The global financial crisis is far from the only one that has affected the modern global economy. Every year the world needs more and more food. "Man shall not live by bread alone." 8: 3; Mt 4: 4; Lk 4: 4], but the era of free bread seems to be a thing of the past. Paraphrasing a well-known biblical maxim, one could probably say: "Man will live on expensive bread." In 2007-2008, world food prices increased by an average of 80-90%, and for some goods-more than three times. The instability of the dollar provoked financial speculation with grain futures, which caused a price spiral and new price turns at a higher level. In 2007-2008, there was a sharp influx of "hot money" from the stock market to commodity exchanges, where quotes for most agricultural products are set. Speculative operations have become more active in the real goods markets in the context of an upward environment [http://www.fondsk.ru...]. The rise in food prices, which was called "agflation" (agricultural inflation), was particularly intense in the East until mid-2008.: meat - 40-60%, cereals and corn-50-70%, milk and butter - 60 - 80%, vegetable oil - 80 - 100%. The price of a ton of Thai rice, for example, increased in 2008 to $ 1,000, i.e. 3.5 times compared to the level of 2007. The world price of wheat increased 2.3 times to $ 400. per t [http://www.time...].

High yields and the global financial crisis "dropped" food prices in the second half of 2008. "Agflation" led to the fact that global agricultural producers significantly increased production, attracting relatively cheap loans. This, in turn, caused an oversupply in the market. In the context of the financial crisis and a sharp drop in oil prices, food prices began to fall, and loans became more expensive. By the end of 2008, prices for grain, vegetable and animal oils had almost halved. According to Russian researcher A.V. Akimov, the prices of those food products that are mainly consumed by the poor turned out to be the least stable [http://www.fondsk.ru...].

The description of the genesis of the food crisis has almost come close to the language of textbooks. On the one hand, the global food market is very conservative and is developing slowly. To get more grain, we need to plow additional acreage, we need more fertilizers, agricultural machinery, we need more capacity for storage, processing and transportation. All this is associated with a huge additional investment. The global food market is adapting faster than the growing demand in Asia. As a result, food prices are rising. On the other hand, intensive monopolization of the food market in Western countries is accompanied by the expansion of land for crops for biofuels, which leads to a reduction in food production. Agricultural raw materials needed for bioenergy-wheat, barley, corn, sunflower, sugar cane, sugar beet, rapeseed, etc. - are being withdrawn from the consumer sphere, and the price growth for them is only accelerating.

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The growth rate of food prices in developing Asia (RSA) is significantly faster than the global average trend, which is largely due to the structure of the cost of final products. The fact is that in the RSA, the share of grain in the price of bread is at the level of 30 - 40%. In the EU and the US, this share does not exceed 10%, the rest is spent on baking, packaging,and transportation. The share of feed grain in livestock production in the Republic of Belarus reaches 70-80%, in the countries of the Old and New World - 1.5-2 times less. For vegetable oil, the share of oilseeds in the prime cost in the West does not exceed 30-40%, in the RSA - almost twice as high. Therefore, the increase in world prices has a differentiated effect in different countries. If in the EU and the US food prices grow by an average of 5-10% per year, then in the RSA - by 25-30%. It should also be taken into account that in the West, food costs on average do not exceed 15-25% of the family budget, while in the RS they reach 80-95% [http://www.rfca...]. As a result, the total GDP of the RSA in 2007 - 2008 declined due to high food prices, and the rate of economic growth slowed down by 0.9-1.8% and were one and a half times lower than in 2005-2006.

The food crisis is unfolding against the backdrop of the growing population of developing Asian countries, which is growing by about 60-80 million people annually. These are primarily the Southeast Asian countries, India, and China, where the dynamics and structure of consumer demand changed relatively slowly before the beginning of the XXI century. In recent years, due to accelerated modernization, the leading DCS have moved beyond self-sufficiency and switched to consuming higher-quality and more expensive food products (meat, milk, bread products).

The genesis of the food crisis is sometimes attributed to the consolidation of the well-off strata in highly populated DCS: rapid growth in consumption in high-income groups leads to an increase in global demand for food and becomes one of the reasons for soaring prices. This opinion has been repeatedly expressed, in particular, by FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf and IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn. American President George W. Bush in July 2008 even tried to quantify the Indian middle class - 350 million people. That's more than the entire US population! However, if we look at the indicators of per capita consumption, then the first place is occupied by residents of highly developed countries. The average American, for example, consumes 25 times more meat, 4 times more vegetable oil, and 3 times more milk each year than an Indian [http://www.oyax...].

