The article analyzes long-term and modern processes of global economic growth based on statistical and economic indicators calculated by the author and a number of models. Its most important components, proportions and factors in economically advanced and developing countries are investigated. It is being clarified whether Western countries and Japan show signs of what some scientists call "secular stagnation", or whether they are growing, but in a different dimension. The most important components of the Asian economic breakthrough, its economic and social consequences and contradictions are considered. The article provides an assessment of the opportunities and main determinants of the implementation of the catch-up and breakthrough development strategy by the countries of the East and South.
Keywords: developed and developing countries, global growth, modeling, Asian economic breakthrough, catch-up and breakthrough development, inequality, debt, instability, reforms.
The picture of the world in the light of dramatic events in a number of its regions has become significantly more complicated. According to my calculations, the global political and geopolitical stability index declined by almost 1/10 in 2000-2015, including 1/5 in the developed countries, almost 1/3 in Europe and Central Asia, and more than 1/2 on average in the Middle East and North Africa (calculated by: [The World Bank. World Governance Indicators, 2015; The World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2015, p. 9]).
Despite the intensification of trade, economic, informational and cultural contacts, the world turned out to be far from the "end of history" and the triumph of the liberal order (according to Fukuyama). Zakariya). In it, the (geo)political and economic rivalry of countries has intensified, and there are signs of what S. Huntington called a clash of civilizations. Various threats are growing, and the number of challenges is multiplying. They are, of course, in no small measure (according to A. J. Toynbee) - the engines of evolution. But they can, if their "overdose" occurs, slow down its course, give it a counterproductive direction. In this context, I consider it useful to clarify the main trajectories, factors, problems and contradictions of modern economic growth in developed and developing countries.
LONG-TERM ACCELERATION OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
During the approximately two-hundred-year period of world history, a process unique in terms of human creativity and innovation, called modern economic growth (SIR) by the Nobel laureate S. Kuznetsov, emerged and began to operate. Humanity, having overcome the main Malthusian constraints (see Grinin and Korotaev, 2012), managed to move from extremely low and unstable rates of per capita economic growth, which in general did not differ much in 1000-1800
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from zero, to a relatively high average annual rate of 0.9-1.0% in 1800-1950, which doubled or tripled in 1950-2014-up to 2.5-2.6% (hereinafter, unless specifically specified, calculations were performed according to: [World DataBank; IMF Data; Untadstat; OECD. StatExtracts; UNDP.Data; Maddison, 2003; Maddison, 2007, p. 376-383; Melyantsev, 2013(1)]).
At the same time, in 1000-1800, per capita GDP in future RGS at least doubled, and in the countries of the East and South (UIs), it is possible that it decreased by about 1/5-1/4. As a result, the countries of the West, which lagged behind the countries of the world in terms of this indicator at the beginning of the last millennium by about half, overtook the latter by the beginning of the XIX century. If in the first hundred and fifty years after the start of the industrial revolution, per capita GDP in the West and Japan as a whole increased five times, then in the colonial and dependent countries - by no more than 3/5. The gap in the level of average per capita income in favor of RGS has more than tripled, reaching an impressive five-fold value. However, in the last two - thirds of the century, which was marked not only by the world's transition to STP, but also by the economic recovery of developing countries (MS), the acceleration of per capita income growth rates (by almost an order of magnitude-from 0.3 to 2.7%) was significantly greater than in the WG (from 1.1 to 2.5-2.6%). The convergence process has been outlined. The income gap between the two groups of countries has narrowed - although still modestly-to 4.5 times its current size.
SIR was linked to rapid structural metamorphoses. The accelerated modernization of the employment structure resulted in an intensive growth of the share of employees in industries with higher capital-to-labor ratio and labor productivity. The indicator under consideration in industry and services worldwide grew from 1/5 in 1500 to 1/4 in 1800, 2/5 in 1950, 1/2 in 1980, and more than 2/3 (including 96-97% in the WG and 62-63% in the RS) in 2013 [Melyantsev, 2014(1), pp. 21-22]. If the intersectoral structure of employment had not changed significantly over the past two centuries, or if it had changed twice or three times more slowly, then the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the world during this period would most likely have been 1/3-2/5 less (for the calculation methodology, see [Melyantsev, 1996, pp. 51, 163; Melyantsev, 2013(1), pp. 16-18]).
In the structure of GDP, the share of gross capital investment in physical capital increased-in the whole world from 2-4% in 1000-1800 to 9-11% in 1800-1950. (in general, until now, the RG-from 4-6% to 12-14%, in the RS - from 2-3% to 6-8%) and 23-24% in 1950-2014. (in the RG 22-24% and in the RS 24-26%), as well as investments in human capital. According to my calculations, the share of investment in education, health care and science has increased by almost an order of magnitude in the world during the transition to SED - from a paltry 0.2-0.3% of GDP during the first eight centuries of the last millennium to 2.5-3.0% in 1800-1950. (in future RGS - from 0.4-0.6% to 3-5%, in RS - from 0.1-0.3% to 1.4-1.8%), increasing in the first post-war decades by 4-5 times - up to 12-13% (in RGS - up to 14-16%, in RS - up to 6-7% of GDP) and by another third in 1980-2013 - up to 16-17% of GDP (21-23% in the RG and 8-10% in the RS).
The major structural, cultural and institutional changes that have taken place in the RG and RS, the improvement of their existing macroeconomic regulation tools, and the intensification of the international division of labor (IDP) have led to a tendency to accelerate the dynamics of aggregate factor productivity (TFP). The global average annual growth rate increased from almost zero in 1000-1800 (0.01-0.02%) to 0.4-0.5% in 1800-1950. (in the WG - 0.7-0.8%, in the future RS 0.1-0.3%) and 1.5-1.6% in 1950-2010 / 13 (in the WG 1.7-1.9% and in the RS 1.1-1.3%). As for such an indicator, which is very significant for the assessment of GDP, as the contribution of SPF to GDP growth, it increased from less than 1/10 to ~1/4 (in the WG - 1/3, in the RS - 1/5) and almost to 2/5 (in the WG - 1/2 and RS - 1/4).
Impressive changes in the economy have led to significant changes in the social sphere and the standard of living of the population. Over the past two centuries, the global average is the proportion of poor and very poor people (per capita consumption of less than $ 1.25 per day in PPP).
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2005 and 2011) decreased significantly - from 4/5-9/10 to 1/10-1/5. At the same time, in the beginning of the 2010s, the share of people living on less than $ 2.5 and $ 10 per day in the Republic of Belarus as a whole reached about half and over 4/5 of their residents, respectively.
Schedule 1
Dynamics of the human development index (HDI) in developed countries( RGS), developing countries (RS) and the world as a whole (RGS in 2014 = 1000)
Note. 1. The Human Development Index (HDI) is calculated as the geometric mean of relative indicators of per capita GDP (in PPP 2011), the average life expectancy from birth, the level of education of the adult population (for 1000-1800 years estimated by literacy, for 1800-2014 - by the average number of years of education of the adult population). 2. HDI for groups of countries and the world as a whole is weighted by population size.
