"In China, all the inhabitants are Chinese, and even the emperor himself is Chinese."

G. H. Andersen

When discussing the history and politics of China, they often emphasize its uniqueness in the sense that its historical development does not fit into the trends common to most countries. For example, one can often find the opinion that, despite the fact that China was conquered by foreigners more than once, at the same time, due to a number of features of its culture, it did not become part of other states (which happens with conquered peoples), since foreigners quickly dissolved among their subjects and became part of them. This view, which is partly correct (the assimilation capacity of Chinese culture is indeed very great), seems to be rooted in the traditional sinocentric concept of history developed by Chinese Confucian historians many centuries ago. Its essence, among other things, was that China is the only state of its kind, the main one in the world, and therefore cannot be part of any other state. Under this concept, the periods of foreign rule were considered as dynasties-foreign in origin, but not much different from their Chinese predecessors or followers.

In this article, we will try to understand how close this concept is to the truth. This is especially important because it has had a strong impact on world Sinology, and Chinese science, which has occupied an increasingly important place in the world hierarchy in recent decades, almost officially considers this concept its methodological basis. This is largely due to the fact that these ideas are extremely convenient for the current political goals of the PRC leadership, which are often far from striving for scientific rigor and truth [Kuzmin and Dmitriev, 2010 - 2011].

Keywords: China, Middle State, state ideology, historical mythology, nationalism.

Our most important sources are, of course, Chinese, written at different times. However, it should not be overlooked that traditional Chinese historiography was official in nature. For example, in the Qing Empire, even in Modern times, there was virtually no independent historical writing, printed historical treatises were censored, and texts that did not comply with official doctrine were often destroyed. The understanding of the purpose of history and the interpretation of the historical process have always remained Confucian: there is no other historical science in the imperial state.

It couldn't have happened in China. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on non-Chinese sources, in particular Tibetan and Mongolian, which often cover the same events and concepts in a completely different way.

When analyzing the problem, it is useful first of all to analyze the very concept of "China" and its analogues. The understanding of the term China (Chinese: Zhong-guo - Middle State, or Tien-xia - Middle Kingdom) and its equivalents by different peoples and at different times was not the same. For the first time, these terms are mentioned in texts dating back to the Zhou Dynasty (1122 - 249 BC), and most likely to its later period - Eastern Zhou (770-249 BC). Perhaps it is the polyethnic nature of the principalities grouped around the Zhou Wang that explains the specifics of such a vague term, defining the area of Chinese culture. The Shang Dynasty (1766-1122 BC), which was overthrown by the Zhou People, seems to have been largely a mono-ethnic group. The surrounding Shang tribes, many of which were closely related to the Shans and were strongly influenced by Shang culture, may have recognized themselves as vassals of the Shang ruler for centuries, but this did not in any way become the Shans, who remained the only state-forming people who gave this state a name. At the same time, the influence of the Shang culture on its neighbors was so strong that many of them, by the end of the dynasty, probably did not differ much from the Shans themselves, but there was no merger, since such a concept completely contradicted the views of the Shans on the state and the people.

The system set up by the Zhou People (who were some of the Shang's long-time vassals) was initially quite different. It was no longer possible to build a state based on the Shan principles, declaring the Zhou people to be the only state-forming people. First, apparently, the conquered trenches were much more numerous and cultured than the conquerors. Secondly, the Zhou people largely adopted the Shan culture and were not so different from the conquered ones (apparently, at the dawn of the history of the Shang, the differences between the Shan and the surrounding tribes were more noticeable, which influenced the formation of their worldview). This facilitated the adoption of the multi-ethnic concept of the State. Third, in preparing to overthrow the Shang, the Zhou people formed a coalition of allied tribes, who, of course, demanded their share in the new state. In any case, the lands conquered by the Zhou were too large to be ruled centrally, so most of the newly annexed territories were given over to members of the Zhou ruling house of Ji and the most distinguished military leaders. Wang was stronger than any of his vassals individually, but no more than that, and over time there was a tendency to shift the balance of power in favor of appanage principalities.

Thus, the West Zhou state was more of a confederation, with the core of the Zhou ruling house, but not the Zhou people themselves, as a tribe. All those governed by rulers who recognized themselves as vassals of Wang of Chou and followed the established political etiquette were considered his subjects and, accordingly, part of the Middle State, or the Middle Kingdom. Apparently, in the most ancient cases of using the term Zhong-guo, it meant the Wang capital or the Wang domain, which fits perfectly into our concept, since it was the fact of recognizing the power of Wang and the political orientation towards his capital that were the main unifying factors of the confederation of politicians that would later become China.

The new model of the state proved to be very effective: the territories controlled by the vassals of Zhou Wang significantly exceeded the borders of the Shang state and expanded rapidly: the actual absence of a narrow ethnic component in the new concept of the state greatly facilitated the subjugation of other peoples, their involvement in the orbit of Chinese culture and assimilation. It played its part

and the fact that when distributing land, the founders of the Zhou state were especially generous in distributing territories to their colleagues on the borders with foreign peoples. These lands often still had to be conquered and subdued, but if it was possible, such a lot had every chance of rapid growth and strengthening due to the capture of the territories of the "barbarians". The inner fiefs, which were initially considered more prestigious and whose rulers were very high in the Zhou hierarchy, did not have such" room for maneuver".

During the Eastern Zhou period, when the terms in question seem to be coming into use, Wang's real power actually came to naught. This did not prevent his subjects, even formal ones, from clearly realizing that they belonged to one community - more cultural than political. It could not have been otherwise, because up to the accession of the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC), the central power in the Chinese ecumene, if it existed, was largely sacred and nominal: the Zhou wang, of course, was recognized as the Son of Heaven, the supreme ruler of the whole earth, through his good power ensuring the correct change Although he was a man of many seasons and fertile soil, his power during the Eastern Zhou period, outside the borders of the rather modest Wang domain, was more religious and magical than political in nature. At that time, the Middle Kingdom (or Middle State) was a set of polities that recognized the supreme authority of the Zhou Wang and, consequently, shared the basic values of the Zhou culture. After all, the recognition of such authority was considered the main criterion for joining civilization.

