V. KORGUN

Doctor of Historical Sciences

After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States became the most important factor influencing the development of the internal political situation in Afghanistan. All the major events in the country in recent years have taken place with the direct or indirect participation of the United States.

On October 7, 2001, the United States, together with its NATO allies, launched Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban, with the approval of the UN Security Council. The main goal was declared to be the elimination of the hotbed of international terrorism in Afghanistan, represented by the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda organization that supported them.

MISCALCULATIONS OF THE US STRATEGY

In November 2001, the Taliban resistance was broken, and armed formations of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance entered Kabul. The Taliban regime was eliminated, but its military and political objectives were only partially achieved. The main forces of the Taliban movement were not defeated, but only weakened. Most of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders, led by Mullah M. Omar and Osama bin Laden, have fled to neighboring Pakistan along with a significant portion of their armed forces, where they have taken refuge among the Pashtun tribes of the "independent strip" - self-governing areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Meanwhile, the operation revealed significant shortcomings in the US strategy in Afghanistan. Massive bombardments in Afghanistan were accompanied by serious losses among the civilian population. The military action has worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country, causing a flood of refugees and disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to 1.5 million hungry people. The number of internally displaced persons increased by about 360,000 and the number of refugees to Iran and Pakistan increased by 200,000.¹

The bombing was perceived by many Afghans as a war not against terrorism, but against Afghanistan. This led to the emergence of anti-American sentiments, especially among the conservative part of the population of the Pashtun tribal zone. Similar sentiments have emerged in other Muslim countries, primarily in the Arab world. And in neighboring Pakistan, whose leadership, led by General P. Musharraf, was forced under US pressure to support the Americans in the war on terror and abandon the support of the Taliban, large anti-government and anti-American demonstrations of Islamic fundamentalists swept through. By the way, a significant part of world public opinion was inclined to interpret the American bombing as an aggression against Afghanistan itself. Thus, according to a public opinion survey conducted by the Gallup International Association in 37 countries after the events of September 11, the majority of respondents supported solving the Afghan problem on the basis of international legal norms, while only the public of three countries-Israel, India and the United States - expressed support for military action.²

In addition, the goals set by the Americans in Afghanistan were limited and served the interests of the Americans themselves rather than the Afghans.

"What should be the priority in Afghanistan? - asked the Pakistani journalist Iffat Malik. - Ask an American, and he / she will say: "The destruction of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the capture of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar "(although not necessarily in that order). Ask an ordinary Afghan and they will tell you: "Peace, ethnic harmony, poverty eradication, economic development, democracy "(probably in that order). The gap between the American and Afghan responses is deep. And the consequences can be disastrous. " ³

WASHINGTON'S HENCHMAN

Along with solving purely military tasks in the fight against terrorism, the United States has established itself as a leading player in the Afghan political field.

In early December 2001, representatives of the main political forces of Afghanistan gathered in Bonn to form an interim administration. The United States, with the support of UN representatives, exerted the strongest pressure on the conference participants, pushing their proteges into the new authorities. In a bitter struggle, they managed to secure the approval of Hamid Karzai, the leader of a small Pashtun tribe, as head of the Afghan transitional administration. At the same time, the former king, the elderly Muhammad Zahir Shah, on whom the United States has relied for many years, was left on the sidelines with an uncertain future status.

Hamid Karzai, while in exile in the United States, was closely associated with the American business establishment. Until now, four of his brothers live in the United States, two of them - Kayum and Mahmoud own a chain of restaurants in different cities. Along with bizne-

com X. Karzai was active in politics. After the death of his father at the hands of the Taliban in Quetta (Pakistan) in 1999, he tried to enlist US support in organizing the Pashtun anti-Taliban movement, in 2000 he spoke in the US Senate explaining the situation in Afghanistan. H. Karzai made contacts with some representatives of American political circles, including Michael Sheehan, a specialist in the fight against terrorism. counterterrorism officer in the Bush and Clinton administrations. But the official could not promise the future president anything significant: in those years, the administration of George W. Bush simply ignored the events that took place in Afghanistan. In her eyes, Afghanistan was a failed country, especially in light of the Taliban's military successes.

