Introduction: Argumentation

The concept of "post-secular society" came into the sociological discussion from a mostly philosophical discussion of the work of Jurgen Habermas1 on rationality and religion in modern society. The philosophical discussion of religion in the modern period has had a major impact on how sociologists think about the subject of their study. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between social theory and social philosophy, and therefore there is always some overlap between sociology and the philosophy of religion. In the past, among the participants in this interplay of philosophy and sociology, there have been significant figures - such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Ernest Gellner, and Peter Winch - who have, so to speak, belonged to both camps. In recent discussions about the role of religion in public life, the parameters for discussing the future of religion have been set not by sociologists, but by philosophers and theologians. I am referring, in addition to Habermas, to the contributions of Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, Gianni Vattimo and Jacques Derrida. Although it is the philosophers who have raised the main questions about the place of religion in clearly secular societies, I will take a critical stance on how they characterize religion, while keeping in mind that they ignore the role of religion in the world.-

Оригинал см.: Turner B. S. Religion in a Post-secular Society//The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion/Turner B. S. (ed.). Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. The rights to the translation and Russian edition are provided by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

1. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere // European Journal of Philosophy. 2006. Vol. 14 (1). P. 1-25 [Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity / / Habermas Yu. Between naturalism and religion, Moscow: Vse mir, 2011, pp. 109-141].

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They use comparative empirical data provided by anthropologists and sociologists. In short, if philosophers set the framework for discussion, they themselves often lack the kind of discussion material and quality that is associated with the results of field research by anthropologists and sociologists. The question here is actually about the nature of a secular society, and therefore we must give an answer, or at least respond seriously, to the question posed by Habermas: do we live in a post-secular society?

In this article, I will make a few critical points about the analysis of religion in current sociology, without forgetting about modern philosophy. Later, when I speak of "philosophy, "I will speak of" social philosophy." My criticisms relate to several points. Philosophers tend - an inevitable consequence of their professional training - to focus on religious beliefs rather than practice, and they almost never pay attention to religious objects. But even the reference to "religious beliefs" in this case may be too general, since the discussion is mainly concerned with the fact that formal theology has no authority in modern public discussions. It is clear that in official theologies, major religions proclaim their most important truths, but when it comes to the role of religion in everyday life, practice comes to the fore.

If we are referring to religious beliefs, then we should think more seriously about these beliefs as part of the habit of individuals and pay more attention to religion and the body, or more precisely, to religious habit and embodiment2. We should make more systematic use of the works of Pierre Bourdieu in the modern study of public religion.3 And if the body is ignored in the study of religion, the same can be said about emotions. In recent years, the sociology of emotions has developed and become an important area of modern research, 4 but it has not found its place in recent philosophical discussions. Of course, the work of William James "The Diversity of Religions".-

2. Turner B. S. The Body and Society. L.: Sage, 2008.

3. Rey T. Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy. L.: Equinox, 2007.

4. Barbalet J.M. Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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social experience" was fundamental to the development of sociology (for example, in the work of Emile Durkheim), but today little attention is paid to the emotional aspects of current religiosity. Finally, because of the continuing tendency to turn to formal theologies, official pronouncements, and formal institutions, there is a parallel tendency to neglect such important features of modern religiosity as the growth of "post - institutional spirituality," the development of various forms of popular religion, and the rise of Revivalist or fundamentalist religions such as Pentecostalism and Charismatic movements.

Perhaps the main problem is precisely the lack of attention on the part of philosophers to empirical sociological research. Philosophical discussion of the crisis of religious faith and authority too often ignores the empirical evidence revealed by social science. Abstract speculations are rarely supported by actual research results. Although Charles Taylor cites William James and Emile Durkheim in his work"The Secular Age" 5, he has almost no systematic development of the current achievements of scientists. This lack of attention to the conclusions of modern sociology drawn on the basis of empirical research is combined with a lack of interest in comparative sociology. Most Western philosophers have little to say about religion outside of Northern Europe and the United States. This creates a problem, because the purpose of the discussion about the post-secular was partly to understand the peculiarities of the European experience of secularization, on the one hand, and the American exceptional case, on the other. In other words, it is very difficult to make any generalizations based on European experience, according to which the separation of state and church under the Westphalian system presupposed a history of confessional politics - that is, generalizations that would make sense in relation to the modern period and to religions that do not belong to the Abrahamic tradition of Judaism, Christianity, etc. of Islam. Conversely, current anthropological and sociological research clearly points to the vitality of religion in the rest of the world, especially in the form of modern pilgrimages, religious revivalism in Asia, and Pentecostal and charismatic movements in South America-
5. Taylor C. The Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007.

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Costa Rica and Africa. When Western philosophers turn to religious movements outside the West, they pay too much attention to fundamentalism in general and radical Islam in particular.6 But there are many forms of revivalism and examples of the growth of religious activity beyond the manifestations of radical or political religion. Most Muslims living in countries as far apart as Singapore and the United States are very well integrated into today's multicultural society.7 Closer attention to the historical and comparative study of religion would not only improve our understanding of the recent history of Muslim immigration, but also help us understand the complexity of secularization and post-secularization processes.

As this compendium shows, 8 There is a general consensus among sociologists today that the so-called secularization thesis of the 1960s and 70s was too narrowly focused on Northern Europe, and if it shed some light on the post-Christian society of developed industrial countries, it had little to do with what was happening outside of it the European context. There is an alternative to the simple idea of secularization as a reduction in church membership and a decline in the social significance of religion. In modern societies, religion has simultaneously been democratized and commercialized-along with the growth of so-called megachurches, televangelism, drive-in confessions and buy - a-prayer, religious tourism, and what I call "low-intensity religion." 9 (low intensity religion). Religion has survived not so much as a reflexive faith, in Kant's words, as in the form of health and wealth cults, which offer a whole range of services to meet the diverse needs of human beings on this world. Religion is quite compatible with secular consumerism,

6. Juergensmeyer M. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

7. Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. Washington, DC, 2007.