Calculated from: [World DataBank; IMF Data; Untadstat; OECD. StatExtracts; UNDP. Data; Maddison, 2003; Maddison, 2007, p. 376-383; Meliantsev, 2004, p. 124-125; Мельянцев, 2013, с. 9].
The average life expectancy from birth, which was 25-26 and 27-28 years in the world as a whole a thousand and two hundred years ago, respectively (in 1800, in future RGS-32-34 years, in MS-25-27 years), in the first hundred and fifty years after the onset of SED increased by one and a half times - to 43-44 years. However, if it doubled in the RG (up to ~66 years), then in the colonial and dependent countries it increased only by 2/5 - up to 37 years. In 1800-1950, the absolute gap between the RGS and the RS in favor of the former increased fourfold (from 7 to 29 years).
In 1950-2014, as a result of positive changes in the quantity and quality of nutrition of the population, progress in medicine, improvement of sanitary conditions and education of the population, the indicator under consideration grew by two-thirds on average in the world, to 71-72 years. If in 1800-1950, the average annual growth rate of the UWR in the world increased by 1 month, then in 1950-2014-by five months. At the same time, if in the RG it grew by a little more than 15 years, to 81 years (or 3 months a year), then in the RS it almost doubled (from 37 to 69 years), or by six months a year. The indicated gap in the DSSR between the RG and RS was reduced by 2.5 times (calculated from the sources to Graph 1).
If in 1000-1800, the average annual growth rate of the population's education index increased by no more than 0.1% per year, then in 1800-1950 it (1.1%) increased by an order of magnitude, and in 1950-2013/14 it added almost a third (1.4-1.5%). At the same time, there is a gap in the average number of years of adult education between the RG
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and RS 1 in 1800-1950 increased from one to eight years (the indicator was 1.7 and 0.7 years, 10 and 2 years, respectively), and by 2013/14 to 10 years (in general, for the WG - 18, and in the RS - 8 years). Although there is considerable progress in both groups of countries, in contrast to the DSSR, there is no convergence in absolute values of the number of years of study in general between the RS and the RG.
At the beginning of the last millennium, current RGS lagged behind future MSS by about half in terms of the human development index (HDI). In the next eight centuries preceding the industrial revolution, the Western countries, implementing reforms in the material, social, cultural and spiritual spheres of life, subjugating the seas and oceans and placing many countries and peoples in the world in colonial and semi-colonial dependence, managed to increase their level of development, measured by the HDI, more than three times, surpassing the latter (for which it has practically not grown) twice (see graph 1).
In the whole world, despite the discoveries made in the XI-XVIII centuries, the HDI increased by less than 0.1% per year. However, in the future, the average annual growth rate showed a significant acceleration. At the same time, both in the world as a whole-from 0.7-0.8% per year in 1800-1950 to 1.5% in 1950-2014 and in the RG group (from 0.9-1.0% to 1.2-1.3%), and-but to a much greater extent - in the MS group (from 0.4-0.6% up to 1.9-2.0%). In terms of the dynamics of the indicator under consideration, the latter, lagging approximately twice behind the former during the XIX - first half of the XX century, over the next six decades significantly - by one and a half times - surpassed the WG and managed to reduce the gap in the HDI value from 3.5-fold in 1950 to 2.3 in 2014.
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: "SECULAR STAGNATION" OR GROWTH IN ANOTHER DIMENSION?
The view of the world through F. Braudel's "long stretches" has a right to exist and, in general, gives a positive and optimistic sense of the world economic development that is dynamically gaining momentum. But not everything is so simple. We live in the framework of not only super-long, but also shorter periods. If we evaluate the trends of the last few decades, we can see the opposite trend in global economic dynamics, which is associated with a noticeable slowdown, primarily in the centers of the world economy [Solow, 2014, p. 16].
In describing this phenomenon, which is a subject of considerable discussion, one should pay attention to a kind of extended Solow paradox (see [Melyantsev, 2009, part 1]). In 1987, the Nobel Prize-winning economist R. Solow remarked:: "You can see the arrival of the computer age everywhere except in performance indexes." Although in 1996-2004 the impact of computers and IT was reflected in the dynamics of both capital expenditures and productivity, however, according to a number of economists, the effect was short-lived [Has the Ideas Machine Broken Down, 2013]. The world economy is represented by segments and technological structures (see Sadovnichy et al., 2012) that grow at different rates. Modern measures of economic progress, such as GDP, take into account a number of macroeconomic results, but a number, including those from the latest processes, do not.
It is impossible not to see significant progress, in particular, first of all, in the development of ICT. Computer power in the world since the mid-1950s. increased by about a trillion times. Now a typical smartphone is 3 million times more powerful and about a thousand times (adjusted for inflation) cheaper than the average computer of the mid-1960s in 2013-2014. Over 2/5 of the world's population, including about a third in the RS and over 4/5 in the WG, were connected to the World Wide Web. International Internet traffic in 2005-2014 grew by an average of 38-44% annually. If in the Middle Ages the volume of knowledge in Europe doubled, according to estimates, in at least 50 years, now it is increasing 50 times in ten years [World in 2050, 2013, p. 315].
1 Now RG, in the XI century. lagging behind the leading countries of the East and South in terms of literacy by three to five times, by the beginning of the industrial revolution, they increased it by about 13-15 times to an average of 2/5, three times four times surpassing the latter [Meliantsev, 2004, p. 124-125].
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The second is to increase the global flow of goods, services, and finance. In 1980/81-2013/14, according to the narrowed flow concept, it grew by 2/3 as a whole - from 21-22% to 35-36% of world GDP, and according to the expanded one, it tripled: from 50-60% in 1975-1984 to 170-180% in 2005-2014 [Kose and Ozturk, 2014; McKinsey, 2014, p. 2, 4]. On the scale of intensification of international economic relations, including through TNCs, see: [Tsvetkova 2012; Tsvetkova, 2014].
Third, to increase the global share of investment in human capital in the total expenditure on the formation of human and physical capital. This indicator (excluding housing) increased from less than 1/10 in 1000-1800 to 1/5 in 1800-1950, more than 1/3 in 1950-1980, and more than 2/5 in the 1980s and early 2010s (calculated from: [Melyantsev, 2013(1), pp. 18-20]).
Fourth, there is a marked reduction in the world's average annual population growth rate: from 1.8-2.0% in 1950-1980 to 1.3-1.5% in 1980-2014 (1.7% in the 1980s, 1.4-1.5% in the 1990s, 1.0-1.2% in 2000-2014).
However, despite all the above, the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP on the planet decreased by more than a quarter-from 2.7-2.9% to 2.0-2.1%, respectively (calculated from the sources in Graph 1). In general, in the RS, it on average slightly increased from 2.4-2.6% in 1950-1980 to 2.7-2.9% in 1980-2014 But the scale of the increase itself is small. It is associated with the economic success of only a few dozen MS (for the differentiation of MS, see: [Abramova, Fituni, Sapuntsov, 2007; Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012; Boytsov, 2012; Bragina, 2014; Krasilshchikov, 2014; Potapov, Salitsky, Shakhmatov, 2011; Fituni, 2012; Fridman, Karamurzov, 2011; Elyanov, 2013]). This can be explained almost entirely by the decrease in the average annual population growth rate in the RS as a whole - from 2.1% to 1.6-1.7%, respectively.
