Keywords: faith and reason, science and religion, R. Boyle.

Preface to the publication

The question of how faith and reason relate to each other, or, in other words, the question of the limits of rational knowledge in theology, was as acute for Robert Boyle (1627-1691) as it was for other contemporaries who tried to justify the Christian religion in the face of a rapidly developing empirical science and, if possible, the question of the limits of rational knowledge in theology. so to speak, "a new European rationality". Of course, the claim that earlier, during the Middle Ages, faith and reason were constantly in perfect harmony with each other is a strong exaggeration, but, nevertheless, it was with the beginning of Modern times that Christian theology increasingly began to come under fire from rationalistic criticism. The point here was not only (and not so much) that

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the scientific revolution and the new natural philosophy created skepticism about Christian dogma. A significant role was also played by the mutual attacks of representatives of various Christian denominations, who accused each other of "defending things that are impossible and contrary to reason," as William Chillingworth wrote about Catholics in his treatise "The Religion of Protestants" (1638)1.

In England, a long interdenominational controversy led to a heated debate in the second half of the seventeenth century, which essentially focused on the question of how far the human mind can go in its attempts to rationalize biblical revelation. This discussion was probably initiated by English Socinians, such as John Biddle (1615-1662), author of the famous Double Catechism (1654). While rejecting the dogma of the Trinity, original sin, eternal punishment, etc., they relied primarily on common sense, logic, and a rationalistic interpretation of the Bible in their criticism of traditional Christian dogma. The Socinians were opposed by the Reformed theologians John Owen (1616-1683) and Richard Baxter (1615-1691). Owen, although he noted the"excessive claims of reason" 2 in the Socinian teaching, argued with them in a completely rational way, trying to defeat the enemy with his own weapons. Baxter, for his part, simply stated that reason cannot judge the mysteries of revelation. In a treatise with the characteristic title "The Presumption of Reason against Divine Revelation", he wrote: "Human nature, damaged by [original sin], tends more to question the truth of the Word of God than to recognize and acknowledge its own ignorance and inferiority; people are willing to question whether the things that Christ has revealed to them are true, and yet they themselves do not know the nature, causes, and consequences of the Word of God. the essence of these things. " 3
Owen's attacks, and especially Baxter's, were not ignored. The discussion was joined by the Cambridge Platonist philosopher and Latitudinarian theologian Joseph Glanville (1636-1680), who, while condemning Socinianism in general, lamented that Baxter-type theologians denied the role of reason

Chillingworth W. 1. The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation. Oxford, 1638. P. 77-

Owen J. 2. Vindiciae Evangelicoe. Oxford, 1655. P. 63.

Baxter R. 3. The Arrogancy of Reason against Divine Revelations. London, 1655. P. 13.

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in theology: after all, it turns out that almost the only reasonable Christians are Socinians. In a sense, Glanville's view was drawn back to the medieval era with its idea of harmony of faith and reason: "The principles of reason in no way contradict the dogmas of faith"4.At the same time, again in a completely scholastic spirit, he recognized that some of the truths of Christianity "transcend human reason," but "this only means that reason cannot comprehend how these things exist; but in this sense, many of the actions of nature also transcend human reason."5
Glanville was answered by Robert Ferguson (c. 1637-1714), who was once Owen's acolyte. Ferguson agreed that in principle the truths of faith cannot contradict the truths of reason, because "revelation does not imply that a person should stop using his intellectual abilities, but on the contrary: it enriches these abilities with discoveries... improves them"6.On the other hand, Ferguson believed that after the fall, the human mind is so damaged that most individuals who are prevented from thinking straight by "passions and lusts" may well feel that some Christian truths are contrary to reason.

In 1676, Owen returned to the discussion with The Nature of Apostasy. In this treatise, he again attacked the Socinians, who "expanded the territory of reason" too much, which, according to Owen, led the English Church inspired by their teachings to that very apostasy, that is, to fall away from the true teachings of Calvin. I must say that in this essay Owen was even more radical than Baxter. In his opinion, some of the truths of revelation not only exceed the capacity of the human mind, but also contradict it-precisely because (as Ferguson pointed out) the human mind was damaged as a result of the fall.

It was around this time that Robert Boyle entered the discussion. He expressed his thoughts first of all in his treatise "Things that are above reason "(1681)7, as well as in " Reflection-

Glanvill J. 4. Seasonable Recommendation. London, 1670. P. 25.

