Scientific life. Congresses, conferences, and symposia
On May 26, 2003, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held a scientific conference "Russia and Iran", where more than 20 reports and presentations on various aspects of relations between Russia and Iran were heard. It was attended by scientists from academic and educational institutions, representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main attention was paid to the assessment of the political and economic situation in Iran, the directions of its foreign policy, and the prospects for developing relations with the United States.
N. M. Mammadova's speech (IB RAS) was devoted to the analysis of the political situation and disagreements in the political elite of Iran. She noted that these differences are based on elements of the contradictory state structure of Iran as a theocratic republic. The contradictions lie in the structure of state power: along with the highest bodies representing the interests of the clergy and elected mainly by high-ranking clergy, there are republican institutions of power. At the same time, the President of the country as the head of the executive branch and the Mejlis as the highest body of legislative power are elected by direct elections, i.e. they are more legitimate. So far, the official policy of Iran, which is presented by the republican structures of power, especially in relations with foreign countries, may not coincide with the actions taken by the regime on behalf of the highest Islamic structures. The most striking manifestation of this inconsistency may be Iran's position on Islamist organizations, primarily Hezbollah. So, we can talk about the presence of official contacts with them, but not military - economic ones.
Contradictions are inherent in the nature of relations between Shiism and the authorities, as well as in the lack of organizational unity of the Shiite clergy. The principle that was supposed to minimize this inconsistency and ensure the primacy of the religious component in the structure of power-the principle of velayate fakih - was enshrined constitutionally, and in the structure of power it was expressed in the establishment of the post of rahbar at the head of the country. It was he who was supposed to resolve all the contradictions that arise between the various branches of government. Disagreements in the ruling circles have always existed, manifesting themselves in the inconsistency of Iran's internal and external policies, sometimes reaching a dangerous level for the regime. Perhaps the most critical moment in terms of preserving not only the balance of power in the ruling elite, but also the theocratic regime itself, was the period after the United States ranked Iran as an "axis of evil" and conducted its military operation against Iraq. Both the dynamics of the regime's internal transformation and the form of resolving the contradictions between Tehran and Washington now largely depend on the alignment of political forces in Iran, their goals and the policy directions they choose, both within the country and in relations with the international community. The adjustment of Russia's policy towards its southern neighbor also depends on this.
The content of the political process in Iran in recent years is the struggle between "reformers"and " conservatives". Reforms began to be implemented in the country after Khomeini's death, first as economic (under the governments of A. Rafsanjani), and after 1977 (under the governments of M. Khatami) - as political. However, the peculiarity of the reform movement headed by M. Khatami is that the reform is supposed to be carried out within the framework of the constitutional field.
Since the late 1990s, students and their organizations have played an increasingly important role in the reform movement. Demographic changes have led to the fact that people under the age of 30 make up 70%, including the group of people from 15 to 25 years - a fifth of the country's population. The age for participation in elections is 16 years, sometimes reduced to 15 years. It is this most active part of the electorate, which grew up in the conditions of the Islamic system, which not only deepened the gap in the level of development of Iran with other countries, but also reduced the standard of living of its population compared to the pre-revolutionary period, that becomes the tuning fork of socio-political life. it is politicized, and the majority of students are united in the Daf party.-
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Tareh Tahkima Vahdat", who supported the reform movement and joined the "23 May Front". Its departments operate at all (more than 60) universities. They are united by the Central Council (Office to Consolidate Unity), which is able to quickly mobilize students to demonstrate in defense of the reform movement (summer 1999 and autumn 2002). In fact, this student organization has split into two groups, one of which advocates the radicalization of reforms and is concentrated around one of the universities in Tehran - Olamee Tabatabaei University.
The main pillar of the reformist forces is the executive branch headed by the President of the country, especially after the majority in the Mejlis (after the 2000 elections) was made up of his supporters. The formation of the current government did not cause any contradictions between the President and the Mejlis. In the Mejlis of the 6th convocation, "reformers" have 222 seats, "conservatives" - 55, independents - 13.
The "conservatives" continue to maintain significant positions in the power structures. These include, first of all, those authorities in the Islamic Republic that are religious in nature. These are the rakhbar, which determines the main directions of the country's policy, the Supervisory Board, which checks laws for compliance with the norms of the constitution and Islam, and the judiciary. Perhaps the Expediency Council should also be considered among the highest bodies that reflect mainly the position of "conservatives". Despite the fact that among its members there are supporters of the reform wing, and the chairman of the Council, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, holds centrist positions, its members are appointed by Rahbar, who seeks to prevent the preponderance of reformist forces. When working with young people, the Conservatives rely on the Ansare Hezbollah party, whose program, which prioritizes Islamic goals over national ones, is very radical. In recent years, however, the party has lost its position in the youth movement. The military backbone of the "conservatives" continues to be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps( IRGC), as it reports directly to Rahbar, although there are supporters of the "reformers"in its leadership. The army is more neutral. One of the main pillars of the "conservatives" is the judiciary, which is headed by representatives of the clergy. Special courts for clergy are actively used, since most of the leaders of the reform movement are theologians.
