1term population forecasting is gradually becoming part of the practice of social sciences. The UN Population Department regularly publishes such forecasts for countries, major regions, and the world as a whole. Verification of forecasts made by the UN earlier shows a fairly high degree of reliability. The results of demographic forecasts are used to analyze development prospects in a wide variety of areas, since the population is both the main producer of goods and services, and the main consumer of natural resources. Identifying "bottlenecks" in the economy of the future provides a basis for forecasting in the field of politics and in the social sphere. A significant limitation is that the commonly used demographic forecasting methodology is quite complex and makes it difficult to conduct research in other disciplinary areas (economics, sociology, etc.) and perform similar calculations. The article presents the results of calculations based on the method developed by the author and tested by time. The possibilities of long-term forecasting of processes related to population growth are shown. On this basis, the tasks that arise in related branches of social science in long-term forecasting are formulated.

POPULATION FORECAST

The population size in this forecast is calculated according to the author's method of changing the modes of demographic development (operational description of the demographic transition).2. This methodology is based on identifying several ways of demographic transition, i.e. development from high birth and death rates to low ones. After the demographic transition is completed, the death rate begins to exceed the birth rate due to the aging of the population - an increase in the proportion of elderly people with an increase in average life expectancy and a low birth rate. The demographic transition calculated by the method of changing modes of demographic development is described in connection with the socio-economic development of the population.-

1 Based on the methodology of changing demographic development regimes in the second half of the 1970s, the author gave a forecast for 2000 of the world population in general and for a number of regions and countries, in particular, according to 1975 data.The forecast of the world population given by the UN is more accurate only by 1.14 percentage points. For the regions selected for the forecast using the operational description of the demographic transition, the average error of the UN forecast was 11.73%, which is on average 0.1 percentage points more accurate than the author's forecast.

2 The methodology and all forecast calculations are described in more detail in our book " 2300: Global Problems and Russia "(Moscow, 2008).

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gress, which means taking into account the fact that reducing the birth rate and mortality is possible only at a certain level of economic development.

One of the most fundamental problems of long-term forecasting of the world population is the answer to the question of whether it will be stable after the demographic transition is completed or will decrease. In this paper, the calculation is based on the assumption of natural population decline under the conditions of its aging. This hypothesis assumes a high standard of living, good health care while maintaining a small number of families (analogs are modern Western European countries and Japan).

The forecast calculations were performed according to four scenarios: the maximum, minimum, and average options, respectively, are the slowest, fastest, and average options for changing modes and expiration dates for each mode, as well as the real one. The latter scenario provides for a more rapid reduction in population growth in South Asian countries and immigration to Europe, North America, and Australia and New Zealand before 2300, while for the rest of the scenarios, the natural population decline in these countries and regions is not mitigated by immigration after 2100.

A comparison of forecast scenarios showing the dynamics of the world population as a whole up to 2300 is presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Comparison of forecast options up to 2300

Option

Growth period, number of years

Growth, million people

Maximum value, million people

Year when the maximum value was reached

Period of population loss, number of years

Loss, million people

Population in 2300, million people

Average

105

6907

13371

2110

190

7252

6119

Max.

215

23222

29686

2220-2225

75

6063

23623

Minimum

45

2342

8806

2050

250

5939

2867

The real one

90

4903

11367

2095

205

6219

5148

Since all scenarios are based on changing modes of demographic development, and the last one in this scheme is the mode of natural population decline, all graphs have a similar nature of changes: growth, reaching the maximum, then decline.

If we do not consider the maximum and minimum scenarios, then the estimated period of population growth is approximately 100 years, and the growth during this time will be 5-7 billion rubles. humans, i.e. the world's population, may double in the next 100 years. Level 11.4-13.3 billion. a person is the maximum number of the world's population, after which there is a period of decline lasting about 200 years. This decline "eats up" all the growth over the previous 100 years, and by 2300, the average population size is slightly less than the current one, and the real one is 1.3 billion less than the current one. human.

Calculations show that the natural decline in population over two centuries does not cause an extremely large reduction in the world's population as a whole, which would call into question the possibility of the existence of a developed civilization of a modern type.

As for the minimum option, this is a level that can be achieved, but only with very large development efforts in countries that have not yet completed the demographic transition. The maximum option shows what could have happened if the socio-economic and demographic development of Asian and African countries were allowed to happen

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take it easy. Obviously, Asia and Africa are the regions where the main population growth will occur. Even Latin America, with all the scale of demographic processes in this region, gives a much smaller increase to world growth.

In the table. 2 and 3 show the dynamics of the share of large regions in the total population of the Earth. Currently, Europe, North America and Oceania account for approximately 17% of the world's population, while Asia and Africa account for 74% (the difference between these groups of regions is approximately 4.3 times). According to the average scenario, their ratio changes to 11 and 81% in 2050, and to 8.5 and 85% in 2100. This is a tenfold gap. By 2300. it changes to 6.7% and 87%, i.e. the gap increases to 13 times.