5. Ibid. P. 22.

Ferguson R. 6. The Interest of Reason in Religion. London, 1675. P. 20.

7. The treatise was accompanied by the supplement "Some tips on how to judge things that exceed reason", which also dealt with the relevant topic.

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The book contains a number of articles on a certain theological difference" (1690)8, the translation of which into Russian is now offered to the reader's attention. So, according to Boyle, some truths of the Christian religion exceed the cognitive capacity of the human mind. These truths include those that "the mind, left to its own devices, would never have discovered, and probably would not even have been able to invent." 9 This means that the human mind needs the help of divine revelation to grasp these truths. However, it does not follow that reason is capable of fully comprehending these truths, for there are " truths that are described in the revelation contained in holy Scripture, which not only cannot be discovered by natural reason, but are also so difficult to understand that even when they are presented in an unambiguous way and as clearly as possible, they cannot be fully understood." it is even possible, and yet they exceed the capacity of our weak and limited minds. " 10
This situation is valid for three main reasons: 1) the human mind cannot formulate concepts that accurately convey the character of such revealed truths ("incomprehensibility" in Boyle's terminology; it refers, for example, to the infinity of the divine nature); 2) the human mind cannot know how and what consequences they cause ("inexpressibility" in Boyle's terminology; it refers, for example, to the infinity of the divine nature). 3) these truths contradict what the human mind knows about other things ("asymmetry" in Boyle's terminology; this includes, for example, the freedom of human will).

When Boyle says that some truths of Christianity are "above reason," he means that they are exceptions to the general "principles" or "rules" of reason. At the same time, Boyle has two types of such rules. The first type refers to the laws of nature, which are formulated by observing natural phenomena. Such laws include, for example, the well-known ex nihilo nihil fit principle. Boyle specifically emphasizes that these laws, which apply to natural things, should not apply to supernatural things. Dru-

8. First published as a chapter in The Christian Virtuoso, one of Boyle's major theological works.

Boyle R.9 . Treatises. London, 1836. P. 74

10. Ibid. P. 75.

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the highest rules of reason are "those that come from the faculty of thought itself ... when it is properly located and shaped." 11 These are, in other words, universal principles like the logical laws of identity and non-contradiction. According to Boyle, these laws cannot be violated in principle, since God preserves absolute harmony in the universe. However, man does not possess divine omniscience, and moreover, his intelligence is weak even in comparison with that of spirits. Therefore, it may seem to a person that two propositions (for example, about universal conditioning in nature and about the freedom of human will) are contradictory, although the point is simply that the finite human mind cannot comprehend the harmony between all truths.

Boyle's approach to the relationship between faith and reason seems to have been more carefully developed than that of his contemporaries. Although Boyle's use of the categories "incomprehensibility" and "inexpressibility" does not go beyond the general thrust of Baxter and Ferguson's work, the concept of "asymmetry", as well as the subsequent doctrine of a fundamentally existing harmony, which, nevertheless, is incomprehensible to the human mind due to its natural weakness, seems to be a natural phenomenon. a unique and original discovery that distinguishes Boyle from his contemporaries and opponents.

A. Appolonov

* * *

Sir,

1. I am not at all surprised, and I do not in any way blame your curiosity, which you have expressed in seeking an explanation of the important distinction used to defend certain sacraments of the Christian religion, according to which "they are certainly above reason, but not against reason." It is true that this distinction has been used by many learned people, especially in the past; however, I understand that you and your friends believe that they were not particularly clear about it, and therefore the use of this distinction could not prevent attacks from non-believers, could not make these attacks less justified, and even did not prevent the use of this distinction. it helped to avoid suspicion from the srt-

Boyle R. Some 11. Advices about Judging of Things Said to Transcend Reason//Works in 5 vols. London, 1744. Vol. IV. P. 462.

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We are grateful to those who were inclined to look at this distinction only as a convenient excuse to avoid certain objections that could not otherwise be answered. Indeed, as far as I can judge, very few of these authors (those with whom I am acquainted, for I do not presume to speak of others) have attempted to explain this distinction (and then, I fear, insufficiently), and none of them have attempted to justify it.

2. In order to eliminate the difficulties that you have pointed out, I will try to do two things: 1) to explain in what sense, in my opinion, this distinction should be understood; 2) to show that this distinction is not arbitrary or illusory, but is based on the very nature of things.