By 2025, the world's population will grow by about 20% , from 6.7 billion to 8 billion. By 2050, it may reach 9-10 billion people. For Asia's five billion people, this means that by the middle of the twenty-first century. between a third and half of the continent's population will be concentrated in countries where the population is growing faster than agricultural production. In order to slow the rate of decline in food security, food production in Asia needs to be increased at least twice over the next few decades. Agriculture is objectively becoming a key sector of the global economy. The problem, however, is that most DCS are not able to make large investments in the agricultural sector due to the financial crisis. This has a negative impact primarily on the poorest countries in the East. If in the middle of the first decade of the XXI century, about 1 billion people were malnourished in developing countries. By the end of this period, another 100 million "new hungry"people appeared. Reducing the number of undernourished people turned out to be possible only in areas where the export-oriented economy was actively developing: China, the Asia-Pacific region, and Latin America [http://www.fondsk.ru...]. The food crisis is not new to Asia, it is caused by both external and internal causes.

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INTERNAL FACTORS

In the last third of the 20th century, the "green revolution" began in many Eastern countries, which can be considered as one of the capital-intensive forms of scientific and technological progress in the agricultural sector. Almost half a century of experience of the "green revolution" is contradictory and often indicates that there may be a significant gap between the dynamics of production and the dynamics of the process of food commoditization. A certain, sometimes significant effect achieved in the production sector due to various agricultural or infrastructural innovations is often lost (partially or completely) in the sphere of circulation. The development of trade infrastructure in developing Asia as part of the "green revolution" sometimes contributed not so much to the growth of comradeship as to the expansion of speculative accumulation of agricultural goods, especially grain, by monopoly resellers who transported products to urban and industrial centers, storing and selling them during periods of increasing demand. For example, the speculative operations of large wholesalers who occupy dominant positions in the grain market in South Asian countries (up to 2/3 of the total market fund is ultimately concentrated in their hands) led to the fact that wholesale food prices continued to rise even during the years of record harvests [http://www.eng.vedanta...].

At the end of the XX - beginning of the XXI century, the inter-industry production and structural dynamics in the Russian Autonomous Region changed significantly. The "green revolution" as a focal capital-intensive form of NTP in the agrosphere (i.e., a consequence of the substitution of living labor for materialized labor) was characterized by a slower increase in productivity compared to the growth of the capital-to-labor ratio in agriculture, since the dynamics of production capital usually did not ensure a proportional increase in commodity output, but also did not compensate for the relative substitution of living labor for materialized labor, even in within the boundaries of the farming (capitalist) way of life. As a result, the impulses of the "green revolution" in the East gradually began to fade, and its commodity potential was exhausted. The rate of increase in the degree of comradeship, and consequently the rate of increase in food security, has slowed significantly. This factor was most strongly reflected in the countries of South Asia, but it also significantly affected the food balance in other DCS, causing food shortages.

The relative decline of large and medium-sized grain producers (by an average of 1.5 - 1.7% per year) was accompanied by a fall in total agricultural exports from Asian countries at the beginning of the XXI century by about 1/7-1/5. [http://www.sifynew...]. The share of food in the value structure of exports decreased by 25-35%. Consequently, taking into account the multiplicative effect of domestic demand and the average country consumption structure, the value of agricultural producers as suppliers of agricultural goods decreased by almost 1/4, and as consumers of the same goods, mainly food, increased by 1/5. At the same time, the role of world trade in the food supply of the DSA increased by approximately 1/3.

Food security. In the second half of the 20th century, the development of the agricultural market in the developing world was mainly determined by the need to solve the food problem. The low level of food security was associated with negative dynamics of the total food supply (due to domestic production and imports) against the background of advancing demographic changes. Domestic food production for a long period of time did not show any significant increase in proportion to the rate of population growth. The food crisis was manifested with varying severity in different countries and regions. The corresponding indicators are shown in table 1.

1 Criteria for determining the size of medium and large farms: 7.5-10.5 ha for South Asia; 4-7 ha for Southeast Asia; up to 5 ha for Southwest and East Asia; 2.5-4.6 ha for North Africa.

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Chart 1

Growth in per capita food production in developing countries in 1987-2007, % (annual average)

Рассчитано по: [Asian Development Review, 2006 - 2008; Europa Regional Surveys of the World..., 2006; Review of Asian and Pacific Studies..., 2003 - 2007; Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 2003 - 2006; Agricultural Situation in India, 2003 - 2005; Economic and Political Weekly, 2007; The Economist, 2006; Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2005 - 2007; Times of India, 2004 - 2007].