Table 2

Share of large regions in the total population under the average scenario

Year
Region

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

Europe

728.4

11.3

738.2

6.9

651.3

4.9

506.9

4.1

394.5

4.1

307.1

4.0

239.0

3.9

Asia

3905.2

60.4

6408.8

60.0

7753.7

58.4

7126.4

58.3

5633.5

58.4

4384.6

57.2

3412.6

55.8

Africa

905.6

14.0

2246.8

21.1

3501.7

26.4

3474.1

28.4

2749.2

28.5

2278.0

29.7

1911.3

31.2

North America

330.5

5.1

408.5

3.8

418.8

3.2

325.9

2.7

253.7

2.6

197.4

2.6

153.7

2.5

Latin America

561.1

8.7

824.9

7.7

908.7

6.8

752.8

6.2

585.9

6.1

471.7

6.2

382.8

6.3

Australia and Oceania

33.1

0.5

46.2

0.4

50.9

0.4

41.5

0.3

32.3

0.3

25.1

0.3

19.6

0.3

The world at large

6463.9

100.0

10673.4

100.0

13285.0

100.0

12227.6

100.0

9649.0

100.0

7663.9

100.0

6118.9

100.0

Table 3

Share of regions in the total population under the real scenario

Year
Region

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

millions of people

%

Europe

728.4

11.3

738.2

7.3

651.3

5.7

569.7

5.8

498.8

6.4

437.1

6.9

383.3

7.4

Asia

3905.2

60.4

5867.4

57.9

5831.0

51.3

4644.1

47.1

3614.6

46.3

2813.3

44.5

2189.6

42.5

Africa

905.6

14.0

2246.8

22.2

3501.7

30.8

3474.1

35.3

2749.2

35.2

2278.0

36.0

1911.3

37.1

North America

330.5

5.1

408.5

4.0

418.8

3.7

369.5

3.7

325.9

4.2

287.6

4.6

253.7

4.9

Latin America

561.1

8.7

824.9

8.1

908.7

8.0

752.8

7.6

585.9

7.5

471.7

7.5

382.8

7.4

Australia and Oceania

33.1

0.5

46.2

0.5

51.7

0.5

44.9

0.5

38.0

0.5

32.2

0.5

27.4

0.5

The world at large

6463.9

100.0

10132.1

100.0

11363.2

100.0

9855.0

100.0

7812.3

100.0

6319.8

100.0

5148.1

100.0

In the real scenario, the initial ratio between the currently economically developed regions that have completed the demographic transition and Asia and Africa in 17 and 74% by 2050 changes to 12 and 80%, which is not very different from the average

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the script. In 2100, the ratio is 10 and 82%, i.e. the gap is only 8 times, and not 10, as in the average scenario. In 2300. It is 12.8% and 79.5%, a difference of 6.2 times, i.e. less due to immigration to Europe, the United States and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand.

In Asia and Africa, demographic development will not be uniform. The most populous are East Asia, where the population is determined by China, South Asia, which includes India and such large population countries as Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as Iran, and sub-Saharan Africa, where the most populous country is Nigeria. Together, they now account for 59% of the world's population, with East and South Asia roughly equal, and Africa twice as much as each of the two Asian regions.

According to the average scenario, by 2050, South Asia is the undisputed leader (30.4% of the world's population), and sub-Saharan Africa overtakes East Asia (18.1% vs. 17.3%). The success of China's demographic policy makes this forecast very likely. China is becoming a demographically advanced country, and the demographic problems of oversupply are concentrated in two regions: South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, in other regions, such as West Asia and North Africa, overpopulation problems are very acute due to the fact that the natural environment of these regions is desert, but their scale is smaller here due to the smaller population. West Asia and North Africa currently account for 3% of the world's population.

The environmental problems of South Asia (the small territory of Bangladesh, the predominance of deserts in Pakistan) make it problematic for long-term population growth in these countries without the threat of an environmental catastrophe. At the same time, India's economic success in recent years, as well as the convincing victory of state policies to reduce the birth rate in Iran3, where Islam has not become an obstacle to modernization in this area, suggest that the demographic transition in this region will occur faster.

This reflects a realistic scenario in which sub-Saharan Africa is consistently ahead of South Asia by 2100 (27.4% vs. 23%). The possibility of rapid population growth in Africa calls into question such a factor as the AIDS epidemic in this region. At the same time, this may be a prerequisite for demographic growth later, since population growth here is now almost suspended and an improvement in the situation with AIDS-related deaths may be the beginning of a compensatory increase in population growth, which will later be replaced by a demographic transition.

In any scenario, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are regions where demographic problems and their socio-economic consequences will be very acute in the coming decades. It will probably require the efforts of the international community to help solve these problems. Assistance may be needed to prevent humanitarian disasters in the event of famine, but promoting the economic and social development of problem regions or those parts of the countries in those regions that are most in need of assistance may be more effective.