Despite the majority of "reformers" in the Majlis and the government, there was no noticeable change in the balance of power in their favor. Any attempts to control, even budgetary ones, the activities of the IRGC or Islamic funds were blocked by the Supervisory Board and the Expediency Council. They also rejected draft laws on granting the President additional powers and restricting the rights of the Supervisory Board in the electoral system. It became clear that changes to the Constitution regarding the structure of State power were needed, which would ensure further democratization of the regime.
The preservation of the internal political "status quo" and the lack of noticeable results of liberalization caused a split in the reform movement itself. The main political outcome was the loss of offensive power. It seems that the degree of socio-political compromise has reached its limits. Dissatisfaction is growing in society not only with the "conservatives", but also with the supporters of M. Khatami, who are not able to turn the situation in their favor. The actual boycott of municipal elections in February 2003, when only 15% of the population (with the right to vote) came to vote, reflected public doubts about the possibility of constitutional reform of the system. The first organizations of "neo-reformers" emerged, which aim to fight for the complete secularization and democratization of power. The same requirements are put forward by most student organizations. It is possible that in a situation of growing danger of external military intervention, we can expect the positions of this new, more radical center of political forces to strengthen in the country.
In a state of unstable balance between "reformers" and "conservatives", the positions of A. A. Rafsanjani began to strengthen. On the one hand, only the Kargozaran party can be attributed to the unquestionably supporting political forces, but most of the functionaries of the higher administrative apparatus are his supporters. It is possible that if the confrontation between A. A. Rafsanjani and A. Khamenei continues to grow, the first one may be resolved-
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He can count on the support of a part of the Organization of the struggling clergy, of which he is an official member. It is likely that if the Rafsanjani group comes to power, we can expect the country to reorient itself to a development model closer to that of South Korea or China. Questions of economic feasibility, especially interest in attracting foreign investment, will minimize the importance of supporting Islamic extremist organizations and the need to build up military capabilities. The recent actions of A. A. Rafsanjani, whether it is interference in the budget financing of the Supervisory Board, or a statement on holding a national referendum on establishing relations with the United States, go beyond the powers of the head of the Expediency Council, and can be regarded as an attempt to seize the initiative from the incumbent president.
Thus, the main problems of Iran today are the internal political struggle and relations with America. In the context of a confrontation between the United States and Iran, one might expect the positions of "conservatives" and "reformers" to converge in the face of a common danger. However, the growing differences between Khatami and Khamenei in recent months, as well as the differences between Khamenei and Rafsanjani on the establishment of relations with the United States, indicate the opposite. The country's population supports the normalization of Iranian-American relations, and the majority in the Mejlis appeals to conservative circles to speed up the adoption of bills that can accelerate the modernization of society. If conservative circles agree to this, the reform potential of the existing power structure will be preserved, and the system can actually be changed in the short and medium term - without social cataclysms and with the attributes of Islamic power preserved. In a situation of maintaining the status quo, which cannot last long enough, external pressure on the system is likely to lead not to its consolidation, but to its collapse.
The problem of the instability of the Iranian regime and the prospects for the country's economic development was considered by V. P. Tsukanov (IB RAS), who focused on the economic policy of the reform wing as one of the most important factors in reforming the government system as a whole. The latter was initiated by Rafsanjani, who based the transition of the economy from wartime to the peaceful stage on the policy of economic balance. It included: liberalizing domestic prices, liberalizing currency exchange and foreign trade, partially privatizing public sector enterprises, phasing out price subsidies and replacing them with targeted assistance. However, in fact, this policy was limited only to price liberalization measures, which led to a failure in its implementation and became one of the reasons for increasing the differentiation between "conservatives"and " reformers".
Currently, the "reformers" propose to solve several of the most important tasks by means of economic policy.
In the budget area, these are: a gradual reduction in the share of government spending in GDP; the cessation of state-owned companies 'financing from the budget; revaluation of the value of state-owned companies' assets; revision of the privatization program in order to subordinate it to the task of increasing budget revenues; rationalization of tax rates, including the abolition of tax incentives; drawing up a separate currency budget for three years The Central Bank of Iran proposes to divide all state-owned companies into two groups, one of which will include enterprises that remain state-owned, and the second-those that are subject to privatization.
