Key words: China, national minorities, Tibet, XUAR

T. V. LAZAREVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

National politics in China has gone through a long, zigzag path of development. Over the 60 years of the PRC's existence, in the course of resolving the national issue, forms have been found that ensure the preservation and strengthening of the country's territorial integrity (national autonomy areas have been created in places where non-Chinese people live), improve interethnic relations, and develop the economy and culture in national regions.

Mistakes and miscalculations were also made to resolve the national issue in the PRC, which had a very negative impact on national relations and overall stability in the country. However, these mistakes are being overcome, and recent years have been a very constructive period in the development of nation-building. Although China's experience in dealing with the national issue is flawed, it has many positive aspects.

At the same time, there are manifestations of separatism in such regions as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. The actions of separatist forces in China and abroad are regarded as a serious threat to the unity of the state and the cohesion of nationalities, which can destabilize the situation.

MAJOR PAIN POINTS: TIBET...

It is necessary to note the politicized approach to the current situation in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions, both from the Chinese side and from Western countries.

Naturally, when covering and analyzing the actions of the separatists, Chinese leaders pursue their own internal political interests - preserving the stability and territorial integrity of the country.

At the same time, the PRC believes that some Western countries, led by the United States, under the pretext of caring about "democracy" and "human rights" interfere in the internal affairs of multinational states. This kind of destabilizing activity is also being conducted in relation to the PRC. It is aimed, ultimately, at splitting the territorial integrity of China, creating independent states - Tibet and East Turkestan.

According to the Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Ethnic Affairs, Mou Benli, the forces of national separatism in China are colluding with hostile forces operating abroad, trying to give an international dimension to the existing national problems in China.¹

An example is the March 2008 riots organized by the Dalai Lama's supporters in Lhasa, which marked another anniversary of the failed lama uprising in 1959 and resulted in pogroms, violence and bloodshed.

Riots of this magnitude have not been seen in Tibet for more than 20 years. The actions were prepared and planned in advance, as evidenced by the caches of weapons found as a result of operational search operations. There was a call for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Everyone remembers with what precautions and under what heavy security athletes carrying the torch of the 2008 Olympic Games moved around a number of countries. Supporters of Tibetan emigration managed to attract the attention of the international community to their actions.

Unlike Xinjiang and other national administrative divisions in Tibet, almost 95% of the population is still Tibetans. According to people who visited the area, they persist in calling themselves Tibetans, but not "Chinese" - members of the so-called united Chinese nation (Zhonghua Minzu), which Chinese propaganda has been trying to convince them of for 5 decades.

Lamaism, a form of Buddhism professed by literally the entire Tibetan population, has become an organic part of the culture of the Tibetan people, and has left its mark on all aspects of their everyday life and national art. The destruction of once-numerous Tibetan monasteries has increased the hostility of Tibetans towards the Chinese.

The Tibetan question as a problem of Tibetan emigration arose in 1959 after the Dalai Lama XIV and about 80 thousand Tibetans fled to India.

The separatist influence in Tibet is based largely on the Dalai Lama's group, which relies on the support of major Western states with strong anti-Chinese sentiment. Regular foreign visits of the Dalai Lama, you-

Perhaps China's most turbulent region, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

presentations at international symposia and forums that exploit the theme of Tibet contribute to its image as a champion of independence.

The Chinese leadership understands that the Dalai Lama enjoys unquestionable authority as a cleric among the population of Tibet.

From the very beginning, China's attitude to the "Tibetan issue" was and remains unequivocal. Beijing wants to stop any political activity of the emigration, which has a pronounced anti-Chinese character, and return the Dalai Lama to his homeland.

Since the Dalai Lama's flight, China's position towards Tibet has changed repeatedly, and the Dalai Lama's demands to the Chinese government regarding the status of Tibet have also changed.

At present, as a result of lengthy negotiations, the Dalai Lama is offered to return to his homeland, provided that he renounces all requirements related to national issues, including the legal status of Tibet and ways of its further development.

Beijing sees the Dalai Lama not as a "Dalai Lama", but as an ordinary citizen of the People's Republic of China, who will be banned from holding any positions in Tibet. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees are allowed to return only because they are "compatriots". It was also stated that "China guarantees the Dalai Lama three statuses-a religious figure, a representative of the upper class and a person who left his name in the history of Tibet. He only needs to love his homeland, and he will get a position equal to or close to the status ... The Panchen Lamas."

The Chinese leadership has consistently stressed its willingness to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Thus, in 2008 alone, at the request of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese leadership held three consultations with his representatives. For his part, the Dalai Lama insists that all he wants for Tibet is greater autonomy within China. The Dalai Lama proposes to fight for his demands in a nonviolent way.

...AND THE UIGHUR MUSLIMS OF XINJIANG

Although the influence of separatist forces in Xinjiang in the international arena is not as great as that of the Dalai Lama, it is they who are most active, quite effectively spreading among the local population the ideas of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism heated from outside.