These polities were not always Chinese in ethnic composition: The Chu kingdom was inhabited by the ancestors of the modern Hmong (Miao), the inhabitants of Wu and Yue were related to the Vietam (Yue), the Qins may have originally been one of the nomadic pre-Tibetan tribes. As a matter of fact, the Zhou people were originally part of this nomadic world, but by the Eastern Zhou period, they had adopted the Shan heritage and became the legislators of the culture that was to become Chinese proper. In a number of princedoms ruled by Chinese dynasties (Qi, Yang), there were obviously significant ethnic groups among the population: the dialects of even different Chinese kingdoms were very different from each other. It is not without reason that another generalizing term for the Chinese as an ethnic community (Hua-xia  "all Xia") preserves traces of this diversity within the ethnic group, which, of course, was due to the fact that by the end of Eastern Zhou, the Chinese themselves were descendants of very many tribes that were assimilated and brought together largely due to flexible policies the Zhou people.

The authority of the Zhou (i.e., Chinese) culture was so great that non - ethnic kingdoms not only readily accepted ^it1, but also consciously joined the struggle for a place in the Zhou political hierarchy, recognizing themselves as vassals of the Zhou Wang, and their states as part of the Middle Kingdom. Those who were not included in this system were considered tribes, not states, although, of course, this was often not the case: in the Shang and West Zhou periods, there were polities among these "tribes" (for example, in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze), if they were inferior to the Chinese states in terms of development, then only slightly. At the same time, it should be understood that, for example, the Chusans, who received from Wang not just the high (according to the Zhou hierarchy) title of Tzu for their ruler, of course, did not want to become another vassal of the weak Zhou Wang, but sought to join the struggle for hegemony on the Chinese Plain, which could only be done by accepting the rules of this struggle. Even the sworn enemies of Zhou Wang, who did not even think about recognizing his suzerainty, were still strongly influenced by Chinese culture, which even then began to dominate the region, which in its size significantly exceeded the boundaries of Zhou Wang's political influence.

¹ However, in many cases (Wu, Yue, and to a lesser extent Chu), Sinicization was purely apical, and the masses of the population were not affected by Chinese culture very much.

Seeing how the rulers of non-Chinese peoples seek to embrace the fruits of Chinese enlightenment and pledge allegiance to Zhou Wang, and how yesterday's "barbarians" (i.e., non-Chinese cultural speakers) begin to write Chinese characters (one of the most important achievements of Chinese culture, which was most popular with their neighbors) and follow Chinese customs, philosophers and politicians became convinced that the subjugation of all the surrounding "barbarians" is only a matter of time and proper behavior of the ruler - the source of the power of te, which, according to this concept, softens the mores of even remote peoples and gradually prepares them to recognize the supremacy of the Zhou ruler.

However, over time, this system ceased to satisfy most of the princes who adopted the concept of the Middle State. Zhou Wang already looked too weak a figure to maintain unity. Wars have become more frequent in the Middle Kingdom. The idea of unification under one ruler became increasingly popular. As a result, in the fourth century BC, the rulers of the seven largest principalities assumed the title of Wang, which marks a break with the Zhou tradition and open claims to sole rule. In the struggle, the kingdom of Qin wins - far from being the most ethnically Chinese: initially, the Qins were apparently closely connected with the Tibet nomadic periphery of the upper Yellow River, although later they fully adopted Chinese culture. As recent epigraphic findings have shown, the late-stage" barbarism " of the Qin is nothing more than a propaganda invention of their opponents. This dynasty lasted for a relatively short time, but the Han dynasty that succeeded it was ² (206 BC).AD-220) was enough to lay the foundations for almost all the basic concepts of a single Chinese culture, within which the idea that the Middle Kingdom was a single empire ruled by a Chinese emperor occupied a rather important place.

Thus, the Zhou concept of confederation became a thing of the past, along with a variety of scripts, measurement systems, and chronicle traditions that were abolished by the first imperial edicts and replaced by a single system. However, nothing could be done with the variety of dialects that made it virtually impossible for Chinese people from different regions of the empire to communicate orally. But the most important thing was that people with very different ethnic roots, wearing different costumes, living in different natural conditions, very different in appearance and actually speaking different languages, now considered themselves Chinese, because they were subjects of the same emperor, shared a common set of cultural concepts, and had a common history, real and mythological. It is this phenomenon that has become the basis for the constant expansion of the borders of the Chinese state and the area of residence of the Chinese ethnic group-a phenomenon more cultural and political than ethnic. He also allowed China to unite every time after centuries of fragmentation and submission to foreigners: the feeling of belonging to a single ethnic group lived in the Chinese despite everything. It seems to us that this feeling, united by the empire, was rooted precisely in the order established by the Chou confederation, which is open to all. At the same time, the recognition of oneself as a community that follows common cultural concepts in a single state led to assimilation, which consolidated the Chinese ethnic group.

