K. A. LIKHACHEV

(Saint Petersburg)

India Keywords:, Pakistan, Islamic extremism, radicalism, terrorism

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the nature of the activities of Islamic extremist organizations in India has undergone significant changes. To a certain extent, this is due to the general evolution of the phenomenon of international terrorism. Along with actions directed against members of the Indian army and police, the number of attacks on civilians, as well as attacks on government buildings, increased.

In the 2000s, Islamic terrorists made a number of attempts to paralyze the life of various Indian cities by bombing or attacking government facilities. Attacks on temples and holy sites belonging to both Hindus and Muslims - members of the moderate part of the community who do not want to support jihad-have also become more frequent. Until recently, the spread of Islamic extremism was largely confined to the northwestern states of India, primarily Jammu and Kashmir (DiK). Today, the borders of terrorism in the country are expanding.

There are two periods, or waves, of the greatest Islamist activity in northwest India in the last decade: early 2001-autumn 2003 and summer 2005-autumn 2008.

The decline in extremist activity from late 2003 to mid-2005 is explained by the temporary suspension of Pakistan's support for terrorist groups in India. It should be borne in mind that the most active Islamist organizations, both initially Kashmiri and Pakistani, as part of the Joint Jihad Council (JDC) had their headquarters in Pakistan or were associated with Pakistani radical groups, ¹ coordinated by the Interagency Intelligence Service of Pakistan (MP).

In turn, the reason for the decline of the second terrorist wave, which began in the summer of 2005, was the reaction of the world community, outraged by the major terrorist attack that occurred in India in November 2008.

THE FIRST WAVE

In 2000, the Government of India responded to the peace initiatives of the Kashmiri terrorist organization Hizb ul-Mujahideen and in 2000-2001 forced negotiations with the opposition, which demanded the mandatory participation of Pakistan at all stages of negotiations. However, at the same time, the activity of another Pakistani-Kashmiri extremist group, Lashkar - e-taiba (LiT), increased, which carried out several serious terrorist attacks not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but also in Delhi (the attack on the Red Fort). This circumstance forced the Government of India in May 2001 to lift the moratorium on conducting combat operations in DiK ², which had been in force since November 2000.

The events of September 11, 2001 in New York became a serious factor in strengthening the fight against terrorism around the world. The US administration's pressure on the Pakistani leadership to stop cooperating with the Taliban has changed Islamabad's position. However, the subversive activities of the IDP of Pakistan in India have not stopped.

As early as October 1, 2001, a major terrorist attack was carried out in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir: 38 people were killed in a car bomb explosion. ³ The next step of the terrorists was the attack of LiT militants on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001, during which 13 people were killed, and the consequences could have been significant

worse, as about 30 kg of RDX and crates of hand grenades were found in ^the terrorists ' car4. The attack on the Indian Parliament has strained relations between the two countries. The Indian government has officially accused Islamabad of supporting terrorists on Indian territory.⁵ Only the US intervention was able to prevent a new outbreak of conflict between the two nuclear powers.

However, Islamic extremism in India was not limited to Kashmir. On March 27, 2002, near Godhra in Gujarat, terrorists stopped and set fire to a train in which 57 Hindus returning from Ayodhya were burned alive. The attack occurred as a result of a confrontation between Muslims and Indian nationalists "in memory" of the destruction of the Babur Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 and the beginning of construction of the Rama ⁶ Temple in its place. A peculiar catalyst for the extremists in March 2002 was the congress of about 15 thousand Hindus who gathered during the week preceding the terrorist attack. It is significant that only in 2009 a special government commission published a 1,000-page report on these events.