But everything changed after September 11. In October 2001, Karzai formed an armed group and began fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. However, in a clash with the Taliban, his unit was almost ambushed, and H. Karzai himself was wounded. He was rescued by American special forces. By early December, when a conference of various Afghan political forces met in Bonn, Karzai was already a well-known political figure. He returned to Afghanistan on an American plane as head of the Interim Administration and landed at the Bagram air Base occupied by American troops.

During the international Conference on Afghanistan held in Tokyo on January 21, 2002, the United States reinforced its political support for the Karzai regime with financial commitments, becoming one of the largest donors to Afghanistan. Washington then allocated $ 296.75 million for the reconstruction of the country. Only the European Union provided more funds - 550 million euros ($495 million at that time).⁴.

On January 28, while hosting Karzai in Washington, Bush announced a "long-term partnership" in reorganizing the Afghan armed forces. "The United States will remain a friend of the Afghan people,"he said with pathos at a press conference after meeting with Hamid Karzai. ⁵ This was the first visit of the head of Afghanistan to the United States in 40 years.

Meanwhile, the United States did not immediately decide on the form of its military participation in the Afghan events. Refusing to participate in peacekeeping operations, the Americans did not join the multinational contingent of the peacekeeping forces (ISAF). They also spoke out against the deployment of these forces outside of Kabul, which H. insisted on. Karzai. By the spring of 2002, an international anti - terrorist coalition of military personnel from 17 countries, including 5,000 from the United States, 2,200 from Canada, and 1,700 from the United Kingdom, was finally formed in Afghanistan. Spain, Denmark, Germany, Turkey, and Norway also sent large contingents.⁶

Soon, the American presence (not only military) in the country began to gradually acquire a comprehensive character. American advisers settled in various Afghan ministries and departments, but, unlike the Soviet ones during the occupation of Afghanistan, they did not advertise their presence. But the main "locomotive" of American policy in Afghanistan was the US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, an American citizen of Afghan origin. This man had a strong influence on the political development of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period.

THE "LOCOMOTIVE" OF AMERICAN POLITICS

З. Khalilzad was born in 1951 in Mazar-I-Sharif, northern Afghanistan, the son of a local government finance official. After graduating from high school, he was sent on a student exchange to study in the United States, where he spent a year. His stay in America made a strong impression on him. After returning to his homeland, Zalmay saw Afghanistan with different eyes and began to think about how to change the country. In 1970, he entered the American University of Beirut. After graduating in 1974, he went to the University of Chicago, where he defended his dissertation on the problem of the Iranian nuclear program.

In 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Z. Khalilzad published a series of articles on this subject, proving that the USSR had made a major mistake and could be defeated. The articles caused a serious resonance in the US military circles. The young scientist was noticed by US Secretary of State John Kerry. Schultz, who decided to use him as an expert in the Afghan war. In 1984, he became a citizen of the United States7. In 1985, not without his recommendations, the CIA began to supply the Afghan Mujahideen with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which significantly influenced the course of the war in Afghanistan in favor of the Afghan opposition. At the same time, under the influence of Z. Brzezinski, his colleague at Columbia University, where Z. Khalilzad worked as a teacher, and in the following years-

With the help of his boss P. Wolfowitz, head of the State Department's political planning department, he became one of the "hawks" who joined the ranks of American neoconservatives. In 1998, he signed an open letter to Clinton, insisting on the elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime. It was signed by D. Rumsfeld and P. Blavatsky. Wolfowitz.

In the mid-1990s, Z. Khalilzad became a consultant to the American oil company UNOCAL, which together with a number of other foreign companies developed a project for the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghan territory. When the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in 1996, he was one of those who publicly supported the theocratic regime, claiming that it was not anti-American in nature. While working on the gas pipeline issue, he even met with a Taliban delegation in Houston. However, by the end of the 1990s, his attitude towards the Taliban radically changed: he began to argue about the danger of bin Laden's activities and the policies of the Taliban regime, which sheltered the number one terrorist.