Although the demographic growth of Arab countries does not have as strong an impact on global development as population growth in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, it should be pointed out that the local consequences of such growth can be significant. If in 2005 the population of Europe was 8.1% of the world, and the total population of West Asia and North Africa was 6.1%, then in 2050, according to

3 A sample survey of 90,000 Iranian women conducted in accordance with international standards in 2000 showed that the total fertility rate in the country is 2.0 children per woman. See: [Iran Achievements Replacement - Level Fertility / / Population Today, May / June 2002, p. 8-9].

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According to the average version of the forecast, it will change to 5.2% against 6.6%, i.e. the population of all Europe from Spain to Estonia will be less than the total population of the Arab countries and Turkey. This creates a huge potential for emigration to Europe from Arab countries.

The Demographic Division of the Economic and Social Department of the UN Secretariat in 2004 published a forecast until 2300 and discussed it by experts [World Population in 2300..., 2004].

The UN's long-term forecast provides for five scenarios for changing the reproduction of the world's population. They are based on the UN forecast to 2050, which was made in 2002 as a regularly revised calculation of the prospective population size. All scenarios include hypotheses of a gradual increase in life expectancy after 2050 and zero migration.

Scenarios differ in their total fertility prediction4. A comparison of scenarios shows the fundamental difference between the hypotheses in the UN forecast and the author's forecast.

The differences in forecasts are as follows::

1. Variants of the UN forecast provide for slower population growth in the first half of the 21st century than the author's variants.

2. The author's scenarios lead to one form of forecast population dynamics: growth, reaching a maximum, and population decline. At the same time, the UN's medium and zero-growth scenarios predict an almost stable population level.

3. The population dynamics for both minimum scenarios are similar (the curves vary equally), and the difference is mainly due to the difference in the baseline level in 2050. The minimum value for 2300 in the UN forecast is 2.3 billion rubles. people, and in the author's forecast - 2.9 billion. human. In general, the UN forecast deviates little from the ideology of population stabilization, and the author's forecast is more focused on analyzing dynamics with accelerated growth, reaching a peak, and then a steady decline in the population.

The UN forecast assumes unprecedented rapid demographic changes in the world in the coming decades. The method of changing the modes of demographic development is largely based on precedents and suggests a more conservative option.

ASSESSMENT OF THE POPULATION'S RESOURCE NEEDS

The above quantitative estimates show that the next century may be very stressful for the Earth's resource system, exhaustible and renewable natural resources, and the ecological system. Even a low population growth rate means large population increases, and socio-economic development requires an accelerated increase in the consumption of natural resources.

In the context of economic globalization, competition for scarce resources can lead to acute conflicts that are detrimental to the unity of the world economy and the process of globalization. Conflicts, rather than achievements, can become global. A strong and concerted effort by the international community will be required to provide the growing population with the necessary resources in a balanced manner. At the same time, if, thanks to the efforts of the world community, progress is made in the development of currently lagging countries in the next hundred years and their demographic and socio-economic condition is quite stable, then the gradual decline in the world population will mitigate the severity of global life support problems.

4 Total fertility is a characteristic that shows how many children a woman will give birth to on average during the childbearing period.

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The population forecast, on the one hand, needs to be checked for feasibility, since there are environmental, economic and social constraints on population growth, and on the other hand, it makes it possible to predict variables that are not related to demographic ones, but are related to population growth. Among these variables, which can limit demographic development, constraining economic growth, and can themselves be calculated for the future using population data, the need for fuel and energy resources (FER) that ensure industrial development, and in natural resources for food production.

The analysis of energy and food problems and prospects for civilizational interaction in our long-term calculation is primarily aimed at a more complete and accurate description of the features and prospects of demographic development. The normative method becomes the most convenient tool for analyzing energy and food problems. Since demographic development regimes are based on the dependence of demographic indicators on the level of socio-economic development, it is possible to determine approximate values of numerical variables that characterize the energy and food problems that correspond to a certain level of socio-economic development, and therefore to the modes of demographic growth. Then, having a population forecast made using standard modes of demographic development, it is possible to correlate these modes and the standards developed in retrospect, thus obtaining the needs for certain resources to provide for the population. Of course, we can assume that the standards will change significantly, but this is only a reason for one or more calculations, and not for refusing them.

Since the formation of minerals is beyond the control of mankind, it seems quite obvious that their reserves are finite. Unlike metals, coal, oil, and natural gas can only be used once. It is the non-renewable nature of mineral fuel, which currently forms the basis of the global fuel and energy balance, that makes the energy problem particularly important. Modern industrial civilization is largely based on the consumption of large amounts of energy. Energy efficiency may increase, the structure of production may change in favor of less energy-intensive goods, but the energy economy will remain one of the foundations of the modern system of productive forces.

While reducing the energy intensity of economic growth in developed countries, there is a rapid increase in the consumption of fuel and energy resources in developing and transition economies undergoing a period of industrialization. The uneven distribution of fuel resources across countries necessitates large-scale international trade in coal, oil, and natural gas. The combination of these conditions makes the energy problem global.