Due to the low intensity of harvesting and the inability of the market to accumulate the necessary amount of its own agricultural products, the most important source of centralized distribution in many RSAs was food imports. At the same time, a reservation should be made: food imports in some cases could only conditionally serve as an indicator of an absolute food deficit and / or crisis, since the minimum basic need of a developing country for additional food products produced in it was not identical to the actual domestic demand for imported food, which, as a rule, is sold by the state at subsidized prices. An example of this inadequacy is provided, in particular, in India, where in some years the growth of domestic production was higher than the growth of the population, but this did not have a proportional impact on imports.

For many years, the share of imports in India's gross grain production was at the level of 5-10%, although the success of the hotbed "green revolution" made it possible to reduce the share of imported grain by almost half. 2000-2005 India was even a net exporter of wheat, exporting 4 million tons a year. However, in 2007-2008 it again resorted to food imports and annually imported grain (4-6 million tons for $ 1.5 billion), as well as meat and animal fats (for $ 2 billion). For comparison, all Indian imports amount to $ 200 billion, with oil and petroleum products accounting for a third [http://www.eng.vedanta...]. In addition to imports in 2007-2008, the state carried out domestic purchases of wheat (9-11 million tons per year), since the demand for grain of the poorest population was at the level of 13-15 million tons of grain. imports, therefore, were an essential component of government trade at subsidized prices for social stability.

In most countries of South, South-East and South-West Asia, the low level of minimum maintenance and procurement prices predetermined an insufficient accumulation of marketable products (usually less than a third of the production volume).

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food) and the limited impact of pricing on the overall market environment. Controlled trade was seen as an instrument of anti-crisis food policy, which mainly consisted in ensuring a sufficient flow of goods to cities at affordable prices. Limited domestic food supply and fractional effective demand manifested themselves in practice in the unprofitability of state trade organizations and the inefficiency of the food supply system as a whole. Attempts to resolve this contradiction by raising retail prices, i.e., primarily at the expense of the lower urban strata, for whom state trade was the most important channel for meeting the demand for basic necessities, and official price control was the only means of protection against the market dictates of private merchants, did not strengthen the internal political stability and authority of the ruling regimes. In the summer of 2008, for example, unrest caused by rising food prices was observed in 30 developing countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the Philippines [http://www.cnn...].

The specific nature of the process of food commoditization in the agricultural sector of the RSA consists in the fact that the market receives products of qualitatively heterogeneous farms belonging to different functional forms, which respond differentially to macroeconomic factors of supply and demand. By its structure and economic content of the main components, the commodity products of various farms ultimately reflect the level of labor productivity characteristic of a particular way of life. The analysis of the causes of the food crisis associated with the dynamics of the total (on the scale of the entire agriculture) food supply, therefore, involves assessing the marketability of individual types of farms and the market reaction of producers belonging to different ways of life.

Along with the fading impulses of the "green revolution" at the beginning of the XXI century, the process of small-scale agrosphere production and the reduction of land ownership and land use accelerated in Asia, along with the growth of the number of small and very small producers. Small producers usually supply the market with the share of the crop that provides them with the necessary cash equivalent to meet urgent needs, and keep the remaining part (if there is a balance at all). for your own consumption. If prices rise, the sale of less grain provides the small farmers with the necessary cash resources, and conversely, when prices fall, commodity output usually increases. At the beginning of the XXI century, negative indicators of the price elasticity of the commodity stock indicated a negative correlation between prices and the level of comradeship in small farms. Market revenues may decline markedly as prices rise, which in turn puts upward pressure on prices. High production costs in small farms, sometimes exceeding the level of market prices, significantly narrow the basis for product orientation.

This negative dependence was typical not only for the market supply of food (grain). A significant share of income comes, for example, from sugar cane, jute, peanuts, cotton, etc. On irrigated land in Thailand, for example, they occupy about a quarter of all areas in farms of less than 1 ha and up to 20% in farms of 1-3 ha, in India (Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra-Pradesh, Tamil Nadu) - 25% in farms of less than 5 acres and 30% in farms of 5-10 acres [http://www.oyax...]. The dynamics of the market fund of small producers is largely related to changes in prices for non-food commercial crops, when in the conditions of the" seller's market", the consumption of own grain increases, and market sales fall. Non-market factors can also have a significant impact on comradeship (part-time earnings in the city, seasonal migrations, money transfers from city relatives, etc.).