Among the victims of the fire were both activists of the nationalist Hindu organization Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and just pilgrims with children. As early as March, the capital of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, started rioting in Muslim neighborhoods with the connivance (if not at the direction) of local leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the leaders of the right-wing VHP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Within a few days, the violence had spread to the countryside. As a result, with the complete inaction of the police and official authorities of the state, already in the first days of the pogroms, more than 850 people were killed (according to unofficial data - more than 2 thousand), most of whom were Muslims. ⁷

Against this background, the adoption of the Act on Combating Terrorist Activities (ABTD)on March 28, 2002, was a very controversial step taken by the central government⁸, according to which it became possible to detain the alleged participants of the terrorist attack for up to 180 days without charge. Under Indian criminal laws, a person who has made a confession to the police can recant it in court. However, if a suspect was detained under an ABTD, he had no right to refuse confessions. It should be noted that in the case of the arson attack on the train, these rules were applied only to Muslims and did not apply to the Hindu rioters.⁹ Of course, such double standards in the administration of justice contribute to the severity and long-term prevention of confessional conflicts.

In the early 2000s, Lashkar-e-Taiba came to the forefront of terrorist activity in northwestern India. Like most other extremist Kashmiri organizations, LiT was formed with the support of the Pakistani MR. The organization's activities included attacks on government organizations and the killing of"infidels". Between 2000 and 2002, more than 50 people were killed on their way to the sacred Shiva Cave in Jammu and Kashmir, although the entire route (about 400 km) was patrolled by mobile military detachments.¹⁰ Another major LiT action was the September 2002 attack on a temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, which killed 29 people.¹¹

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir has deteriorated markedly since the May 14, 2002, alleged murder of 35 family members of military personnel stationed in the Jammu Valley, ¹² an event that has caused a strong response in army units across the State. Under such conditions, the country's parliamentary elections were held in September-October 2002. Kashmiri extremists tried to disrupt the vote, in particular by using pro-Islamic media to promote anti-Hindu sentiment. At the same time, some publications (Srinagar Times, Daily Aftab and Alsafa) that condemned the activities of terrorists were forced to close down during the elections under the threat of physical violence. ¹³ The actions of Kashmiri Islamists attracted attention around the world.

Under pressure from the international community, especially the United States, as well as due to his own internal problems (conflict with radical Muslim leaders, assassinations carried out by local extremist groups), Pakistani President Pervez Muigarraf suspended support for terrorist organizations operating in India. As a result, by the fall of 2003, the first wave of terrorism had subsided.

The coalition of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the United Progressive Alliance (OPA), which won the May 2004 Indian parliamentary elections, fulfilled its election promises: it canceled the extremely unpopular ABTD and began negotiations with Pakistan, as a result of which the Islamabad Declaration was signed on January 6, 2004 within the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A declaration that included points on India and Pakistan's joint fight against terrorism ¹⁴.

SECOND WAVE

However, General Musharraf has not been able to overcome Pakistan's traditional perception that ending support for Islamic terrorists in India means Pakistan's de facto defeat in the fight for Kashmir. That is why the Pakistani government's "fight" against terrorism has been reduced to pressure on minor extremist groups. At the same time, the authorities ignored the process of training potential terrorists in religious seminaries-madrassas and military camps in Pakistan.¹⁵ Thus, the killing of Indian soldiers and civilians continued.

On July 5, 2005, the Indian police prevented an attempted attack by orga militants.-

The Jaish-e-Muhammad (DiM) attack on a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, ¹⁶ and the LiT explosion that killed 10 people later that month on the Janpur Express in Uttar Pradesh, ¹⁷ marked the beginning of a new wave of extremism. Another large-scale terrorist attack occurred on August 25, 2005 in Mumbai. Cars packed with explosives were blown up first in the square near the central market and the city temple, and then near the Taj Mahal hotel (46 people were killed).¹⁸.

The terrorist attack carried out on October 29, 2005 in Delhi (killing more than 70 people)¹⁹ was the largest in the first few years of this century. Responsibility for the bombings was claimed by a previously unknown Islamic Revolutionary Group (Islami Inkilabi Mahaz-IIM), created, as it turned out, in 1996, but until recently did not show itself in any way ²⁰.

In late 2005, there was an attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in the south of ^the country21. The year 2006 did not get any calmer: three explosions in Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh) in March killed 21 people. The Bangladeshi extremist organization Harkat-ul-jihadi-al-islami (Khudi)claimed responsibility for the attack. ²² (Before that, the largest terrorist attacks were mainly carried out by Pakistani groups.) There are two related KHUDI groups - in India and in Bangladesh. In the Indian media, a single abbreviation is usually used to refer to them, so for clarity, the Bangladeshi group is called Khudi-B.