It was in the" melting pot " of the Han Empire and the crucible of fragmentation and enslavement by "barbarians" that the Chinese people as we know them were formed-the Han, who chose the name of the first long-lasting empire by their self-designation. The Han people included a huge number of different tribes and peoples: from closely related, assimilated under the Zhou, to the more remote Hmong and Viet, as well as various

² The name of the dynasty, which later became one of the self-names of the Chinese, was chosen from the title Han-wang received by the founder of the dynasty, Liu Bang, from Xiang Yu, the head of the anti-Qin resistance, after the victory over the Qin. The lot of Liu Bang was located in the south of the modern Prov. Shaanxi and northern Sichuan, with Hanzhong as its capital, soon Liu Bang started a war against his patron and defeated him, but the title he received from him was immortalized in the name of his dynasty.

northern nomads. Some of the latter, having fallen under the charm of Chinese culture, began to consider themselves Chinese, often adopting only writing, but not perceiving either the Chinese language or Chinese material culture. In the era of fragmentation, the very concept of the Middle Kingdom increasingly took on national features: a region inhabited by people who considered themselves Chinese and should one day be united under the rule of a single emperor. Self-awareness was an integral factor in the composition of the Chinese nation, outweighing centuries of fragmentation and foreign power, as well as differences in spoken language, ³ habits and even anthropological type, which were the result of the rapid expansion of the area and number of people who considered themselves Chinese.

The term "Chinese" (Chinese Zhongguo-ren  lit. "man of the Middle State") referred to the whole set of people of the Chinese national and cultural community, the heirs of the Zhou culture (although it seems to have been used quite rarely). In this respect, it was fundamentally different from local definitions ("Shandong", "Guangdong"), which, given the diversity and diversity of local types of Chinese, have always played (and continue to play) an important role in the self-identification of each Han. For this reason, the term has always had a rather solemn character, acquiring a particularly important role during periods of division of the country or its enslavement by foreigners. In fact, it replaced the term "Khanets", but in a higher, cultural and ideological register.

At the same time, during periods of unity (Tang, Northern Song), the national component became somewhat less significant, and the empire began to live according to its own laws, which put the loyalty of a subject or vassal and the performance of the necessary ceremonial in relation to the ruler above his nationality. During these periods, the concept of Zhong-go became more vague. However, we do not know of any cases where the term zhongguo-ren is used to refer to foreigners, even if they are subject to the central authority of the emperor who rules China.

Different territories were incorporated into the empire with different rights and under different administration. For example, many lands that are now designated as the territory of the Tang Empire in Chinese academic historical atlases (see for example: [Zhongguo lishi, vol. 5, 1996, maps 32 - 33, 50 - 51, 63 - 64]), in fact, they were either nominally vassal states or protectorates (for example, a number of territories East Turkestan and Central Asia). What modern researchers do not distinguish, the people of that time clearly distinguished: these territories, even if controlled by the Tang, were never called China and were not mixed up with the" inner", actually Chinese provinces. For example, in the " New [version] of the [dynasty]Story Tang" (Xin Tang-shu ) the actual Chinese provinces of the empire are described in tsz. 38-42 (chapters 1-5 of the section Di-li  ("Structure of the earth") [Xin Tang shu, 1986, tsz. 38-42, p. 4236-4247]), the southern, recently annexed provinces (primarily Vietnamese lands) are described in ts. 43 (A), and the degree of detail of descriptions is much lower than in the "Chinese" chapters [Hsin Tan shu, ts. 43 (A), p. 4248 - 4250]; the northern and western fringes, lands of vassal tribes and states are listed in zz. 43 (B), and the much lower degree of control of the central government over these lands is quite clearly expressed, among other things, in the fact that this chapter does not contain information on the population of a particular area (which is, in fact, the main content of the "Chinese" chapters) [Xin Tang shu, 1986, tsz. 43 (B), pp. 4250-4254].

The "Chinese Empire" - regardless of the family name or nationality of the dynasty that sat on the throne - was an example of a universalist empire, such as-

³ Many dialects of the Chinese language are so different from each other that they not only make communication between their native speakers impossible, but also, in fact, from a linguistic point of view, can be considered as separate, although related, languages.

It was like Rome or Byzantium, which perceived itself as the center of the inhabited world and believed that only it was the carrier of civilization and culture. This concept implied that the barbarian neighbors, as their cultural level increased under the good influence of Chinese civilization and the emperor personally, would become his vassals, and then become Chinese altogether. The difference was that the ancient Roman cultural concept did not initially involve the transformation of "barbarians" into Romans, although this trend increased, especially in the later period, when Roman citizenship was granted to the majority of the empire's population.

Naturally, in the sinocentric scheme, those peoples who did not recognize the authority of the Chinese emperor were considered as disobedient and could become the object of the monarch's anger. China, by definition, could not have a conversation on equal terms with any other state, since there was only one empire in the world - the Middle One (China) and the rest could only count on more or less high places in the hierarchy of its vassals. Of course, over time, it became increasingly difficult for countries that were considered Middle States to maintain the realism of this paradigm, and many vassals were registered as such only formally or without their knowledge at all. But in general, the empires managed to keep the imperial concept unchanged until the defeat of the Qing in the "opium" wars, when the economically more developed countries of the West forced it to move from international relations of the type of tribute to contractual ones.

As we can see, initially in the concepts of China and the Middle Kingdom (Chinese: Zhong-guo and Tian-xia), as well as in the very idea of empire, the ethnic component was almost not present (although the primacy of a single culture and language still led to assimilation). However, the history of China has developed in such a way that the Chinese had to not only enjoy life in the only empire of the inhabited world, but also survive the times of centuries-old enslavement by foreigners. Many territories inhabited by the Chinese were ruled by foreigners for centuries. Twice - from 1279 to 1368 and from 1644 to 1911-foreigners (Mongols and Manchus, respectively) managed to conquer China entirely, joining it to their empires.

* * *

The foreign-language names of China do not indicate either the concept of Zhong-guo or the Chinese ethnic group. The Russian word " China "and the Mongolian word" Hyatad " are derived from the Khitan (Kara-Kitai) - the name of a people, probably a Mongol group, who lived from ancient times in Northern Mongolia and Manchuria, and in the tenth century created the Liao Empire from the Pacific Ocean to East Turkestan and from Mongolia to Central China. The Indian, Arabic, Japanese, Malay and Latin names of China - "Chin", "Mahachina", "Xing", "Sina" - have a single root, and probably derive from the name of the first Qin empire. The modern word " China "in various versions can be derived from" Qin "- through the medieval" Chin and Machin", and from the name of the Manchu Qing Dynasty.