The question is whether the lack of energy resources will not be a condition that limits the development of mankind. At present, let us repeat this once again, the energy problem is not acute, but it is potentially possible to create situations that will exacerbate it.

In order for the population growth envisaged in the demographic forecast to be realized, it is necessary to ensure adequate food production. The growth of global agriculture in recent decades has significantly reduced the severity of the problem of hunger, but for developing countries, the challenge of balancing food and a growing population will be of great importance in the coming decades. With population growth, agriculture should, on the one hand, ensure an increase in per capita consumption, and on the other, expand in such a way that

page 100
feed an increasing number of people. Thus, the food problem can significantly worsen with the growth of the population. The obvious question is whether, with existing and even new technologies, it will be possible to feed the growing population of developing countries with very limited agricultural land resources and the emerging shortage of fresh water in these countries.

DETERMINATION OF THE PER CAPITA NEED FOR FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX IN THE FUTURE

The most general indicator of the level of fuel and energy resources needs is their consumption per capita. This indicator depends on the structure of the industry, the climate, and the size of a particular country, since fuel and energy resources are spent in large quantities on covering distances by vehicles. However, on average, it reflects the overall level of needs related to technological and economic development. In other words, without achieving a certain level of fuel and energy consumption, it is impossible to achieve the development of productive forces and economic well-being.

The problem boils down to defining such levels or macroeconomic standards that, on the one hand, would reflect the group or individual differences of countries in terms of climate, territory, etc., and on the other, would characterize the levels of consumption that need to be achieved to create a modern technological level of production and a modern way of life.

The trend towards a reduction in fuel and energy consumption per capita in developed countries, which began in the 1980s, has proved to be unstable. The United States and European countries have almost returned to the pre-crisis level of per capita consumption, while Japan has significantly exceeded it. This is a somewhat unexpected result, as consumption growth in recent years has occurred in the context of a new economic growth model, in which the share of energy-intensive industries is lower than before, and the share of services in the economy is higher, which should reduce the need for fuel and energy resources. It turned out that in the conditions of low energy prices, their savings at the macro level do not become a sustainable trend.

Since the basis for calculating the level of consumption is the demographic forecast, and its main indicator is the population, the first step for forecasting in the energy sector is to determine the per capita consumption of fuel and energy complex.

To calculate the global balance, the need was calculated for large regions (Table 4).
Since currently the main consumers of fuel are developed countries, different standards are set for individual regions.

Table 4

Fuel and energy needs per capita by major regions, kg per person per year

Year
Region

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Europe

5000

5000

5000

5000

5000

5000

5000

Asia

1100

1500

2000

5000

5000

5000

5000

Africa

450

900

2000

5000

5000

5000

5000

North America

11000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

10000

Latin America

1300

2000

5000

5000

5000

5000

5000

Australia and Oceania

6000

6000

6000

6000

6000

6000

6000

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For European countries, a single standard of 5 tons per person per year is established. In the northern countries, including Russia, it is higher, while in the southern countries it is lower. In Australia and North America, per capita consumption is consistently higher than this level: about 6 tons per person per year in Australia and about 11 tons in North America. For Australia, consumption of 6 tons is set for the entire calculation period, and for North America, it is planned to reduce as a result of more rational use to 10 tons by 2050 and maintain this level in the future.

For other regions, a single standard of 5 tons per person per year is established. The experience of Japan, which is very advanced both in terms of production and consumption, shows that even with a warmer climate than in Europe, the consumption of fuel and energy resources per capita is about 5 tons. This coincidence is probably due to the fact that industrial, including electric power, transport, household and municipal fuel consumption in countries of the same level of development is provided by similar technologies. As for climate differences, in countries with cold climates, fuel and energy are used to increase the temperature of domestic and industrial premises, and where the climate is hot, air conditioning is necessary, which requires a large amount of electricity.

The next calculation task for Asia, Africa, and Latin America was to determine the time frame for reaching the standard consumption values. In our forecast, these dates are linked to demographic development. As we noted above, the demographic transition is linked to socio-economic development, and the reference countries correspond to the modes of demographic development. This correspondence implies that countries that have reached a certain level of demographic development should have an appropriate socio-economic level. One of the most important indicators of this level is the consumption of fuel and energy resources per capita. China's experience in recent years shows that effective catch-up development requires a rapid increase in the consumption of fuel and energy complex 5.

For the analysis, we used data from the average and real variants of the demographic forecast. Although the calculation, especially for Asia, was carried out for a large number of countries and regions, it is possible to determine the prevailing modes of demographic development in the region, especially in large countries that determine the average indicators for the region. In addition, another benchmark is the current global average level of consumption per capita. It is equal to about 2 tons per person.