As for the WGS, in general, the average annual GDP growth rate per capita decreased by at least half - from 3.5-3.6% in 1950-1980 to 1.6-1.8% in 1980-2014 (calculated from sources to graph. 7), continuing to decline in the last period-from 2.4-2.5% in the 1980s to 1.8-1.9% in the 1990s and 1.0-1.2% in 2000-2014.
Countries experiencing acute financial and social problems have tripled their contribution to global GDP growth-from 3/5 in the 1950s and 1980s to 2/5 in the 1990s and 1/5 in 2000-2014 (according to the G20, from 30% in 2000-2007 to 10% in 2008-2014, respectively). Their share of global GDP calculated on the basis of 2011 PPP declined from almost 3/5 in 1950 to 54-56% in 1980 and about 2/5 in 2013/2014. And the share of the Russian Federation in the total economic, military, scientific and technical potential of the G20, calculated as a composite index consisting of six indicators, in 2000-2014. it fell by a quarter - from 62% to 45% (calculated from sources to Graph 1).
Schedule 2
Average annual growth rates of GDP and its most important factors in developed countries (WG) and developing countries (RS) in 2008-2013, %
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Note. 1. Y, L, K, and R represent the average annual growth rates of GDP, employment, fixed capital, and aggregate factor productivity (TFP), respectively. 2. Calculation of the growth rate of SFP is made by the formula:
R = Y - α · L - (1 - α) · K. The elasticities of GDP growth for labor (α) and capital (1-α) are assumed to be equal for RG 0.7 and 0.3, for RS 0.6 and 0.4.
Calculated from sources to graph 1.
In general, the average annual growth rate of SFS in the Russian Federation decreased from 2.5% in 1950-1980 to 1.1% in 1980-2014, which, all other things being equal, can explain approximately 2/3 of the slowdown in the dynamics of their GDP. The considered indicator on average for the RS (1.1-1.3%), which in 1950-1980 was at least twice lower than in the RG, turned out to be a third lower in the last three and a half decades (1.5%), and during the "great recession" (in 2008-2013 - 1.6%) - almost three times higher than in the West and Japan as a whole (calculated from [Melyantsev, 2013(3), p. 19-20], as well as according to Graph 2). Only in the first 14 years of this century, a number of dynamic large DCS managed to catch up with the three leading RGS in terms of TFP (USA, Germany, and Japan) by about a third-from 1/4 to 1/3 (see graph 3).
Schedule 3
Dynamics of the level of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) of the leading RS and RGS in % of the US level and the average ratio of the TFP level of the RS from the RGS, in %
Note. 1. IN = India. 2. Calculated by the following formula: TFP i / TFP j = = (Yi / Li 0·65 · ki 0.35)) / (Yj / (Lj 0.65 · Kj 0.35)), where TFP i and TFP j, Yi and Yj, Li and LJ, Ki, and KJ) - respectively, the levels of SFP, GDP, employment, and fixed capital in the compared country and the United States.
Calculated from sources to graph 1.
According to my calculations, based on the compact model below, which describes ~3/4 of the variations in the average annual economic growth rates of the ten largest Russian regions, calculated for 1950-1980 and 1980-2014, respectively. (calculated from sources to the graph. 1), their deceleration in the second period, all other things being equal, could be caused by two factors. Approximately 2/3 of the slowdown was due to the achievement of higher levels of per capita income by the RG. This factor directly and indirectly absorbs the action of many effects. As a result of the growth of wages and other incomes, a number of labor and civilizational costs increased, demand for many types of goods and services was saturated, and the factor of overflowing of labor and capital resources to segments of the economy with their generally higher productivity was largely exhausted:
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Y it - average annual GDP growth rate of the i-th country from among the 10 largest RGS for two periods (1950-1980 and 1980-2014); Y/P i0-GDP per capita in the initial year of the period; ΔP1564 it - change in the share of people of working age in the total population of the country over the period t (in percentage points). Based on the data shown in parentheses, all parameters are statistically significant (at the level of less than 8%). The adjusted determination index (r2 adj) is very high.
According to the model, one-third of the slowdown could be explained by the transition of developed societies to a functional mode of more or less rapid loss of the demographic dividend. The median age in the whole Russian Federation in 2014 is already one and a half times higher (42-43 years) than in the RS (29-30 years, without the PRC - 26 years). In Japan and Western European countries, this is already affecting the average population capacity and risk tolerance in their societies. This leads to a decrease in the share of savings and capital investment in GDP, on the one hand, and an increase in necessary, socially significant, but not the most productive for the development of the economy costs (pensions, benefits, medical expenses), on the other.
On average, in the WG, the share of education expenditure in GDP, which approximately doubled in 1950-1980 to 6.2-6.6%, then remained at the same level over the next three decades (calculated from the sources in Graph 1). In general, in the WG, the share of R & D expenditure in GDP, which tripled in the last decade, was the same as in the previous one. In the first three post-war decades, it rose to 2.1-2.3%; in the 1980s and early 2010s, it hardly increased by only 0.2-0.4 percentage points (calculated from sources in Graph 1). It is likely that the phenomenon of underfunding science, and not just "exhaustion of ideas", according to R. Gordon [Gordon, 2012], could eventually lead to a certain slowdown in the development of breakthrough technologies. There is a version that in modern science there are fewer and fewer "low-hanging fruits". For example, antibiotics were easier to discover than to decipher the human genome [Has the Ideas Machine Broken Down, 2013, p. 19-22].
However, across the WG as a whole, the costs associated with population ageing, which grew from 3% of GDP in 1960 to 5-6% in 1980 and 12-14% of GDP in 2014, are estimated to double in a few decades (calculated from sources in Graph 1).
At the same time, the intensification of the process of financialization of the world economy, primarily in its centers, which began approximately in the last quarter of the last century, which, it would seem, should have contributed, among other things, to the dynamic development of the real sector through the expansion of its lending and financing through the productive use of debt and equity securities, in practice
where Yj is the average annual GDP growth rate of the country i, Y/P i0 is the initial level of per capita GDP, FN j is the volume of loans issued to the economy and the volume of market capitalization for equity securities, attributed to GDP.
Adj. R2 = 0.75, N = 20 (largest countries in the world), T = 2000-2013.
All parameters have a significance level of at least 10%.
Analysis of the model calculated for the twenty largest countries in the world for the first 13 years of the XXI century shows that, all other things being equal, achieving and maintaining relatively high economic growth rates is inversely proportional to the initial level of per capita income of the country, directly proportional to the increase in the financial depth of the economy to a certain critical level (according to my calculations, 1.5-2 times the size of the country's GDP), but inversely proportional to its further accelerated growth (approximated by the square of the financial depth, see also Graph 4).