8. The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion / Ed. Bryan S. Turner. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

9. Turner B.S. Religious Speech: the Ineffable Nature of Religious Communication in the Information Age//Theory, Culture & Society. 2009. Vol. 25. No. 7 - 8. P. 219 - 35.

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This is evidenced by religious markets that offer spiritual services in a broad sense, and not just narrowly ecclesiastical services. Some historians argue that nothing has changed in the sense that the world's religions have always satisfied this kind of material interest by selling amulets or making pilgrimages to the tombs of saints. But I say that religion has always had an element of sacredness, in which there was an ineffable nature of the divine or the holy. From my point of view, this was the view of Rudolf Otto when, in 1917, he spoke of the "numinous" in his work"The Sacred" 10. God cannot be known as such, and the sacred manifests itself through intermediaries-prophets, angels, mystical beings, through landscapes or through spirits, whereas the very essence of the sacred remains ineffable. In the modern world, with the development of, for example, the Internet, the role of these traditional intermediaries is reduced and the ineffable hierarchy of things is democratized through popular manifestations of religion. Now the sacred is expressible.

Political and social issues

I believe that the discussion of secularization can only become conceptually more rigorous and more relevant to reality if we distinguish between what I call "political secularization"and" social secularization." The first relates specifically to public institutions and political entities, i.e., to the historical separation of church and State, while the second relates specifically to issues concerning values, culture, and related relations. The political dimension is primarily institutional and formal, while the social dimension is informal and has to do with customs. Political secularization was essentially the cornerstone of the liberal idea of tolerance, according to which we are given the freedom to have private beliefs, provided that they do not have a negative impact on public life. In the West, this liberal decision was associated with the Anglican context and the names of Richard Hooker and John Locke. Initially, it was a local political decision designed to

10. Otto R. The Idea of the Holy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923 [Otto R. Sacred. St. Petersburg, 2007].

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end the conflict between Catholics and Protestants. It is generally recognized that this path has led to a dead end or is experiencing strong social pressure, as modern societies are becoming more multicultural and multi-religious. In the situation of the seventeenth century, multicultural societies with many competing and conflicting religious traditions could not have been foreseen. Since religion often defines identity in modern societies, it is difficult to maintain a simple separation of public and private. Moreover, these identities are, as a rule, transnational and therefore cannot be limited by national-State borders. We can say that public space is sacral to the extent that public religions play an important role in political life. The secular institutions of Western citizenship are coming into a tense relationship with these new processes, as citizenship in the 19th century came to be understood exclusively as belonging to a political nation.

Political secularization is a historical process in which the place of religion in public life is usually determined and regulated by the State. Thus, the separation of religion and state did not mean equal relations. One such event occurred when the Virginia Assembly stopped paying salaries to Anglican clergy from tax-supported funds; and then, after a heated debate, the so-called First Amendment establishing religious Freedom was introduced. The right to freedom of conscience was closely linked to the concept of privacy, and therefore religious freedom became one of the main components of political liberalism and modernity.11 Although these changes are often seen as a consequence of the establishment of new ideals, it can also be argued that religious freedom has become a practical consequence of political processes. In the American colonies, the steady growth of religious pluralism, the need to attract more migrants, and the desire of merchants to develop trade between the colonies were the material foundations of liberalism and individualism.12 In nedav-

11. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

12. Abercrombie N., Hill S., Turner B.S. Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism. L.: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

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the study, which uses the idea of competition in religious markets, states that "religious freedom is subject to government regulation"13. This assumption arises from the argument of Anthony Gill, who, in his Political Origins of Religious Freedom, 14 argues that if dominant religious groups want the State to regulate small religions, then religious freedom becomes the political goal of marginalized religious movements and minority groups. From a political point of view, this approach leads to the unsurprising but important conclusion that "politicians seek to minimize the cost of government."15 Clearly, governance is much more problematic in a pluralistic context, where there is ample space for religious rivalries and conflicts. Since almost all modern societies are multicultural and multi-racial, "religious governance" is an essential component of political secularism16. In other words, the paradox is that precisely because religion is important in modern life as a carrier of identity, the state must control it in order to minimize the costs of governance. As we will see, Habermas calls this situation post-secular, because in order to protect public communication rationality, it is important that there be an open dialogue with and between religions. The failure of such a dialogue is likely to lead to a political conflict.

Social secularization, in turn, concerns social values, practices and customs, namely everyday life or what can be called the social sphere. This is the set of rituals, practices, and places that are associated with religious practice. We can describe this area using the usual sociological characteristics of the level of religiosity: church membership, faith in God, religious experience, prayer, and other types of piety. This social space includes inr-

13. Gill A. The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. P. 47.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. P. 47.

16. Turner B.S. Managing religions: state responses to religious diversity//Contemporary Islam. 2007. Vol. 1. No. 2. P. 123 - 37.

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a variety of heterogeneous elements: popular religious beliefs, superstitions, and magical practices, as well as elements originating in more formal world religions. This religious sphere is undoubtedly flourishing in both formal and informal dimensions. In this case, there is almost no evidence of a formal religious decline outside of Northern Europe, and the traditional notion of secularization should either be seriously corrected or discarded altogether. In relation to this particular religious space, Grace Davy's expression - believing but not belonging (faith without belonging [to a religious community]) - retains all its significance. However, secularization at the social level is actually quite a complex phenomenon. If you look beyond Europe, it becomes quite obvious that there is a worldwide revival of religion, which is described either by the term fundamentalism or by the term pietization. There is evidence of a resurgence of traditional religions in Asia, such as spirit possession in Vietnam, Islam in Southeast Asia, Shinto in Japan, and Taoism in China.