By 2050, Latin American countries will be dominated by demographic development regimes that are typical of developed economies during the period of industrial development, and by 2100, the region will be dominated by demographic regimes that are typical of European countries at present. The regional average for 2050 is set at the level of the current global average, and for 2100-at the level of modern Europe and Japan.6
5 V. A. Melyantsev points out that " ... the economic breakthrough of Asian fast-growing countries is largely due, among other reasons, to the relatively high dynamics of energy consumption. In the 1980s and early 2000s, the average annual growth rate of this indicator per capita in the largest Eastern countries - China and India - reached 1.8-1.9%. That is, they were 1.5 times higher than the average for all other developing countries (1.1-1.3% per year, including 0.3-0.4% in Latin America, 0.3 - 0.4% in Tropical Africa, and almost 2.5 times higher than in developed countries (0.7-0.8% per year)" [Melyantsev, 2006, pp. 157-158].

6 Per capita fuel and energy requirements may hide the differences in economic development paths that actually exist in different regions. How strong they are between Latin America and East Asia is clearly demonstrated by S. V. Zhukov and A. Ya.Elyanov in their article "Developing Countries: the Asymmetry of globalization" [Vostok (Oriens), 2006, N 6, pp. 64-82]. Nevertheless, modern economically developed countries also have different economic structures, but similar levels of fuel and energy consumption, so the specifics of industrial development are often not so important for forecasting needs.

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Table 5

Forecast of fuel and energy consumption based on the average scenario of the demographic forecast for large regions up to 2300, million tons of CU. t.

Year
Region

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Europe

3642.0

3691.0

3256.3

2534.4

1972.6

1535.3

1194.9

Asia

4295.7

9613.1

15507.4

35632.1

28167.3

21923.1

17063.0

Africa

407.5

2022.1

7003.4

17370.6

13745.8

11390.1

9556.7

North America

3635.5

4084.9

4187.8

3259.4

2536.9

1974.5

1536.8

Latin America

729.4

1649.8

4543.3

3763.8

2929.4

2358.3

1913.8

Australia and Oceania

198.6

277.5

305.4

248.8

193.7

150.7

117.3

The world at large

12908.8

21338.5

34803.6

62809.2

49545.6

39331.9

31382.5

Table 6

Forecast of fuel and energy consumption based on a real-world demographic forecast scenario for large regions up to 2300, million tons of CU. t.

Year
Region

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Europe

3642.0

3691.0

3256.3

2848.3

2493.8

2185.3

1916.4

Asia

4295.7

8801.2

11662.1

23220.5

18072.8

14066.3

10948.0

Africa

407.5

2022.1

7003.4

17370.6

13745.8

11390.1

9556.7

North America

3635.5

4084.9

4187.8

3694.6

3259.4

2875.5

2536.9

Latin America

729.4

1649.8

4543.3

3763.8

2929.4

2358.3

1913.8

Australia and Oceania

198.6

277.5

310.4

269.4

227.9

193.4

164.7

The world at large

12908.8

20526.6

30963.3

51167.2

40729.1

33068.9

27036.4

For Asia and Africa, demographic evolution is similar. These regions follow the path of Latin America, but with a delay of 50 years. By 2100. they reach the current global average, and by 2150-the level of modern Europe and Japan. The 2050 levels are determined by interpolating the 2005 and 2100 levels. Given Africa's strong lag, the current option for changing consumption standards calls for rapid catch-up development in Africa.

It is possible to perform more accurate calculations with interpolation and extrapolation of time series of fuel and energy consumption, but, in our opinion, a combination of calculations and simple logic of setting indicators is necessary in order to make the qualitative meaning of the established levels of standards for predictive calculation clear. You can make further adjustments later, if necessary. In general, the assumptions made ensure that demographic and economic development in the forecast period is consistent with the current technical and socio-economic model of society.

DETERMINATION OF PROJECTED FUEL AND ENERGY DEMAND VOLUMES

The next step is to calculate the needs for the population as a whole, which is a multiplication of the per capita standard by the population size (Table 1). 5 and 6).

page 103
Table 7

Accumulated fuel and energy needs up to 2300 according to the average and real forecast scenarios, billion tons of CU. t.

Year
of Writing

2005-2050

2005-2100

2005-2150

2005-2200

2005-2250

2005-2300

Average

771

2174

4614

7423

9645

11413

The real one

752

2040

4093

6390

8235

9738

According to calculations, the total demand for fuel and energy resources will increase by 4-5 times by 2150. This means an average annual growth of 1-1. 1% over 145 years, which is not improbable, despite the very large increase in the volume of fuel and energy consumption. The subsequent decline is associated with a decrease in the world's population. The most significant growth occurs in the countries of Asia and Africa, which, according to the logic of our forecast, need it for economic development that ensures the conditions of demographic transition. In other words, the accelerated development and economic growth of these regions are necessary not only to combat poverty and inequality in the global economy, but also to reduce the growth rate of the world population, which will ultimately reduce the pressure on the limited resources of the planet.

The use of the normative method in the analysis of fuel and energy needs allows us to estimate the amount of resources needed, and the next step is to analyze the possibilities of finding these resources, producing the necessary amount of energy and covering the existing needs.