In 2006, the previously revealed information about cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Pakistan and the General Directorate of Military Intelligence of Bangladesh (GUVR) was confirmed. Delhi Police Special Forces have arrested an MP agent who spent several years training special operations groups in Bangladesh. According to Indian data, by 2006 there were more than 250 Bangladeshi and Pakistani terrorist groups in India.²³

In 2005-2006, in addition to the most dangerous Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, one of the Kashmiri extremist organizations, Harkot ul - Mujahideen, became more active, which provided great assistance to the Afghan Taliban in its confrontation with the United States in 2002. ²⁴ Thus, on the night of May 1, 2006, in the districts of Kashmir, Kharkot-ul-Mujahideen was formed. Doda and Ud Hampur (Jammu and Kashmir) 35 Hindu villagers were killed ²⁵.

But the bloodiest terrorist attack of 2006 occurred in July in Mumbai, where massive explosions on intercity trains killed more than 200 and injured more than 600 people.²⁶ The Indian authorities have blamed the terrorist attack on the IDP of Pakistan, LIT, as well as the local group Islamic Movement of Students of India (IDSI)²⁷.

It should be noted that the Delhi police, which had become noticeably more active, managed to arrest more and more militants-members of various groups (DiM, LiT, etc.). In 2005, 19 militants were killed and 14 were arrested; in 2006, out of two dozen militants arrested, ¹⁷ were members of lit28.

Despite the significant rise in terrorist activity, the official dialogue between India and Pakistan did not stop, and on September 17, 2006, after a meeting of the Presidents of the two countries, the formation of the Joint Mechanism for Countering Terrorism (JMMT)was officially announced²⁹, after which terrorist activity in India decreased for a while.

Now the main goal of the extremists is to disrupt the peace process. The next major terrorist attack occurred in February 2007 in Jammu and Kashmir: 66 people were killed in explosions on the Samjhauta express (Indo-Pakistani "friendship train"). It is assumed that the action was carried out by LiT militants, since a few days before the terrorist attack, the ideologue of the organization, Abdul Rahman Makki, declared that India should not build a dam on the Chennai River to the detriment of Pakistan (the use of Kashmir's water resources is regulated by the so-called 1960 Water Agreement and remains a long-standing subject of dispute between the two countries).³⁰.

The southern direction of terrorist activity can be considered unusual. Thus, on 25 August 2007, two explosions (44 people were killed) allegedly committed by Khudi-B and LIT groups occurred in Hyderabad, a major industrial center of the country. It is possible that the terrorists were trying to provoke clashes in a city where the proportion of the Muslim population exceeds 40% of the total number of residents.³¹

In November 2007, explosions occurred in three cities of Uttar Pradesh-Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad. This time, instead of rdx, which is labor-intensive from the point of view of production and use, ammonium nitrate was used, which is inferior to RDX in explosive power, but in combination with metal objects (bolts, etc.), which can enhance the striking effect. Moreover, the components for this type of explosive can be purchased legally, since ammonium nitrate is used as fertilizer ³².

In 2006 - 2007, Uttar Pradesh came out on the 2nd place after Jammu and Kashmir in terms of the scale of terrorist activities on its territory. The Indian Intelligence Bureau (IRB) has published information on 23 terrorist groups in Uttar Pradesh.³³ In recent years, the state has regularly seen militant attacks on barracks and police stations, courts and law offices.³⁴ Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state with 80% of its Hindu population, appears to have become a new arena for Islamic extremists.³⁵

Between 2000 and 2007, a number of attacks were carried out on various temples (both Hindu and Muslim) in the north - western states of India. Most of these attacks were carried out by LiT or DiM terrorists, in some cases by Khudi-B ³⁶.

The aim of the extremists was to achieve the maximum level of human losses in sacred places for Hindus.

WILL THERE BE A THIRD WAVE?