All these arguments create a conceptually fruitful contrast between the role of religion in the public-political sphere and its role in the social space of civil society. This division is important because while it is quite easy for the State to create conditions for legal regulation of religion in the political sphere, it is very difficult for the State to exercise successful control over the social functions of religion. If we take the post-communist world (for example, Poland, Vietnam, and China), then in retrospect, it is clear that although political secularization was quite successful there, religion was never eradicated from the world of life, to use Habermas ' terminology. It can be assumed that the current attempts to suppress Falun Gong at the level of everyday life in China will not lead to anything in the long run17. Perhaps an even more characteristic example of this difference between the political and the social is the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in its relations with society and the State. Although the church experienced severe repression in the first years after the Russian Revolution, the close connection grew-

17. Goldman M. From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

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Christianity and nationalism meant that Christianity could play a useful role in Russian politics. After the fall of the Soviet regime, the Orthodox Church was able to revive under the able political leadership of Patriarch Alexy II, who entered into a close alliance with both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev.18 In 1982, Pimen managed to achieve the return of the Church of the Danilovsky Monastery in the center of Moscow. In 1991, he restored the veneration of St. John the Baptist. Seraphim of Sarov, who died in 1833 and was canonized by Tsar Nicholas P. The relics of the saint were returned to Sarov Cathedral. In 1997, the Religious Freedom Act placed Orthodoxy in a privileged position, while Catholicism was politically marginalized. In Putin's Russia, Orthodoxy continues to flourish as an official religion, giving some degree of spiritual and national legitimacy to the party and state. There is also a close connection between the army and the church, which is reflected in the fact that icons are used to bless warships, and the patriarch performs a thanksgiving service on the anniversary of the creation of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Although the public role of Orthodoxy has been largely restored, the church's influence is largely based on cultural nationalism rather than spiritual authority. So, if 80% of Russians call themselves" Orthodox", then only about 4% call themselves" believers". This correlation between the political and the social allows us to say that if Orthodoxy is an influential public religion, and the public space is partially resacralized, yet Russian society remains secular. The legacy of atheism and secularism of the past retains its influence on the everyday social world, even if religion today plays a significant role in national revival. Therefore, whenever the term "post-secular society" is used, we must find out whether we are talking about secularization that relates to formal institutions at the political level, or that relates to a living religion at the social level. In my opinion, a philosophical analysis of the role of religion in the culture of society is very important, but from it we learn little about how religion manifests itself in society as a whole.

18. Garrad J., Garrad C. Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

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The return of Religion

Most of today's sociologists and political scientists have come to the conclusion that religion should be taken seriously in discussions about the public sphere, which cannot be said about the major post - war theorists-Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu, Ralph Dahrendorf, Norbert Elias, Nikos Pulanzas and others. What has changed? The obvious answer is that there have been various transformations in social and political life that have placed religion as an institution at the center of modern society. I will focus on a few macro-social factors that can explain this preponderance of religion in the modern world. If necessary, this will only be a cursory essay focused on understanding post-secularism. The collapse of organized communism and the decline of Marxist-Leninist ideology allowed religion to be revived in Europe, and especially in Poland, Ukraine, and the former Yugoslavia. As we have seen, the Orthodox Church was closely linked to Russian nationalism, and in Vietnam, although the Communist parties did not disappear, the period of reconstruction gave way to a return of religion to public life - Catholicism in the South and Protestant sects among ethnic minorities. And the belief in spirits attracts businessmen from the growing capitalist sector.19 In various communist - influenced parts of the world, from Cuba to Cambodia, there was public disillusionment with organized communism and the doctrines of Marxism - Leninism in the 1990s. Globalization and the Internet have created new opportunities for evangelism, even in societies where the Party still tries to regulate or suppress the flow of information and religious cooperation. In China, Charter 0820 calls for freedom of religious assembly and practice, among other things. While these dissident movements are unlikely to shake the Party's control or its authoritarian responses to the religious revival, such processes seem to show a significant increase in religious activity.-

19. Taylor P. (ed.) Modernity and Re-enchantment: Religion in Post-revolutionary Vietnam. Singapore: ISEAS, 2007.

20. Charter 08 is a manifesto signed by Chinese intellectuals in 2008 that calls for political reform and democratization in the People's Republic of China. It was published on December 10, 2008, on the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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both in the currently communist and post-communist countries.

Another feature of globalization has been the growth of migration and the establishment of migrants in new places, which around the world has led to the emergence of diaspora communities in societies with growing economies. These diaspora communities are usually formed on the basis of religious beliefs and practices, so that in modern societies it no longer makes sense to distinguish between ethnicity and religion. Indeed, Turks in Germany have become Muslim, and Chinese minorities around the world often become Buddhist. In Malaysia, people of Chinese descent are automatically considered "Buddhists". As a result, religion has become the main participant in the "identity politics". Religion becomes a place of ethnic and cultural rivalry, and therefore states are involved in the management of religions and thus inevitably move away from the traditional liberal approach of separation of state and religion. Paradoxically, the state, by starting to regulate religion in the public space, makes it more significant and visible. In countries as diverse as the United States and Singapore, the state is beginning to regulate Islam in order to incorporate "moderate Muslims"into society. 21 From Hinduism in India to Catholicism in Poland to Shintoism in Japan, there is a complex interplay of religion and national identity all over the world, and thus religion becomes part of the internal structure of the public sphere.