This raises the question: are the necessary resources available to cover the identified needs? To answer this question, it is necessary to determine the accumulated total fuel and energy requirements for the calculation period and compare them with the available resources.

Accumulated total requirements are determined in the following way. The calculation is based on data for seven years: 2005, 2050, 2100, 2150, 2200, 2250 and 2300. It is hypothesized that the growth of needs between these years is linear. Then the total consumption over a 50-year period can be calculated as the area of the trapezoid. Its bases are the consumption levels in neighboring years out of the seven indicated above, and one of the sides is the time interval (45 and 50 years). Then the accumulated needs for the period will be the product of the half sum of consumption for two adjacent years by the number of years of the period:

S = 1/2(a + b) t, where

S - demand over 45 or 50 years,

a and b - needs for two adjacent years,

t is a period of 45 or 50 years.

The calculation results are shown in Table. 7. It can be seen that accumulated needs are non-decreasing, but over time, the rate of their growth slows down significantly as the population stops growing and decreases. It should be noted that if the population size were stabilized, the growth in demand would be greater.

CALCULATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERING FUEL AND ENERGY NEEDS

The calculated demand can be met either by burning fossil fuels or from other sources. These include hydro and nuclear power, as well as renewable energy sources (solar, wind, geothermal energy, biomass, etc.). The main source of energy remains fossil fuels, which account for 4/5 of fuel and energy complex production, although from 1971 to 2000 their share

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Table 8

Accumulated needs for coal, oil and gas according to the average and real scenarios of the demographic forecast, billion tons of cu. t.

Year
Scenario

2005-2050

2005-2100

2005-2150

2005-2200

2005-2250

2005-2300

Average

616

1739

3692

5939

7716

9130

The real one

602

1632

3274

5112

6588

7790

Table 9

Calculation of total coal, oil and gas reserves in the world as of the end of 2006

Fuel type

Unit of measurement

Initial volumes

Coefficient to convert to Yandex units of money.

million tons of cu. t.

Hard coal

million tons

478771

1

478771

Brown coal

million tons

430293

:2

215147

Oil with oil shale

million tons

191000

x 1.5

286500

Gas

billion cubic meters

181460

x 0.90 x 1.5

244971

Total

-

-

-

1225389

--- Source: BP Global Energy Database http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview

decreased by 6.5 percentage points. Over the same three decades, the share of nuclear energy has grown 13-fold, but it does not even reach 7%. The shares of hydropower and renewable energy sources are almost stable.

The growth prospects for alternative fossil fuel energy sources are quite contradictory. For the long-term calculation, we will assume the total share of alternative energy sources to fossil fuels at 20% and leave it unchanged for the entire period of the forecast calculation. Obviously, this assumption is very conservative and does not take into account the possibility of a radical change in the balance of fuel and energy resources as a result of scientific and technological progress. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to establish as the initial version of the calculation the possibility of practically extrapolating to the future what is available now, those technologies that actually exist on an industrial scale, those ratios of industries of the fuel and energy complex that have developed in the world. The extrapolation approach will allow us to test the sustainability of the current energy management system in the context of population growth and increasing its needs.

Fossil fuel needs, which represent 80% of those shown in Table 7, are shown in Table 8.

The volumes of available coal, oil and gas resources are calculated based on information from the British Petroleum database [BP Statistical Review of..., 2007], sections "Oil-Proved Reserves, Gas - Proved Reserves, Coal-Reserves". From these tables, the totals for the world as a whole (Total World) are taken. Conversion factors for calculating the amount of reference fuel equalizing different calorific values of fuel types are taken from the "Approximate conversion factors" section of the same database. The calculation results are shown in Table 9.

The total amount is 1225 billion tons of CU With the above-calculated demand (Table. 8) these reserves will be depleted in 75-80 years.

The analysis shows that the lack of fuel and energy resources can be a serious obstacle to human development and slow down population growth due to the lack of energy resources.-

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Table 10

Forecast of availability of arable land for the world population, ha per person

Year
Scenario

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Average

0.22

0.13

0.11

0.11

0.15

0.18

0.23

The real one

0.22

0.14

0.12

0.14

0.18

0.22

0.27

lack of sufficient resources for the development of an industrial economy 7. It will take a lot of effort for resources to become a commercial product that is provided at a reasonable price. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the necessary technical means and economic mechanisms to meet the growing needs of humanity have been developed. If there are problems in providing fuel and energy, a large reserve can lead to fuel savings, including in extreme cases the rejection of energy-intensive types of consumption such as passenger cars, which can ensure a balance of production and consumption.

CALCULATION OF LAND AND WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR AGRICULTURE

Land and water are the most important resources for the production of agricultural products, which form the basis of human nutrition. With the continuous improvement of the productive forces in agriculture, these two factors remain crucial, at least in economic terms. In any agricultural system, yield, i.e. output per unit area, is a very significant criterion of efficiency. Both land and water are used for household needs other than agriculture. Their abundance or scarcity is important for the economy as a whole.

