population growth in the first half of the current century than its variants, and notes that the forecast of the leading international organization assumes unprecedented rapid (i.e., no historical analogues) demographic changes.
In view of the fact that forecasts for the near future are of the greatest practical importance, it is probably worth asking what is the reason for such discrepancies. Demographers of the United Nations, the US Census Bureau, and other national schools, including domestic ones (see for example: [Demographic modernization..., 2006]), assign a large role to demographic inertia, the so-called population moment (accumulated mass of the population). At the same time, the birth rate is a variable at the present historical stage, since mortality has already reached low rates in all societies and civilizations, with the exception of the most primitive ones, primarily in Africa and some Pacific islands. With such an extrapolation to the future of the trends that have emerged so far, two aspects that are not always directly related to the socio-economic situation become very important, namely, openness to the outside world, availability of information about modern family planning tools, and their price-based features. Apparently, it is the explosion of information on these issues and the ease of birth control methods that have affected both middle-and low-developed countries and regions over the past two or three decades that has led to a spontaneous, deep and almost universal decline in the birth rate. The observed decline has led to an unprecedented high rate of decline in the natural population movement in the forecast calculations of the United Nations and other demographic services.
Meanwhile, A.V. Akimov's methodology, based on historical analogies and precedents, is poorly adapted to account for the most recent reference variants of demographic development. Hence, apparently, the differences in estimates for the prospect-
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tiva. At the same time, the forecast curve used by him for the future of three centuries does not differ in principle from other long-term forecasts and includes the phase of a fading rise, stabilization and decline in the number of inhabitants on Earth. This is probably explained by the fact that the author proceeds from parallel patterns of a kind of" economic transition", i.e., the transition from high to low employment in agriculture, which hides the transformation of agricultural and closed individual large areas into non-agrarian, industrial and service areas.
The same agreement is observed between the calculations of A.V. Akimov and international services in terms of the correlation between the dynamics of demographic potentials of more developed (Europe, North America and Oceania) and less developed regions, primarily Asia and Africa. The calculations presented in the article demonstrate an increase in the demographic gap, which is very rapid and deep in some variants of the Asian-African area from the European-North American, i.e., the conditional East from the conditional West, or South from the North, while the demographic potential of the Christian-European region, which has been leading in economic terms for the last three centuries, is steadily decreasing.
It is worth noting that the shift in family planning observed in recent decades in low-and middle-income countries and areas does not completely offset cultural, social, religious and moral differences. The proportion of married women using modern contraceptives is reported to have increased rapidly (mainly during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s) in Jordan (from 15% to 40%), Morocco (from 1% to 50%), other North African countries and Egypt (from 24% to 56%). much less noticeable were the changes in Syria, Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Arabian Peninsula. In Turkey, the percentage of people using modern pregnancy protection increased from 22% in 1963 to 64% in 1998, and in Iran-from 3% in 1969 to 73% in 1997. According to this indicator, Iran was ahead of India (43% in 1998-1999), Bangladesh (40% in 1999-2000) and Pakistan (24% in 1996-1997). The corresponding indicators of most sub - Saharan Africa and some Southeast Asian countries were at the "Pakistani" or even lower level (Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia) [Global Population..., 2002].
Although the use of modern contraceptive methods is far from directly correlated with demographic growth, it undoubtedly affects its indicator. From the above data, it can be seen that differences, and very significant ones, are observed not only between Muslim and non-Muslim states, but also within these groups. They seem to be explained by two factors-the possibility of using funds, the economic factor, and the social, gender-related position of women in the family and society. At the same time, it is a mistake to assume that the attitude in Islam to birth control is fundamentally different from the approaches typical of other religious systems. Initially, all religions, at least the Abrahamic ones, favored a high birth rate and a large family. In the modern era, the attitude of religious Orthodoxy has not changed, but family planning, especially in traditional, "natural" ways, is not prohibited. The situation in the Islamic world does not seem to be any different in this sense, although not all Muslim theologians approve of the practice of birth control, especially with imported, "Western" means.