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Schedule 4
Relationship between financial depth (lower scale) and average annual GDP growth rate (vertical scale), % (for the ten largest economies in the world for the period 2000-2014)
Note. 1. The indicator of financial depth (FY) is obtained by dividing the amount of loans issued to the real sector of the economy and the amount of shares by GDP (in %). 2. R 2 - coefficient of determination. Shows how much of the variation in the dependent variable (here, the GDP growth rate) is explained by the studied factor (FG).
Calculated from sources to graph 1.
In the last two or three decades, the financial sector has been growing rapidly (according to a narrowed concept, from an average of 2-3% of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s to 5-8% in the early 2010s [Bradford DeLong, 2013]), accompanied by significant deregulation, credit pumping, "leveraging", and the creation of high-risk financial institutions. poor calculation, fraudulent financial instruments and inflating bubbles, destabilized their economies and eventually led to the "great recession".
The financialization of the Russian economy literally washed resources, including talented workers, out of the real economy. In the US, in 2007, the financial sector concentrated up to 4/5 of all bank loans. The salaries of senior managers of companies (250-300 times higher than those of lower-level employees) increasingly depended on current, short-term, risky profitability to the detriment of long-term projects. In the United States, in 1980-2005, profits in real terms increased by 250% in the non - financial sector, and by 800% in the financial sector. The latter in 2000-2014 concentrated 27-33% of all profits of the private sector of the American economy (calculated from: [The Economic Report of the President, 2015, p. 391; Acemoglu, Robinson, 2013, p. 182-183]).
Households and non - financial corporations combined are responsible for a significant increase in US private debt in 1974-2012 - from 110% to 245% of GDP-by only 1/3, but by 2/3 - by the financial sector [Wolf, 2014]. As for the national debt, its size on average in the Russian Federation in 2000-2014 increased more than one and a half times - from 70 to 108% of GDP, three times exceeding the same value in the whole RS [Wigglesworth, 2015].
The consequences of the crisis and the use of credit pumping (to save banks and the wealthiest part of the population) as a way to overcome it led to an increase in their total debt in Russia in 2007-2014 by an amount equivalent to at least half of their GDP [Not Kicking the Habit, 2015]. Despite a number of measures taken by the Working Group to monitor shadow finance, establish stronger standards for bank capital adequacy, and reduce the size of the bank's "leverage", the financial regulatory framework has at best been created by a third.
Although a slight increase in income inequality may contribute to an increase in savings, a significant excess of the Gini coefficient (starting, perhaps, from 0.36-0.4) is capable of causing a relative narrowing in the trend
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effective demand, reducing the tax base, activating monopolization processes, and increasing instability in society.
Meanwhile, in recent decades, such factors as the offshoring of some businesses and jobs in the RS, the active replacement of labor by capital through the use of ICTs and robots have manifested themselves in the RS [Akimov, 2015, pp. 30-41; Michaels, Graetz, 2015], the increase in unemployment, underemployment and the share of unskilled labor in a number of segments of the service sector, have contributed in no small measure to the deepening of income and wealth inequality. But perhaps the most significant factor in this sense was the large-scale deregulation of their economy and finance, a decrease in the level of progressiveness of tax systems, a reduction in income taxes, a weakening of trade unions, an increase in superprofits and bonuses, primarily in the financial sector of the economy [The Center for American Progress, 2015, p. 41, 93].
In the United States, in 1977/80-2010/13, the richest 1% of the population received approximately 3/5 of the increase in the country's national income. On average, in large countries, the share of the richest 1% of the population in total income has increased by at least three-fifths over the last third of the century, from 8-9% in 1975-1980 to 13-14% (in the United States to 18-19%) in 2010-2013. Since the bottom 90% of the American population has grown in real income at an average rate of no more than 1.0-1.3% per year since the early 1980s, and their debt has increased significantly, their savings rate has decreased many times-from 9% to 1-2%. [The Economic Report of the President, 2015, p. 36-37; Atkinson, Piketty, Saez, 2011, p. 9; Saez, Zucman, 2014, p. 61].
As a result, the share of capital investment in GDP in the Russian Federation as a whole decreased by a quarter compared to the level of the 1950s and 1960s (including in Japan-by a third), falling to 19-20% in the early 2010s, which, according to experts, caused a significant effect of capital aging in them.
The above demonstrates and to some extent explains the deceleration of economic growth and the dynamics of its efficiency found in the RG. But, first of all, this community of countries is heterogeneous. Some are less successful, others are more successful. Secondly, despite all the existing problems that have arisen since the beginning of the "great recession", the WGS have generally very strong economies and remain very attractive for capital and talent, including those from the RS.
Among the major developed economies in the first 14 years of this century, the highest GDP growth rates were found in the group of Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, Great Britain, Australia and Canada), which grew twice as fast (calculated from the sources to graph. 1) than the more regulated and less risk-oriented economic systems of the euro area (EEA) and Japan, which also experienced more acute monetary and financial problems. At the beginning of the 2010s, the average share of new companies among existing ones in the EEA and Japan was half or three times less, and venture capital investment in GDP was five to six times less than in the United States. The fear of failure discourages starting a business 53% of Japanese, 42% of Germans, but only 32% of Americans. The latter are proud to fail several times [Time to Get Started, 2013; A Slow Climb, 2013; Klasing, 2013, p. 447, 463].
In 2010-2012, the gap between the RG and RS in terms of per capita R & D expenditures and the number of published scientific articles per million people reached 8-10-fold. Although the share of economically advanced countries in world exports of high-tech goods decreased from 4/5 in 2001 to almost 3/5 in 2012, they account for 2/3 of the knowledge-intensive world trade, economic, financial and information flows in the world, making up 1/7 of the world's population, and the lion's share (in 2001-2012 over 9/10, with the United States accounting for more than half of the world's export revenue from the sale of patents and licenses. The share of RGS in world wealth (the total net asset value of households), although it decreased by almost 1/10 in 2000-2014, nevertheless amounts to almost four fifths (calculated from sources to graph. 1, and also: [McKinsey, 2014, p. 9; Credit Suisse, 2014, p. 4, 46, 47, 57, 60]).
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Schedule 5
Top ten largest countries in the world, 2014: GDP and GDP per capita
Calculated from sources to graph 1.
The United States, whose share in global GDP (in PPP) has declined by more than half over the past 70 years since World War II, in 2014 lost the first place in this indicator to China (see box 5). But the country, despite financial, economic and social problems, retains considerable power and priority positions in the world economy. critical areas of the global economy.
The United States, which has the world's largest population of highly educated, hard-working people and is constantly replenished by the immigration of "brains"2, accounts for eight of the ten most prestigious universities in the world, about 30% of global R & D expenditures [Goldman Sachs, 2015, p. 17] and more than half of global military research expenditures, over three-fifths of the most frequently cited publications are the majority of Nobel scientific laureates. They have a global reserve currency, 17 of the world's top 25 brands, 2/3 of the market capitalization of global technology companies, and account for more than half of the value of stock markets. They have achieved a significant reduction in unit costs in recent years, including due to success in shale energy, further computerization and robotization, and have taken the first place among large countries in terms of ease of doing business and level of economic freedom [Goldman Sachs, 2015, p. 13-14, 17-19].
