The article examines the evolution of the Muslim community in France in the context of a secular society. The article provides an overview and characteristics of various areas of Islamic identity and major Muslim organizations. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the radicalization of a part of Muslim youth and the formation of Islam as an element of French culture, which causes a certain rejection and division in French society.

Keywords: Islam, France, Maghreb countries, integration, religion.

The Muslim community in France exists in a secular democracy. France is the only country in the European Union (EU) that proclaims secularism as an official state ideology.

At present, relations between the French Republic and religion are regulated by the law on the separation of church and State, which was adopted in 1905. This law, in particular, guarantees freedom of religion, and the state avoids providing material support to any of the faiths. Religion is considered a private matter of citizens, church institutions and clergy exist at the expense of believers. According to chapter I of the Constitution, France "is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic" [Constitution francaise.., 2011, p. 3]. However, in accordance with Law No. 2003-2 of 18.03.2003, this chapter was amended to state that "the French Republic respects all beliefs".

Explaining the essence of the phenomenon of secularism, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France from 2007 to 2012, noted that " secularism guarantees the right of every citizen to profess his religion, as well as the right to be an atheist. Secularism is not an enemy of religions. On the contrary, secularism is a guarantee of freedom of conscience for every citizen" [Sarkozy, 2004, p. 16]. This point of view is shared by the current President Francois Hollande, who pointed out during a visit to Tunisia in July 2013 that Islam does not contradict democratic values, which is confirmed by the experience of France. At the same time, secularism as a philosophy, according to the prominent French orientalist Olivier Roy, "presupposes the concept of cultural, historical and spiritual values based on the philosophy of the French enlighteners, the idea of progress and ethical principles based on a rationalistic perception of the world" (Roy, 2005, p.34). The ideology of secularism was formed in France within the framework of the confrontation between the Republican state and the Catholic Church, which after the French Revolution of 1789 took rather harsh forms1. Vpos-

1 In 1793, Catholic worship was banned in Paris, instead of which the Cathedral of Our Lady of Paris paid homage to Reason (Culte de la Raison). After the death of the founders of this cult, P.-G. Chaumette and J.-R. Ebsre, M. Robespierre introduced the cult of the Supreme Being (Culte de I'être supreme) [Aulard, 1925(1); Aulard 1925(2); Carlyle, 1991, p. 494].

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The emergence of the concept of Christian democracy in the 1980s predetermined the convergence of the positions of the two sides and, at the same time, the desire of the Church to find common ground with the non-Catholic part of society in order to promote "Christian European culture". This was confirmed in a proposal made in 1984 by Pope John Paul II to include a reference to Christian culture in the preamble of the European Constitution. However, in the 2000s, the question of Islam and its relationship with the "French identity", one of the important components of which is considered secularism, became more acute.

The Arab-Muslim community in France is the largest in the EU. This is due to the complex history of France's relations with the Maghreb (North Africa)countries2 - former French colonies. According to various sources, 5 - 6 million people live in France. Muslims (the population of France in 2014 is estimated at 66.2 million), of which about 82% are from the Maghreb countries. Some French Muslims have adapted to European culture and lifestyle and integrated into French society, but many of them remain committed to traditional beliefs and culture. They consider Islam to be the basis of their civilizational identity.

In the 1980s, young Maghreb immigrants began to struggle to be recognized as full members of French society. If their parents in the 1960s and 1970s demanded better living and working conditions by joining trade unions, the generation of the 1980s sought to get a European education, to create a radio broadcasting system in Arabic and Berber, etc. In the early 1980s, various associations created by immigrants organized demonstrations and marches to protest the French authorities ' treatment of Maghreb residents as "second-class"citizens. The most massive was the "march for equality", held in 1983 and gathered about 10 thousand demonstrators.

However, the legacy of the Algerian war, which for many years created distrust and hostility towards Muslims in French society, as well as obvious differences in the way of life, culture and traditions of native French and immigrants, remained a serious obstacle to the integration of the latter into the new society. To solve this problem, the younger generation of Maghreb migrants began to act in two directions. One presupposed the path taken by the previous generation-joining the Socialist Party, organizing anti-discrimination campaigns involving immigrant associations such as SOS-Racisme and France-Plus, founded in the 1980s and advocating genuine integration. The second way was taken by those Maghrebians who believed that the usual combination of trade union struggle and socialist slogans was not enough to overcome the actual inequality between autochthons and Allochthons. Many immigrants believed that the active emphasis on Islamic identity, firstly, would be an expression of protest against discrimination, and secondly, would provide them with the opportunity to acquire full citizenship.