The main difference between Muslim and non-Muslim communities is the second factor related to gender. Of course, even in non-Muslim traditional communities, women have a low social status, and their freedom to decide their personal fate and freedom of movement are limited. Women work in the fields, do hard work, work at home, and often have no voice in family matters. This is the case almost everywhere and regardless of religion in Africa. In India, the position of the daughter-in-law in large families is different
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it is so hard that their suicides are not uncommon. At the same time, it is believed that despite the general low status of women in poor Eastern societies, the problem of gender inequality and female disenfranchisement among Muslims is most acute, and it persists to some extent in urban communities, often without changing even when moving from a low to a high level on the material and social ladder (on discrimination against women in the Russian Federation). See [Nebogatova, 2006, pp. 83-96]).
At the same time, Muslim communities, of course, are not uniform. They differ among themselves in many ways, due to cultural traditions, economic characteristics, history and current geopolitical situation. If you imagine the Islamic area in the form of a giant circle, then in its center will be the birthplace of religion - the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. Historically, the strictest Islamic canon has been formed here, and the customs of women's seclusion, their closed, "invisible" way of life to the outside world, are still widespread. Moving in different directions from the historical and geographical center of Islam, we find modifications of the reference-archaic Arab-Muslim model. In the north, these are Persian, Caucasian and Volga variants, in the northwest-East Mediterranean, Turkish and Balkan, in the northeast-Afghan and Central Asian, even further east is Hindustani Islam, and in the southeast-Malay - Indonesian, finally, in Africa, the southern, semi-Arab and non-Arab variants are widespread, and to the north-east-the Indian Subcontinent. to the west - Arab-African samples. The situation of women in different parts of the Islamic area differs from that which characterizes it in the center, making in some cases not too big or even insignificant difference between the social and family status of a Muslim woman and her non-Muslim neighbor. However, religion still has an impact on the status of women and through it affects demographic processes.
India provides a compelling example. Muslims in this country in 1951, after the secession of Pakistan, made up 10% of the population. Each successive census, conducted every ten years, has seen an increase in the proportion of Muslims, which now stands at almost 15%. Concerned about the prospect of being squeezed out by Muslims, the Hindu public prompted the Government to appoint a special commission to investigate the causes of this phenomenon. Ta presented a report from which it follows that the factors of the increased growth rate of the Muslim population are diverse, but the phenomenon itself is stable and difficult to change [Muslim Demography...].
Whatever the reasons, the proportion of Muslims in the world's population has been steadily increasing over the past two centuries, and especially rapidly since the end of World War II. According to estimates in 1950, Muslims accounted for 13-15% of the world's population, and in 2000 - already 19-22%. The share of Muslims by the middle of the XXI century may, according to some forecasts, increase to 30-35%, in other words, every third inhabitant of the planet will belong to the community of followers of the Prophet Muhammad.
All this, by the way, is fully consistent with the calculations given in the article under discussion. It notes that the demographic development of Asian and African countries will not be uniform. Although East Asia is still the most populous region, by 2050 it will be the most populous region in the world. it will lose these positions, because China is becoming a demographically developed country largely, we note from ourselves, under the influence of political factors. India and other South Asian states do not have strong state-political levers to influence population reproduction, and therefore the inertia of growth makes South Asia, with its ever-growing Muslim population, the undisputed demographic leaders. The second area with an excess population is sub-Saharan Africa, where there is also an increase in the proportion of Muslims.
In my opinion, A.V. Akimov somewhat underestimates the demographic potential of other regions with predominantly Muslim populations. Success of the Ira-
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A country where total fertility (average number of births per woman) has fallen to 2.0 should be evaluated cautiously, as this country is characterized by a traditionally rather high place of women in the family and a huge impact of political power. If government policies change, the demographic situation may also change dramatically.