On May 13, 2008, more than 60 people were killed in 6 explosions in crowded places in Jaipur, Rajasthan. This time, a mixture of RDX and ammonium nitrate ³⁷ was used. A previously unknown group, the Indian Mujahideen (IM), claimed responsibility for the attack. In a letter sent by its leaders to the IRB, it was reported that the purpose of the attacks was to undermine the tourism-based economy of Rajasthan and punish Muslims who do not support jihad. ³⁸ Indian intelligence, after studying the information received, came to the conclusion that IM is a new group created from former militants of the Islamic Movement of Students of India and Khudi - B, who set out to surpass the activity of such large groups as LiT and DiM. Later it became known that the terrorist attack was indeed carried out by IDSI ³⁹.

One of the leaders of the BJP, Mukhtar Abbas Akvi, accused Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the United Progressive Alliance led by him of pursuing an unacceptably soft policy towards terrorists.⁴⁰ It is true that the terrorist activity against the background of ongoing contacts between Delhi and Islamabad could not but cause discontent of the opposition less than a year before the 2009 parliamentary elections.However, the pressure of the opposition and some media outlets did not affect the government's course in relations with Pakistan.

By the end of the 2000s, a new trend in the activities of terrorists was clearly manifested: the desire to paralyze the life of a large city by carrying out not individual actions, but a series of simultaneous explosions and attacks. For example, in July 2008, explosions occurred in the most crowded places in Ahmedabad and Bengaluru (Gujarat)⁴¹. The explosive devices were equipped with special electronic fuses previously used in terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines.⁴² It can be assumed that due to the limited capabilities of Pakistani intelligence to supply militants with RDX and fuses, IDSI and other groups began to establish contacts with terrorists in Southeast Asia.

Musharraf's departure from the post of President of Pakistan in 2008 led to the destabilization of the political situation both in Pakistan and in Kashmir. In particular, more than ³⁰ militant attacks on Indian Army units were carried out in India in the summer of 200843.

In September 2008, 5 bombings occurred in New Delhi (more than 20 killed)⁴⁴: Homemade ammonium nitrate bombs were detonated in central markets and squares. The Indian Mujahideen group again claimed responsibility, with a message sent to television news channels emphasizing that LiT, which was also believed to be involved in the bombings, had nothing to do with them. Given the scale of IM's activities, Indian experts suggested that along with the traditional goals of any terrorist attack, the organization pursued the goals of self-promotion and increasing its importance in the eyes of potential sponsors.⁴⁵ LiT and DiM are known to be supported not only by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistani intelligence, but also partially funded by Saudi Arabia.⁴⁶ In this regard, the desire for THEM to push out LiT and DIM may also have the goal of changing the direction of financial flows.

In 2009, a special report of the Delhi police indicated that the Indian Mujahideen is not an organization, but a network of 3 independent groups operating in different states, and in Gujarat IM is a member of IDSI; in Uttar Pradesh it is a group of radical Islamists associated with Khudi-B, and in Mumbai extremists IM they work closely with the local crime syndicate ⁴⁷.

Part of the success of the terrorist attacks in India is due to the lack of coordination between the country's various intelligence agencies in the fight against extremism.⁴⁸

The inadequacy of the security system was particularly evident in the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, when a carefully planned action by a group of 10 terrorists actually paralyzed the huge city. During the 60-hour armed confrontation between Lashkar-e-Taib militants and army units, 164 people were killed, including 26 foreign citizens. At the same time, using modern means of communication (GPKS-navigators, cell phones, walkie-talkies, etc.), the terrorists received instructions from outside ⁴⁹. Pakistan has officially admitted that the terrorist attack was planned and prepared on its territory.⁵⁰

The international community's negative assessment of Pakistan's role in the attack forced Islamabad to send its main forces to fight terrorism inside the country and limit its support for extremists in India. Thus, the second terrorist wave, which began in the summer of 2005, began to decline.

* * *

In February 2010, after a period of calm, a new major terrorist attack in Pune (Maharashtra) in the west of the country resulted in the death of 9 people. A previously unknown group, Lashkar-e-Taiba al-Alami ^{51, which may be a new LiT cell in India, claimed responsibility for it}. The main goal of the terrorists was to disrupt the resumption of Indian-Pakistani contacts at the state level announced in early February.