Although I do not seek to impose my opinion on anyone (especially on you), nevertheless, since I (like others) have used the distinction we are considering on several occasions, I consider it my duty to acquaint you with the meaning in which I understand it before proceeding.

3. By things which theology says are above reason, I mean concepts and propositions which reason as such, without the aid of supernatural revelation, would never have revealed to us, whether our limited faculties can comprehend them or not. And by things contrary to reason I mean such concepts and propositions as not only cannot be discovered by reason in themselves, but also, when we try to comprehend them, openly and obviously contradict the principles or certain conclusions of sound reason.

4. As a small illustration, I offer you a comparison from the realm of the sense that is considered to be most closely related to thinking; I believe that you will readily agree that this is vision. So, imagine that you are standing on the shore of the sea, and its depth in this place is great, and the diver asks you what you see there-in the depths; Your answer, quite likely, will be that you can only look into the greenish sea water to a depth of no more than a few yards and if he keeps asking you about what's at the bottom, you'll have to answer him with "I don't know." If the diver then jumps into the water and reaches the bottom, and then rises to the surface and shows you a shell found at the bottom with a pearl inside, you will easily agree that it was inaccessible to your eyes, and that

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Your eyesight is imperfect (although this imperfection as such is not personal, but common to all people, just as the pearl has the natural color and luster characteristic of all such things). However, if a diver claims that the pearl he shows you is the size of a tennis ball, or that it is larger than the shell in which it is located, or that it is not round, but cubic in shape, or that its color is not white or transparent bluish, but black or purple, then you will not doubt that his statements contradict not only (or not so much) what your eyes tell you, but also everything you know about these things, and therefore you will deny what he says. After all, to admit this would be to accept not only that your vision is imperfect, but also that it deceives and creates illusions (even though the visual organ functions normally and is properly turned to its own object).

5. This illustration gives, perhaps, a somewhat superficial idea of the distinction between things that are above reason and things that are contrary to reason. However, it will become clearer if you look at the subject more carefully. And as a first step in this direction, I ask you to take into account that, in my opinion, things that are said to be above reason are not the same type, but fall into two very different categories.

6. It seems to me that there are some things which the mind cannot discover by its own light, and there are other things which, if presented to it, it can comprehend.

7. In the first place, there are truths in the Christian religion that the mind, left to itself, would never discover, and probably would not even be able to invent. And these are most of the truths that depend on the free will and institutions of God: for example, that the world was created in six days, that Christ was born of a virgin, and that in his person two natures infinitely remote from each other, such as the divine and the human, were united, and that the bodies of the righteous will rise up after death and in such a way that glorified people will become like or equal to angels.

8. I believe you will believe me that I can easily give other examples of this type of theological truth; and, of course, there are many such truths (I think more than we can imagine),

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for the discovery of which we lack the means or tools, although when these truths are properly presented, they are fully understood by us. So, if I look at the starry sky first with the naked eye, and then use telescopes of various powers, then I will not only gradually discover more and more stars (according to how powerful this or that instrument I use): In addition, I will also find serious reasons to assume that there are many celestial bodies in unimaginably remote regions, and only the lack of more powerful telescopes hides them from our view.

9. Thus, I believe that what follows is easy for you to understand for yourself, since it does not differ from the opinion of some (I dare not say many) Orthodox theologians. I must add, however, that in addition to these mysterious truths, which are remote and hidden from us, and therefore cannot be discovered by the human mind, there are other things that can be said to transcend reason.

10. For there are other truths related in the revelation contained in holy Scripture, which not only cannot be discovered by natural reason, but are also so difficult to understand that even when presented in an unambiguous way and as clearly as possible, they nevertheless exceed the capacity of our weak and weak mind. limited reason - due to one of the three reasons that I indicated in the dialogue "Things that are above the human mind". Namely, that something either (1) cannot be clearly comprehended by our thought (such is the infinity and perfection of the divine nature), or (2) is unspeakable by us (such, for example, is the way in which God created the rational soul, or the way in which it, being an immaterial substance, affects the human body, and vice versa; I chose this example rather than the creation of matter example, since it is more obvious), or 3) is asymmetric, i.e. incoherent, i.e. as such does not agree with other things that are either obviously true or can be perceived as true (and this is the divine knowledge of future contingent events or events). freedom that resides in the human will, etc.).