The second way has become particularly popular since the second half of the 1980s, when its proponents began organizing conferences attended by Muslim associations, building mosques, and open and public observance

2 Algeria became a French colony in 1830. In 1883 and 1912. The French protectorate regime was imposed on Tunisia and Morocco, respectively. Both countries achieved independence in 1956. In Algeria, from 1954 to 1962, under the leadership of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a stubborn anti-colonial struggle was waged, during which about 1 million Algerians were killed. In 1962, peace talks began between the FLN and France, culminating in the signing of the Evian Agreements granting Algeria independence. France and the three countries signed agreements on cooperation in various fields,including emigration. The Maghreb countries joined the so-called francophone zone, which covered the former French colonies, and began to enjoy trade and economic benefits.

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muslim customs, to wear clothing that included the hijab (headscarf) and niqab (burqa) for women.

One of the first most influential Muslim organizations was the Union of Young Muslims (SMM), founded in Lyon in 1987, whose leaders demanded that the French authorities recognize the morals of Muslims "to live their spiritual life, openly show their belonging to Islam and publicly celebrate their religious holidays" (Bowen, 2011, p. 49). As one of the SMM's founders noted, its members "were radical and were not afraid to chant' Allah wa Akbar '(Allah is great) during their demonstrations " [Le Monde, 24.05.2005]. The SMM had its own publication, the Tawhid magazine (the dogma of the oneness of Allah and the recognition of his divine nature), established on the basis of the Muslim Cultural association of the same name, established in 1986. The journal published conference materials and works of prominent Islamic ideologues. The SMM and Tawhid established contacts with local Muslim organizations that shared their views.

At the same time, Muslim communities formed in a number of French cities, including Lyon and Marseille, began to demand permits for the construction of large cathedral mosques. These projects met with opposition from a significant part of the residents of these cities, who believed that such structures were not compatible with historically established architectural ensembles. Dissatisfaction was also caused by street prayers held during Muslim holidays, especially since the places allocated for them did not accommodate everyone. Under the pressure of protests, the city authorities were forced to bulldoze temporary places of prayer built by Muslim communities, as happened, for example, in Charvier-Chavannes [Le Monde, 17.08.1991].

In 1989, the wearing of the hijab by Muslim students became a major factor that attracted French attention to the spread of Islam in the country. In the course of opinion polls, girls indicated that they felt happy to become "practicing" Muslim women by studying "authentic Islam" and Arabic. However, like many of their peers, they did not identify "authentic Islam" in France with that practiced in the Maghreb countries where their parents came from and which they described as "too traditional and problematic".

The younger generation, which included Muslim students who were born in France, who were granted French citizenship, and for whom (unlike their parents) the first language of communication was French, nevertheless sought to preserve their Muslim identity. They attended courses in the study of Islam and Arabic, listened to lectures and sermons of Muslim preachers, including those who came from well-known Arab Islamic universities, where they were given the opportunity to enroll. Many students participated in mass annual Muslim conferences held in the Paris suburb of Le Bourget, where well-known Islamic ideologues spoke.

The teaching and Islamic educational structures established in France in the 1980s were different from those in Muslim countries. Teaching in the "new homeland" was conducted in French, teachers and preachers represented various theological schools, and therefore the training was largely built taking into account the global Islamic discourse and French realities. Islamic educational structures consisted of private schools, courses at mosques and various Islamic associations; training was usually conducted on weekends and in the evening. The teachers were mostly young Muslim intellectuals, including imams who were educated in Arab countries.

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Heads of Islamic educational institutions took part in Muslim conferences, debates, and public debates in the media. The imams of the two largest cathedral mosques in Paris and Lyon, who held the titles of rectors, regularly participated in various official events and spoke in the media, usually showing loyalty to the authorities. However, some young French imams have adopted Salafist ideas that are common among the Muslim diaspora.