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As for the case of a neutral (or" zero") relationship between food commodity output and changes in market prices (relatively stable sales under positive or negative market conditions), such a relationship was typical, as a rule, for intermediate, transitional groups of producers that are not so small as to have no surpluses at all, and (so far more) they are not large enough to respond positively to price changes in all cases. According to a number of sample surveys, Indian farms larger than 30 acres, representing 25% of the total number of farms surveyed, accounted for between 2/3 and 4/5 of all market grain receipts. Approximately the same number of farms (15 - 30 acres) gave the rest of the marketable products. Small producers (less than 15 acres) sold a small amount of grain [Agricultural Situation..., 2003-2005]. A higher market price means for them an increase in real income, respectively-in personal and productive consumption. When prices fall, the situation of such producers worsens, but nevertheless not to such an extent as to significantly affect the level of commodification.

Producers of the farm (commercial) sector "consciously" relate to the movement of market prices, reserving a significant part of the crop for speculative sale. The upward trend in prices of competing commercial crops only increases the ability of the farm sector to retain food for sale in the "seller's market", i.e. when the demand for food usually exceeds its supply. Thus, in the seasonal structure of grain market receipts in India in recent years, there has been a tendency to increase the share of deferred sales. The most dramatic increase in deferred grain supply occurred in the states that were at the forefront of the green revolution: Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chandigarh, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar [http://www.sifynews...]. Speculative food accumulations spur a price spiral.

For domestic trade in essential agricultural commodities, the RSA also has to deal with sharp regional and seasonal fluctuations in prices, food shortages, and price increases in non-grain areas (such as the grain-deficient states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala, and West Bengal in India), while food overproduction and falling prices in other (sometimes neighboring) agricultural regions.

The total availability of food for consumption in the agricultural sector and sale on the market can be formalized as follows: At= Qt- (ΔWt- ΔWt-1), where Qt is food production, ΔWt is current year's rolling stocks, and ΔWt-1 is previous year's realized stocks. Total commodity supply of food for the non-agricultural sector: St = At - Ct + I = At-nct + I, where Ct is domestic food consumption by the rural population, I is imports, n is the number of people employed in the agricultural sector, and ct is the average per capita food consumption in the agricultural sector. In general, the value St fixes in the most general form the lower limit of covering commodity demand at the expense of domestic resources of the village, includes possible imports and takes into account agricultural exports concentrated in cities.

Consumer demand in developing Asia is unevenly distributed among different income groups of the employed. A significant part of the aggregate demand for food is concentrated in high-income urban strata. However, a considerable (and sometimes large) share of effective demand (at least 1/3 - 2/5) also falls on those employed in the agricultural sector, non-factory small-capitalist and small-scale production, trade and services. Thus, the aggregate consumer demand in the domestic market of the Eastern countries and, consequently, the severity of the food crisis are largely related to the dynamics of the social development of the Russian Federation.-

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cyostructures. If the state cancels subsidized food distribution, and global and domestic prices rise, the lower strata of the population suffer first.

Aggregate commodity demand in the Russian Autonomous Region has increased by an average of 27-32% over the past 10 to 15 years. High-income and adjacent groups (the top 10-20%) accounted for approximately 30-40% of consumer demand in the city and countryside. The maximum level is in South Asia, and the minimum level is in the south-east and East Asian sub-regions. The lowest (in terms of income received) 60% of the population accounted for about 28-30% of all consumer spending (including on basic necessities, mainly food), and the middle strata - 34-38% of these expenditures. The highest growth in consumer demand of low-income groups was observed in Southeast Asia, followed by South-West Asia and North Africa (by 22-25%, 18-21%, and 17-20%, respectively). Most of the lower strata spent on a relatively wide range of cheap consumer goods with high income elasticity of demand. For more detailed indicators for the six countries, see table 2.

Chart 2

Share of various population groups in total consumer spending in 1990-2007 (average annual data)

Рассчитано по: [Asian Development Review..., 2006 - 2008; Europa Regional Surveys of the World..., 2006; Review of Asian and Pacific Studies, 2003 - 2007; Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific..., 2003 - 2006; Agricultural Situation in India, 2003 - 2005; Economic and Political Weekly, 2007; The Economist, 2006; Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2005 - 2007; Times of India, 2004 - 2007].

In the first decade of the 21st century, the overall picture in 6 Eastern countries was characterized by a relatively stable distribution of food expenditures. High-income segments of the population spent no more than 10 - 15% of their income on food, the average - from 25 to 30% of the annual budget, and the lowest-90-100%. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, real demand for food products from urban communities increased in all Asian subregions (in South-West Asia and North Africa-by almost 1/3, in South Asia and Southeast Asia - by 1/4). In the last two subregions, which are characterized by slower rates of urbanization, there was also an increase in the share of the poorest groups in total consumer spending. As a result, there was a slight decrease in differentiation (according to the structure of consumption), and in the Southeast Asian countries there was a certain increase in the level of consumption.-

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increasing consumer demand among the lower strata not only in the city, but also in the countryside.