11. In this connection, it may be useful to point out that, as far as things that exceed the human mind are concerned, we are not only talking about different types of things, but also about different levels or, at least, about different degrees of their unknowability.

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12. In fact, with regard to some things, it becomes clear that they exceed the human mind almost as soon as they are presented - at least, even before they are subjected to a deep investigation (this applies, for example, to the infinite - both in extent and in number). But there are other things which, when they are first considered in general, that is, when they are still somewhat indefinite, do not confuse or overwhelm our understanding; and so far as they are intelligible, they can be used in ordinary reasoning. But when we begin to examine them more carefully and trace the ultimate consequences that they might have, our minds are confronted with unsolvable difficulties, if not contradictions. And in order to show that I have said this for a reason, I ask you to consider with me the fact that we usually talk in terms of place, time, and motion. And we have some vague concepts of all this, by which we understand each other when we talk about them. But if we begin to think about these concepts and carefully consider all the difficulties that arise in the course of this thinking, our minds will be overwhelmed by the number and scale of these difficulties (those that we have discovered ourselves, or those that can be discovered and presented by others, although those people who might raise objections to our hypotheses, we would hardly be able to firmly establish something that we, in turn, would not be able to object to).

13. What I have said may, I hope, help to remove any difficulties or hesitations concerning the distinction here considered, for, as they have already occurred to me, they are very likely to occur to you. Namely, the point is that if any theological utterance is supposed to transcend our reason, then we cannot claim to believe in it without revealing that we do not understand what we are saying well enough, because we claim to verbally express the act of thinking of what cannot be thought and about you can't formulate a concept.

14. But in this respect we can quite reasonably resort to a distinction similar to that which I have recently made. For in different cases, the concepts that people have about the same thing can be quite different,

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after all, one of them may be more obvious and superficial, and the other-more philosophical and accurate. And I have already given an example of such different types of concepts when I said that people have different ideas about place and time, which, being known objects, are nevertheless (as I have shown elsewhere) so obscure in nature that it is not surprising that Aristotle himself complained the difficulties that arise in trying to give a clear and non-objectionable concept of place, and Augustine honestly admitted his inability to explain the nature of time.

15. And what is said about the colossal difficulties that make it difficult to penetrate deeply into these known objects of research also applies to quantity, local movement, and other primary things, whose mystery is no less, although it differs in terms of the very things to which it relates.

16. These examples show that we are not at all like parrots (as your friends have hinted about those who use our distinction) or people without reason when we claim that certain things we know are in some respects superior to our reason: for the concepts we have about these things, even if we are not aware of them. they are vague and imperfect, yet they can be used and in some way intelligible, even though the things to which they relate in some other way may exceed the cognitive capacity of our minds (for a careful researcher may see that these things have something that cannot be fully understood, or some other meaning). otherwise, they are beyond our comprehension, at least in this earthly life).

17. Having removed the objection that required this digression, I will now return to the main topic and tell you that any suitable example may suffice to clarify the first part of the expression used here (when it is said that the sacrament (or any other aspect of the faith) is superior to reason, but does not contradict it), for if there is at least one If there is only one truth that is recognized as such, but which is not fully understood clearly and distinctly, then it will no longer be possible to say that the use of our distinction implies the assertion of something irrational or absurd. And this objectionable expression will be further justified if we show that it is not contrived or arbitrary.,

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but based on the nature of things. And this is exactly what I will try to do by showing that although I recognize the existence of two kinds of things that are considered superior to reason, nevertheless, it is not necessary that either of these kinds should always contradict reason.

18. And as for the first type of things that transcend reason, men cannot discover certain truths without the help of a knowledgeable mentor, and yet they are able, when these truths are revealed to them by such a mentor, both to comprehend them with the help of the cognitive abilities of their minds and to confirm them truth and accept them. The mind of man, being a very limited faculty, is naturally endowed with no more store of knowledge than it can in principle acquire by itself; and it would be a great misfortune to mankind if we were to deny, as contrary to reason, all that our own natural light cannot reveal, and, accordingly, if we were not able to do so, we should not be able to to deprive ourselves of the highest benefits that we could gain from interacting with some higher and stronger intelligence. An example suitable for my current task would be the sentient souls themselves, who are believed by all to have the same natures. Nevertheless, it is the case that a person who is only superficially familiar with geometry, for example, would not be able to discover by his own light that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its side, while an experienced mathematician will skilfully explain and prove this noble theorem by a series of arguments to a student who, with his thus-trained mind, he will be able to both understand and confirm it (even to the point where Plato said that those who deny it are animals rather than humans).