We should focus on what these "dynasties" are. The term "dynasty" in Europe and its Chinese translation have different meanings. In Europe, this is the surname of rulers from the same family, replacing one another, the existence of one dynasty does not exclude the simultaneous existence of others. Chinese "dynasty" is the name of a state based on the period of rule of one family that has adopted the Chinese concept of monarchical power, and this is a state that includes China in whole or in part, or a border state whose ruler, proclaiming himself emperor, claims the Chinese throne. These surnames were ruled by the mandate of Heaven-tien-ming  is a West Zhou concept, according to which the dynasty rules according to direct instructions from above. At the same time, such a mandate can be obtained as well as

lose: if the ruler acts improperly, he loses the favor of Heaven, and must be deposed. There were also cases when the title of emperor was taken by the ruler of a state that was obviously not strong enough to expect to conquer all of China. But the charm of the title, the most revered in the Chinese ecumenical order, made it desirable for the ruler of different peoples to possess it. In this case, the analogy with Rome, which we gave above, is appropriate.

Of course, not all such applicants were recognized by Chinese historians as real emperors and real dynasties: this right was usually reserved for ethnic Chinese. There are few exceptions: these are the Yuan and Qing dynasties, founded by the Mongols and Manchus, who managed to subdue all of China, and therefore Chinese historians had no choice but to recognize them as full-fledged dynasties, even if they were "barbaric". Two other foreign dynasties that ruled only in Northern China - the Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin-were granted dynastic status only because their official histories were written and included in the corpus of dynastic histories under the Yuan. It is unlikely that they would have been able to count on this if the Mongol rulers of China had not considered it necessary, in order to legitimize their own rule, to declare them dynasties as well. All this contained a certain conceptual contradiction: the legitimate emperor-the personification of Zhong-go-was a "barbarian".

Outside the framework of Chinese (now Han) culture, it was impossible to create a "legitimate" dynasty in China; the very problem of legitimation was purely Chinese. At the same time, of course, such legitimation was necessary for foreign invaders to keep China.

If in Europe the concept of a dynasty (as a series of rulers from the same surname) is shared with the concept and designation of a state, then in China it is combined. As a result, in traditional Chinese historiography, it is not China that is included in the countries that conquered it, but simply the dynasty is replaced in China itself. To a large extent, this was because the conquerors themselves were satisfied with this situation: first, it made it easier to control the Chinese subjects, who in each of these states made up the overwhelming majority, and secondly, as mentioned above, within the region around China, the title of emperor of the "main state in the world"was created. was the most desired one. Neither the Mongols nor the Manchus had their own concepts of world monarchy at the time of the formation of their states - more precisely, these concepts were reduced to the general provisions that other peoples should submit to them and their monarchs, who rule at the behest of God. In the form of Zhong-guo and the mandate of Heaven, the great Khans received a well-developed ready-made concept that did not contradict their own traditions.

Here you can see an analogy with the claims of various European rulers to continuity with the Roman Empire. This continuity was declared by Byzantium (which its inhabitants called the Kingdom of the Romans), the Holy Roman Empire, and Russia before the 1917 Revolution (especially in the XVI-XVII centuries, when the concept of the Third Rome was considered state-forming). Sultan Mehmet II of Turkey, who captured Constantinople, considered himself the successor of the Byzantine emperor and took the title of Kaisar-i-Rum (Caesar of Rome). Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire at various times owned Italy and some other territories of the former Roman Empire (but this, we note, does not give grounds for modern Italy to claim all the territories that were part of these empires).

* * *

The Mongol and Manchu emperors used different methods of legitimation for their subjects. For the Chinese, they were the successors of "Chinese dynasties," and for their own peoples, they were the successors of the founders of their states.

The grandson of Genghis Khan, the great Khan Kublai, issued a decree in 1264, according to which the Great Mongol State (Their Mongol uls) was henceforth called in the Chinese manner the Great Original (Da Yuan). The text of the decree did not specify that it was valid only on the territory of China [Yuan shi, tsz. 4, pp. 7245-7246], but it was written in Chinese and, apparently, was not communicated to other Genghisid states that were formally part of the Mongol Empire and were subordinate to Kublai. Nevertheless, the decree of the great Khan was by definition binding on all his subjects. Thus, if we are completely consistent in identifying the Yuan state and China, then we should recognize that the borders of China at that time extended to Hungary and Palestine, and the entire Great Mongol Empire (including Russia) is China.

The Mongol khans of other uluses recognized the seniority of the great khans according to the old Mongolian tradition - on the basis of succession from Genghis Khan. The Chinese also recognized the power of the Yuan emperors as another Zhong-Guo dynasty, which by the will of Heaven overthrew the previous Ming dynasty. Kublai gave Chinese temple names to his predecessors, and so did his ruling descendants. At the same time, all Yuan emperors had Mongol names - just as the Manchu emperors had Manchu and Mongolian names along with Chinese ones. Thus, the Mongol concept of the Great State of Genghis Khan now overlapped with the Chinese concept of the Middle State. At the same time, the Mongols only in the last decades of their rule began to perceive Chinese culture. But Sinicization was clearly not enough to make the Mongols Chinese. Despite its name, the Yuan Empire remained a Mongol state that included conquered China to the very end, even though its capital was located in China.