The socio-cultural development of the Muslim community was accompanied by the emergence of several trends in the perception and practice of Islam. Traditional classical Islam, represented by various madhhabs of the 3rd Sunni persuasion, became the most widespread. It is preached, in particular, by imams and theologians of the Grand Mosque of Paris (BPM), founded in 1922, which is one of the most well-known and respected Muslim structures that hold solemn services and various religious events during Muslim holidays. French leaders repeatedly visited the BPM, where they read out their appeals on various issues to French Muslims. The imam and rector of the mosque is a well-known Muslim figure Dalil Boubaker, who has close ties with representatives of the Algerian diaspora, the Algerian Embassy and, accordingly, with the Algerian authorities.

In 1985, the French National Federation of Muslims (NFMF) was established in close contact with the Moroccan and Turkish communities. In 1986, on the initiative of Muslim religious figures-fundamentalists, the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (SIOF) was formed, which annually holds symposiums called "Meetings of Muslims of France" in the suburbs of Paris, on the territory of the Le Bourget exhibition complex. They discuss issues related to the daily life of the Muslim community, and hold discussions on theological issues.

In 2001, a group of Muslim figures who broke away from the SIOF formed the Union of Muslim Associations (UMA), which was headed by Hassan Farsadou, a former member of the SIOF leadership. The AGR is currently expanding its influence in the suburbs of Paris, where it has nine mosques at its disposal, including the largest in the suburbs of the capital Saint - Denis.

In the early 2000s, the Muslim Party of France (PMF) was founded by Muslim activists in Strasbourg. In this regard, it should be noted that the law regulating relations between the state and religious organizations and prohibiting the creation of political parties on a religious basis was adopted in France as early as 1905.Strasbourg was part of Germany at that time, and this law did not apply to it. In its program, the PMF advocates for the recognition of religious organizations, including Muslim ones, as social partners and the implementation of the communitarianism strategy, which involves the creation of peculiar zones in areas of compact Muslim residence-communes in which Sharia laws apply. The PMF is perhaps the only example of a political party founded on Islam in Europe. However, the PMF remains small, does not enjoy any noticeable influence, and practically operates underground.

In turn, in 2003, at the initiative of the Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevenemant, the French Council of Muslim Worship (FSMC) was established. According to its creators, the Council was supposed to represent a large part of the French Muslim community. The French authorities would be able to make more effective contacts with diasporas. As a result of the June 2013 presidential election,-

3 Madhhab - theological and legal school. In the Sunni direction of Islam, there are primarily four main theological and legal schools of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali [Encyclopedia, 1991, p.152].

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the head of the FSMC was the famous Muslim figure Mohammed Moussaoui [http://www. lecfcm.fr].

Individual Islam has become a new and rather peculiar phenomenon in the religious practice of French Muslims, and Farhad Khosrokhovar, a professor at the French Higher School of Social Research (EHESS), has called it a significant social phenomenon.4 Individual Islam is mainly practiced by Muslim intellectuals and part of the younger generation. They consider religion to be a private matter, in which their position coincides with the generally accepted attitude towards religion in French society. Naufel Brahim, a leading researcher at the Higher School of Economics and a specialist in individual Islam, in an interview with the author of these lines, defined individual Islam as "the product of individual ego and subjective perception of Islam"5. According to I. Brahim, the historical traditions of France, starting from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789, as well as modern institutions (schools, media and society as a whole) that preach individualism, contribute to the spread of individual Islam.

In 2003, the Movement of Secular Muslims (DSM) was formed in France, whose members defend republican and democratic principles. Fadel Amara, a member of the French Socialist Party and a women's activist who opposes the wearing of the niqab by French Muslim women, is a prominent representative of the JSM. Amara is also the chairman of the Non-Confused and Non-Subordinate organization of Algerian Muslim Women, which advocates for women's equality in the Muslim family. They view their Muslim identity more as cultural and not bound by religious dogmas. Fadel Amara strongly opposes Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. So, it divides all French Muslim women who wear the niqab into three categories: girls who thus seek to protect themselves from street hooliganism; girls in transition who are in search of their identity; " soldiers of the green color of Islamic fascism, educated, often graduated women, adherents of radical Islamist ideology, who regularly attend meetings of Islamist organizations." and potential jihadists" (quoted in [Geisser and Zemouri, 2007, p. 148]). It should be noted, however, that the SMM is not widespread and reflects the sentiments of the minority of representatives of the Muslim community in France.

Along with these movements, adherents of neo-fundamentalism are gaining strength in the French Muslim community. Some of them aim to unite all existing Islamic organizations in France into a single Muslim association under their own leadership. This trend is characterized by a rejection of European values and a refusal to integrate into French society. Their leaders support the doctrine of communitarianism. In France, there are also supporters of radical Islamism who are trying to create mosques or houses of worship under the leadership of self-proclaimed imams. This trend, whose number of followers is relatively small, was informally called "Islam of suburbs and garages".