19. Other examples can be given to prove the above-mentioned truth. Nevertheless, there is no stronger prejudice than the idea that a proposition or concept that reason cannot discover by itself is counterintuitive. But it is purely accidental and external to the truth or falsity of the statement that we have not heard of it before, or that we cannot discover it by our own efforts, but must obtain knowledge of it from another. But then this inability to discover something in the course of independent research does not preclude us from both understanding it (once it is properly presented) and determining what it is.-

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share its compliance with the requirements of common sense. In order that you may agree with what will be said in the next part of my discussion, I must add that this kind of intellectual assistance can often not only enlighten but also reward the human mind by providing it with information that is both consistent with and complementary to earlier, vague, and imperfect concepts. When, for example, an ancient medal, part of which is covered with rust, is shown to an inexperienced person, even a scientist, he cannot by his own efforts read the entire inscription, which is half destroyed by time and rust, and understand its meaning. But if his mentor becomes an expert in antiquities, this person can learn to identify the lost letters that he could not read before, understand the meaning of the inscription and confirm the authenticity of the thing that it should be. And because many of those who are philosophically inclined, like yourself, flinch at the word "mystery" and suspect that - because it hints at something difficult to understand - they are hiding something by using this obscure term illusory, I venture to add that in accordance with our teaching, we should consider the fact that various things pertaining to the Old Testament are called "secret" in the New Testament in so far as they were so in the Mosaic Law, but then ceased to be so because the apostles announced them to the whole world. Thus, the calling of the Gentiles to the Church is described by their apostle as a mystery, because, in his words, "the mystery that was hidden from ages and generations "is now" revealed to his saints " (Colossians 1: 26). And this same author tells the Corinthians that he gives them the secret and immediately explains it, predicting that the pious believers will not die, but those who are alive at the coming of Christ will not perish, but will change, and the rest of the dead will rise incorruptible (cf. 1 Cor 15: 5 1-5 2). This amazing teaching (although it could not have been revealed either by the light of nature or by the texts of the Old Testament) is called a mystery by the apostle; but for us it is no longer a mystery, for he has already foretold everything and, accordingly, explained it.

20. I can cite other examples (see Mt 13 and Eph 5: 31) that confirm the observation I have just made that (1) certain things that Scripture teaches that are beyond what is known, and probably beyond what can be revealed by natural light, are far away from that,

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(2) That such discoveries attest to the importance of Scripture to the rational mind, since they not only agree with the doubtful and imperfect ideas we already have about things, but also complement them and even lead to perfection. And I dare add that such intellectual support often helps us to understand that certain things that are not only above reason, but at first glance counterintuitive, are actually compatible with a mind that has been improved by the support that revelation provides. As a philosophical illustration, I can cite the following example: when Galileo first began to make his discoveries with a telescope and claimed that there were planets beyond the orbit of Jupiter, he said something that other astronomers could not immediately accept as true; but they could not prove it to be false either. And even if a certain revelation is perceived not as superior to reason, but as contrary to it, it is necessary to consider first whether such a teaching is really contrary to universal principles. or is it just something that depends on the amount of information that we have (in other words, although we believe that something is irrational, we cannot know for certain that the grounds on which this judgment rests are clearly and completely known to us). So-to go back to the example given above - when Galileo or some of his disciples claimed, contrary to popular belief, that Venus sometimes became horned like the Moon, the astronomers (although they considered the generally accepted opinion to be well founded, because it was based on the evidence of their own eyes) could not refute it, because the naked eye could not provide sufficient information about this phenomenon. In the same way, when Galileo spoke of hills, valleys, and shadows on the moon, they could not immediately reject this statement, but they had to accept it on faith (or at least incline to it), as well as everything else that he said about the shape and number of planets. For they already knew that he had - and was successfully using - a new method of discovering celestial bodies that was unfamiliar to them; and therefore they could not act as judges of all the things that Galileo claimed to have discovered by his method (although they certainly knew something about it). could judge). And even though they couldn't see on the moon

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What he talked about (the valleys, mountains, and their shadows), they could nevertheless reasonably suspect that the difference between their opinions about this planet and his might be due to the imperfection of their naked eyes - especially when you consider that what Galileo said about the nature of the planet was not true. The study of lunar objects by analogy with the sea and the earth, rather corrected and improved, rather than completely excluded their previous representations. Indeed, he recognized that the dark spots they observed were the shadowed regions of the moon, and gave the reason for their shadowing, and their naked eyes could not lead to any such knowledge. And the fact that the [shadow-casting] mountains are invisible to the naked eye, Galileo explained the considerable distance between the Moon and us, because even at a much smaller distance, square towers seem round, etc.