In the monetary sphere, it is proposed to expand the powers of the Central Bank and transfer to it the right to determine the goals of monetary policy, the choice of levers of monetary regulation (reserve ratios, setting the discount rate, conducting operations on the open market), setting a single bank rate and encouraging priority industries through the budget. According to the Central Bank, whose leadership belongs to the reform wing, all laws regulating the activities of banks in Iran should be revised in accordance with international practice. In general, the Central Bank's position is completely abstracted from the Islamic principles of banking operations.
The currency sector is also subject to reform. The current currency system is actually based on the principle of multiple exchange rates, but the immediate introduction of a single and free exchange rate system is not necessary.-
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the exchange rate limit is considered unrealistic for at least two reasons. One of them is the extreme dependence of foreign exchange earnings on oil exports. Another is the need for rapid reform of banking activities. Therefore, it is still planned to maintain a "floating" regulated exchange rate, especially to encourage oil exports, but at the same time legalize the opening of foreign currency accounts, expand the rights of exporters to use foreign currency earnings, gradually exempt imports from quantitative restrictions and currency quotas, and regulate them using the exchange rate and customs duties.
The situation on the labor market requires changes in labor legislation. The current legislation does not promote economic growth or increase employment. Among the main areas of labor market reform are: restoring the link between wage growth and labor productivity growth; developing the private sector, including with the use of foreign capital; introducing a ban on the use of foreign unskilled labor instead of local labor; and expanding employment in the modern private sector.
Central Bank economists take a very radical stance on the social aspects of economic development. In their opinion, the payment of subsidies in its current form results in discrimination against the rural population in favor of the city; in addition, a number of subsidies (for fuel, air transportation) benefit the rich rather than the poor. It is proposed to distribute part of the oil products according to quotas, and the rest - at world prices.
The current system of decision-making in the country is inefficient, primarily due to the duplication of functions between its parts and the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between the departments in charge of areas and bodies focused on solving emerging problems. There are more than 30 different councils that do not clearly separate the functions of planning, decision-making, and execution. Islamic public administration bodies, including those provided for by the Constitution, do not find a place in the schemes of "reformers". Therefore, the answer to the question of whether the "reformers", acting only within the constitutional framework, will be able to achieve a blurring of the theocratic features of the Iranian state system, may be more negative than positive.
The problems of the international situation of Iran and its foreign policy were considered in the reports of L. M. Kulagina, S. B. Druzhilovsky, V. I. Sazhin and others.
L. M. Kulagina (IB RAS) noted that the war in Iraq and the presence of American troops there will undoubtedly have a serious impact on Iran's foreign policy. The military action against Iraq has had a mixed impact on the positions of rival groups in the Iranian leadership. While Khatami and his supporters can show more flexibility in seeking compromises and dialogue with the United States, conservative elements led by Khamenei are trying to play on anti-American sentiments. Former President A. Rafsanjani does not rule out the possibility of making changes to the traditionally hostile course of Iran towards the United States and Egypt. He believes that the problem can be solved through a referendum. Kulagina noted that Iran has long-term interests in Iraq. His policy towards Iraqi Shiites will be determined by the desire to have a friendly Iraq on its borders with a strong Shiite element in the power structures. Another consequence of the war in Iraq is the Middle East settlement issues. If the United States unblocks this process according to its own scenario, the balance of power in the region may not change in favor of Iran, and it will not be involved in the most important political processes in the region. Therefore, the Middle East direction of Iran's foreign policy has become one of the main ones today. This is confirmed by M. Khatami's visits to Syria and Lebanon in May 2003. Iran faces very serious problems in the region and a hostile policy of the United States, which makes it fear for its security.
S. B. Druzhilovsky (MGIMO University) Russian Foreign Ministry) gave a retrospective analysis of the development of relations between the United States, Iran, the USSR (and Russia). Speaking about the consequences of the war in Iraq, he expressed the opinion that in the conditions when the situation around Iran has become seriously complicated, Russian capabilities in the Iranian direction have weakened. Under the current circumstances, the United States can count on solving the Iranian problem according to its own scenario. An attack on Iran, unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be fast, since their troops are close by, and there may simply not be time for protest from other countries of the world. At the same time
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He believes that the United States may not be in a hurry to attack Iran, as they count on a long-term presence in neighboring Iraq and on using both the Mujahideen Khalq force and the Iraqi Kurds to their advantage. Tehran will probably have to make certain compromises in the near future in order to confirm its commitment to peace and international security to the international community. Pressure will increase on Iran and Russia, especially on the issue of ensuring nuclear security.