The same can be said about nationalism. In the post-war period, nationalism began to gain strength in conjunction with anti-colonialism. In the Arab world, this was often combined with pan-Arabism. These kinds of secular movements in North Africa and the Middle East achieved some political success after the Suez crisis, and Nasser was able to gain support for his vision of a postcolonial and mostly secular Arab world. If political activism began to grow in the 1940s along with the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, then further radical processes took place after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. However, the Kree-

21. Kamaludeen M.N., Pereira A., Turner B. S. Muslims in Singapore: Piety, Politics and Policies. L.: Routledge, 2009.

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The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 was a critical event in modern history. The fall of the secular state, which promoted a nationalist vision of society as opposed to the traditional Islamic vision, was an example of a spiritual revolution for the whole world. This was the only example of mass mobilization in the name of religious renewal. The message of the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati against what he called "Westoxification"22was received by a wide variety of religious movements outside the specific Iranian context.23
In current discussions of post-secularism, the key question, often only implied and not explicitly stated, is whether it is possible to successfully incorporate radical forms of Islam through dialogue into a democratic and predominantly liberal environment. Where are the roots of Islamic radicalism? One of these issues is the intractable issue of the status of Palestine and its conflict with the State of Israel. However, in a broader historical perspective, the Palestinian question may have been the single most important issue feeding political Islam, because it fed "a massive collective sense of injustice that continued to weigh heavily on our lives" .24 In sociopolitical terms, twentieth-century radical Islam has been interpreted as the result of the social frustration of those social strata (poorly paid social workers, overworked teachers, under-employed engineers, and alienated college professors) whose interests were not adequately taken into account and whose aspirations did not fully coincide with the postcolonial secular nationalism of leaders such as Nasser, Suharto, and others. Saddam Hussein, nor with the neoliberal "open door" policy of Anwar Sadat in Egypt or Shadly Bendjedid in Algeria. Social dislocation resulting from modern glo-

22. Westoxification (gharbzadegi in Farsi) - "Westernization", financial, cultural or military orientation towards the West on the part of non-Western societies. - Approx. trans.

23. Akbarzadeh S., Mansouri F. (eds.) Islam and Political Violence. Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West. L.: Tauris, 2007.

24. Said E. W. Afterword: The consequences of 1948//The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948/Eds. Rogan E. and Shlaim A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. P. 248 - 61.

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It created an ideal environment for external Western support for those secular elites in the Arab world who received significant oil revenues. Economic growth through rents derived from oil production and sales has given rise to bureaucratic authoritarianism in almost the entire Middle East. In short, religious radicalism can be seen as a consequence of the religious crisis of power, the mistakes of authoritarian nationalist governments, and the socio-economic divisions that were exacerbated by the economic strategies of neoliberal globalization.

The discussion of Islamic radicalism is largely shaped by the works of Gilles Kepel, such as Jihad, 25 which was first published in French in 200o; it is an influential but highly controversial book. Its thesis is relatively simple: the last three decades have seen both the impressive rise of "Islamism" and its political failure. In the 1970s, when sociologists believed that modernization meant secularization, an unexpected surge in political Islam (especially the importance of Shiite theology for popular protests in Iran) was perceived as a challenge to the dominant ideas of modernity. Religious movements in Iran, especially when they forced women to wear the chador and excluded them from the public sphere, were initially defined by leftist intellectuals as a form of religious fascism. The requirement to wear a headscarf still provokes feminist criticism of the status of women in modern Iran.26 However, over time, Marxists began to realize that Islamism had a massive base and was an impressive force in the struggle against Western influence, and Western conservatives were attracted by the Islamic message of moral order, obedience to God and hatred of secular materialists, that is, communists and socialists. Western governments were willing to support both Sunni and Shiite resistance groups to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan after 1979, despite their ties to radical groups in Pakistan and Iran.

These religious movements eventually filled the political vacuum created by the failure of the Arab market.-

25. Kepel G. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. L.: I. B.Taurus, 2002.

26. Nafisi A. Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books. N.Y.: Random House, 2008.

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the anti-Western approach that has shaped anti-Western policies since the Suez crisis. According to Kepel, Islamism is a product of both generational pressure and class structure. Religious radicalism attracted younger generations in the cities, which were the result of a post-war demographic explosion in developing countries and, as a result, a mass exodus of young people from rural areas. This generation was quite poor, despite a relatively high level of literacy and access to secondary education. The lower classes in big cities have become one of the sources of recruiting supporters of religious and political radicalism. However, such supporters were also recruited from the middle classes-descendants of trading families from bazaars discarded by the processes of decolonization, as well as doctors, engineers and entrepreneurs who, while happy with the salaries made possible by rising oil prices, were also alienated from political power. The ideological drivers of Islamism at the local level were "young intellectuals, recent graduates of technical and other faculties, who themselves were inspired by the ideologues of the 1960s" .27 Traditional Islamic themes of justice and equality were turned against regimes that were perceived as corrupt, bankrupt and authoritarian, and especially those that were supported by the West during the Cold War and the confrontation with the Soviet Empire.

The rise of Islamism should be seen in the context of these international conflicts of the 1980s. The main factor during this period was the struggle between the radical Shiite Khomeini regime and the conservative Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia. While Tehran tried to export its revolution abroad, conservative governments in Egypt, Pakistan, the Gulf states, and Malaysia often supported Islamic radicals in their fight against communism. These Governments, particularly in Malaysia, have often been willing to contain Islamism through co-optation and concessions, especially on the role of Islamic law (sharia). The main goal of Islamism is to resist the displacement of religious law in the private sphere and, accordingly, to return Sharia law to the public space - to its proper place. According to Kepel, the political success of Islamism has reached a high level.-

27. Kepel G. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. P. 6.

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Shay was born in 1989, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was threatened by Hamas (the Islamist resistance movement) during the Palestinian intifada, and in Algeria, the Front Islamique du Salut (the Islamic Salvation Front) won a landslide victory in the first free elections after independence. In the same year, an Islamist ideologue, Hassan Al-Turabi, came to power in Sudan as a result of a military coup, Khomeini symbolically and controversially extended the scope of sharia law by issuing a fatwa on Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses", and the Soviet army, in the end, was withdrawn from Afghanistan, having achieved nothing there. The fall of the Berlin Wall was a powerful impetus for the eventual fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and Islamism eventually began to fill the political and ideological gap in the international system created by the collapse of organized communism and Marxism-Leninism as its theoretical foundation.