Although in recent decades the United States has lost ground in a number of traditional, semi-modern and some modern industries (pharmaceuticals, communications equipment), including due to offshoring in favor of first Japan, then Asian NIS, China and other RS, it retains an undisputed leadership in the most knowledge-intensive industrial segments: in aerospace, software, complex electronics In the field of military industry, medicine and export of high-tech services [Supyan, 2013, p.141; Not Quite What It Seems, 2015]. In the last few years, they have stepped up the process of reshoring manufacturing industries on a high-tech basis. Although the expanded US government's deficit remains relatively high (5.5% of GDP in 2014), the current account deficit remains relatively low.
2 Immigrants run a quarter of all high-tech firms in the United States and have founded more than half of startups in Silicon Valley [McKinsey, 2014, p. 70].
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the current account balance has more than halved - from 6-7% of GDP in 2007 to 2.5-3.0% of GDP in 2014, and unemployment, according to the broad concept, has decreased from 16-17% in 2009 to 11-12% in early 2015 [Goldman Sachs, 2015, p. 10, 11, 26].
Summing up, I would like to emphasize that RGS have a strong intellectual and innovative potential and (as yet) a high level of quality of public institutions, which can allow them to pass through the test strip and reach higher technological development trajectories.
It is useful to take into account that the systems of national accounts currently operating in the Russian Federation, which were created to assess the dynamics of the output of standard mass-produced goods, are increasingly less able to capture qualitative changes in their largely post-industrial, globalized economies. Given the recent gigantic growth of non-rival, non-exclusive information products and services provided to the population almost free of charge (Google, Wikipedia, Skype, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc.), as noted by Professor J. Bradford DeLong," we produce and consume more than the economic indicators suggest " [Bradford DeLong, 2015].
During the year, a third of products in the Russian Federation are replaced or significantly modified, while their companies often earn 2.5 times more from their external operations (in the United States in the early 2010s-2.5 times more [McKinsey, 2014, p.26]) than from the export of goods and services. According to the WG, the GDP/GNP growth rate is underestimated by at least 0.3-0.7 percentage points (or about 1/5) due to the overestimation of deflators, as well as a significant underestimation of improvements in the quality of products and services. In the Russian Federation, taking into account the increased time and quality of leisure, life expectancy of the population, the real growth rate of their well-being is significantly (not less than a third) higher than the average per capita GDP [Melyantsev, 2013(2), pp. 122-123; Mokir, 2014].
Having clarified a number of the most important characteristics of the state and dynamics of the economy of the Russian Federation at the present stage, we will carry out a similar analysis in a concise form for the whole RS.
"ASIAN ECONOMIC BREAKTHROUGH": SCALE, MAIN PARAMETERS, PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS
In the RS, rapid growth was found mainly in a number of Asian new-industrial and industrializing economies (including the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) and large Asian states with significant comparative and dynamic competitive advantages (China, India, and Indonesia). These countries: (a) are quite intensely involved in international value chains, (b) have a relatively strong pro-market state, (c) pursue generally balanced macroeconomic policies, (d) rely on business-oriented elites, (e) have huge masses of relatively cheap but increasingly (more than 3-4 decades ago) of a capable, healthy, educated and experienced workforce.
The intensification of export-oriented development in the countries of the East and South was largely based on the very significant inflow of FDI for their economies. 3 In 1980-2013, the share of DCS increased 3-4 times in global FDI inflows and 1.5 times in world exports of goods and services, reaching about half of the global level for each indicator. At the same time, in both cases, this occurred by 2/3 due to Asian RS and NIS (calculated from sources to Graph 1). A very significant factor is marked by-
3 According to our model based on large countries of the world in the 2000s, the higher growth rate of per capita GDP by about 2/5 was determined by a higher indicator of FDI inflows related to the size of a country's GDP. The calculation is adjusted for the initial level of development and taking into account a number of characteristics of the institutional capacity of states [Melyantsev, 2014(2), p. 193].
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an impressive increase in Asian intra - continental trade integration-from 25% in 1990 to 54% in 2013 [Business in Asia, 2014, p. 3].
Currently, developing, new industrial and transition economies account for more than a third of global R & D expenditures, more than 2/5 of patent applications filed in the world, and world exports of high - and medium-tech products4, 3/5 of industrial production, and 2/3 of global fixed capital investment (calculated from sources to Graph 1). As in previous comparisons, Asian DCS and NIS, which account for approximately 2/3 of the population of the entire DCS group (including transition economies), account for between 3/4 and 9/10 of the noted DCS achievements. This shows the considerable competitiveness and efficiency of their economies.
In the" Asian breakthrough", the most important role belongs to China. In terms of the achieved output of the industrial sector of the economy in PPP terms in 2011, the PRC in 2014 surpassed the combined indicator of the USA, India, Japan and Germany (see graph 6).
Schedule 6
WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES, 2014: comparison by GDP size and sector components, USD , PPP 2011
Calculated from sources to graph 1.
At the same time, the PRC, while continuing to rely on the huge investment, export and labor potential of its people, is increasing its competitive advantages of a high, innovative order. If in 2005-2009 the share of R & D expenditures in the country's GDP was 1.4-1.5%, then in 2013 the share of R & D expenditures in the country's GDP was 1.4-1.5%. it has already reached 1.9% and is projected to reach 2% in 2014, outstripping not only the RS, but also a number of RGS. In 2013, China's absolute R & D expenditures, calculated in PPP terms, were 5-6 times higher than in the Russian Federation, and even higher than in Japan and Germany combined, just short of 3/5 of the US level that China is projected to reach, all other things being equal, in 2022 (calculated from: [Global R&D Spending..., 2013]). In the largest Chinese electronics firm Huawei, half of the employees are engaged in research and development [The Best since Sliced
4 It should be clarified that, for example, in China in the early 2010s, more than 4/5 of exports of medium - and high-tech goods were carried out by foreign firms and mixed companies with a high share of the latter [Business in Asia, 2014. p. 6].
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Bread, 2013, p. 60]. China has become a world leader in patent production and produces more doctors of science in natural sciences and engineering than in the United States [Jung, 2014].
In terms of the level of robot armament in the manufacturing industry (OP) in 2014, the United States (152 units per 10 thousand employees) was 5 times higher, while Germany and Japan (282 and 323 units, respectively) were 9-11 times higher than the PRC (30 units), while at the same time significantly inferior to South Korea (437 units), in which already has almost every twentieth of those working in the OP was a robot. At the same time, according to the total number of industrial robots in China, in 2014 (182 thousand) lagged behind North America (237 thousand) by 1/4 and from the EU (311 thousand) - by 2/5, according to forecast estimates, in 2017 (428 thousand) is expected to surpass the first (292 thousand) almost 1.5 times and EU (343 thousand) - by 1/4. At the same time, the Chinese robot fleet is expanding by 4/5 due to supplies from Japanese and Western companies (calculated from: [World Robotics News, 2015; Akimov, 2015, pp. 30-41]).