Strictly speaking, income inequality among the poorest groups in the context of urban employment growth was more pronounced than consumption inequality. Changes in the share of food in the structure of consumer spending of various groups can be judged by the dynamics of the food price index (mainly for cereals) and the dynamics of the coefficient of variance of food expenditures ("Gini coefficient"). Decreasing (from 1 to 0) values of the coefficient of variance indicate a narrowing of the consumption gap between different groups. On the contrary, if the ratio approaches 1, this indicates a reduction in the share of lower groups in total expenditures.

The variance coefficients for India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia can be calculated based on the assumption that the income elasticity of demand does not exceed 0.6 - 0.8 (with an increase in income per unit, consumer demand increases by 0.6 - 0.8), and the price elasticity of food demand (based on the average values of food indices). per capita consumption) is 0.2 - 0.3 (an increase in domestic demand by 1 leads to an increase in prices by 0.2 - 0.3). The corresponding aggregated data is shown in table 3.

Figure 3

Share of various consumer groups in food expenditures in 1997-2007, % (annual average)

Рассчитано по: [Asian Development Review, 2006 - 2008; Europa Regional Surveys of the World..., 2006; Review of Asian and Pacific Studies, 2003 - 2007; Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific..., 2003 - 2006; Agricultural Situation in India, 2003 - 2005; Economic and Political Weekly, 2007; The Economist, 2006; Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2005 - 2007; Times of India, 2004 - 2007].

To assess the level of food shortage (the depth of the crisis), it is advisable to determine the per capita consumption of food, taking into account the real per capita income of the main categories of employees. Based on the calculated indicators, it is possible to give rough estimates of domestic food consumption and its total product supply, as well as determine the coefficients of commoditization for the countries under consideration (diagr. 4 - 6).

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Figure 4

Average annual gross production of grain and legumes (qt%) 1997-2007

Chart 5

Average annual domestic consumption fund (Ct%) in 1997-2007

Рассчитано по: [Asian Development Review, 2006 - 2008; Europa Regional Surveys of the World..., 2006; Review of Asian and Pacific Studies, 2003 - 2007; Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific..., 2003 - 2006; Agricultural Situation in India, 2003 - 2005; Economic and Political Weekly, 2007; The Economist, 2006; Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 2005 - 2007; Times of India, 2004 - 2007].

Figure 6

Degree of comradeship (At- Ct)/Qt, %

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On average, for the Asian countries under consideration, the growth of the total commodity supply of food slowed down by about 25-30% by the end of the first decade of the XXI century. As far as individual countries are concerned, this deceleration has occurred unevenly in different years, with significant fluctuations in some cases. Among the countries under review, the growth rate of commodity output of food (from the agricultural sector) declined faster in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and India. In the first two countries, commodity output increased twice as slowly as in the 1980s and 1990s.The growth of agricultural marketability declined at about the same rate in Pakistan and Indonesia.

Thus, the significant positions of the state in the modernization of commodity circulation of food based on the achievements of scientific and technological progress (standardization, storage, transportation, processing, etc.) did not provide a corresponding increase in marketability. The functioning of various parts of modern trade, as well as state measures taken within the framework of the" green revolution "to expand the product supply of the agricultural sphere, often did not achieve their goals precisely because of their usually inherent" universality", orientation towards agricultural producers in general, without taking into account, however, the nature of the lower orders, their contacts with other structures. As a result, the food crisis in Asia was becoming permanent.

The global food crisis naturally has its own specifics in different areas of the developing world. While the food crisis is a problem for most rural areas, mainly related to the disproportionality and asymmetry of inter - sectoral and inter-regional dynamics, as well as the imbalance and skewness of the agricultural market, it is a tragedy for the world's poorest countries, where food production is chronically lagging behind population growth.

In sub-Saharan Africa (Eritrea, Niger, Liberia, Sudan, Ivory Coast), the Comoros, and Haiti, for example, where almost all food and fuel are imported, between 3/4 and 4/5 of the population is malnourished. Armed conflicts only exacerbate the problem in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq [http://www.fondsk.ru...]. The total food deficit resulting from an imbalance between supply and demand under demographic pressure is estimated at $ 100 billion in the poorest countries. It is interesting that this indicator is equivalent to the annual food losses of the countries of the Old and New World. In England, for example, about $ 20 million is thrown into a dumpster. t of overdue products for 40 billion dollars a year, i.e. about half of the food produced and purchased. In Japan, 30 to 40% of all products go to the trash, in the United States - at least a quarter (for $ 45 billion). This would be more than enough for all the hungry "third world". Italy, for example, by eliminating food losses, could feed Ethiopia, and France-the Congo [http://www.evrasianhome...].