However, Kepel believes that since 1989, political Islam has declined, despite the dramatic and highly effective attacks of Al-Qaeda in New York in 2001, and later in London and Madrid. Political opponents of radical Islam were able to exploit the division of the movement's class base. For example, the fragile class alliance of poor urban youth, religiously oriented middle classes, and alienated intellectuals meant that Islamism was unprepared to deal with long-term and systematic opposition from the authorities. Over time, governments have found ways to divide these social classes and thwart plans to create an Islamic state with only Muslim law - sharia-in place. From Kepel's point of view, the extreme and aggressive manifestations of Islamism - the armed Islamist group in Algeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden's network organization Al-Qaeda - indicate its political disintegration and insolvency. The capture in May 2009 of Mas Selamat Kastari, an Indonesian of Singaporean origin who allegedly planned the attack on Indira Gandhi International Airport, ended the threat of terrorist attacks in Singapore that was linked to the activities of the Jemaah Islamiyah organization.

However, the confrontation with the West is only one and, in the long run, perhaps not the most important aspect of the current crisis.

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islamic renaissance. A much more stable aspect can be associated with personal piety. For example, modern religious movements seem to be very attractive to women. 28 Saba Mahmoud, in her book The Politics of Piety, 29 used the basic concepts of Bourdieu's sociology to explore the growth and consequences of Muslim habit among pious women in modern Egypt. Her ethnographic study of Cairo provides a fruitful framework for thinking about Islamic renewal on a larger scale. Of course, in Egypt, Muslims practice their religion in the context of a dominant Islamic culture in which other groups, such as Copts, are minorities. The need for religious renewal becomes more acute when Muslims find themselves a minority in a larger and more diverse community, and when, therefore, the temptations of secularization and assimilation are much greater. The need to establish special group norms is more urgent in circumstances where the religious community is a minority or the majority feels threatened by a minority that is economically or politically dominant, for example. Then everyday norms of religious practice become especially important for determining religious differences. Where Muslims do not constitute the overwhelming majority, the question of how social groups should interact without violating their inherent requirements of piety becomes relevant. A typical example in this case is the food code, since in the aspect of defining social ties, piety implies first of all certain bodily practices that have some measure of intimacy. In such situations, acts of piety can lead to friction and conflict with other social groups. With the growth of Muslim diasporas, these renewal movements can become more frequent and more visible, as the survival of the group depends on them, and in this sense, the debate in France about headscarves has essentially become a reflection of the general problems of modern multicultural politics.

28. Tong J.K.-C., Turner B. S. Women, Piety and Practice: a Study of Women and Religious Practice in Malaya//Contemporary Islam. 2008. Vol. 2. P. 41 - 59.

29. Mahmood S. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

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Faith and practice in a post-secular society

To return to our discussion of the prospects for a post-secular society, as I have already said, philosophers played first fiddle in discussing the place of religion in modern society, mostly ignoring the anthropological and sociological study of religion. These philosophers - Habermas, Rorty, Taylor, Vattimo-do not feel the ethnographic nature of the descriptions of religion that modern social science provides. In particular, they neglect religious practice in favor of the idea that the current problem of religion is related to the question of faith. As a result, when you read their work, you don't get any idea about the actual nature of everyday religion, as far as belief systems are concerned. Following Durkheim and Wittgenstein, the main defect of this approach is that it focuses on beliefs at the expense of religious practice; the life force of religion is necessarily linked to practice. Faith is preserved only when it is put into practice. Bourdieu's notion of habitus is very relevant here. One can understand the importance of religion in everyday life by seeing how deeply following religious precepts is linked to the habit of a social group. This argument, which appeals to the practical nature of religion in this world, seems to me to be the central argument of twentieth-century anthropology, especially the social anthropology of Mary Douglas. Religion in Western society is weak not because it is philosophically inconsistent, but because it has been deritualized, cut off from the religious calendar, and cut off from both the human life cycle and the annual agricultural cycle. In the West, one of the few remaining religious holidays (namely, Christmas) is an annual commercial event, now often combined with the secular celebration of the New Year. Kant, in his Religion within Reason Alone, 30 may have been right in saying that Christianity (essentially Lutheranism) was its own gravedigger, because as a reflexive faith it did not need the practice that Kant associated with a "cult religion." German Protestantism is virtually devoid of ritual practices as such.

30. Kant I. Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1960.

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Much has been written recently about the limitations of the traditional theory of secularization and, consequently, much thought has been expressed about the idea of a post-secular world. 31 Although I have expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations of Western thinking about religion, an alternative defense of the secularization thesis is possible, namely, pointing to the growth of religious markets. The process of global commodification of modern religions allows us to look at secularization in a completely different way. If religion is a system of beliefs and practices based on the ineffable nature of religious communication, then modern liberal societies have democratized religion and turned it into an expressible system that is fully compatible with the modern world. This "expressiveness" can now be sold as a product and as a service in religious markets.

Much of what Habermas writes about the idea of a post-secular society refers to research and arguments that are quite close to sociologists of religion. So, for example, he argues that the secularization thesis is based on the idea that the disenchanted world (apparently a reference to Max Weber) correlates with the scientific view of the world, according to which all phenomena can be explained scientifically. There was also a differentiation of society into specialized functions (apparently, a reference to Niklas Luhmann), in the process of which religion increasingly became a private matter. Finally, the transformation of society and overcoming the agrarian phase have raised living standards and reduced risks, freeing individuals from the feeling of dependence on supernatural forces and from the need for appropriate assistance.