For DCS that implemented pragmatic reforms, pursued a generally balanced macroeconomic policy, managed to increase the rate of extended savings, and diversify exports, it is typical that their international competitiveness ratings, according to the WEF, were significantly higher than the trend calculated by the logarithm of their per capita income (see Box 7).
Schedule 7
Relationship between per capita GDP and international competitiveness in the world's 30 largest economies, 2014
Calculated from: [The World Economic Forum. Global Competitiveness Report, 2014-2015, 2014, p. 13; sources to graph 1].
The increased economic performance of the leading group of RS can be explained to a certain extent based on the "pilot" model calculated by us for large countries of the world that are part of the "Big Twenty" (calculated from the sources to Graph 1). In 2000-2014, the faster growth of per capita GDP in the RS compared to the WG was determined by: 1/3 of the effect of A. Gershenkron (catch-up development associated with a relatively lower initial level of per capita income in the RS); 1/4 - generally higher rate of accumulation of physical and human capital in the RS; 2/5-relatively more significant (than in the WG (!)) progress in implementing pragmatic reforms aimed at improving (usually from a low level)
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the degree of economic liberalization.
Y/P j and Y/Poi are the average annual growth rate and the initial level of per capita GDP, respectively; NKHj is the share of capital investment in fixed assets, education and R & D expenditures in GDP,%; ΔEcFreedj is the change in the level of economic freedom over the period.
Noting the success of the RS, I would like to emphasize that over the past three decades, at least 2/3 of the total number of them have not taken the path of sustainable catch-up development. At the same time, no less than three or four dozen countries in the South are "failed states" or countries that approach them in a number of characteristics, have particularly acute problems and underdeveloped socio-political institutions [The Fund for Peace, 2014; Abramova, Fituni, Sapuntsov, 2007].
A number of more or less successful MSS have either already fallen into the mid-development trap or are likely to fall into it in the near future. This, despite the variety of specific factors for MS, occurs in most cases when the scale of movement of cheap labor from traditional to semi-traditional and modern segments of the economy is reduced, and the quality of institutions and the business environment is no longer sufficient to maintain GDP growth rates that are acceptable for the implementation of a catch-up development strategy [Pritchett, Summers, 2014]. China, in particular, is characterized by a rapidly aging population and an increasingly expensive labor force5, a significant exhaustion of the effect of its overflow into more productive industries, the inability to continue maintaining high growth rates of the average number of years of adult education, as well as further increasing the (prohibitively high) rate of investment and export quotas. By the way, the latter has already decreased by almost 1/3 - from 38-39% of GDP in 2006-2007 to 26-27% in 2013.
In general, in the RS, the growth rate of their GDP from the mid-2000s to 2012-2014 decreased by almost half, or by 3-4 percentage points, including in the PRC-by 2/5 (according to unofficial data, by half), i.e. by 4.8-5.3 percentage points; in India-by almost half (by more than 4 percentage points); in Brazil and the Russian Federation-by about 3/4, respectively, by more than 3 percentage points and almost 6 percentage points (calculated from sources to Graph 1).
Although in 1980-2014. DCS have reduced their relative gap in the level of per capita GDP from the RGS as a whole by 2/5, and their per capita GDP still does not exceed an average of 1/4 of the corresponding indicator of the latter. And the absolute gap in per capita GDP has grown by more than 3/5. Although in 1980-2013, India and Taiwan increased their level of per capita income relative to the United States by 2.5 times, South Korea-by 3.3, and China - by 4.5 times, the absolute gap in per capita GDP relative to the United States was reduced by few: South Korea - by 1/4, Taiwan - by 2/5. At the same time, in China it increased by 2/5, in India and Russia - by 3/5, in Brazil - by almost 3/4, and in South Africa-by 4/5 (calculated from sources to Graph 1).
Due to a number of reasons, including the imperfect structure of capital accumulation (in 2010-2013, the share of investment in human capital in the total expenditures on the formation of physical and human capital in China, India and Indonesia
5 If in 2003 the average hourly wage in China was almost three times lower than in Mexico, then in 2013 it was already 1/5 higher. As a result, due to its geographical advantage and price competitiveness, the share of the latter in US imports in 2012 (12.4%) began to quickly approach the "Chinese quota" (17.5%) [Swapping Spree, 2015].
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it was tripled, in Russia, Turkey and Brazil - 1.5-2 times less than in the United States) (calculated from sources to the graph. 1), generally poor quality of training, infrastructure, management and institutions (the average rating on the corruption perception index in the top five RS is more than six times worse than in the top five RGS) [Transparency International, 2014], RS in terms of the level of SFP and its contribution to GDP growth is on average three times behind from the RG (see graphs 2, 3).
In the past two years, the rising value of the dollar, as well as a generally significant decline in prices for raw materials exported by the RS, have been the most important factors that caused capital outflows from their markets. This has led to serious macroeconomic imbalances in many of them, including Turkey, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and China. As a result, according to the IMF, the total volume of foreign exchange reserves of the RS, which increased 4.5 times in 2004-2013, reaching $ 7.9 trillion, decreased in 2014 for the first time in the last 19 years (by $ 115 billion).
According to McKinsey's data, in general, the real economy debt as a percentage of GDP, which increased in many of them by dozens of percentage points in 2007-2013 (in Brazil and Mexico by 27-30, in Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia - by 43-49), reached 175-180% by the end of 2013. At the same time, the share of DCS in global debt growth, which doubled in comparison with 2000-2007, was almost half in 2008-2013 [Kynge and Wheatley, 2015].
In China, which over the past five to six years has been trying to overcome a number of crisis phenomena in its economy by "credit pumping", the total debt of the country increased by more than 4/5 in 2008-2014 - from 145-150 to 270-280% of GDP. The leverage of Chinese companies was twice as high as in the United States. During the period under review, the volume of non-performing loans attributed to GDP in China doubled, reaching 15-17% [Dobbs et al., 2015]. These factors provoked rapid growth, and then the collapse of the Chinese stock market in the summer of 2015 by an amount that exceeded, according to average estimates, a quarter of its GDP.
The negative consequences of modern economic growth include losses associated with environmental pollution. Since in 1980-2014 the growth rate of carbon emissions in the RS was more than ten times higher than in the RG, the share of the former in its total volume increased over the period under review from less than 1/2 to about 7/10. At the same time, the combined share of two fast-growing Asian giants, China and India, in the global growth of these far from harmless exhausts increased from about half in the 1980s and 1990s to 2/3 in 2000-2014. (calculated from sources to Graph 1).
In terms of air pollution, India ranks 174th and China 176th among the 178 countries included in the survey [Air Quality..., 2014]. According to the WHO, in 2014, Delhi's air pollution level was 15 times higher, and in Beijing - 40 times higher than the WHO allowed standards. According to experts, heavy air pollution reduces life expectancy by 3-6 years for about 3/5 of the population of India and China [Breathe Uneasy, 2015].