After the events of September 11, Z. Khalilzad is becoming one of the most sought-after political experts in Washington. He works as a consultant to the National Security Council under the leadership of Condoleezza Rice and is involved in planning American policy in Afghanistan. At the Bonn Conference Z. Khalilzad, along with UN Secretary - General's Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, are the main behind-the-scenes figures in the negotiation process, through whose efforts and under pressure the Interim Government of Afghanistan headed by Hamid Karzai was formed.

In February 2002, Khalilzad was appointed Special Representative of the US President in Afghanistan. And he is secretly involved in the political life of the country as an invisible but tangible conductor of American interests. Thus, he is preparing and actively participating in the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 in Kabul, during which the Transitional Government of Afghanistan was formed. Once again, he lobbies for the interests of H. Karzai, sidelining the figure of former King Muhammad Zahir Shah, who returned to his homeland from exile in April 2002 and expected to receive the post of head of state, leaving H. Karzai in the rank of Prime Minister.⁸ The ex-monarch received the "consolation prize" - the decorative title of"Father of the Nation". Under US pressure, former Afghan President B. Rabbani9, who was removed from the game by the Americans at the Bonn Conference, also stayed on the sidelines. Curiously, 86 Loy Jirga delegates boycotted the vote, citing that the jirga meeting was organized by the Americans in an effort to push their protégé X for the top post. Karzai ¹⁰.

At the end of 2003, Z. Khalilzad was appointed US Ambassador to Afghanistan. From this point on, he becomes a participant in all major political events in Afghanistan, often determining their nature and directing them in the right direction. To the right place first of all for the USA! He quickly draws closer to Karzai and becomes his shadow. His influence on the Afghan leader is so great that he does not make any meaningful decisions without the advice of the American ambassador. Their cooperation is so close, and the invisible power of Z. Khalilzada is so tangible that it gives reason for Afghans to believe that the American ambassador plays a greater role in the current affairs of state administration than is commonly believed, and secretly call him the" viceroy " of Afghanistan.

Despite a year-long absence from Afghanistan (Z. Khalilzad served as the US Ambassador to Iraq), he did not lose his position in Kabul and, after returning, immediately plunged into active political activity, taking part in the preparation and adoption of the new Afghan constitution of 2004. In fact, in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative L. Brahimi and H. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Karzai he was one of the authors of the Basic Law of Afghanistan.

During the discussion of the constitution, there were critical moments that could lead to the disruption of the entire event, and then Ambassador Z. Khalilzad proved to be an experienced intermediary. This kind of situation has arisen, for example, on the issue of dual citizenship of government members. At the same time, it turned out that many ministers with an American passport worked in the Transitional Government. By the efforts of Z. Khalilzad and L. Brahimi found a compromise solution.

However, some observers questioned the possibility of successful implementation of the constitution, in particular, since it was imposed on the Afghans by its foreign architects. The goal of a strong presidential government in Afghanistan, one foreign observer suggested, is not the future prosperity of Afghanistan, but to ensure that control of the country at the highest level remains in the hands of Washington. In this whole game, the observer was convinced, Karzai is nothing more than a pawn on the chessboard ¹¹.

Talents of Z. Khalilzad was again required in the fall of 2004.

time of the presidential election in Afghanistan. The administration of J. R. R. Tolkien President Bush was betting heavily on his protégé, H. Karzai, whose victory was intended to demonstrate Washington's undoubted success in promoting democracy in Afghanistan and thereby increase Bush's own chances in the presidential election in November.

H. Karzai was the undisputed favorite in the election. He more or less suited various political, religious, ethnic factions and groups, as well as ordinary Afghans, as a figure capable of siphoning money from the world community. Moreover, some of these funds were used to bribe major field commanders and other influential figures.