21. Now I must say something that, on the one hand, may be a kind of supplement to the form of argument I am using here, and on the other hand, may be a confirmation of the grounds on which this argument rests. I do this rather forcibly, because I expect to be told that the person who tries to convince us that there are things beyond our understanding is trying to deceive us, and is preparing a clever trap by using an arbitrary distinction, which he can use as he pleases.

22. So, I will say a few words about this. I recognize that this distinction may be misused, and that some scholastic theologians have indeed misused it. However, there are other distinctions that are used quite reasonably by scientists, and even philosophers, but are not at all protected from being distorted; and I do not understand why these distinctions are better than the ones I am talking about here. At the same time, we are now considering not whether some rash people can use our distinction improperly, but whether it has a basis in reality. So, turning to things themselves, I will consider the fact that for the proposition "to be above reason" (in the sense indicated above) is (as was already noted earlier, when I spoke of the first type of things that exceed reason) something external and accidental in relation to truth or falsity. Indeed, " to be above ra-

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zuma" is by no means an absolute characteristic, but a correlated one, implying a relation to the amount of knowledge that is possible for human understanding (which volume is surpassed); but something that is higher than human reason may not exceed a more enlightened reason, such as is found in rational beings of a higher order, for example, in the human mind. angels, and even more so with God, who (since we perceive him as a being who must possess infinite perfections) must possess perfect cognitive abilities and unlimited knowledge. So, admitting this, we must not deny that a higher intelligence can comprehend many things that we cannot comprehend, and also learn about them, that they are in harmony with the unchangeable and eternal ideas of truth and, accordingly, can agree with each other (while people with much weaker abilities, may suspect or believe that these things are individually false or incompatible with each other). However, once I have begun to discuss this subject, I can go much further than time allows, and therefore I must confine myself to one argument, which proves that for things that exceed human reason in the sense indicated above, it is by no means impossible that even those that are open to us should be true. objections that can't be answered directly. For I believe that some of the things that go beyond reason may indeed contradict each other; and yet each of them may be justified by such arguments as the most learned and intelligent men can both accept and reproduce; arguments that consist in putting the adherents of the opposite opinion in front of the other. such objections, to which they could not give a direct answer.

23. This, it seems to me, is obvious in the case of a dispute about the infinite divisibility of quantity (for example, a straight line). Indeed, many famous mathematicians and even more physicists (in particular, almost all Epicureans and other atomists) believe that this is impossible. However, the opposite is also claimed, and it is believed that Aristotle proved it mathematically in a special treatise; and this is the opinion of the Aristotelian school and several excellent geometers. Indeed, the statements of these opposing parties are contradictory, according to-

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because it is necessary that a given straight line - at least in the mind-should divide into parts, which in turn either divide further or not (and then the division must sooner or later stop); and therefore only one of the opposite opinions is true. And it is clear to those who, with the proper skills, have carefully and impartially examined this dispute, that either of these two sides is vulnerable to objections that cannot be clearly answered and that confuse and overwhelm the minds of those who seek to defend it.

24. Now, sir, I will proceed to discuss this distinction, not only because I do not find that others have said more about it than I have, but also because I am trying to explain and justify the importance it has in protecting not only some of the sacraments of the Christian religion, but also (that it may have gone unnoticed for you) some important points of natural theology. Indeed, natural religion taught pagan philosophers such truths as, for example, the creation of an intelligent soul or mind (which is an immaterial substance), the formation of the world from universal matter (although this action required that an immaterial substance communicate movement to the body), and that God knows the thoughts and intentions of man, no matter how hard he tries to hide them, and what he knows about the free actions of people for many centuries before they were born. These and other sublime truths were achieved before the beginning of the preaching of the gospel; however, when I carefully consider how difficult it has been to understand the modus these things and to explain exactly how some of them were implemented, and how some of the divine attributes (such as eternity, immeasurability, omnipotence, etc.) belong to God and how some actions (for example, the motion of objects or the creation of human minds with all its noble powers), are it; so, I say, when I consider all this, I acknowledge that I understand that there are certain exercises that can be opened with only one light of nature, against which it is possible to make such an objection based on physical principles and the established order of things corporal, if they are cited consistently, would lead the people of a small mind to acknowledge that their minds are weak and imperfect and, of course, commensurate with the most sublime and mysterious truths, and that they are not able perfectly to comprehend them and re-

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However, they would recognize these unusual truths, because the weight of positive arguments would push them to do so.