V. I. Sazhin (Voice of Russia Radio), assessing the US policy in the Middle East, believes that their main strategic goal is Iran. After the regime change in Iraq, the impact on Iran is already carried out in several areas: disrupting its nuclear missile program; preventing support for anti-Israeli groups, primarily Hezbollah; and protecting human rights. At the same time, the main task becomes to achieve the transformation of the Iranian regime. Tehran itself qualifies the threats coming from the United States as follows: the deployment of American troops on the perimeter of Iran's borders will complicate its position militarily, politically and socially; establishing control over Iraqi oil will allow them to influence OPEC policy, which will make the Iranian economy very vulnerable; the permanent presence of the United States in Iraq will strengthen Israel's position, the success of US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq makes it easier for them to create a unipolar world, which poses a real threat to the national security of Islamic states that, according to S. Huntington, are civilizationally opposed to the West.
The main accusation against Iran from the United States is that Tehran is actively pursuing a nuclear program that has a military component. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (USA), there are seven major nuclear research centers operating in Iran, and a program is underway to create about 10 new centers. The Iranian leadership denies the existence of a military component of all these programs. There is no consensus in the Bush administration on how to solve the Iranian problem. Hardliners in the Defense Ministry support the idea of bringing the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the UN for consideration; moderates - for holding appropriate negotiations; those who maintain close relations with Israel's military circles say that the latter can strike at Iran's nuclear facilities. British analyst R. Bennett believes that the United States will first resort to intrigue, economic pressure, and the actions of special services, and only then conduct a military operation.
V. I. Yurtaev (INES) in his report "The Chance of Russia and Iran: Leadership in Eurasian Integration" noted that in the era of globalization, project activities come to the fore when solving geostrategic tasks. In this regard, the implementation of the North-South transport corridor project is of great importance. The agreement on its creation was signed in 2000 in St. Petersburg by Russia, Iran and India. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Finland and a number of other countries have expressed their desire to join this project. The time has come for Russia and Iran to develop a new format of cooperation. The issue of creating a permanent Russian-Iranian institute for strategic communication, whose main goal should be to develop and provide intellectual support for international projects within the framework of a unified concept of cooperation between Russia and Iran, is becoming urgent. Through joint planning and implementation of transport, communication and other projects for Eurasia, Russia and Iran have a chance to determine the format and content of modern globalization processes in Eurasia.
The topic of communication projects is also reflected in the report of E. V. Dunaeva (IB RAS). Iran participates in the international tourism project "Great Silk Road", which is implemented by the WTO and UNESCO. The main goal of the project is to attract tourists to Iran. It was noted that tourism revenues tripled between 1998 and 2001, although tourism services account for only 2.4% of the country's total exports. The main problem on the way to further development of the tourism industry is the lack of capital. The Government is making certain efforts to attract investment in this sector of the economy, introducing certain tax incentives. E. V. Dunayeva noted that the market of tourist services in Iran may be of particular interest to Russian Muslims.
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M. S. Kameneva's report was devoted to language contacts between Russia and Iran, which have a long tradition and are developing successfully today. Teaching of Iranian languages, including Persian, began in Russian universities in the first half of the 19th century, when Iranian studies were taking its first steps here. However, the emergence of interest in the Persian language dates back to an earlier period - the first half of the XVIII century, which was dictated by the active development of economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Iran, interest in learning Russian has noticeably increased in recent decades, particularly after the Islamic Revolution. Speaking about the linguistic aspects of language contacts, Ms Kameneva noted that Russian loanwords in Persian and Persian lexemes in Russian are insignificant, but they function in both languages and have different historical connotations.
The topic of the report by O. Ishmukhametov (ISAA at Moscow State University) is cooperation between Iran and Russia in the field of civil aviation. This problem is very urgent, since about a third of the Iranian fleet of aircraft is Russian - made. In 2002, the 141-aircraft fleet of Iranian airlines included 15 purchased Russian-made aircraft and 25 leased ones. The restructuring of civil aviation in Russia and the rise in the cost of air transportation during the 1990s led to the fact that Russian airlines formed a certain reserve of free aircraft, which they willingly leased out. A prerequisite for the development of leasing was also the growing demand of Iran for aircraft in the 1990s due to the growth of passenger traffic. An important role in establishing leasing relations between the two countries was played by the relative cheapness of renting Russian aircraft.
The discussion that unfolded at the end of the conference once again showed the relevance of the topics chosen for discussion regarding possible scenarios for the development of the situation in and around Iran, as well as Iran's relations with Russia. Most of the participants of the conference noted that today Iran is going through an extremely tense period in its development, which is characterized by both internal political contradictions and foreign policy problems. The way out of this situation can be ensured by increasing the efforts of the existing government system to reform the country.
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