Habermas rightly notes that this approach is based on a narrowly European point of view. In contrast, America remains a thoroughly religious society, where religion, prosperity, and modernization go hand in hand. Keeping in mind the global context, Habermas draws attention to the spread of fundamentalism, the rise of radical Islamist groups, and the presence of religious issues in the public sphere. There is a need to

31. Habermas J., Mendieta E. Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002; Habermas J., Ratzinger J. The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion. San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006 [Habermas Y., Ratzinger Y. Dialectic of secularization. On Reason and Religion, Moscow: BBI, 2006].

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rethink Locke's liberalism, since the policy of privatizing religion can no longer be a viable strategy based on the separation of state and religion. Habermas ' solution for overcoming the conflict between radical multiculturalism and radical secularism is to engage in dialogue for the inclusion of small foreign cultures in civil society, on the one hand, and to open up subcultures in the direction of the state in order to encourage their members to actively participate in political life, on the other.

Perhaps most interesting, or at least in some respects characteristic, is Habermas ' discussion on the pre-political foundations of a liberal state with Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) at the Bavarian Catholic Academy on January 19, 2008. Both participants were conciliatory. Habermas recognized that religion has preserved values and ideas lost outside its borders, and that the most important concept of the fundamental equality of all people is inherited from the Christian faith. Habermas ' response to the Pope can be understood if we keep in mind the phenomenon of Kulturprotestantismus ("cultural Protestantism"), which is characterized by respect for religion and within which religion occupies a much more significant place in public life than in the British context. Habermas ' answer is quite benign, but it is based on the idea that politics (the state) cannot function without a healthy civil society or a set of shared values. The role of religion - in many ways contrary to critical theory and contrary to the thesis of secularization - can be positive, since it provides the necessary support for public life as such.

Habermas and Ratzinger have one important point in common: they both oppose relativism, which they see as a very destructive force. Habermas is particularly hostile to the postmodern version of relativism. His approach to religion, at least initially, differs from that of Rorty and Vattimo. In this case, I am referring first of all to what the latter says in The Future of Religion. 32 Rorty's relativism is a mixture of bourgeois postmodernism and pragmatism, which he calls "postmodern boer".-

32. Zabala S. (ed.) The Future of Religion. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2005.

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It is therefore quite possible to put its position on a par with the"weak thought "of Vattimo. Both philosophers agree that " there are no facts, only interpretations." They differ only in their attitude to religion, since Vattimo is a practicing Catholic, while Rorty belongs to the secular socialist tradition. The latter, in his work Consequences of Pragmatism, 34 asserts that the role of philosophy is not to establish eternal foundations of Truth, but to be a voice that, like literature and art, instructs humanity. Philosophical progress is found not in a philosophy that "becomes more rigorous" but in one that "becomes more imaginative." 35 Since Rorty was concerned with setting the limits of philosophical knowledge in an unstable, volatile, and insecure world, his philosophical critique has much in common with postmodernism. If applicable-F. Lyotard defined postmodernism as a "distrust of metanarratives,"36 while Rorty, in one of his most influential articles, described it as "Private Irony and Liberal Hope."(Private irony and liberal hope) - refers to an ironic person as one who has "radical and persistent doubts about the finality of the vocabulary that he currently uses" 37. Rorty's postprofessional philosophy seeks to reconcile Dewey's pragmatism and the deconstructivist approaches of continental philosophy. In Finding Our Country, 38 Rorty tries to show that Dewey's legacy is still very relevant to progressive efforts to realize the emancipatory spirit of the"American creed."

In their writings on the future of religion, Rorty and Vattimo support the idea that faith, hope, and charity are based on the same principles.-

33. Rorty R. Essays on Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. P. 199.

34. Rorty R. The Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

35. Rorty R. Achieving Our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. P 9.

36. Lyotard J.-F. Sostoyanie postmoderna [The State of Postmodernity], Moscow: Institute of Experimental Sociology, St. Petersburg: ALETEYA Publ., 1998.

37. Rorty R. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. P. 73.

38. Rorty R. Achieving Our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America.

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traces of New Testament Christianity-form the value framework of modern society. They reject the authority of the Church in general and the papal authority in particular. They also believe that the Church's teaching on gender and sexual relations is hopelessly outdated and represents an essentialist reduction of women to nature (if not to anatomy). If the Church abandons its hierarchical and anti - democratic structures and its commitment to a priestly understanding of the priesthood, it will be able to serve the needs of modern society-or at least be better suited to such a ministry. So, in general, their views are close to the conciliatory position of Habermas, according to which the Christian heritage is largely the basis of modern Western civilization.

These philosophical discussions are mainly concerned with political secularization, that is, the possible role of religion in public life when it comes to women, justice, and power, but they are of much less importance for the analysis of everyday religion, which embodies practices that are far from philosophical speculation.

Globalization and religion

One of the criticisms of modern philosophical interpretations of religion is that they are oversimplified. Habermas believes that religion is visible today because of missionary work, religious rivalry and manifestations of fundamentalism. The other facts that are overlooked are the globalization of religious piety, the commodification of religion, and the emergence (mainly in the West) of what sociologists call spirituality. We can generalize these manifestations of religiosity by stating that the globalization of religion takes three forms. Thus, there is a global rivivelism, for which, as a rule, the concept of institutional religion and adherence to it (be it a church, mosque, temple or monastery) remain important, as well as an emphasis on orthodox beliefs, the guardian of which is to some extent an institutional authority. Within Rivivelism, there are traditional forms of fundamentalism, but also Pentecostal and Charismatic churches. Then, the various forms of folk and traditional religion to which the OS adheres continue to persist-

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the newcomers are poorly educated people who are looking for healing, consolation and various benefits in such religious practices. Such a religion has little to do with meaning and identity, and is instead designed to provide some comfort to those who lack the means to make a decent living. Finally, there is the spread of a new spirituality, which is a heterodox, urbanized, commercialized form of religiosity that usually exists outside of traditional churches.