Economic growth in the RS has occurred in an environment of high and, in many cases, growing levels of income inequality. According to one of the calculations, the average unweighted Gini index for the distribution of income in the DCS of Asia for the 1990s-2000s increased from 0.39 to 0.46. What does this mean and what does it affect? According to experts, if the level of inequality had not changed over the past twenty years, then, all other things being equal, it would have been possible to lift another 2 billion people out of poverty in MS Asia [Rhee, 2012].
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Schedule 8
Estimates of Gini coefficients for the distribution of personal income (after taxes and social services). transfers) in the top ten largest countries in the world (2010-2012)
Notes. 1. WBR - Great Britain, YAP-Japan, FR-France, INDUS-India, INZ-Indonesia. 2. For China-two estimates: 0.47 - official, 0.61 - according to the Chinese Household Finance Survey, conducted in China in 2011 among 8,438 rural and urban families.
Compiled from sources to graf. 1, and also: [Gan L. Un pays tres inegalitaire, 2014, p. 17].
In the early 2010s, the average unweighted Gini index by income (after taxes and social transfers) for the five largest DCS was 1/4-1/3 higher than for the corresponding five WGS (see box 8). The gap between DCS and WGS calculated by UNDP experts in terms of multicriteria inequality (in terms of income, social security,etc.). educational attainment, life expectancy of the population) in 2013 was even more ambitious. In countries with an average level of per capita GNI, it was 1.6-2 times higher, and in poor countries - 2.5-3 times higher than in economically advanced countries (calculated from :[ The UNDP, 2014, p. 171]).
As for China, which has repeatedly expressed its commitment to social harmony through CCP leaders, the Gini coefficient for income increased from 0.29-0.30 in 1980-1983 to 0.35-0.36 in 1990-1993, 0.39 in 2000-2003, and 0.47 (according to unofficial calculations-0.55-0.61) in the early 2010s. [Roberts, 2014; Whyte, 2014, p. 41]. In China, the number of dollar billionaires increased from one in 2003 to 115 in 2011, 161 in 2014 and 212 in the first quarter of 2015. However, although it is growing rapidly, it is still three times smaller than in the United States [The World's Billionaires, 2015].
At the same time, the Gini coefficient, calculated on the basis of available, perhaps far from complete, data on the distribution of total household wealth, grew significantly in China in 2000-2014 - by 1/5-from 0.60 to 0.72. If we take into account that in other large developing and newly industrialized countries it was even higher (in 2014 in Mexico and In South Korea - 0.74-0.76, in India, Brazil and Indonesia - 0.81-0.84, in the Russian Federation - 0.90), then we can talk about a huge social polarization of their societies. I emphasize that the average unweighted Gini index for the distribution of wealth in the seven major RS (0.80) was generally higher than in the seven major RS (0.71, including in Japan 0.63, in Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France-0.66-0.70, in Germany-0.77, in the USA-0.85) (calculated from: [Credit Suisse. Global Wealth Databook, 2014, p. 102-105, 150]).
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Calculations made using the Credit Suisse database among 46 large and medium-sized countries of the world (24 RGS and 22 RS), which account for more than 9/10 of their population, GDP and total wealth, show that if the share of countries with a growing share of the top decile and the "top" 1% in the RGS in 2000-2014 If the share of the population in the total net asset value of their households did not exceed 1/3, then in the RS it was approximately 7/10. In the period under review, the average unweighted share of total wealth accumulated in the top 10% of the population of the RS was slightly less than 3/4, and in the RG it was about 3/5, i.e. in the first group it was about 1/5 higher than in the second. If in 2000 the average unweighted share of the richest 1% of the population in the aggregate under consideration in the RS (38.5%) was almost 2/5 higher than the corresponding indicator for the WG (27.9%), then in 2014 (the ratio 43.1% : 26%) - already by 2/3. For fourteen years of the current century, the share of wealth concentrated among the oligarchic part (1%) of the population has significantly increased in the PRC (almost doubled, from 19 to 37-38%), in the Republic of Korea and Egypt (one and a half times, respectively, from 22-23 to 33-34 and from 32-33 to 48-49%), Taiwan, Argentina and Turkey (by 2/5, from 23-24 to 33-34%, from 32 to 44% and from 38 to 54-55%), India and Indonesia (by 1/3, from 36-37 to 49% and from 38 to 50-51%), in the Russian Federation (by a quarter, from 53 to 66%) (calculated by: [Credit Suisse. Global Wealth Databook, 2014, p. 124-125]).
Based on approximate and possibly incomplete data (due to the concealment of some assets), the highest concentration of wealth in the top decile of the population among large and medium-sized RGS and RS was found in 2014 in the United States, Brazil, Egypt and India (73-75%), the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia (76-78%) and the Russian Federation (84-85%) 6.
The very strict situation that exists in the RS with the distribution of income, consumption, wealth and other aspects of the population's well-being does not contribute to the very rapid elimination of poverty. Although the number of beggars (daily consumption per capita less than $ 1.25 in 2005 PPP) in the whole of the RS decreased by 2/5 from the beginning of the 1980s to the beginning of the 2010s (mainly at the expense of the PRC), it almost doubled in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the share of beggars (according to the same criterion) among residents of the RS during the period under review decreased threefold (from 52-53% to 16-18%). But the total number of beggars is still comparable to the population of one of the largest countries in the world - India (1.2 billion).
If we bring the clearly underestimated criterion used above to $ 2 in PPP in 2005 per day, it turns out that during the thirty-year period under review, the share of the "critically poor" has halved, but remains equal to 36-37% (calculated from sources to Column 1).
The World Bank's shift from using the 2005 PPP to the 2011 PPP for calculating the critically poor resulted in a roughly halving of the corresponding absolute and relative poverty indicators for the entire MS in the early 2010s. However, if more realistic (although not yet very high) criteria for determining poverty are set accordingly ($1.8- $ 3 in 2011 PPP), the share of those in the RS who did not really get out of it remains quite high-15-38% [Bland, 2014].
The proportion of the population of the RS that is below the level of multidimensional poverty (in terms of consumption, level of education received, and health status) was estimated at a quarter at the beginning of the 2010s. At the same time, for example, in Brazil, Indonesia, China, the indicator was lower than 1/10, in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India it was 43-55%, and in Ethiopia - 87-89%. Taking into account those who did not significantly break away from this level, the proportion of the "multi-dimensionally disadvantaged" in the MS group as a whole was 1.5 times higher (calculated from: [The UNDP, 2014, p. 180-181]).
Summing up the above, it is easy to see that it turns out to be a very ambiguous result. If the assessment of ultra-long-term trends in global economic development gives, as noted, a reason for optimism, clearly showing epochal metamorphic changes in the world economy, then it is necessary to take into account the current situation.-
6 In 2014, 111 dollar billionaires in the Russian Federation had almost 1/5 of the total family wealth of the country [Credit Suisse. Global Wealth Report, 2014, p. 33, 53J.
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If we look at the current trends and achievements of the countries of the West and East after their entry into the path of modern economic growth, then a closer study of it over the past few decades causes conflicting feelings.