At the same time, 80% of French Muslims are "non-practitioners" and only 20% scrupulously follow all the precepts of Islam. Of these 20%, approximately 5% belong to orthodox fundamentalist Salafists and followers of the Tabligh6, who reject European values and seek to completely change their religion.

4 Interview with Farhad Kosrokhovar. P., 15.06.2013. Archive of the author. - B. D.

5 Conversation with Naufel Brahim. P., 17.06.2013. Archive of the author. - B. D.

Tabligh wa Da 6 ("message and call") is a fundamentalist Islamist organization that promotes strict adherence to Sharia law. It was founded in the 1920s in what is now Pakistan. Currently, there are many Tabliga organizations in Western Europe with a center in the UK. In France, there are Tabliga branches with several thousand followers.

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isolate yourself from the "godless society" and live according to Sharia law. The exclusion from economic and social life and, consequently, the high level of unemployment in this environment, especially among young people, and its partial marginalization contribute to the strengthening of the influence of jihadist ideology. About a thousand adherents of jihadism in France are members of closed and semi-underground Islamist organizations that may pose a potential danger. However, according to the American researcher J. R. R. Tolkien, Boven, "their activities are under control, imams conduct sermons in French, and only where parishioners do not know it - in Arabic."7
At the same time, most of the problems associated with the Muslim diaspora are socio-economic rather than inter-confessional or inter-civilizational in nature and relate to unemployment, the lack of opportunities to get a good education and take a decent place in society, and the lack of infrastructure in Muslim areas. Thus, the areas of Paris known as the" red belt of Paris", which were previously occupied by employees of industrial enterprises located here, after the withdrawal of many of them, were populated by migrants, including the unemployed. The growth in the number of unemployed people was facilitated by mass layoffs in the 1990s and 2000s in the automotive industry, where 50% of the labor force was represented by migrants from Algeria and Tunisia. One of the reasons for layoffs and, consequently, unemployment, along with the global financial and economic crisis, was the withdrawal of industrial enterprises from France to countries with cheap labor. So, for example, in the Paris area, which once housed a complex of enterprises that produced the Citroen car, a park has now been laid out, and production facilities have been moved out of the country.

Unemployment and the inability to find a niche in society provoke Muslim youth to social protest, which often takes aggressive forms and is used by radical Islamists. For a number of years in the suburbs of major French cities, there have been periodic clashes with the police, arson of cars and other illegal actions, which mainly involve emigrant youth. I must say that among the prisoners in French prisons, 40% are people whose father was an immigrant. The problem of drug distribution and use remains urgent. According to the current legislation, the detection of a small amount of drugs by the police does not entail any penalty. At the same time, it is in the suburbs, where drugs are especially common, that semi-underground Islamist organizations professing radical Islamism and jihadism operate.

Currently, in France, as in many other EU countries, there is an increase in Islam, both in the religious and socio-political sense. This was reflected, in particular, in the nomination of candidates by representatives of the Muslim community in municipal and parliamentary elections, in their membership in public and human rights organizations, and in the Muslim influence on public thought in France. In 2012, for the first time in the country's history, about 400 French citizens representing the Arab-Muslim diaspora ran for the parliamentary elections (the total number of candidates was 6,611), and about 10 of them were members of the 571-member parliament [Kepel, 2014, p.13].

Representatives of French Muslims actively work in the National Advisory Committee on Human Rights, protecting the rights of immigrants to worship. The aforementioned Union of Muslim Organizations (UMA), based in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, where about 450 thousand Muslims live, regularly publishes materials on its website covering the life of the Muslim community.

7 Conversation with John Boven. P., 14.06.2013. Archive of the author. - B. D.

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communities, details of municipal election campaigns, as well as criticism of the authorities for allegedly encouraging Islamophobia and racism. However, such activities can hardly be considered as aimed at integration into French society. Rather, it reflects the desire of a significant part of the Muslim community to preserve their Islamic values, traditions and religion.