For a general assessment of the available land resources for agriculture, we will use the data of the World Bank's publication "2006 World Development Indicators" on the website http://devdata.worldbank.org. According to Table 3.1. "Rural population and land use", the total land area is 1296.63 million square kilometers. The share of arable land is stable at 10.8%. It was at this level in both 1990 and 2003.

Based on the demographic forecast and the above-mentioned land area and the constant share of arable land, the calculation of arable land area per person for the future up to 2300 is made according to the average and real scenarios (Table 10).

The trend is that in the twenty-first century, without expanding the area of arable land, the average land supply per capita in the world will decrease twice - to 11-12 acres, and the current level will be reached only in the middle of the twenty-first century. As well as providing fuel and energy resources, natural population decline reduces the severity of the problem, but over the next decades the problem will become more acute all over the world. Of course, it is possible to expand arable land and increase yields, but these opportunities need to be explored, because if they are not used, humanity may face a food shortage due to a lack of agricultural land. In order to increase the productivity of agricultural land, the possibility of irrigation is of great importance, since it radically raises yields, but irrigation requires a large amount of fresh water.

According to the 2006 World Development Indicators, the world's renewable freshwater resources amount to 43507000 million cubic meters. m per year (Table 3.5. "Freshwater" on the site http://devdata.worldbank.org.) Further, based on the demographic forecast data-

7 S. P. Kapitsa points out the danger of loss of stability of the world system during the demographic transition by developing countries. See: [Kapitsa, 1999].

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for the calculation of the per capita supply of fresh water on average in the world (Table 11).

Table 11

Global average fresh water consumption according to the average and real versions of the demographic forecast, cubic meters per person per year

Year
Scenario

2005

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Average

6730.8

4076.2

3274.9

3558.1

4509.0

5676.9

7110.3

The real one

6730.8

4294.0

3828.8

4414.7

5569.1

6884.3

8451.1

In the coming decades, humanity will find itself in a situation of global freshwater scarcity, as the availability of less than 5,000 cubic meters per person per year falls under the definition of "low". Since many consumers, including municipal and industrial consumers, need water, agriculture, which is currently the largest consumer of water, will find itself in a difficult situation. Geographical redistribution of agricultural production to areas that do not experience water scarcity is inevitable.

Of course, desalination of seawater offers unlimited possibilities, but it is energy-intensive, and, as was shown above, energy resources in the period when there is a shortage of fresh water, will also be scarce or expensive.

Thus, despite the great technological, agronomic and economic achievements that have ensured the modern socio-economic development of most countries of the world, the threat of facing planetary growth constraints in the form of fuel, energy and food shortages has not been completely eliminated. If development continues according to the current technological and economic model and the link between economic and demographic development remains as it was in the twentieth century, then in a few decades the problem of the limits of population and economic growth may become not only real, but also acute.

CIVILIZATIONAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The growing economic integration of the world's countries, the formation of a global information space, and intensive international population migration are taking place in the context of interaction between different civilizations that make up the world's population.

The definition of "civilization" is not simple. If we reduce the concept of civilization to the applied level, which provides useful interpretations of real facts, then the main features of the civilizational concept are two. The first is the recognition that " ... culture and various types of cultural identification (which at the broadest level are the identification of civilization) determine models of cohesion, disintegration and conflict "[Huntington, 2003, p. 15]. Second, the life cycle of a civilization goes from birth to growth, flourishing, and then to decay.

What are the options for the existence of a European civilization and its coexistence with other civilizations, based on the conditions that follow from the demographic forecast, i.e. an increase in the population of Asian, African and Latin American countries with a decrease in the population of Europe, including Russia, North America, Australia and Japan? As a first approximation, they can be represented as the following scenarios describing the state of society in a very long-term perspective::

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1. "Convergence of Civilizations". As a result of intensive international communication, joint activities in the global economy, and changes in the mentality of equalizing consumption levels in different countries, carriers of all civilizations have become so close in their mentality that any joint activity has no civilizational restrictions, people have become so "used" to each other that there is no antagonism between carriers of different civilizational values. Cultural differences will remain, but they will not be the cause of hostility or hindrance to joint activities.

2. "The Triumph of technology". The development of biology and applied biotechnologies has led to the general practice of increasing life expectancy and mass active longevity in developed countries. At the same time, there was a significant development of technologies related to the creation of artificial intelligence and manipulators, which led to the widespread introduction of unmanned technologies in production and services. Mass cheap labor has become almost unnecessary. The sphere of labor has largely become creative, and man as an instrument of production and a buyer has been displaced by a few creators who live in harmony with the environment, which is not very difficult due to the small size of this group. Population decline is not perceived as a problem, as extra people are just a nuisance.