EXTERNAL FACTORS

From the point of view of the dynamics of globalization processes in the current food crisis, two stages can be traced: the first-from the late 1990s to mid-2008, the second - from mid-2008. The first period is characterized by a direct correlation between world fuel, raw materials and food prices. The rapid rise in prices for energy, metals and almost all types of raw materials was projected on the costs of the agricultural sector. Along with the increase in oil prices (10 times from 1998 to 2008), the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel quadrupled. From 2003 to 2008, the main types of fertilizers tripled in price. Transportation and energy costs of Asian agricultural producers increased. The price scissors mechanism came into effect, when the cost of food products increased faster than wholesale quotations,

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and the monopoly of resellers and processors gave retail prices an additional boost.

The second stage (since mid-2008) coincides with the worsening of the global financial crisis and falling prices for hydrocarbons. The direct correlation between oil prices, which have decreased by 3 - 4 times, and food prices, which continue to grow against the background of financial speculation with grain futures, is broken. Rapidly changing food prices are often much more difficult to adapt to than fluctuations in fuel and commodity markets. Developing Asian countries are forced to resort to protectionist regulatory methods, introducing tariffs, restrictions and bans on food exports and / or imports in order to stabilize domestic commodity circulation and support national producers. This has a negative effect on the global food trade, and the fragmentation and segmentation of the global food market begins. In 2008, 20 developing countries imposed partial or total bans on the export or import of agricultural products to protect the domestic market and domestic agricultural producers. India, China, Cambodia and Vietnam, for example, banned the export of rice, Pakistan - wheat. Protectionism ultimately only worsens the global food crisis, causing new price spikes [http://www.arka...].

Bioenergetics. A new branch of the global economy-the production of biofuels (bioenergy) is becoming one of the key external factors of the global food crisis and a sharp increase in food prices. It is based on both spontaneous market mechanisms and long-term policies of developed countries. A two-pronged process is being activated: first, the acreage under biofuel crops is expanding, and secondly, more and more food raw materials are being used for the production of biofuels.

In 2005, the United States passed the Energy Policy Act, which provides for expanding the use of bioethanol in order to reduce oil imports and the use of gasoline and diesel fuel by 20% by 2017. In three years after the adoption of the law, the cost of corn has increased 2.5 times. Prices for sugar cane, soybeans and wheat jumped accordingly, as land began to be converted to corn crops. The increase in grain prices, in turn, caused an increase in prices for meat, dairy products, poultry, eggs. The reorientation to biofuels, therefore, predetermined the upward dynamics of food prices. In 2007 - 2008, the United States produced about 20 - 25 billion rubles. By 2017, the volume of its production should reach 135 billion cubic meters of bioethanol. l per year, i.e. grow 5-6 times [http://www.ananova Now even B-1 "Stealth" strategic bombers can fly on bio-kerosene.

In order to reduce oil dependence and find cheaper fuels, the EU also adopted a program to increase the share of biofuels in the market to 6% by 2010 and 10% by 2020. Now this share does not exceed 2%. Fertilizer producers and processing companies engaged in the construction of distilleries are seriously interested in the development of bioenergy. Bioenergy is a corporate-state project: under the banner of energy security, the high global hydrocarbon price environment at the beginning of the 21st century was used to subsidize the production and use of biofuels and provide them with the most-favored-nation treatment. Food and agricultural raw materials have reached the level of strategic resources and objects of global competition no less than energy carriers.

Bioenergy has tied fuel prices to food prices; a new mechanism for regulating key markets has emerged, as well as new effective weapons both to fight against oil-producing countries and to control food-dependent developing countries. One of the conditions for obtaining an American visa

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food aid is a requirement to expand the area under biofuel crops. In this regard, the experience of Haiti is clear. In the 1990s, 170 thousand tons of refined rice were produced here annually, which met 95% of domestic needs. At the beginning of the XXI century, rice crops began to decline due to the reorientation to the production of biofuel crops. At the same time, imports of American rice, which was half the price of Haitian rice, began to grow. As a result, American rice occupied the market. Haiti is now 80% dependent on rice imports from the United States [http://stockmarket...].

Bioethanol policy deepens food supply imbalances in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). It is not only about their entry into a new era of expensive and more expensive food. If we take into account that the countries that produce biofuels are simultaneously the main producers and exporters of food (USA, Brazil, EU countries, Australia, Canada), then in fact the situation today is characterized by the beginning of a kind of global war between fuel and bread. In the context of the global financial crisis, bioethanol producers manage not only to contain, but also to lower energy prices, thereby equalizing the profitability of biofuel production with petroleum products and at the same time accelerating the growth of food prices. In 2008, biofuels from sugar cane, including all subsidies, cost an average of 70-90 cents per gallon, ethanol from corn - 1.5-1.7 dollars, and from edible oilseeds-1.8-2 dollars per gallon, which in terms of Russian rubles was about 5, 10 and 13 rubles, respectively. per l.

