ODD ARNE WESTAD. THE GLOBAL COLD WAR. THIRD WORLD INTERVENTION AND THE MAKING OF OURS TIMES. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. XIV, 484 c.*

The theme of the "cold War", the confrontation between the" superpowers " - the USSR and the United States - has attracted the attention of historians for many years. However, in recent years, the range of such studies has significantly expanded, including not only direct confrontation between the two blocks, but also

* Odd Arne Westad. The Global Cold War. Third World interventions and the creation of our time. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. XIV, 484 p.

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and events on the "global periphery". A significant contribution to this work was made by one of the leaders of the Center for Cold War Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science - Norwegian Professor O. A. Vestad. First of all, this applies to the recesized monograph, published initially in the USA (second edition in 2007), and then in France (La Guerrefroide globale. Le tiers-monde, les Etats-Unis et I'URSS, 1945 - 1991. Paris: Payot, 2007).

The monograph is devoted, with the exception of small sections on Cuba and Nicaragua, to the attitude of the "superpowers" to events in Asia and Africa. Starting out as a study of the motives and interests that shaped U.S. and Soviet policies in the "third world," Westad says he realized that they could not be understood without studying the "ideological foundations of their interventionism" and the "transformation of third world politics" that led to the intervention of "superpowers" (p. 1). - structure of the monograph. The first three introductory chapters deal with the ideology held by the" superpowers "and" post - colonial leaders", i.e., the leaders of independent countries, and in the subsequent ones-the manifestation of the" cold war "in certain areas of the world and, finally, the" Reagan offensive "and the"Gorbachev retreat". At the same time, the author pays the least attention to those conflicts where, in his opinion, regional specifics rather than the Cold war context prevailed, in particular, the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani conflicts.

The book is dedicated to the memory of "Ruth Furst, a South African communist who was murdered by apartheid agents in Maputo in 1982, and Syed Ali Majrooh, an Afghan Muslim and democrat who was murdered by Islamic extremists in Peshawar in 1988" (p.XI).

What distinguishes Vestad's book from most other Western books on this subject is its extensive use of archival documents and its attempt to give an objective assessment of the actions of the United States and the USSR. As for the first circumstance, the author found himself in a privileged position: as a consultant to the declassification commission that worked in Moscow in the early 1990s, he gained access to archives that, paradoxically, are still inaccessible to Russian historians. In addition, he used materials from the archives of the United States, China, Germany, Italy, Serbia, and South Africa. And his attempt to take an unbiased look at the politics of the " superpowers "and avoid one-sidedness in its coverage is already evident from the titles of the first two chapters of the book:" The Empire of Freedom: American Ideology and Interventions Abroad "and"The Empire of Justice: Soviet Ideology and Interventions Abroad". Equally important is the third chapter, Revolutionaries: Anti-Colonial Politics and Transformation, which focuses heavily on the Non-Aligned Movement (p.VII).

Unlike a number of other researchers, Vestad actively uses the term "third world", rather specifically defining it as "former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were subjected to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination" (p. 3). The original title is the fourth chapter - " Creating the Third World: The United States confronts the Revolution." The author claims that it was the United States that "did a lot to create the third world as a reality, both in a positive and negative sense" (p. 157), with its intervention in Iran, Guatemala, the Congo, support for Israel and, most notably, an economic system that preserved most of the population of the "third world"in poverty. In the same cases when the leaders of individual countries (Nasser in Egypt, Sukarno in Indonesia) they did not show any willingness to follow Washington, and relations with them deteriorated.

Speaking of the "third world," Westad makes an interesting point that while in the 1960s the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement sought to assert their independence from both the East and the West, " the general disillusionment with the paths taken by the first leaders of independent states ... was the main reason that many of the new rulers, especially in Africa, they turned to the Soviet model in the 1970s" (p. 109).