However, he also had to endure a difficult struggle. His rivals tried to unite in an opposition bloc and put forward a single candidate, but it did not take place: the personal political ambitions of his competitors were stronger than the national interests. Already on the eve of the elections, they announced a boycott, which smelled like a disruption of the elections, at best their illegitimacy.

H. Karzai was outraged: "Who is more important - these 15 candidates or the millions of people who came to vote today?"¹². The international community also became agitated: $ 200 million was allocated for the elections. ¹³ Karzai's" right - hand man", US Ambassador to Afghanistan Z. Karzai, had to be used. Khalilzad, who met with rebel candidates on election day and persuaded them to lift the boycott, contributing to the victory of H. Karzai.

Z's Afghan achievements Khalilzad was highly appreciated by Washington, and in June 2005 he was transferred to a new, already familiar and more complex area of work - the US Ambassador to Iraq, and in 2007 he was appointed US representative to the UN.

WHERE DOES THE DONATION GO?

The United States, along with the EU and the World Bank, is Afghanistan's largest donor. In 2007, in response to the recent realignment of NATO forces, Washington announced an additional $ 8.6 billion over the next two years for training the Afghan national army and police, as well as $ 2 billion for the next two years. for road construction, energy, and the fight against drug trafficking ¹⁴. The amounts are truly considerable for a country whose annual budget does not exceed $ 650 million.

However, the problem is not in their size, but in how they are spent. This issue was raised by Afghan Finance Minister Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi in the spring of 2007 in Washington at a forum in the American Congress organized by the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce. The Minister's statement about the inefficiency of spending the allocated amounts confused the forum participants. The charges were brought primarily against the US Agency for International Development (USAID)¹⁵, which was contracted to perform work in Afghanistan in the amount of $ 1.4 billion in US financial assistance.

In the years since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there has been a clear mechanism for providing and spending financial resources allocated by donor countries. More than half of these funds are returned to the same countries through various channels, since, as a rule, the donor country prefers to give money to its contractor company. Moreover, the lion's share of these funds goes to the maintenance of highly paid "experts".-

and "consultants" and providing them with comfortable living conditions and security (mansions, high salaries, cars, security, etc.). In addition, the contractor company often hires another subcontractor company, and that, in turn, another one, and so it turns out a whole chain, each link of which it seeks to snatch its share of the investment. Afghanistan gets a pathetic balance from the original amount. "As a result, there are crumbling hospitals, clinics and schools, dangerous highways for driving, and farmers are provided with such" assistance", after receiving which the situation of many of them becomes worse than before. Overall, countless millions are wasted as a result of mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption, generating public hostility. " ¹⁶

US ECONOMIC INTERESTS

While President J. R. R. Tolkien Bush convinces Americans that the war in Afghanistan is being waged against terror, in the name of protecting the United States from terrorists, and a number of scientists and journalists are increasingly openly writing that the real reason for the war in Afghanistan was the desire to change the Taliban regime to a more friendly one that can help realize American economic interests in the Central Asian region.

Americans are attracted by the vast hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian region, to which they have long sought access. Some Western observers refer to this region as the "Middle East of the 21st Century." As Halliburton Energy executive Dick Cheney, the future vice President of the United States, put it in a speech to the captains of the American oil business in 1998: "I cannot imagine that a region as strategically important as the Caspian Sea could suddenly appear in the future."¹⁷ Washington could not put up with the fact that the oil of the Caspian region is being pumped by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium led by the American company Chevron to Russia. The United States generally did not like the options for pumping energy resources through Russia and Iran. This is why American energy companies and government officials have shown such interest in Afghanistan , a possible transit route for laying the pipeline bypassing Russia. The well-known Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, author of the book "The Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia" (2001), is convinced that the US policy in the region over the past 10 years has been dictated mainly by corporate interest in its resources.¹⁸