The legitimation of the Qing Dynasty, which also claimed universal power, was similar. It legitimized itself in the eyes of the Chinese as another Zhong-Guo dynasty, ruling under the mandate of Heaven, in the eyes of the Mongols - as the dynasty of Genghis Khan's successors, and in the eyes of the Tibetans - as the patrons of the Buddhist religion. At the same time, the Mongols called the Qing Empire not China, but Manj Chin uls (the Manchu State of Qing)⁴, while China continued to be called Hyatad, that is, they distinguished the names of the entire state and one of its parts. However, from the Confucian point of view, the Mongol and Manchu states are "barbarian" states (to stop being so, they would have to become Chinese). Then it turns out that the Yuan and Qing empires as a whole are not China.

All states that included the territory of China in part or in full were officially called not China, but by dynasties. There was no need to call them China (Zhong-guo), because from the Confucian point of view, no other states of comparable level, i.e. empires, existed in the world. The only thing that mattered was which dynasty ruled in this single empire, and it was necessary to indicate this. An indirect confirmation of this is the foreign names of China, derived from the names of the Qin or Qing dynasties. The Qing Empire was called China in its official documents with the states of the West and Russia only on the initiative of these states. But can the Qing Empire be equated with China?

The Qing Empire was created by the Manchus (a people ethnically and culturally distant from the Han Chinese) outside of China. The fact that Manchuria is now a northeastern part of China does not mean that it has always been part of China. Manchuria, along with the Mongols-

⁴ The main meaning of the Mongolian word uls is state (it should not be forgotten that in nomadic cultures, unlike sedentary ones, the concept of "state" is primarily associated with the people, and not with a specific territory or borders). Later, under Chinese influence, the Mongols began to use it to refer to the Chinese "dynasty" (chao ). However, initially in the Mongolian language, apparently, there was no unambiguous equivalent of the European term "dynasty"; the closest word to it is ugsaa, one of the main meanings of which is"royal family".

China, Tibet and East Turkestan, was one of the most important places for the formation of non-Chinese states, many of which (for example, the Jurchen Jin Empire) successfully fought with China. Abahai, or Huntaiji, the founder of the Qing state, in order to increase his status among his neighbors and obtain a Chinese title, recognized his dependence on China, although he was de facto independent. Later, he gave his state the name Qing (Pure) - as opposed to the neighboring Chinese Ming (Light). For some time, the Qing Empire existed simultaneously with China - the Ming Empire. The Han called the Manchus Guan-wai du ren  - "people outside the outposts", i.e. non-Chinese.

The Manchus, having captured Beijing in 1644, placed Fulin (the motto of the Shunzhi rule), the emperor of the already existing Qing state, on the Chinese throne. Then they gradually took over the rest of China. Prior to this, the emperors of the Ming Dynasty (the so-called Southern Ming) continued to control parts of China until 1662. During the Manchu conquest of China, more than 10 million people were killed, many millions died of epidemics, hunger and deprivation, many became slaves or were driven from their homes. The conquest of Northern China was relatively peaceful, as the Manchus were perceived by many as saviors from the chaos and outrages of the armies of the rebellious peasants. However, the southern Chinese (who put up a fierce resistance) were treated as "resisting barbarians" and killed hundreds of thousands during the conquest. And this was done mainly by those troops of the Ming Empire who went over to the side of the Manchus. Consequently, now " barbarians "were understood as Chinese - those people of Zhong-guo who resist the" saviors "- foreigners, however, who managed to legitimize themselves by founding a"new dynasty".

The Chinese did not stop trying to break away from the Qing Empire. In the first 18 years after the conquest alone, more than a hundred anti-Manchu uprisings took place. The Qing Dynasty applied many discriminatory measures against the Chinese, designed to preserve the dominant position of the Manchus and prevent their assimilation. In the Qing Empire, the deep division between the Manchus and Han remained virtually until the end of the monarchy.

Both the Mongols who ruled, and later the Manchus, and the conquered Chinese actually clearly distinguished between "China proper" and the "barbarian" parts of both empires that were not China. This can be seen, for example, from the statements of the first Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, who overthrew the Yuan Dynasty, as well as Sun Yat-sen, who overthrew the Qing Dynasty.

Zhu Yuanzhang's manifesto, in particular, stated: "In the recent past, the Hu barbarians [Mongols] stole [lands] Huaxia [Chinese] and dominated them for more than 100 years. Who among those who have reason can restrain their anger when the headdress and shoes change places? <...> I founded the main state in the Middle Kingdom. He called it Da Ming (Great Bright)" (quoted in [Martynov, 1978, p. 48]).

The declaration of the Tongmen-hui Revolutionary Union ("United League"), headed by Sun Yat-sen, in 1905 set out the goals of the revolution and the future government of the country: "From the very foundation of the Chinese state, it has always been ruled by the Chinese, and although it happened that foreigners seized power, our ancestors always found the strength to expel them, to revive the glory of the Motherland and preserve it for posterity. Even today, the Han proclamation of the struggle for justice and the expulsion of the northern barbarians is a continuation of the glorious feats of their ancestors. < ... > Those whom we now call the Manchus go back to the eastern barbarian tribes who lived behind the border fortresses. During the Ming dynasty, they often disturbed the borders of our state. Later, taking advantage of the turmoil in China, they invaded its borders, destroyed our Chinese state, seized power and forced us, the Han, to become their slaves. < ...> China should be the state of the Chinese, and it should be ruled by the Chinese. After the expulsion of the Manchus, our national state will be reborn

in all its glory" [Sun Yat-sen, 1964, pp. 113-117]. Some revolutionaries even referred to the Xinhai Revolution as a "racial revolution," dismissing social issues. In this they followed the traditions of the secret societies that had fought the Manchus for centuries under the slogan "Overthrow the Qing, restore the Ming".