The next four chapters are largely regional in nature. They analyze developments in Cuba, Vietnam, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa, primarily in Ethiopia, Iran, and Afghanistan. At the same time, according to Westad, "Cuba and Vietnam, defending their revolutions, opposed not only Washington, they opposed the course of development of socialism that was developed by the USSR" (p.158).

The author believes that it was the events in the " third world "that came to the center of the"cold war" by the beginning of the 1970s. In general, he is critical of the work of Western historians,

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They focused on the confrontation in Europe, believing that "the most important aspects of the Cold War were not the military and strategic aspects related to Europe, but those related to the political and social development of the third world "(p.396). This view is not indisputable, although Westad's view that Moscow never wanted the detente process to interfere with its support for friendly regimes in the "third world" is true. Even if, I would add on my own, not everyone in the Soviet establishment supported this line.

The author examines in detail the events that, in his opinion, put an end to detente, in particular the crisis in Angola in 1974-1976, and, describing the international situation after the victory of the MPLA in Angola, which followed the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, quotes the words of K. N. Brutentz (at that time Deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee): "The world was turning in our direction" (p. 241).

However, at the end of this decade ,the "superpowers" (the US in Iran and the USSR in Afghanistan) faced an "unexpected and underestimated challenge" - "the rise of a radical form of Islam that rejected both liberal capitalism and Marxism." Westad shows that Washington under Reagan was ready to cooperate with any opponents of Moscow, whether it was the "Mujahideen" in Afghanistan, the" contras " in Nicaragua, or the supporters of Pol Pot in Cambodia.

The author's mistakes are not numerous, but some of them are difficult to explain. For example, the map of the Russian Empire in 1914 does not include Primorye, although Vladivostok is shown on it. A number of mistakes are related to such a complex topic as the war in Angola. Researchers are well aware that even seemingly solid archival materials need, as far as possible, to be verified with the help of "oral history" or memoirs of participants in events. For example, Vestad writes, referring to the report of the Soviet embassy, that the first group of Soviet officers arrived in Angola on November 12, 1975 (p. 235). However, as the participants in the events themselves point out, this happened only four days later (A. A. Tokarev. Business trip to Angola / / Asia and Africa today. 2001. N 2). It can be assumed that the drafters of the report proceeded from the fact that on November 12 the decision of the Government of the USSR on this issue took place, but it took time to implement it, even if urgently.

Westad also states that in 1987, "the MPLA and Cuban offensive came to a halt near Cuito Cuanavale when a force of more than 5,000 South African soldiers attacked across the border" (p.390). However, the Cubans (unlike our advisers) did not participate in this offensive. Their units were sent to this area of operations only after the enemy launched a counteroffensive and created a threat to the city of Cuito Cuanavale. Nor does the author prove his claim that the transfer of a large contingent of troops from Cuba in early 1988 allegedly caused" horror " among Soviet advisers (p. 391).

However, Westad is not alone in his approach. So, if earlier arguments about sending Cuban troops to Angola by Moscow were "in fashion", then in recent years, after the" collapse " of the USSR in the West and in Cuba, another trend prevails - to prove that the Soviet and Cuban military had different missions there and that their relations were characterized not so much by cooperation how many contradictions.

Special attention should be paid to the figure given by the author of our country's expenditures in the "third world", although the source of it, unfortunately, is not specified. "In the last ten years in power, the CPSU may have spent less than 2.5% of total government spending on military and civilian aid in the Third world, with about half of that spent on the war in Afghanistan." Therefore, the author believes, in economic terms, "The Soviet Union could almost certainly continue its interventions abroad, even during the period of stagnation and decline, if the planned economy continued to exist" (pp. 401-402). This judgment of Westad is useful to take into account those who believe that helping our friends in developing countries was almost the main reason for the difficult situation in the USSR in the last years of the "Gorbachev era". I will add that as a result of these "interventions", at least in economic terms, the national economy of the country received no less than it spent.

In general, Westad's work can be regarded as a new word in the historiography of the Cold War. It is valuable not only in itself, but also as an incentive for historians, including Russian ones, to continue their research on a number of issues raised by its author.

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