Indeed, in 1995, the American oil company UNOCAL held talks with President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov on the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghan territory to Pakistan to pump Turkmen gas to Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea coast. In 1996, after the Taliban came to power in Kabul, the Americans also contacted them to sign a corresponding agreement. The Taliban's Islamic fundamentalism and mass repression, as well as the emergence of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan in 1996, have prevented the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the United States, but they have not become an insurmountable obstacle to a potential deal. In November 1997, UNOCAL's management hosted a Taliban delegation in Houston, treating the Afghan extremists to expensive hotel rooms and fine food, and offering them a lucrative contract.¹⁹

The Clinton administration tacitly supported the company's efforts, but in the end, the deal did not take place: the Taliban refused to cooperate with the Americans. After the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Washington also did not want to deal with them anymore. Nevertheless, attempts to negotiate with the Taliban in secret continued almost until September 11, 2001. Moreover, the Bush administration provided them with $ 124 million in aid. ²⁰ However, during secret meetings in Washington, Islamabad, and Berlin in 2001, the Americans demanded bin Laden's extradition to them, and when they received him, they did not stop. the final refusal, they threatened to use force against the Taliban. Many believe that this threat provoked bin Laden to carry out the September 11 attacks as a pre-emptive strike out of fear that the Taliban would surrender and force him to leave Afghanistan.

After the bombing of Afghanistan began in October 2001, the American Ambassador to Islamabad, W. Chamberlain, informed the Pakistani government that due to new geopolitical changes, negotiations on the gas pipeline project would be resumed. Karzai, meanwhile, was quick to say that his government intends to work closely with neighboring countries and American oil companies to maximize profits from the transportation of oil and gas in the Caspian basin. On February 8, 2002, Karzai visited Pakistan and, together with Musharraf, declared "fraternal relations" and cooperation "in all spheres of activity" ^.21

Subsequently, an international consortium for the project implementation was revived, which included UNOCAL, Gazprom, energy companies from Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. India has also joined the project. The Asian Development Bank even allocated money for design and survey work. However, its implementation is constantly postponed, and this is understandable: large investors, primarily UNOCAL, are in no hurry to invest huge amounts of money until stability and security are ensured in the country.

Finally, not the least important place in the American economy

politics in the region has a geopolitical aspect. The United States seeks to secure political dominance here, or at least predominant influence. The main tasks are to oust or displace Russia in Central Asia, which is the traditional zone of its military and political responsibility, to prevent China from being one of the main players, to block Iran, and to keep India and Pakistan, which have nuclear status, under control.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where Russia and China play a leading role, serves as a counterweight to the growing US attempts to impose its influence in Central Asia. In the summer of 2005, the SCO demanded that the Americans determine the timing of the US military presence at the bases of Central Asian states. The joint Declaration adopted at the SCO summit in July 2005 was aimed at repelling US attempts to "monopolize or dominate international relations." In 2006, the SCO's campaign to reduce the US military presence was continued: Uzbekistan demanded the withdrawal of American troops from its base, which soon closed it.

However, the problem is not limited to the US military presence alone. Russia and China are critical of the broader ambitions of the United States in the region, which is likely to continue to seek control over the energy resources of the Caspian basin. In these plans, Afghanistan will play a significant role both as a launching pad for further attempts at US economic and political expansion in the region, and as an energy bridge for transporting these resources to neighboring and, possibly, to distant countries, including the United States.

THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN FAILS

US efforts in Afghanistan were far from limited to the political and diplomatic activities of the American ambassador. Washington continued to exert a decisive influence on the military and political situation in the country. So, in May 2005, during an official visit to Washington, H. Karzai signed the Afghan-American strategic cooperation agreement, which established the permanent status of American bases in Afghanistan, which are important for the United States in the framework of regional policy.