The growth of the number of Muslims and the activation of the Muslim diaspora in France cause a mixed reaction from residents of the country. Some French citizens, the political establishment, and the scientific community accept the position of this category of Muslims. This is partly due to changes in the definition of Islam made during the time of President Sarkozy: instead of "Islam in France" (L'Islam en France) - " Islam of France "(L'Islam de France) or" French Islam " (l'slam francais). This definition, which not all French people agree with, can be interpreted in such a way that Islam becomes an integral part of the French socio-political and cultural spheres. In turn, a part of the French scientific Oriental community is interested in Eastern metaphysics and Islamic esotericism. In particular, Abdennour Bidar, a well-known French philosopher and one of the ideologists of the concept of individual Islam, made a report on this topic in May 2014 at a scientific conference at the Paris Higher School of Social Sciences, in which the author of these lines participated.

At the same time, the thesis of "acculturation" of Islam is put forward, that is, the possibility of a Muslim expressing his identity to a greater extent from the position of Muslim culture than religion. In the French Muslim community, as well as in the Muslim Ummah (Muslim world), there is a debate on this issue. However, at the moment, the majority of Muslims, including the well-known Sunni ideologist Youssef al-Qaradawi, do not accept this thesis (see: [Le Monde, 20.05-21.05.2012]). In France, disputes continue over the French national identity and the role of Islam in it. Part of the political establishment and orientalists, including Gilles Kepel, a well - known French scholar of Islam, express concern about the growing influence of Islam and, in their opinion, the attitude of secular Republican France towards it [Kepel, 2014, p.14]. A reflection of this concern can be considered the adoption of laws prohibiting the manifestation of religious affiliation (wearing a niqab by Muslim women) in public places.

In this situation, along with the discontent of a part of the population with both government policies in the field of economy and immigration, and the actions of the EU leadership, which, according to their critics, "imposes decisions that do not correspond to its interests on France, and European commissioners who were not chosen by anyone," the influence of right-wing parties, in particular the National Front, is increasing (NF). So, during the European Parliament elections on May 22-25, 2014, 25% of French voters voted for the NF candidates, which allowed the Front to get 22 seats out of 74 reserved for France (a total of 751 seats in the European Parliament). Now the NF will be able to form a parliamentary group in a coalition with its allies from Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, which may significantly influence EU policy.

The French Muslim diaspora is actively influenced by external Islamist movements. In the 1980s, the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (SIOF), an influential Muslim socio-political organization, was founded in France by followers of the Tunisian Islamist Nahda (Renaissance) party and the Egyptian Islamist association "Muslim Brotherhood" (Kepel, 2012, p. 37). In 2012, Sheikh Ahmed Jaballah, a Tunisian-born Muslim ideologue and preacher, a supporter of the Nahda and Muslim Brotherhood doctrines, was elected Chairman of the SIOF. Ahmed Jaballa is also the Director of the European Institute for Humanities Research (EIGI), which was opened in Saint-Denis in 2001. EIGI has a theological department where future imams are trained. In his

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The scientific council includes such Sunni ideologues as Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is a permanent resident of Saudi Arabia. Qaradawi is an implacable opponent of President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian leadership, both because they lead the secular Arab Socialist Revival party and because most of the Syrian leadership is represented by Alawites. 8 The Muslim Brotherhood in France successfully cooperates with the Turkish Islamist organization National Vision (Milli Gyuryush) With its participation, the French National Federation of Muslims (NFMF) was established in 1985, which controls hundreds of places of Muslim worship, especially in the districts of Lyon and Strasbourg.

At the same time, the nature of economic relations between this country and Islamic states, such as Qatar, is a factor influencing both the French Muslim diaspora and the domestic and foreign policy of France. This emirate, a member of the regional organization of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC), during the reign of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, became one of the most privileged financial and economic partners of France. According to Hussein Abdallah, a member of the administrative council of the Qatar Investment Association, Qatari investments in France "exceed $ 100 billion. In 2012 alone, they reached more than $ 30 billion" [Ennasri, 2013, p. 165]. They invested in innovative projects in the fields of aviation, aeronautics, and the creation of modern weapons. So, having 7.6 - 10.07% of the shares of the well-known French media holding Lagardere, which, in turn, is one of the main shareholders of the largest European aerospace concern EADS, Qatar has become an investor in the most knowledge-intensive and saturated with modern technologies market. Qatar invests in real estate (palaces of the 17th century, prestigious shops in the center of Paris), the hotel industry (expensive hotels in Paris and on the Cote d'Azur), gambling (27% of casinos in Cannes on the Cote d'Azur), media (Radio Europe 1, Paris Match magazine, Al Jazeera channel in French) and even in sports (purchase in 2011 of the football club "Paris Saint Germain-PSG"). French ministers, statesmen, politicians, journalists, and businessmen were regularly invited to Qatar for various symposia, where deals were made and business and personal contacts were established. The personal friendship between the Emir of Qatar and the French President was confirmed by the visit in 2007 to Paris of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who became the first Arab head of State to be received by President Sarkozy after his election.