25. And if You now, after all I wrote, tell me what no doubt that the case we consider here distincte, assuming hypothetically it can have very bad consequences (insofar as it is a haven for any obscure concepts that charismatic arrogant or conceited philosopher can offer under the name of "mysteries beyond the jurisdiction of mind"), and if this distinctio still be recognized, it will not be a good excuse for a discussion of the doctrines of the Christian religion, I will answer these objections in the following way. As I have already said, I do not deny that our distinction can be misused, but it is also a defect in other distinctions, which are accepted without hesitation because they are useful, and are not denied just because they can be abused. It is therefore appropriate to stand up for these distinctions as well as for our own, and to examine with all possible care how far a concept or teaching treated as a "mystery" requires such a distinction and justifies it. I am also willing to admit that as far as the second objection is concerned, you are mostly right, because I believe that it would be a great weakness for a Christian to consider our distinction as a positive proof, since (as was said recently on a somewhat different point) although "to be or not to be above reason" is a very difficult thing to do, it is something external to a difficult-to-understand idea, yet, in general, the difficulty of understanding does not so much inspire confidence in the concept or teaching,but rather the opposite. Likewise, Christians are not so shallow as to claim that such religious dogmas are to be believed because they are superior to human reason, as if this fact itself were proof of their truth; on the contrary, they only believe that these dogmas are to be believed regardless of their superior reason. if they are sufficiently justified in one way or another.

26. And in support of those who believe in these difficult-to-understand dogmas (which are clearly stated in the holy Scriptures, based on the authority of one who does not deceive and who cannot be deceived), I would like to say now that (as we have previously shown in the previous chapter)

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some doctrines must be true, regardless of the fact that the problems involved cannot be solved by our weak minds, and since the perfection of divine knowledge does not allow us to doubt that God definitely knows which of the contradictory opinions is true, and can tell people about it Therefore, there is no sufficient reason to deny revealed dogmas simply because they are problematic in themselves and open to serious objections.

27. Further, I would like to add something that may help to defend some of the truths of natural religion and some of the truths of revealed religion. That it is reasonable to agree with a certain thing if there is clear positive evidence about it (although we cannot directly answer all the objections that a keen theoretical mind can raise against it) is a truth that is important for religion in general and for the Christian religion in particular, which is a truth that I believe is very important to us. it can be proved by the following example. Since we can walk back and forth and move our bodies from one place to another, I argue that this is sufficient proof that there is a local movement in the world - despite all the plausible and clever arguments that Zeno and his followers put forward to refute this truth. And they found it so problematic that they not only confused and confused the ancient philosophers, but also, as it seems, baffled them (and I doubt that any modern thinkers have been able to come up with a clear solution to this aporia).

28. And now, sir, if you will allow me, we will take a look back at our whole argument , so that I may present something like the brief conclusion I originally intended. Thus, it is not necessary that every concept or utterance that can be found in the Holy Scriptures and that transcends human reason should be counterintuitive. In addition, if the Christian religion is true, and its secrets and other dogmas are revealed by God, then it is not enough to refute any of them by rejecting the very expression (according to which they are above reason, but not contrary to reason), as if it were meaningless and groundless. For even if this distinction is not capable of revealing the truth of the mystery (for that mystery is not true).

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it should be based on its own principles and arguments), it protects the secret from being considered absurd or false (because the secret transcends our reason). But since this may apply almost indifferently to a chimerical concept as well as to a mysterious truth, if this expression is used to justify any such thing, which, although it is pretended to be a secret, is nevertheless false, the error will consist not in the fact that the distinction itself is groundless, but in the fact that it is not true. that it is being misused.

Sincerely yours, etc.

 Boyle R. Treatises. London, 1836.

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