But even if current trends continue, the number of inhabitants in the Middle East and North Africa (from Iran to Mauritania) will grow from 400 million (rounded up) in 2000 to 600 million by 2030, and will approach or exceed 800 million in 2050 [Future of Middle East...].
Needless to say, all calculations for the future are rather conditional in nature, and even inertial demographic processes in reality can be disrupted by unforeseen circumstances. Forecasting is necessary, however, in order to prepare for the expected changes that occur in the event of a fairly smooth flow of historical events. Forecasts are needed to prepare for the probable future, to prevent dangers that can be detected and to some extent averted or reduced.
If from this point of view we approach the variants of interaction of civilizations considered in A. V. Akimov's article, taking into account international migrations and long-term demographic prospects, then the picture is generally very favorable from a rational point of view. Four scenario variants out of five, with the exception of the scenario "evil neighbors", which develops into "Western man - an endangered species", proceed from the triumph of scientific and technological progress and the preservation of leading positions for Western, European-based civilization.
From an economic point of view, this projection seems to be the most plausible. But the political component of world development is, in fact, completely ignored. And the point is not that the author inadvertently overlooked it, but that the options for interaction of civilizations, of which he actually has two - Western, developed, and all other developing ones-are specifically, apparently, limited to interaction as a result of population migrations, people moving without taking into account state borders, etc. geopolitical conflicts. This circumstance gives the variants of civilizational interaction a certain narrowness and one-linedness.
Despite the general optimism that the demographic forecast inspires, predicting a gradual weakening of the pressure of the growing mass of people on natural resources, the normative calculations of fuel and energy resources consumption (FER) made by A.V. Akimov show that there may be a shortage of them over the horizon of 75-80 years.
Even more alarming is the situation with fresh water resources, which, according to the author, will face a global shortage in the coming decades. Lack of irrigation water can cause a food crisis. The shortage of agricultural land is particularly dangerous in conditions of uneven geographical distribution. This increases the likelihood of acute local crises and conflicts over the use of available irrigation water. At the same time, almost all problems of this kind arise in poor and most often Muslim areas or at the junctions of this area with others.
Digressing to general topics, I note that demographic forecasts for the long term, predicting an inevitable decline in the number of earthlings, raise the question: how reasonable is the assumption about the final phase of the demographic transition currently observed as the last in the history of the human population? In other words, won't the low-birth-rate stage be followed by a new pattern of combining these key demographic indicators?
It should also be borne in mind that in all predictive calculations, the demographic behavior of developing civilizations follows the same laws as in the past.
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developed countries. It is difficult to say whether this will happen in reality. After all, it is possible that before the demographic transition becomes a reality on a global scale, it may be interrupted by an explosion of aggression, extremism, political and psychological fractures, pathologies that result in the struggle of different civilizations at the root. Even today, we are witnessing a certain confrontation between the Western, gender-emancipated, largely hedonistic civilization and the patriarchal-autocratic Islamic civilization, which resists the values of freedom, personal dignity and women's emancipation, or, as they say now, empowering women, imposed on it from the outside. All this brings us back to the eternal variations on the theme of war and peace, which can be avoided by focusing on the historical background in the form of socio-economic processes and scientific and technological progress.
list of literature
Akimov A.V. Mirovoe naselenie: vzglyad v budushchee [The world population: a view into the future].
Akimov A.V. 2300 goda: global'nye problemy i Rossiya [The Year 2300: Global Problems and Russia]. Moscow: Vostochny University, 2008.
Demograficheskaya modernizatsii Rossii, 1900-2000 [Demographic Modernization of Russia, 1900-2000].
Nebogatova O. A. Socio-economic situation of women in India at the beginning of the XXI century. 2006. N 6.
Global Population Profile 2002. Percent of Currently Married Women Using Contraception by Method: All Available Years. U.S. Census Bureau, PDF, Table A-13.
Future of Middle East and North Africa // www. freeworldacademy.com, PDF.
Muslim Demography of India: Sachar Committee Report // www.unirisx.com
World Population Projections: The 2002 Revision // www.popin.org, PDF
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