At the end of June 2010, at the meeting of the Interior Ministers of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad, for the first time since the terrorist attack in Mumbai, the heads of these departments of India and Pakistan, P. Chidambaram and R. Malik, met. They discussed the possibilities of developing cooperation between law enforcement agencies and other organizations.-

cooperation between the two countries ' agencies in the fight against cross-border terrorism ⁵².

At the same time, it is alarming that the most large - scale terrorist attacks of the last decade are being carried out by local Indian groups-the Indian Mujahideen and the Islamic Movement of Students of India, which, like the largest Kashmiri terrorist organizations, are linked to Pakistani intelligence. Preventing a new wave of terrorism by Islamic extremists in India largely depends on how much Islamabad manages to curb those forces in the military structures of Pakistan that encourage their actions.

¹ For example, the Kashmiri Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is affiliated with the Pakistani organization Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba is the armed wing of the Markaz-ud-da'awa-wal-Irshad party. Harkat-ul-jihadi-i-islami and Harkot-ul-Mujahideen are affiliated with the Pakistani terrorist groups Jaish-i-Muhammad, Jamaat-i-Ulema and Tablighi Jamaat, as well as with the Afghan Hizb-i-Islami.

^{Belokrenitsky V.} 2. Ya., Moskalenko V. Kashmir's hotbed of Islamic extremism / / Asia and Africa Today, 2002, No. 1, pp. 12-13.

^{Swami P} 3. An Audacious Strike // Frontline, Vol. 18, Issue 21, October 13 - 26, 2001 - http://www.hinduonnet.com/nine/f11821/18210200.htm

^{Tripathi P.S} 4. Terror in Parliament House // Frontline. Vol. 18, Issue 26, Dec. 22, 2001 - Jan. 04, 2002 - http://www.hinduonnet.com/ fline/ fll826/18260040.htm

^{Sinha Y} 5. Cross-border Terrorism is Evil // Facets of Indian foreign policy. New Delhi. Vol. 2, 2003, p. 465.

⁶ 2002: Hindus die in train fire // http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/27/newsid_4168000/4168073.stm

⁷ State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat // Human Rights Watch Report on Gujarat, Vol. 14, N 3(C), April 2002, p. 4 - 6 - http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/india/gujarat.pdf

⁸ The Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (ROTA) // Archive of the Congress website on Biological and Toxic Types of Weapons - http://www.opbw.org/nat_imp/leg_reg/india/Terror.pdf

⁹ India's anti-terror law faces axe - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south asia/3753851.stm

¹⁰ Terror's new face: After Al Qaeda, is it Lashkar? // The Times of India, 06.06.2005.

¹¹ Akshardham attack: 3 get death sentence - http://www.rediff.com/ncws/2006/jul/01akshar.htm

^{Puri L} 12. 30 killed in Jammu suicide attack // The Hindu, 15.05. 2002.

¹³ Kashmir: The View from Delhi // International Crisis Group Asia Report N 69. Islamabad / Brussels, 4.12.2003, p. 17.

¹⁴ Islamabad Declaration - http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?id-14&t=7.1

^{Wilson J} 15. The Jihadi Factor in India-Pakistan Peace Process // Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief N 6, May 2006, p. 2 - 3.

^{Ramakrishnan V} 16. In search of answers // Frontline, Vol. 22, Issue 15, July 16 - 29, 2005 - http://www.thehindu.com/fline/f12215/stories/20056729006601000.htm

^{Pradhan S} 17. 12 killed, 49 injured as Shramjeevi Express derails - http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/12rail.htm

^VijapurkarM 18. 46 killed as twin blasts rock Mumbai // The Hindu, 26 August 2005.

¹⁹ Serial blasts kill 70 persons in Delhi // The Hindu, 29.10. 2005.

²⁰ V Nyu-Delhi increasingly more victims / / Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31.10.2005.

^{Rajamohan R.J} 21. Terrorist Attack in Bangalore: A Profile // Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report N 10, fan. 2006, p. 4.

²² Varanasi blasts mastermind, 5 accomplices arrested // The Hindu, 06.04.2006.