Upon assuming the post of interim President of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen declared the need to merge the lands of all the peoples of China into one state, and the peoples- "into one family" [Sun Yat - sen, 1985, p.121-122]. When Sun Yat-sen abdicated six weeks after taking office in favor of Yuan Shikai, he performed the renunciation ceremony at the tomb of Zhu Yuanzhang [Sidikhmenov, pp. 288-289]. His message was read out, which spoke about the establishment of a free republic in China and the destruction of the enemy of the nation, that is, the Manchus. Sun Yat-sen appealed to the spirit of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, praising him for restoring the Chinese state and expelling the northern barbarians-the cruel and savage Manchus, who were responsible for the destruction of Chinese patriots, desecrating Chinese rivers and hills, forgetting the memory of ancient sages, trading sacred Chinese land, etc. states.

All these statements, as well as the long wars of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs with the Chinese that marked the fall of the Qing Empire, can be considered an admission that neither the Ming Empire of China nor the Republic of China had continuity with the Yuan and Qing empires, and the latter two were not identical with China. The concept of "Chinese" was identified with the concept of "Khanate" - in full accordance with the traditional concept of China, which did not include Tibet, Mongolia, or East Turkestan. Consequently, despite the recognition of the Yuan and Qing dynasties as legitimate by official Confucian historiography, neither the Mongols nor the Manchus were considered Chinese - unlike the ethnic groups that gave rise to China in ancient times (see above). In the Ming Empire, an active policy was pursued to eliminate Mongol influence and assimilate the Mongols - that is, to turn them into Chinese, "the people of Zhong-guo". However, the" foreign dynasties", the Yuan and Qing, pursued the opposite policy. Let's briefly consider it on the example of the Qing dynasty.

The Mongols understood submission to the Manchu Emperor not as entering China, but as a vassal oath to the emperor of their kindred Manchus. Empress Bumbutai (Xiaozhuang), the mother of Emperor Fulin, came from the Borjigin family, i.e., was a relative of Genghis Khan. Some other Qing emperors also had wives from this lineage. The Mongol tradition legitimized Manchu rule through consanguinity, i.e., continuity from the Yuan dynasty. At the same time, most representatives of Old Mongolian historiography were of the opinion that the lineage of the Mongol, Chinese (i.e., Ming), and Manchu emperors was unified (Bira, 1960, p.55). There was a legend about the origin of the third Ming emperor Zhu-di (the motto of the government is Yun-le, 1403-1424) and, accordingly, his successors from Togon-Temur Khan-the Yuan emperor, who ended the Mongol rule of China. The chronicle "Erdeniin tol" tried to link the origin of the Qing Dynasty with one of the closest associates or descendants of Genghis Khan. In the Bolor Tol, it is said that the Manchu khan became the Mongol Khan because he took possession of the seal of Genghis, given to him by two wives of Ligden Khan. According to the "Erdeniin erihe", the Manchu khan found a Jade jewel-the seal of the Yuan emperors, so he was given the honorary title of bogdykhan (emperor), and the name of the years of his reign was changed. Based, no doubt, on information from the Mongols, members of Lord Macartney's embassy at the end of the eighteenth century reported that the Qing dynasty was created by descendants of princes who were expelled from the Chinese Empire and intermarried with Manchus [Staunton, 1804, p. 104].

All this was reinforced by the special position of the Mongols in the empire, the kinship ties of the ruling dynasty with them, and the patronage of Tibetan Buddhism. Every Qing emperor had Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese names. The most important decrees were issued in Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian.

The Manchu Khan Abakhai created the Mongol Chamber to govern Eastern Mongolia in 1636, one of the main functions of which was to monitor the order of granting titles to Mongol feudal lords who declared loyalty. Later it was transformed into the Lifanyuan Chamber of External Relations and also regulated relations with Tibetans and Russians. Since 1627, special legal provisions were adopted for the Mongols. They were based on the legal customs of the Mongols, formed in a legislative form. Later, they were included in the general legislative code "Code of the Chamber of External Relations" ("Lifanyuan Zeli"). In its four editions, the general structure and subject matter of the sections did not change.

In the" Code", Mongolia and Tibet were considered as "regions outside of China", which had separate legislation [Lipovtsov, 1828, vol. 1]. Here are just some measures to preserve their original system: merchants could travel to Mongolia only with permits and had to return on time; all Chinese from the inner regions of China were forbidden to cross the border of Mongolia and plow; in debt transactions between the Mongols and the Chinese, it was forbidden to take and pledge land; Chinese grain farmers, who had long lived in the 4 departments of Khortsin and Tumet, were obliged to pay land plots to the Mongols. money, and the arrival of new farmers from China was forbidden; for robberies and robberies in Mongolia, the Mongols were judged according to Mongolian laws, the Chinese - according to Chinese. Regulations prohibiting Chinese people from settling in Mongolia were issued several times in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Manchu rulers have established religious contacts with Tibet since Nurhaci's time. They also wanted to use the Dalai Lama's authority to subdue the Mongols. The Dalai Lama was interested in finding strong patrons of the Teaching in them. Gradually extending their influence to Tibet, the Qing emperors used a pre - existing model: a mentor-patron relationship with the Dalai Lamas, although in a slightly different form than the similar relationship of the heads of the Sakya school with the Yuan emperors. This relationship was not a fiction used by Tibetans. The Qing period is the "golden age" of Tibetan Buddhism. The Qing Dynasty followed Tibetan Buddhism as well as Confucianism. Eyewitnesses even believed that "the Emperor of China is the high priest of all religions professed within the state" (Timkovsky, 1824, pp. 39-40).

In Tibet, as in Mongolia, civil strife practically ceased during this period, the country was controlled by its own rulers, and the influence of the imperial administration, although growing, was not greater than in a number of other cases of dependence of one state on another. The legislation of Lifanyuan for Tibet was shorter and regulated mainly the import of "tribute" to the emperor, the approval of reborn lamas, the collection of taxes that went to the treasury of Tibet, etc. [Lipovtsov, 1828, vol. 2, pp. 191-277].