The consequence of all these processes is an increasing division between "religion" and "spirituality." 39 Thus, globalization promotes the spread of personal spirituality, and such spirituality is usually not so much a guide in everyday life as it has a subjective, personalized meaning. Such religious phenomena may also include therapeutic or wellness aspects, or the promise of personal growth through meditation. If fundamentalist norms of personal discipline are addressed to those social groups that are socially mobile, such as the lower middle class and educated couples, then spirituality is an urban phenomenon that is more closely associated with single middle - class people who are strongly influenced by Western consumer values.

While traditional believers find meaning in the existing mainstream of Christianity, proponents of" spirituality", according to Courtney Bender 40, "build and create their own religions using the spirituality market, deliberately avoiding adherence to traditional religious communities, identities, and theologies." New religions are also closely linked to the themes of therapy, peace, and self-help. Of course, the idea that religion, especially in the West, has been privatized is not a new idea in the sociology of religion.41 However, these new forms of private religiosity are no longer relevant to Protestantism or the American middle classes; they are now global in nature.

39. Hunt S. Religion and Everyday Life. London: Routledge, 2005.

40. Bender C. Heaven's Kitchen: Living Religion at God's Love We Deliver. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003. P. 69.

41. Luckmann T. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967.

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These popular and informal religious movements have ceased to be local, and in this case we are talking about the proliferation of global popular religions associated with the Internet, cinema, rock music, popular television shows and tabloid pulp fiction. They can also be referred to as "do it yourself" religions, because their adherents randomly adopt a wide variety of religious beliefs and practices. Therefore, these forms of spirituality are not limited to the West, but are fueled by Asian films such as Hidden Tiger, Crouching Dragon, and House of Flying Daggers. And all this is connected with new technological magic, with special effects-filled block-busters. Such phenomena were seen as elements of "new religious movements" that, as we have seen, are products of new spiritual markets. Such forms of religion are highly individualistic; they are unorthodox in the sense that they do not conform to any official theological doctrines, but are characterized by syncretism; and they have very little or no connection with public institutions such as churches, mosques, or temples. They are post-institutional and in this sense may well be called postmodern religions. If global fundamentalism presupposes modernization through personal discipline, then global post-institutional religions are typical manifestations of postmodernism.

The environment in which we live is increasingly becoming a communicative one, that is, one where images and symbols play an important role, rather than the written word. Unlike the world of written language, this visual world is iconic, and it requires new skill and expert hierarchies that do not duplicate the hierarchy of the written word. It is also a new experimental context in which the iconic can become iconoclastic, as in the case of Madonna in her post-Catholic period, when she became Rachel and studied Kabbalah for a while. 42 This combination of self-help, subjectivity, changing authorities, iconic discourses, and personal theology is an essential part of learning.-

42. Hulsether M.D. Like a Sermon: Popular Religion in Madonna Videos//Religion and Popular Culture/Eds. B. D. Forbes and J. H. Mahan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. P. 77 - 100.

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a measure of low intensity religion. This is mobile religiosity, which can be transmitted around the world by mobile people to new places where they can mix their religious needs, practically without affecting hierarchical authorities and without experiencing pressure from them. This is a low-level emotional religion, since modern conversions are more like a change of consumer brands than the result of a deep spiritual search. If new religious lifestyles evoke any emotion at all, they are packaged in such a way that they can easily be consumed and then discarded. Brand loyalty and commitment from consumers of low-intensity religions is also minimal. In a famous 1964 article on "religious evolution" in the American Sociological Review, Robert Bella developed an influential model of religious change - from primitive to archaic, then historical, to early modern, and finally to modern. The principal characteristics of religion in modern society are individualism, the decline of the authority of traditional institutions (the church and the priesthood), the willingness to experiment with various religious idioms, and the awareness that religious symbols are constructs. Bella's predictions about modernity have come true in the form of the rise of popular, deinstitutionalized, commercialized, and mostly post-Christian religions.

In a differentiated global religious market, its segments compete with each other and overlap with each other. The new spirituality is a truly consumerist religion, and if fundamentalism challenges consumer (Western) values, it actually sells a lifestyle based on special diets, alternative parenting, health regimes, various practices related to prayer and meditation, as well as self-improvement techniques. All three forms of religion in the era of globalization are somewhat consumerist, but they are also very different, and here gender is the main feature of the new consumer religiosity, as women increasingly dominate the sphere of the new spirituality. In both developed and developing countries, women have new educational opportunities and are having fewer children, so they have free time to devote to religious activities;

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and they will become, and to some extent have already become, "trendsetters" in the emerging global spiritual market.

If globalization theory tends to emphasize the triumph of modern fundamentalism (as a critique of traditional and popular religiosity), then the real consequence of globalization may be the triumph of heterodox, commercial, syncretic popular religion over orthodox, official, professional versions of spiritual life. The ideological influence of these new religions cannot be controlled by religious authorities, and this influence has a greater effect than official statements. In Weber's terms, this is a triumph of mass religiosity over virtuosity. The habit of modern religion is mostly compatible with the lifestyle of the commercial world, in which consumption is the driving force of the economy. In the urban setting of a global consumer society, megachurches use late-capitalist trading strategies to get their message out to the public. Given all this, I would say that modern religions are at risk, as the tension between the world and religion is lost. We can call this social secularization, but paradoxically, religion can also retain its influence at the political level because it serves as a transnational carrier of public identities.

To sum up, religion plays an important role in the public space, and in many societies the liberal model of secularization, which involves the separation of church and State, no longer works. Religion often acts in the public sphere as a deep justification for nationalism, or it can serve as the main carrier of ethnic identity for minorities in a diaspora multicultural society. These considerations are largely consistent with what Jose Casanova originally said in his book Public Religions in the Modern World.43 In this sense, there is no need to talk about significant political secularization. In a political context, the concept of post-secularism refers to cosmopolitanism and the ethics of recognition. It presupposes rational norms of public discourse, in which religious statements are no longer dismissed as irrational, but accepted as legitimate components

43. Casanova J. Public Religions in the Modern World.

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a public dialog. Religious evolution in the social sphere also provides little clear evidence of secularization. The world's religions are growing, and new religious phenomena are multiplying. However, there is also a global transformation of religion into a commodity, which makes its beliefs and practices compatible with secular capitalism. The tension between the religious and the secular is beginning to fade as religion is integrated into modern consumerism. Can the sacred survive in the context of this profoundly secular process of "commodification"?