Xinjiang is populated mainly by ethnic groups professing Islam. These are mainly Turkic-speaking peoples - Uyghurs (more than 8.3 million people), Kazakhs (more than 1.2 million people) and small numbers of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tatars. The Xinjiang Tajiks and Hui (Dungans) belonging to other ethno-linguistic communities are also Muslims.

Xinjiang is characterized by a constant significant influx of Chinese (Han) population. If at the time of the formation of the PRC, the share of the Han population in Xinjiang Province was approximately 5%, by now it has exceeded 40%. The indigenous non-Chinese population of the region sees this as a threat to the preservation of their own identity, infringement of their vital interests.

Since the establishment of the PRC, the indigenous population of Xinjiang has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the formal nature of the autonomy granted to this province, which would have allowed it to be fully autonomous.-

* Dungan (self-named Hui) - a small ethnic group living in the Ningxia-Hui and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions and in Gansu Province (China), as well as in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Sunni Muslims. The Dungan language belongs to the Sino-Tibetan language family. ed.).

LA was transformed into the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

The peoples of Xinjiang have always gravitated towards the form of national-state structure that existed in the neighboring Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In Xinjiang, there are constant demands to replace the system of regional national autonomy with a federation system.

The situation worsened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of several independent states in the neighborhood, in which a significant part of the population is Muslim, which increased separatist tendencies among Uighur Muslims. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

The declaration of independence by the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, where the indigenous population professes Islam, undoubtedly inspired the Chinese leadership with concerns about the activation of Muslim and pan-Turkic forces in Xinjiang. In China, in particular, they fear any rapprochement between the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Muslim circles and local separatist forces that advocate the revival of Uighur statehood.

In this regard, China has enlisted the support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries in its fight against Uighur separatist organizations both on its own territory and abroad.

In Xinjiang, national separatism is merging with religious extremism, and its adherents are committing terrorist acts under the banner of jihad and anti-Han slogans.

According to Li Dezhu, Chairman of the State Committee for Ethnic Affairs of the People's Republic of China, wherever the "three hostile forces" (national separatism, terrorism and religious extremism) make themselves felt, they always oppose the leadership of the CPC, seek to split the country and represent a common enemy of the entire multi-ethnic people of China. The national question and religion are only a pretext for these forces to carry out their subversive activities.²

According to the Chinese authorities, the subversive forces that enjoy support from abroad, while promoting the idea of an "independent East Turkestan" in every possible way, aim to separate Xinjiang from China. In recent years, the actions of Uyghur separatists, incited from outside, have become increasingly violent, including terrorist acts.

The idea of an "independent East Turkestan" is actively exploited by Uyghur supporters of separatism both in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region itself and outside the PRC.

The emergence of Islamist and pan-Turkist ideas in Xinjiang is attributed by the Chinese researcher Yang Fazhen to the end of the 19th century. It was then that these trends began to spread among the Xinjiang separatists, resulting in the idea of East Turkestan as an independent region - the so-called East Turkestan Islamic Republic. It has become the slogan of foreign and domestic hostile forces that have tried in the past and are trying today to separate Xinjiang from China. According to Yang Fazhen, the ideas of Islamic religious extremism, which began to spread in the world since the 70s of the XX century. in connection with the Islamic revolution in Iran, began to penetrate Xinjiang from the beginning of the 90s.

Currently, there are more than 70 organizations in 15 countries that promote the idea of "East Turkestan" and its secession from China. The vast majority of them were created in the late 90s of the XX-early XXI centuries. In addition to the constant incitement and support of terrorist activities in Xinjiang, these organizations, according to the Chinese authorities, are engaged in promoting the idea of independence of "East Turkestan" abroad, in an effort to make the country more independent.

Table 1

Source: Zhongguo mingzu, 2003, No. 9, p. 6.

this problem has an international character3.

During the years of the PRC's existence, unrest on national and religious grounds has repeatedly flared up in Xinjiang, there have been repeated but small-scale riots and riots, bloody clashes between ethnic Chinese (Han) and Muslim Uighurs. The local authorities suppressed the indigenous population's protests with armed force. As noted by the Xinhua news agency, Chinese law enforcement agencies constantly carry out measures to destroy the terrorists of the separatist "Islamic Movement of East Turkestan"and their bases in Xinjiang. According to repeated statements by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, many Xinjiang extremists were trained in Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.

In 2002, the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan was added to the United Nations list of international terrorist organizations.

Mass riots occurred in XUAR in July 2009. As a result of beatings, robberies, arson and pogroms, 197 people were killed. According to the Xinhua news agency, an indirect reason for the riots was a conflict between Uyghurs and Han Chinese at a toy manufacturing facility in Shaoguan City, Guangdong Province, which was inspired and controlled via the Internet by the "World Uyghur Congress".

The Chinese leadership, while recognizing that the fight against national separatism will be long and difficult, expresses confidence in gradually overcoming this dangerous phenomenon.

HAN AND NON-HAN PEOPLE

The situation in the XUAR, as in Tibet, is atypical for other regional national autonomies, in which the national policy of the People's Republic of China generally benefits

Table 2

Source: Wang Can. Nationalities of China. Beijing, 2004, p. 23.