Until almost the end of the Qing Empire, its rulers were concerned not with Sinicizing the Mongols and Tibetans (as well as the Manchus), but, on the contrary, with preserving their identity - in fact, with ensuring that Mongolia, Tibet, and Manchuria did not become China. This did not prevent them, for example, from passing laws prohibiting the sale of firearms to Mongols and Tibetans. The Manchu policy was quite pragmatic: they did not want to Sinicize these peoples because they saw them (especially the Mongols) as a pillar of their power in the event of Chinese uprisings, but they also feared their own uprisings. One way or another, the Manchus clearly separated their subjects of different nationalities. Consequently, the world-building policy of the Qing Dynasty contradicted the traditional Chinese model: the countries of the" barbarians " did not try to transform the Chinese people.

to China, and to"cultivate" them. On the other hand, the entire empire was designated as China (at least in relations with the West) - while some of its subjects did not consider their lands as China. This shows that the concept of China was used by the Manchus only where it was required by political expediency and was not a state ideology (in contrast, for example, to the Han Ming Empire).

As a result of the expansion of Western countries and the penetration of nationalist ideas into China, which increasingly inspired opponents of the Manchu monarchy, as well as the growing ferment on the national outskirts, coupled with the progressive assimilation of the Manchus themselves, the Cixi regime in Beijing at the beginning of the XX century.headed for the transformation of Mongolia and Tibet into Chinese provinces (in fact - in colonies). In carrying out these measures, the Cixi regime destroyed the Qing dynasty's old ties with Mongolia and Tibet. The answer was the declaration of independence of these countries and the national liberation movement. Unlike the peoples of the Zhou State, the Tibetans and Mongols did not consider themselves Chinese peoples. Neither the Chinese themselves nor the rulers of the Qing Empire considered them Chinese. These territories did not become China by the time the Qing Empire collapsed, either ethnically or culturally. In terms of governance, Mongolia and Tibet were related only to the Manchu dynasty, but not to China and the Chinese. This has been preserved in the Mongolian and Tibetan understanding of history to the present day.

In the era of submission to foreigners and, especially, the collapse of the rule of the emperors under the mandate of Heaven, the concept of the Middle State for the Chinese increasingly acquired a national and cultural character. It was a land inhabited by them, the bearers of Chinese culture, who opposed themselves to the invaders and believed in the rebirth of China under Chinese rule. This idea was at the heart of the Chinese (Han) national movement. By the beginning of the 20th century, nationalism had become a key driving force in international relations, as the traditional sinocentric system collapsed as the Qing Empire clashed with Western powers [Chen Zhimin, 2005, p. 52-53].

In 1912, at the direction of Yuan Shikai, Empress Regent Longyu, on behalf of the infant Emperor Pu Yi, issued a decree that the five nationalities (Manchus, Han, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans) should become the Great Republic of China, fully govern the country, and she and the emperor would resign from office and live in private life. Yuan Shikai was charged with forming a provisional republican government. On February 12, Pu Yi's abdication was announced. This document can hardly be considered legitimate: the function of the regent is temporary rule on behalf of the minor monarch, and not the abolition of the monarchy. The Republic of China and the PRC did not declare their continuity with the Qing Empire.

* * *

In the early months of the Republic of China, there was a debate among the Han establishment about the"five nationalities". The controversy concerned the concepts of Great China (Da Zhong-guo zhu-yi) and Indigenous China (Ben-bu Zhong-guo ). Supporters of the first principle recognized the Han Chinese as the only people capable of state-building. Supporters of the latter were in favor of the independence of the" border " peoples in order to secure the external borders of the republic thanks to them. The prevailing view was that the Mongols, Tibetans, and Turks should be included in the republic so that they could protect Inner China, but not create their own countries that could use foreign forces [Esherick, p. 244].

Accordingly, Han nationalists adopted the concept of a "Chinese nation" (Chinese: Zhonghua Minzu ), consisting of "five nationalities": Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims). For the first time in history, the term "Chinese" (Zhongguo-ren) was used to refer not only to Han Chinese, but also to Chinese people.

in general, for all citizens of this new republic. This concept has become the backbone for reasoning about a certain always-existing community of peoples, whose representatives are now citizens of China. At the same time, since this term is primarily associated with "China proper" and the Han Chinese (see above), the primacy of the latter in this community is unobtrusively emphasized, which is quite consistent with the official ideology of the modern Chinese state. The constant designation of" national minorities "as" Chinese " contributes to their assimilation, although this is not declared.

Of course, the fact that Tibetans, Mongols, and Turks are now Chinese citizens does not mean that they have always been part of the Zhongguo-ren community and are therefore destined to join the "family of nationalities" of the PRC. Moreover, this very concept was originally associated with the Han Chinese and their culture, and the inclusion of any other peoples in it only by the fact of having a Chinese passport does not mean that they became Chinese. For many centuries, the Chinese people have included various ethnic groups, but this inclusion has always implied their voluntary acceptance of the basic concepts of Chinese culture, the desire to become Chinese. Modern "national minorities of China" did not show such a desire and do not show it. On the contrary, they do everything possible to preserve their own ethno-cultural concepts. Therefore, there is no single community of zhongguo-ren or zhong-hua mingzu that includes all Chinese citizens. These terms can only be attributed to the Han nation in the process of assimilation of "national minorities".

Thus, after the fall of the monarchy, the concept of China was interpreted from an external (European) point of view: as a national state with internationally recognized borders and contractual relations-in contradiction with the traditional understanding (see above). Nevertheless, the borders of this state included all the lands that were part of the lost empire. This was contrary to both the new and old concepts of China.