What's at stake? Public religions and the "social"

In the introductory article to this collection, 44 I said that if we want to take the idea of the "social" seriously, we need to study religion. In this final chapter, I return to Durkheim and argue that in the modern world, the social is fragile and fragmented, and that the erosion of the social has serious consequences for the survival of the"sacred." Let us therefore return once more to Durkheim's formulations concerning society.

Durkheim formulated the theory of solidarity by talking about a society based on community, collective rituals, and shared emotions, 45 but the social world that emerged after World War II gave rise to very different images and theories of the social. With the rise of global urbanization and the emergence of global megacities, public life has become increasingly fragmented, giving rise to urban ghettos and subcultures. The idea of a "lonely crowd" gives an image of passive and isolated city residents glued to their televisions. In addition, it was said that after 1950, new youth subcultures were being formed, associated with growing consumerism. Ethan Watters, in his book Urban Tribes, 46 states that these new social groups consisted of "never-married" people between the ages of 25 and 45-

44. We are talking about the collection "The New Blackwell Companion to The Sociology of Religion" (ed. Bryan S. Turner), Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, published under the editorship of Bryan Turner. - Editor's note.

45. Durkheim E. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. N.Y.: Free Press, 1995.

46. Watter E. Urban Tribes: A Generation Redefines Friendship, Family, and Commitment. N.Y.: Bloomsbury, 2003.

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people who formed public but ephemeral interest groups. Their new lifestyles have always been fluid forms of identification with these disparate groups. Dick Hebdidge gave a classic description of these phenomena in his book Subculture. The meaning of Style "47, where he spoke about the opposition movements of rock' n ' roll followers, namely punks, goths and other representatives of rave culture.

These images of modern tribalism found a clear and creative sociological expression in Michel Maffesoli's The Time of the Tribes. 48 The subtitle of this work, in its 1988 English translation, was " The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society." Maffesoli argues that many microgroups have emerged in modern society, which are examples of a general, but superficial and transient culture. Although the life of these "tribes" is fleeting, their members share a common emotional bond that is very different from the cold bureaucratic ties typical of formal organizations. The Punks were probably a classic example of this kind of youth group. In 1967, Guy Debord published The Society of the Spectacle, 49 in which he developed the Marxist theory of economic alienation to show that modern society has become even more alienated due to the influence of the mass media. Everyday life is preoccupied with the production of goods, what Marx called commodity fetishism. We can only experience our world through such mediation, and in this alienated world our being becomes apparent, so that relationships between people become a theatrical world of phantoms and goods. Debord's work on the society of the spectacle became the ideological basis of the Situationist International movement (mainly among students). Debord inspired events and demonstrations to protest the alienation of a media-dominated world. His ideas had a strong influence on the 1968 student protests. After these social protests of the 1960s, ideas about media and alienation became an integral part of postmodern theory. Jean Baudrillard, for example, was influenced by Marshall Mcluhe-

47. Hebdige D. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. L.: Routledge, 1979.

48. Maffesoli M. The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996.

49. Debord G. La societe du spectacle. Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1967.

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He also criticized Marxism as a theory of production that ignores consumption50. In any case, Marx could not have foreseen the growing importance of the media. Baudrillard draws attention to the ways in which reality and fiction, essence and phenomenon merge.51
These ideas about social fragmentation, social systems, and spectacle have come to influence science fiction as well as social theory in relation to cyberspace and cyberpunk themes. William Gibson's work 52 is said to have impressed a new community of hackers and tech-savvy individuals who were experiencing social dissatisfaction and were looking for social forms to express the interactions made possible by computerization. New opportunities may have overcome the limitations of the"electronic industrial ghettos 53 that characterize modern society, and some social theorists have begun to argue for a" cyber community "as a more attractive alternative to the information city 54. These theories welcome the fusion of fiction and texts produced within the framework of social science, on the grounds that it is not possible to create a "cyber city". that traditional social sciences have no chance to describe even the main features of the information age.

We have made this digression into the theories of modern tribalism in order to draw attention to the fact that the elementary forms of the social world that Durkheim tried to describe in his sociology of religion, referring to primordial tribalism, are rapidly disappearing, and new, but fragmented and ephemeral forms of associations are emerging. The new forms of religion that we have categorized as spirituality, on the one hand, and the commodification of religion, on the other, are social expressions of this deeper process of defragmentation and commercialization of everyday life. If the separation of the sacred and profane was

50. Rojek C., Turner B. S. (eds.) Forget Baudrillard? L.: Routledge, 1993.

51. Baudrillard J. Le Systeme des objets. Paris: Gallimard, 1968 [Bordriyar J. System of things. Moscow, 2001].

52. Gibson W. Neuromancer. L.: Gollancz, 1984.

53. Stone A.R. Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Boundary Stories About Virtual Cultures//Cyberspace: First Steps/Ed. Benedikt M.L.: MIT Press, 1992. P. 81 - 118.

54. Jones S. (ed.) Cybersociety L.: Sage, 1994.

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the new subjective and emotional individualism of modern religion is the cultural expression of what can be appropriately called "thin solidarity". Therefore, the possibility of finding viable forms of social existence in the global world of commercial and commodified religiosity is at stake in the revival of interest in religion. However, in general, the prospects for maintaining the sustainability of the social world are not at all rosy.

Translated from English by Alexander Kyrlezhev

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