Until recently, the United States made the main contribution to the armed fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States has long (back in 2004) insisted on strengthening the role of NATO in the fight against terror in Afghanistan. However, their Western allies, which formed the basis of the peacekeeping forces, stubbornly refused to unite with the forces of the international anti-terrorist coalition, where the United States played a leading role. In 2005, the troops of Germany, France and some other countries were withdrawn from Kabul under pressure from the United States and deployed in the northern and western regions of Afghanistan. However, they categorically refused to be involved in the fighting in southern Afghanistan, agreeing to participate only in peacekeeping operations in their areas of deployment.

In 2005, the NATO leadership finally decided to extend the area of military responsibility of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the entire territory of Afghanistan. Accordingly, British, Canadian, Dutch and Australian units were deployed to the south of the country, in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. In August 2006, an official ceremony was held to transfer all coalition troops under the command of NATO.

By the beginning of 2008, the military contingent from 39 countries under the command of NATO numbered 43 thousand people, including 14 thousand Americans, 7700 British, 3000 Canadians, 2500 Dutch and 1000 Australians. Another 13 thousand Americans are fighting in the south-east and east of the country under their command ²².

The lack of visible success in the military campaign, the growing distrust of ordinary Afghans, and the anti-war sentiment in the United States itself are forcing Washington to change its strategy in Afghanistan. The new course was based on the old thesis of the struggle for "the hearts and minds of the people", i.e. the struggle for the trust of the population. The US military began to "go to the people" with the distribution of humanitarian aid and medical services. However, so far this practice has not brought the desired results, since the main US efforts are still focused on a military solution to the problem, and not on helping in the reconstruction of the country. This is evidenced by statistics: spending on military operations since 2002 amounted to 82.5 billion dollars, while 7.3 billion dollars were spent on reconstruction and development of the country. United States dollars.

In the years since the end of the Taliban regime, the Americans and their allies have failed to achieve a decisive turning point in the war against Islamic extremists. Moreover, the Taliban have managed to regroup, change tactics, and step up fighting against the Afghan Government and Western forces. As a result, the military-political situation in the country has sharply worsened. Although the large-scale spring offensive they promoted did not take place in 2007, they managed to significantly expand their area of influence. Extremist groups occasionally captured and held under their control a number of counties in the south and south-west of Afghanistan. In February, for example, they overran Musa Qala, a county seat in Helmand Province, violating an agreement signed in October 2006 with the British provincial command to hand the city over to local tribal leaders. They established their authority there by enacting sharia law. And only in December

In 2007, government forces, supported by NATO units, managed to liberate the city.

As the scale of the armed struggle increases, Islamic extremists, unable to resist the military power of NATO, seek to launch an asymmetric strike against foreign troops. They are gradually changing tactics, increasingly relying on individual acts of subversive and terrorist nature. The most widespread use of suicide bombers by the Taliban is an unprecedented phenomenon in Afghanistan. For example, suicide bombers committed two acts in 2003, 4 in 2004, 21 in 2005, and 139 in 2006. ²³ In 2006, 492 civilians were killed by suicide bombers.²⁴

In 2008, the scale of armed clashes in Afghanistan continued to increase. According to the ISAF Command, there were 595 clashes in 101 counties in the first two months of 2008, compared with 550 in ⁸⁸ counties in the same period of the previous year25. NATO generals are showing growing concern about the deteriorating situation in the country.

The influence of Islamic extremists and the war zone is steadily expanding: according to the influential international think tank Senlis Council (London), insurgents are currently active in 54% of Afghanistan, including in the immediate vicinity of the country's capital ²⁶.

According to analysts and a number of representatives of the NATO military community, the situation in the country is developing, which does not give the slightest reason for optimism. The situation in Afghanistan has "gradually reached a strategic impasse", and the current level and forms of NATO presence in this country do not allow us to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These are the disappointing conclusions of the report, which was prepared by one of the largest research organizations in Washington-the Atlantic Council of the United States, headed by the former Commander - in-chief of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, General James Jones. The report makes a sad verdict on the current military-political situation in the country: "The question is not whether the Taliban will return to Kabul, but when and how." ²⁷