A new area of Qatari investment is the social sphere-the development of French suburbs, where the majority of the Arab-Muslim diaspora lives. In 2011, during a visit to Qatar by representatives of local authorities united in the National Association of Elected Local Deputies (NAIMD), which actively fights against racism and for increasing the representation of suburbs in French government structures, the Emir promised them financial assistance to develop infrastructure and support prayer houses. At the same time, some of the French political establishment, in particular the Popular Front leader Marine Le Pen, view the current situation as a "catharization" of France, believing that Qatar's financial and economic support for the French suburbs is actually aimed at "promoting Muslim fundamentalism in the heart of France" (Ennasri, 2013, p.182). However, cooperation between France and

Alawites 8-a trend in Shiite Islam that emerged in the tenth century. It is an eclectic mix of elements of the Shia faith, Gnostic Christianity, and Muslim cults and beliefs. Alawites reject many of the precepts of Islam, revere Jesus Christ and a number of Christian saints, and celebrate some Christian holidays (see: [Islam. Encyclopedia, 1991, p. 194]).

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This continued under the new leadership of President Francois Hollande and Emir Tamim, who studied at the Sorbonne for a year.

At the same time, in 2013-2014 there was an increase in anti - Islamic sentiments and acts of aggression against Muslims, which was confirmed by reports of human rights organizations. The relative increase in Islamophobia is due, among other things, to the continued illegal immigration of Muslims, including criminal elements, drug traffickers and radical Islamists. To a large extent, the increase in immigration is associated with the negative consequences of the "Arab Spring", which, as the prominent Russian orientalist V. V. Naumkin rightly notes, "complicated the tasks of combating terrorism, which is increasingly merging with organized crime in the north of the African continent" [Naumkin, 2011, p. 33].

Islamophobic sentiments are also caused by such tragic phenomena as the case of the "Toulouse shooter" - a French citizen of Algerian origin, associated with Al-Qaeda, who shot six people in Toulouse in 2013. The French are also concerned about the fact that French Muslim citizens are traveling to Syria to participate in the "jihad" against the ruling regime there. According to official data, at the beginning of 2014, more than 700 French citizens (according to unofficial data - more than 1 thousand) were in Syria in the ranks of armed anti-government groups [Thomson, 2014]. In the event of their return to France, as stated by representatives of law enforcement agencies, they can create a certain threat to public safety. This was confirmed by a number of terrorist acts, the perpetrators of which, as a rule, received their bloody "jihadist experience" in the ranks of the Islamic State (IS) militants in Syria and Iraq. These included attacks on military personnel and police, and assaults on pedestrians accompanied by shouts of "Allah is great" in French cities in December 2014, which resulted in dozens of French citizens being injured.

The most high-profile and bloody were the shooting of the editorial office of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, and the hostage-taking in one of the shops in Paris on 7.01-9.01.2015, during which 17 people were killed and 8 were injured. The attack was carried out by three radical Islamists who had previously received military training in one of the Al-Qaeda training camps and were registered with the police in connection with their activities in recruiting French citizens to conduct "jihad" in Syria. In the same days in Paris, an attack on police officers was committed, as a result of which a police officer was killed. Apparently, as a reaction to these terrorist attacks, in a number of cities in France on January 8, 2015, attempts were made to set fire to two mosques and an explosion in a Muslim restaurant, during which, however, there were no casualties. In connection with the terrorist attacks that took place in Paris and in the entire central district of Ile de France, the highest level of threat was declared, and state institutions, train stations, airports and places of religious worship were taken under heavy security. Terrorist attacks in January 2015 They were the most significant in terms of the number of victims and public response in France since the extremist activities of the SLA organization 9 in 1961 during the mutiny of French generals in Algeria against President Charles De Gaulle and terrorist attacks by Islamist militants in Paris in 1995 during the armed confrontation between the Algerian authorities and radical Islamists. At the same time, the civil conflict in Syria and the actions of the Islamic State have led both to the radicalization of a part of the French Muslim community, and to its definite division into ethnic groups.