Bioenergy has distorted the world food balance, firstly, through the reorientation of agricultural crops from food use to the production of bioethanol (about 1/7 - 1/5 of the grain crop) and biosolary (about 1/5-1/3 of vegetable oils); secondly, through the reorientation of arable land for the production of raw materials for biofuels. Since 2006, about 200 million tons of food and feed grains have been spent annually on the production of bioethanol. If we take into account that the entire world trade in cereals and legumes averages 210-220 million tons per year, and the gross grain harvest in the world ranges from one to one and a half billion tons, then bioenergy consumes about a quarter of the bread produced. For example, to fill up a truck with 100 liters of biofuel, you need to spend on its production as much corn (or rapeseed, or barley, or sugar) as is enough for one average Asian resident for a year [http://www.un.org...].

Together with the introduction of innovative energy technologies, the search for new types and the development of renewable energy sources, developed countries artificially contribute to the growth of consumption of agricultural products (corn, sugar cane, cassava, rapeseed, oilseeds, etc.) for the production of bioethanol and diesel biofuels. Annual subsidies for bioenergy in the US and EU reached $ 12 billion by 2008. In Germany, for example, the production of bioethanol is subsidized by lower taxes. At the beginning of the XXI century, Biosolarka was generally exempt from the tax on automobile fuel. In England, any motor and diesel fuel must include 2.5% of biofuels, and by 2020 the share of bioadditives will increase to 10%. In 2005, bioethanol production in the United States accounted for less than 10% of the corn crop. In 2008, this share was close to 25-30%, and diesel biofuels consume half of vegetable oils.

Bioenergy exacerbates the food crisis primarily by reducing the acreage under food crops. Various benefits encourage farmers and investors to shift their focus from food to biofuels. More and more arable land is being allocated for the production of raw materials for biofuels, as well as genetically modified varieties of agricultural crops. In 2008, the area under such crops increased by 9.4% [http://www.fondsk.ru...]. To replace 5% of hydrocarbons with biofuels, the acreage is

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it should be expanded by 20% at the expense of land under food crops [http://www.dotm...]. In order to expand the production of biofuel crops in the United States, arable and sown areas are being regulated. Since the 1990s, a third of the acreage is covered by a steam-powered farming system that allows for a free switch from food to biofuel crops. In 2007, the United States reduced wheat production to 70 million tons, which allowed the expansion of biofuel crops and at the same time keep grain prices at a high level. At the same time, the American Food Industry Union has significantly increased the degree of monopolization of the domestic market [http://www.cpf...].

The need to increase the area of sugar cane for biofuels has already led to massive deforestation in Latin America, which are the most important "lungs" of the planet. Brazil has 21 million hectares (Amazon basin), Argentina 14 million, Mexico 10 million. ha began to be sown with crops for obtaining biofuels. In some areas of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru, up to 70% of the rainforest has been destroyed. The area of deforested land is not inferior to that of Texas. The burning of tropical forests, which are natural sinks of carbon dioxide, as well as the hydrolysis of plant raw materials in the production of biofuels, associated with the release of significant amounts of greenhouse gases, are among the factors of global warming and lead to the destruction of the tropical jungle ecosystem [http://pawst...]. Similar processes are taking place in the Southeast Asian countries, where the production of biofuels for diesel is growing from the fruit of the oil palm. In Indonesia, for example, it is planned to triple the production of palm oil, and this will halve the country's forest cover. Malaysia has already lost a significant part of its rainforest and continues to cut it down, which dramatically changes the very model of land use.

An objective barrier to overcoming the food crisis is the limited availability of fertile land resources in developing countries. The share of agricultural land in the late XX - early XXI centuries increased from only 33.1% to 35.7%, and the share of arable land - from 10.4% to 11%. For Asia, this means that by the middle of the twenty-first century, 3/4 of the continent's population will live in countries where the minimum provision of cultivated agricultural land - 0.1 ha per person-is not met. In other words, between a third and half of the world's hungry people will be concentrated in the RSA.