A startling picture is emerging: for all the optimism of some NATO generals who talk about the military successes of the international coalition, a mood close to panic is emerging in American military circles. In recent months, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been pressing his NATO counterparts to increase the number of their troops in Afghanistan. Washington itself set an example: in the spring of 2008, an additional 3,200 Marines were planned to be deployed in southern Afghanistan, bringing the total number of US units to 31,200. ²⁸ However, Germany and France categorically refuse to participate in combat operations in southern Afghanistan. And Canada, in March 2008, threatened to withdraw its troops altogether if they were not given reinforcements of at least 1,000 men in Kandahar Governorate.²⁹

In this situation, we must pay tribute to the Western allies of Kabul: they are actively looking for a way out of the impasse. It is obvious: in addition to building up NATO's military capabilities in Afghanistan, more efforts and resources should be focused on the social and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, a peace negotiation process should be launched with the Taliban, and interested parties and Afghanistan's neighbors, including Russia and its allies, should be involved in solving the problems. At the same time, in March 2008, Russia responded to the NATO proposal and expressed its readiness to sign a comprehensive agreement on resolving the Afghan problem between the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the NATO.

^{Conetta Carl.} 1 Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War. Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 30, 2002, p. 4.

² www.gallap-international.com, September 2001.

^{Dr. Malik Iffat.} 3 Divergent Goals in Afghanistan. Dawn, June 30,2002.

⁴ Donors Pledge Over Three Billion Dollars for Afghanistan. AFP, January 21, 2002.

⁵ Bush Pledges Afghan Aid Boost. BBC News, January 28, 2002.

⁶ News Blackout on Afghan Battle. BBC News, May 17, 2002.

^{Anderson Jon Lee.} 7 American Viceroy; Zalmay Khalilzad's Mission. The New Yorker, December 19, 2005.

⁸ King, Karzai Aim for Solid Front in Afghanistan. Khaleej Times, May 29, 2002; Loya Jirga Delegates Stage Walkout. Dawn, June 18, 2002.

^{Akhtar Shameem.} 9 Loya Jirga Paves the Way. Dawn, June 20, 2002; Afghanistan: a Cautious Start. Frontier Post, Tune 27, 2002.

¹⁰ King, Karzai Aim ...

^{Maitra Ramtanu.} 11 The Perils of Presidency in Afghanistan. Central Asia, January 15, 2004.

¹² Afghanistan's Presidential Election Turns Sour as Karzai Challengers Boycott, Claiming Fraud and Incompetence. Associated Press, October 10, 2004.

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ US Speaker Pelosi Meets Afghan President. Kabul (AFP), January 28, 2007.

¹⁵ Minister's Call for Aid Effectiveness Upsets US Official. Washington. Pajhwok Afghan News. April 19, 2007.

^{Ryan John.} 16 Afghanistan: a Tale of Never Ending Tragedy. Center for Research on Globalization - Canada. July 19, 2006. Global Research, ca.

^{Smith David Michael.} 17 Professor Says America Seeks Afghanistan Oil Deal. Canadian National Newspaper, January 19, 2007.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibid.

^{Ryan John.} 20 Afghanistan: a Tale of Never Ending...

^{Smith David Michael.} 21 Professor Says...

²² The Afghan kaleidoscope. Washington, 30.01.2008 / ITAR-TASS correspondent Alexander Pakhomov/.

^{Alisa Tang.} 23 Report: Insurgents killed 669 Afghans. Associated Press, 17.04.2007.

²⁴ Ibidem.

^{Jon Hemming.} 25 Afghan Clashes Up in 2008 but in Fewer Places: NATO. Kabul (Reuters), March 10, 2008.

^{Richard Norton-Taylor.} 26 Afghanistan 'Falling into Hands of Taliban'. The Guardian, November 22, 2007.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ U. S. Urges Support for Canada in Afghan South. Brussels (Reuters), March 7, 2008.

²⁹ Afghan kaleidoscope...

³⁰ Afghan kaleidoscope. Paris, 12.03.2008 / Spec. correspondent. ITAR-TASS/.

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