9 Members of the Organization de I'armée secret (OAS) operated in Algeria and France. They attacked supporters of Algerian independence, staged bombings, political assassinations, and organized several failed assassination attempts on President De Gaulle, whom they considered a traitor who had renounced Algeria (see [Smirnov, 2002, p. 257]).

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those who support the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and those who believe that it oppresses Sunni Muslims.

In the French media, as well as in society as a whole, after the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, discussions began regarding the reform of Muslim organizations in France and, in particular, the French Council of Muslim Worship (FSMK). French President Francois Hollande said that " the FSMK does not have sufficient capacity to influence the order of life, rules and principles of the Muslim community in France. It is necessary to strengthen its representativeness in order to address specific issues. " [www.uam93.com, 2.03.2015]. After the terrorist attacks of January 2015, the French leadership initiated a dialogue with Muslims, which was supposed to involve, along with the FSMC, various Muslim associations that are not part of it, as well as prominent Muslim figures and imams of mosques. The dialogue was aimed, among other things, at activating a new generation of authoritative leaders capable of influencing the situation in the Muslim community. As for the FSMK established in 2003, its leadership, according to the French Islamic scholar Ghaleb Bensheikh, did not enjoy significant influence in the Muslim community due to its "incompetence in matters of Muslim theology. Therefore, we should not be surprised that some Muslim youth are becoming easy prey for extremist preachers" [Le Monde, 13.03.2015].

In turn, Fatih Kimush, a well-known journalist and activist of the Islamic blogosphere, addressing Muslims, stressed the need to move away from radicalism in the blogosphere in order to create an acceptable atmosphere for dialogue. At the same time, he recalled that in January 2015, there were more cases of Islamophobia in France than in the whole of 2014, due to the fact that because of such terrorists who came out of the Muslim environment as the Toulouse shooter Merah and the Couachy brothers who shot the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo,"all Muslims are accused of terrorism " [www.uam93.com, 12.03.2015].

For his part, President of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (SIOF) Amar Lasfar, considering the possible reform of Muslim organizations, speaks in favor of creating a theological structure that could take the form of a "council of ulema", issuing fatwas (religious messages) within the framework of the 1905 law regulating relations between the state and religion. Mohammed Ennish, General Secretary of the Union of Muslim Associations (UMA), said that " the authorities have finally understood that they cannot deal only with the FSMC, which, whether it wants to or not, should reach out to representatives of young Muslims who were born and raised in France and express more confidence in regional Muslim organizations, who put forward new energetic leaders " [www.uam93.com, 12.03.2015].

Some politicians have joined the discussion on Islam in France. Thus, the leader of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, Nicolas Sarkozy, a former French president who served as Interior Minister during the creation of the FSMK, said that "the question is not what the French Republic can do for Islam, but what Islam can do to become French islam" [www.uam93.com, 2.03.2015]. It should be noted that as a result of the municipal elections in France in March 2015, SND received 27% of the vote and came out on top in this indicator. In second place is the National Front (FN) party, led by Marine Le Pen, with 26% of voters voting for it. As for the French Socialist Party, the ruling party of current President Francois Hollande, it was in third place, barely breaking the barrier of 20%. Thus, representatives of the SND, as well as the NF, have a real chance to participate in the 2017 presidential elections. At the same time, one of the leaders of the SND, Alain Juppe, the mayor of Bordeaux, who has already made a decision to-

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Considering the growing influence of the Muslim community, he held talks with the Union of Muslim Organizations (UMA) in March 2015, where he invited its leadership to develop proposals for reforming the FSMK.

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Most of the Muslim community in France continues to maintain an Islamic identity, professing traditional moderate Islam. To a large extent, this is due to the policy of France, which provides every citizen with real freedom of religion. However, Muslim migrants, including those born in France and granted French citizenship, did not fully integrate into French society. At the same time, on the one hand, there is a radicalization of some Muslim youth, leading to increased extremism, which, in turn, provokes an increase in Islamophobia. On the other hand, there is a process of Islam's entry into French culture. To a certain extent, this is due to the weakening of the Christian Church in Europe, including in France [Novozhenova, 2008, p.136], as well as the formation of religious pluralism and the growing role of Islam. However, not all French people accept these realities, which leads to a certain division in French society.

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