An appropriate example for the analogy is the Ottoman Empire. Just as the Qing (Manchu) Empire captured the Ming (Chinese) Empire, the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire absorbed the Byzantine (Greek) Empire. Both the Manchus and the Ottoman Turks made their capitals the capitals of the captured states (Beijing and Constantinople, respectively). The Manchus extended their power to Mongolia, Dzungaria, and East Turkestan, and their influence to Tibet and other territories. The Turks annexed the Balkan countries, Egypt, Iraq, etc., and extended their influence to Algeria, Arabia, Moldova, and other countries. Both were vassal and dependent states. Both empires collapsed, and both revolutions took place. As a result of the national liberation movement, the national states whose empires had once been invaded were separated from them: Greece and China. Greece has regained part of the original Greek lands and does not claim the rest of the" heritage " of the Ottoman Empire - for example, Yemen or Moldova; it does not consider that the Arabs and Moldovans have been connected with the Greeks in "one family" from time immemorial, and now they form one "Roman nation". But in this situation, China declares Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkestan to be its integral parts, and their inhabitants to be Chinese, who have always been united in a "single family" with the Han Chinese.

* * *

The Mongols, Tibetans, and Turks did not participate in the development of the Chinese nation's doctrine or in the Xinhai Revolution. Their revolts were not aimed at creating the Republic of China, but at creating their own independent states. The Mongols, Tibetans, and Turks did not regard their lands as China, nor themselves as Chinese or citizens of China, either in the old or new sense of Zhong - guo.

In this sense, the arguments made by the monarchs of Mongolia and Tibet, Bogdo - gegen VIII and the Dalai Lama XIII, respectively, are indicative. Bogdo-gegen

In March 1912, he explained in a message to Yuan Shikai that Mongolia "was never subordinated to China, but only recognized the power of the Qing dynasty, which has now fallen, and, therefore, the connection of the Mongols with China was interrupted "(cit. by: [Belov, 1999, p. 60]). In 1913, he wrote to the president: as a result of the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, two separate states were formed - Mongolia and China, and "we cannot have claims to each other. The fact that you are at the head of the Chinese people, and I am at the head of the Mongol people, is the most correct solution of the issue, and this, it seems, does not give grounds for inciting mutual hostility." by: [Belov, 1999, p. 103]). In other telegrams to Yuan Shikai, he cited the example of America breaking away from the British Empire; pointed out that the Mongols and Chinese have nothing in common in their faith, language, customs, and way of life; refuted the president's statements that the Qing Dynasty "ceded its supreme rights to the Chinese people" (Belov, 1999, p. 102). Korostovets, 2004, pp. 281-282]. In 1915, Bogdo-gegen refused to accept an investiture from the Chinese president. He indicated in a telegram that in the future he would refuse such grants from China altogether [Tang, 1959, p. 356-357].

Yuan Shikai sent a telegram to the 13th Dalai Lama in which he apologized for the excesses of the Chinese military and reported on the" restoration " of the Dalai Lama to his dignity [Shakabpa, 2003, p. 259]. The hierarch replied that he had not asked for this, since he himself intended to exercise power in Tibet. In one of his telegrams, Yuan Shikai wrote to Bogdo-gegen and the Dalai Lama that China, Mongolia, and Tibet had long been "one family" and that the link between Mongolia and Tibet and China had been destroyed by the oppression of the Qing rulers, and now it was time to "eradicate the abuses" of the Manchus [Information on States, 1912, p. 3]. Both hierarchs ignored this appeal.

Recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and the formation of a monarchical and then republican State of Mongolia on the basis of this would have been impossible without the external support of the Russian Empire, the actions of Baron R. F. Ungern, and then the direct intervention of the USSR. The subsequent confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the unwillingness of the great powers to aggravate relations with China eventually led to the inclusion of Inner Mongolia, Tibet and East Turkestan in the PRC.

* * *

So, if we look at history outside of the sinocentric model, we can conclude that the concept of one China (united or fragmented), which was ruled by different dynasties for many centuries, but never became part of other states, is a historical myth. China (and similar terms) referred to different states, although this concept has always remained connected with the area of origin and habitat of the Han Huaxia and their ancestors. The official names, ethno-cultural concepts, and borders of these states were different. The very concept of "China" was used under different circumstances for different purposes: national liberation of the Chinese people from enslavement by foreigners; justification of internecine struggle and/ or centralization of the state; justification of the rights of a foreign state to captured China; creation of a world empire and subjugation of other states.

The Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing should not be considered as "dynasties of China created by national minorities", but as multinational empires created by non-Chinese peoples: Khitan, Jurchen, Mongol, and Manchu, to which conquered China (or part of it)belongs was fully or partially attached. In the last of these empires, the Qing Empire, the rulers used different tools to influence different peoples: for the Mongols, they proclaimed their continuity with the house of Genghis Khan, for the Chinese - the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, for the Tibetans-the "mentor-patron" relationship. None of these concepts should be given priority, as

each nation considered itself bound by one of them. The subsequent Republican leadership of China did not inherit any of them.

The Republic of China and the PRC have no continuity from the Qing Empire destroyed by the Xinhai Revolution. The modern concept of China as a single nation-state is related to previous concepts of China only by the habitat of the Han Chinese. In order to justify their "rights" to Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkestan, which were never China, Han nationalists developed and in the early twentieth century adopted a new concept - "one Chinese nation", which was later inherited by the PRC. The concept of a "unified Chinese nation" that has included Mongols, Tibetans, and Turks almost since the Middle Ages is another historical myth.

The world powers that recognized the emergence of new states in place of the crumbling European empires did not recognize the collapse of the Qing Empire. They agreed that the above-mentioned territories (with the exception of the modern State of Mongolia) are China. Political and economic expediency and uncritical perception of historical myths about the Middle State play a crucial role in this.

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Mongolian Tibetan-language historical literature (XVII-XIX). Ulaanbaatar, 1960.

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