3. "Celebration of the rentier". Industrial production is moving away from Western countries, but it retains its position as a scientific, technical and financial leader in the global economy. Countries outside the elite circle are unable to catch up with the leaders and are forced to engage in real production, pay for the purchase of new technologies, as well as pay for financial services and loans provided by world leaders.

Under these conditions, Western countries continue to be leaders in the global economy. They are not concerned about population decline, since such an economy does not require a large number of employees. They are only interested in importing labor in the form of "brain drain", i.e. attracting the most gifted people from other countries. The West lends its financial and intellectual capital to others and receives income (rent) for it.

4. "Europe-Russian village". Shifting production to what are now called developing countries means that jobs are also moving to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Young and energetic Europeans, Japanese, and US residents employed in multinational companies become citizens of the world, move from country to country within the company, while in Europe, Japan, and to a lesser extent in the United States, old people remain, and business life freezes. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and a number of European countries, such as France, Spain, Italy, Poland, and the Netherlands, developed agriculture remains and develops because it can withstand international competition. The low birth rate leads to a reduction in the population, and immigrants are few in number, as there are no jobs or social assistance systems for them in Europe as a result of prolonged deindustrialization.8
5. "Angry neighbors". Immigration from Asia, Africa and Latin America to developed countries over a long period of time and on a significant scale has led to the formation of large communities of immigrants from developing countries who are citizens of Western countries and are integrated into the economy.-

8 Deindustrialization can be a long process, fraught with the loss of economic leadership not as a result of economic decline, but because other states are developing faster. This is what happened to the Netherlands, the economic leader of the seventeenth century, but which ceased to be so in the eighteenth century with the decline of industrial production as a result of competition with England. This is described in detail by D. S. Landes in The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (N.Y., W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1999, Ch. 26).

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these countries, but are not carriers of Western culture and do not want to change their values and culture to Western ones. Cohabitation of different civilizations on the same territory becomes inevitable, but it proceeds in the form of segregation, antagonism, hostility and rejection of each other's values.

6. " Western Man is an endangered species." The long-term decline in the population in Western countries with intensive constant immigration of non-cultural population has led to the fact that the carriers of Western civilization have become a minority among the new newcomers, who have successfully mastered the material culture of the West, settled in a new place, feel like residents of Europe, the USA, Canada, Russia, but are not at all inclined to support European-Christian traditions. Carriers of European civilization are forced to adapt to the culture of newcomers, since only this guarantees inclusion in the economic, social and political life of countries controlled by "new Europeans", "new Americans" or "absolutely new Russians". Such a dissolution in the alien environment can be quite peaceful or take the form of coercion.

It seems that the described scenarios give some outline of the future, which can be realized with the demographic development trends that were analyzed above. A number of scenarios ("The Triumph of technology", "The Triumph of Rentiers", "Europe - the Russian Village") can be considered as options for the development of a post-industrial society. In them, the economic and technological components are of great importance. "Convergence of Civilizations", "Evil Neighbors"," Western Man - an endangered species" are more focused on cultural interaction. Naturally, the features of different variants can be combined and intersect. You can switch from one option to another.

Figure 1. Diagram of possible transitions between scenarios of civilizational development

They are shown in Fig. 1. From the current state, a direct transition is possible to five out of six scenarios. To some extent, this is due to the compatibility of scenario characteristics, but it is only partial. You can select several groups of scenarios. "Convergence of Civilizations "and" Triumph of Technologies " form a group of successful development and solution of the main problems of humanity in general-

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scrap, or at least European civilization and Japan. "The Triumph of the Rentier" and "Europe-the Russian Village" are unstable transition states. "The triumph of rentiers" may end with a "Triumph of technology", "Europe - the Russian Village" may develop into a "Convergence of Civilizations", since in this scenario there is a positive interaction between different civilizations. At the same time, both "The Triumph of the Rentier" and "Europe - the Russian Village" may end with the scenario "Evil Neighbors", which together with the last scenario "Western Man - an endangered species"form a risk group and extinction in the long-term plan of European civilization.

The state of the issue is such that there is objective uncertainty about the prospects for global development. It is almost impossible to determine which option is most likely or desirable. Therefore, a broad discussion is needed to determine the most likely and desirable development options.

list of literature

Zhukov S. V. and Elyanov A. Ya. [Developing countries: the asymmetry of globalization]. 2006. N 6.

Kapitsa S. P. How many people lived, live and will live on Earth. Essay on the Theory of Human Growth, Moscow, 1999.
Melyantsev V. A. Asiatic economic breakthrough: scales, efficiency, consequences / / Valery Shirokov: I would like to talk to you. Moscow, 2006.

Huntington S. Clash of Civilizations, Moscow: AST, 2003.
BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007. http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview

Iran Achieves Replacement-Level Fertility // Population Today, May/June 2002.

Landes D. S. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. N. Y.: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1999.

World Population in 2300. Proceedings of the UN Expert Meeting on World Population in 2300. UN, N. Y., 2004. ESA/P/WP, 187/Rev. 1, 24 March 2004.

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