The main generator of technological progress continued to be the countries of the West and Japan, but their growth machine experienced serious failures. As for MS, despite the noted economic, environmental, social, and acute political problems experienced by some of them (civil wars, mass protests against corrupt regimes), it seems that a considerable part of MS, in which a significant proportion of their population is concentrated, is implementing pragmatic reforms, using experience and technology advanced countries, has quite resolutely embarked on the path of modern economic growth.
As of November 2014, the real computing power of the world's most productive Chinese supercomputer Tianhe-2 (MilkyWay-2, world ranking No. 1), which was 33.8 petaflops, 7 was almost equal to the combined power of two American supergiants (Titan and Sequoia, respectively with a performance of 17.5 and 17.1 petaflops, second and third place in the world) and more than three times higher than the most productive Japanese supercomputer at the end of 2014 (K computer, 10.5 petaflops, world rating No. 4). And although the United States accounted for six of the world's ten largest supercomputers (their combined capacity is 50.2% of the total performance of the top ten), the Chinese giant accumulated almost a third (30.3%) of the total power of the world's top ten computer supergiants (calculated from: [Top500 List, November 2014]).
Among the military and politicians, there is an opinion that the weakness of the state is an invitation to aggression. The world, alas, has not yet become the center of harmony. Many countries, if their capabilities allow them, try to strengthen not only in the economic, but also in the military-defense sphere.
A number of analysts note that the modernization of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China is progressing intensively and at a high pace. Military expenditures of the PRC have more than tripled from the level of the United States in 2000-2015, and together with the third (according to other estimates, the fourth) largest military spending in the world, the Russian Federation, these two countries are already spending 2/5 of the level of US$. These are calculations based on exchange rates. In PPP, this proportion is 1.5-2 times higher. If we take into account that, in particular, China's real unit defense spending is not the official 2% of GDP, but, it is possible, at least twice as high (as, for example, in the United States), then the total value of China's military spending is not so far from the United States (calculations and estimates are made according to: [Clover, 2015; Global Defense Spending..., 2015]).
I would like to emphasize that we are talking about the size of annual investments, and not about the accumulated military power and its technological capabilities. Nevertheless, these trends are impressive. With the increased not only economic, but also military and political power of the RS, including the PRC and other BRICS countries, the RG already has and will have to take more and more account. Moreover, the RS, and above all the BRICS countries, began to create organizational economic and political structures, including financial institutions that are alternative to the IMF and the World Bank.
The future, according to a considerable number of researchers, ultimately belongs to the countries of the East and South. Their share in global GDP, if this macro indicator retains its raison d'etre for some time, is quite likely to approach the share of MS in the world population [OECD, 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015].
But it might work, all other things being equal. If, in particular, the governments of the RS, often driven by the interests of a privileged and not very reform-minded minority (vested interests) [Oslund, 2014], will (a) seriously develop
7 Petaflops - a unit of supercomputer power or performance. It is equal to 10-15 (or quadrillion) operations per second.
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entrepreneurship 8, (b) bring management up to international standards [Bruhn, Karlan, Schoar, 2010, p. 629-631], (c) conduct more or less balanced economic and social policies.
This is important because, on the whole, the RS continue to lag far behind the RGS in terms of the skill level of the labor force 9, the quality of state institutions, and, as already noted, the level of aggregate factor productivity. Attempts to implement catch-up development in a forced way, using extensive methods, including by increasing capital and labor costs, very often resulted in deepening economic and social imbalances [PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015, p.25, 27], and increased tension and instability in their societies. According to surveys, at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s, over a quarter of the population of South Korea and India and about a third of the population of Brazil and China experienced significant stress. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the PRC, despite the rather strict public order standards that exist there, in the last two decades the number of social protests has grown at a rate two to three times higher than the average economic growth rate of the country (calculated from: [The Lessons of History, 2014, p. 50; Out Brothers, Out, 2015, p. 45-46]).
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the RGS, despite their existing weaknesses, are unlikely to simply and quickly give up their positions. Rather the opposite. Moreover, it seems that they (primarily the United States) are not so far from launching a new round of scientific and technological progress and are capable of a fairly rapid transition to a new technological order (NTU), in which the leading role will belong along with info -, bio -, cogno -, nano - and space technologies. The economic impact of their proliferation is expected to be many times greater than that of the introduction of machines in the era of the industrial revolution. By 2020, the amount of accumulated information will increase by 50 times compared to 2010 [Barton, 2014]. Many countries will benefit from this. But first of all, economically more advanced ones. This, all other things being equal, may give them the opportunity to buy time and gain additional momentum and incentive to continue the "great battle of thrones" for global dominance for some time.
However, the "other equal conditions" that are favorable for the RG may not work out due to many internal reasons. Financial liberalization has caused increased economic and social instability and a significant increase in inequality [Kolodko, 2014, p. 339]. In the Russian Federation, as you know, the unemployment rate has increased by one and a half to three times, which does not resolve quickly. According to calculations of Oxford economists, in economically advanced countries in the next 10-20 years, the transition to the above-mentioned NTU, increasing the pace of automation and computerization of production will cause the elimination of many hundreds of very common professions today, and from 2/5 to half of those employed in the RG may be at risk. The negative social consequences of this metamorphosis, if the state, society and business do not make adequate efforts to massively and quickly retrain the labor force, including the mechanism of effective social security, cannot be overestimated [Giugliano, 2015].
The world is in a state of great change, increasingly losing stability [Attali, 2012, p. 21]. After the beginning of deregulation of the global economy in the mid-1970s, the number of financial and economic crises per decade increased (depending on the method of calculation) by 4-5 times (calculated from: [Stiglitz, 2011, p. 269; Chang, Ha-Joon, 2008, p. 87; Kose, Ozturk, 2014]). And global income inequality, even when adjusted for some reduction in the per capita income gap.
8 It is estimated that on average in the RS, business activity per thousand people of working age is three times less than in the WG (see: The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2013, p. 85-86]).
9 In the early 2010s, in terms of the share of the adult population with higher education, in general, MS (5%) lagged behind the RG (30%) by six times (calculated from: [The World Bank, World Development Report, 20/4, p. 305-306; The WEF, Human Capital Report, 2013, p. 50-537]).
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The difference in income between the RS and RS did not decrease (taking into account the income hidden in offshore companies, it most likely increased), since the level of intra-country inequality significantly increased in a significant number of countries of the world [Melyantsev, 2013(1), p.34].
The slowdown in global economic growth (to the extent that it can currently be measured) is largely due not only to the fact that MS has many problems. But also by the fact that economically advanced states, where financial circles control power to a decisive extent and determine economic policy, are not really interested in productive reforms aimed at intensive development of the real sector. As even such a zealot of the American establishment as 3. Brzezinski points out, if the financial oligarchy is not calmed down, if the irresponsible policy of printing unsecured money is not stopped, the United States will not have a bright future, but an increase in problems, contradictions and ultimately the loss of world leadership [Bueno, 2015].
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