^{Singh T.Khurshchev} 23. The LeT Menace in Delhi, 11.05.2007 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheLeTMenaceinDelhi_TK Singh 110507

^{Swami P} 24. A Terrorist Organization Rises Again // The Hindu, 24.03.2006.

^{Swami P.} 25, Puri L. Serial terror strikes claim 35 lives in Doda and Udhampur // The Hindu, 02.05.2006.

²⁶ India police: Pakistan spy agency behind Mumbai bombings - http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/30/india.bombs/indexhtml?section=cnn world#

^{Gupta S} 27. Pak hand, says NSA; Arjun, Antulay have a different lake //The Indian Express, 14.06.2006.

^{Singh T. Khurshvhcv} 28. Op. cit.

²⁹ Text of PM-Musharraf joint statement // The Hindu, 17.09.2006 - http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/17/stories/2006091716001000.htm

^{Swami P} 30. Plot against peace - http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file-20070309006112100.htm&date=f1 2404/&prd-fline&

³¹ A Brief Report on Hyderabad Blasts: 25 August 2007 - http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/RegionalAnalysis/SouthAsia/Brief%20report%20on%20b.yderabad %20blasts.pdf

³² Ammonium nitrate: Terrorists' toy, 14.09.2008 - http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/14delblast11.htm

³³ 23 terror modules operate in Uttar Pradesh - http://specials.redift.com/news/2007/nov/23sld01.htm

^{Singh T. Khurshchev} 34. Uttar Pradesh Emerging as a Terror Hub, 10.01.2008 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/UttarPradeshEmergingasaTerrorHub_TKSingh_10 0108

³⁵ Population by religious communities. Census of India (2001) - http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_data_finde r/C_Series/Population_by_religious_communities.htm

^{Singh T. Khurshchev} 36, Singh M.A. A Pattern of Terrorist Strikes on Places of Worship, 15.10. 2007 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/APatternofTerroristStrikesonPlaccsofWorship_MA Singh%2C%20TKSingh_151007

³⁷ Serial bomb blasts in Jaipur (India): 13 May 2008 / International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research - http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/RegionalAnalysis/SouthAsia/Serial%20bomb%20blasts%20in%20Ja ipur.pdf

^{Singh T. Khurshchev} 38. Who are the "Indian Mujahideen"? 13.05.2008 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/WhoaretheIndian Mujahideen_ThangjamKliurshchevSingh_300508

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ Bjp blames UPA for terror attack - http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/may/13rajblast1 .htm

^{Singh T. Khurshchev} 41. The July 2008 Terrorist Attacks in Bengaluru and Ahmedabad, 12.08.2008 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheJuly2008TerroristAttacksinBengaluruandAhme dabad_TKSingh_120808

⁴² Ibidem.

^{Wilson J.} 43, Chakrabarty K.D. India-Pakistan Relations After Mumbai Attacks // Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief, N 21, September 2009, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Serial Bomb Blasts in Delhi, India, 13 September 2008 - http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/RegionalAnalysis/SouthAsia/Serial%20Bomb%20Blasts%20in%20D elhi%20India.pdf

^{Goswami N} 45. Averting Terror Attacks (25 September 2008) - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/AvertingTerrorAttacks_NG_oswami_250908

⁴⁶ Terror's new face: After Al Qaeda...

^{Srivastava D} 47. Terrorism and Armed Violence in India: An Analysis of Events in 2008 // Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies Special Report, N 71, May 2009, p. 14 - 15.

^{Goswami N} 48. Averting Terror Attacks, 25.09.2008 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/AvertingTerrorAttacks_NGoswami_250908

^{Ghosh S} 49. Mumbai Terror Attacks: An Analysis // Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, N 66, Feb. 2009. p. 2 - 3.

^WilsonJ. 50, Chakrabarty K.D. Op. cit., p. 5 - 6.

⁵¹ New group owns up to Pune blast // Hindustan Times.com - http://www.hindustantimes.com/New-group-owns-up-to-Pune-blast/H1-Article1 - 509630.aspx

⁵² PM directs Interior Ministry to implement SAARC Joint Declaration // Associated Press of Pakistan. 1.07.2010.

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