* * *

The complex impact of external and internal factors on the food crisis can be summarized for individual developing countries in Asia using the total ranks according to the rating number formula:

where R is the rating score of the j-factor; m is the number of indicators for assessing the food crisis maximaximum -indicator. Factors are ranked in descending order of the rating score. Calculations show that the food crisis associated with "agflation" and an increase in food shortages in the Eastern countries is primarily caused by internal factors: unfavorable proportions of intersectoral structural changes; slowing productivity growth and productivity of the agricultural sector; fading impulses of the "green revolution"; relative reduction of large grain producers; acceleration of the process of small-scale commodity production and land ownership grinding, etc. land use (35-45%). The use of agricultural crops for the production of biofuels is in second place -

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20 - 25%. This is followed by higher prices for energy, fertilizers and transportation (15-20%); dynamics and structure of food demand (10-15%); growth in consumption in the modernizing Asian region, primarily in India, China, and Southeast Asian countries (5-10%).

For comparison, we can cite data from the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute for 2008 for 40 food producing, exporting and importing countries, which assess the impact on prices of various external factors-from the development of bioenergy and speculative financial transactions to government regulation and the dynamics of the US dollar. According to the results of research, the bioenergetic factor provoked a 30-35% increase in food prices [http://www.warandpeace...]

Bioenergy policy has become an actively discussed social process relatively recently. In the final documents of the G8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, Japan, in July 2008, biofuels are mentioned in the context of world food security. It was mentioned, in particular, the need to accelerate the development and commercialization of "second-generation" biofuels from non-food raw materials, for example, through fermentation of rice and wheat straw, sawdust, cellulose; from methane hydrate extracted from the sea floor, as well as from non-food crops (for example, jatropha), which do not withdraw arable land from circulation. squares [http://www.worldbank...].

In Russia and other CIS countries, food prices are growing at the same rate, and for some products even faster, than in the RSA. The income that Russia currently receives from energy exports is still higher than the cost of agricultural imports, but the accelerating "agflation" may make the ratio gradually quite comparable. The formula "oil in exchange for food", known from the experience of the "third world", may be quite applicable to Russia in the near future. Russia is a key player in the global hydrocarbon market and at the same time one of the largest importers and exporters of food. For various products, the Russian market depends on imported food for about 40 to 60%, and if we take into account that a significant part of the products produced are produced from imported raw materials, this indicator will obviously be even higher. Simultaneously at the beginning of the XXI century. Russia went from being a grain importer (20 million tons were imported in 1998) to a stable supplier of grain to the world market (14 million tons in 2007), becoming the third largest wheat exporter after the United States and Canada, ahead of such traditional exporters as Argentina and Australia. Russia is one of the five largest grain producing countries.

In the agricultural sector, Russia has a significant potential for key competitive advantages. It has the largest reserve of acreage growth due to unused arable land. Since the beginning of the 1990s, about $ 14 million has been withdrawn from circulation in Russia. ha of agricultural land, and the total area of unused arable land reached 25 million ha. These resources can be returned to circulation, which will increase the grain yield by 20 million tons per year, or by a quarter compared to the current figures. No other region in the world has such a potential for expanding arable land. The area of arable land suitable for development is 10% of the world's total reserves of productive arable land [http://www.rg.ru...]. In 2008, Russia was able to increase the area under wheat by 2.8 million hectares, or 12% [http://www.fondsk.ru...]. The global food crisis, therefore, gives Russia a unique chance to become one of the world's agro-industrial leaders. Intensive support and innovative renewal of our own agricultural production for import substitution and ensuring food security are becoming a key development priority for the coming years, and the current global situation provides an additional incentive for this.

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list of literature

Deuteronomy 8: 3; Mt. 4: 4; Lk. 4: 4 / / The Bible. Moscow, 1996.

Agricultural Situation in India. Delhi, 2003 - 2005.

Asian Development Review. Manila, 2006 - 2008.

The Economist. L., I. 2006.

Economic and Political Weekly. Mumbai, 2007.

Europa Regional Surveys of the World. The Middle East and North Africa. The Far East and Australia. South Asia. L., 2006.

Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy. L., 2005 - 2007.

Review of Asian and Pacific Studies. Tokyo, 2003 - 2007.

Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific. UN Economic and Social Comission for Asia and the Pacific. N.Y., 2003 - 2006.

Times of India. Delhi, 2004 - 2007.

http://www.ananova.com/business/html

http://www.arka/am/eng/economy/

http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/

http://www.cpf.az/xeber/

http://www.dotru.net/en/Politics

http://www.eng.vedanta.ru/news

http://www.evrasianhome.org/xml/news

http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2156

http://www.oyax.com/tag/agriculture

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http://www.rg.ru/2008/06/26/luzhkov-biotoplivo.html

http://www.sifynews.com/

http://www.stockmarket.unian.net/eng/detail/

http://www.time.com/world/html

http://www.un.org.ua/en/news/

http://www.warandpeace.ru/view/

http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/

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