* This refers to Gaoshan in mainland China, excluding the Gaoshanese in Taiwan.

** The rest of the Tibetans live outside the TAR, mostly in the prov. Yunan, Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu.

quite positive results.

China is one of the largest multinational countries in the world. In addition to the Han Chinese themselves, which account for more than 90% of the population, there are 55 non-Han nationalities registered in the PRC (in fact, there are even more of them, since the official list does not include a number of small ethnic groups that mainly inhabit Southwestern China). According to the 5th Census of 2000, 106 million 430 thousand non-Han people live in the country, which is 8.41% of the total population of the PRC (see Table 1).

The Han Chinese are not only a numerically dominant nation, they have historically secured a dominant political, economic, and cultural role in the country. For this reason, the relations between Han and non-Han nationalities play an important role in national relations.

The Han Chinese share is about 4 to 5% in Tibet, more than 40% in Xinjiang, and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Guangxi Zhuang and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions already exceeds the number of indigenous people. The ratio of Han and non-Han populations in the national autonomous regions is shown in Table 2.

The peculiarity of the national situation in the PRC as a multinational state is determined by other factors.

One of them is related to the peculiarities of the geographical and territorial distribution of the non-Han population, which lives in areas that make up more than 60% of the area of China. National districts are located mainly in the western part of the country, as well as on the northern and southern outskirts.

The territory of compact residence of small ethnic groups is usually characterized by vastness and sparsely populated. Compared to the coastal areas in eastern China, the population density is very low. So, in Tibet, it is about 2 people per 1 square kilometer, in Qinghai and Xinjiang-no more than 10, and in the provinces of Jiangsu and Shandong, located in the eastern part of the country - up to 500-600 people.

Equally important is the presence of rich natural resources in the territories inhabited by non-Han people. For example, Xinjiang's oil and natural gas reserves account for more than a third of the country's total. Inner Mongolia is rich in forests, iron ore, and pastures. In the course of the expression Yang mei tu qi, which is consonant with the Chinese phrase "perk up". In fact, the hieroglyphs mean "goat's down", "coal", "rare earth elements", and "natural gas", respectively.

Many large rivers originate in areas where small ethnic groups live. National areas account for 50% of the country's forest and water resources.

The culture, customs, and religions of the Chinese people, along with the natural landscape, attract a huge number of tourists from all over the world. The tourism sector developed in recent years makes a significant contribution to the economy.

FROM SELF-DETERMINATION TO REGIONAL AUTONOMY

The basis of the national policy implemented in the PRC is determined by the Communist Party of China.

Approaches to the national problem have repeatedly changed. Thus, before the formation of the PRC, the CCP defended the slogan of self-determination of nations, seeking to attract non-Han peoples to its side. At the same time, it was assumed that the national-state structure of China would be federal.

After the formation of the PRC, the slogan of self-determination of nations was removed. The solution of the national problem began to be implemented on the basis of regional national autonomy as an administrative unit.-

self-government of non-Chinese nationalities within the framework of a unitary state.

The normative act "Basic Principles for the Implementation of Regional National Autonomy in the People's Republic of China" (1952)played ^an important role in the formation of this institution4.

He established that the regions of national autonomy are an integral part of the PRC. District administrative bodies, referred to in the PRC as self-governing bodies, operate under a single central authority, and locally obey the instructions of the higher-level people's Government (executive branch).

The self-governing bodies are the Assemblies of People's Representatives (SNPs) and the People's Governments of autonomous regions, autonomous districts, and autonomous counties. In terms of their formation methods, terms of office, structure, and principles of organizational activity, they are identical to ordinary local administrative bodies, but they function under the unified leadership of the Center. Their functions mainly include law-making, decision-making on a number of critical issues, recruitment and appointment of personnel, and monitoring. The SNP's executive bodies are the Standing Committees (PCs).

Unlike ordinary local State bodies, the posts of heads of administrations in national self-government bodies should be filled by persons of titular nationality.

The system of regional national autonomy (minzu qiuyu zizhi) covers only national administrative divisions and is territorial.

In the 1950s, the establishment of the equal status of nationalities in the country was formally based on the idea of Mao Zedong (1953) that all Chinese nationalities should be considered equal nations (mingzu), regardless of their size or level of social development.⁵

But even at the initial stage of the national policy towards non-Han people, there were cases of discrimination.

During the implementation of socio-economic reforms, violent methods were used, the opinion of non-Han nationalities was ignored, the arbitrariness of Han cadres in a number of national regions was noted, conditions for non-Han people to realize their promised right to "be masters in their own home" were not observed and there were no conditions for non-Han people to realize their promised right to "be masters in their own home", etc. it is very widespread, it is deeply rooted, and until recently, Great Han nationalism still flourishes among some senior cadres. " ⁶

The measures planned at the eighth Congress of the CPC (1956) to overcome shortcomings in the implementation of the national policy were also not implemented.

Nevertheless, in the 1950s, the foundations of a national policy were laid, which, if implemented consistently, could seriously improve interethnic relations and raise the standard of living of non-Han people.

In the mid-1950s, more than 400,000 students were trained. national cadres; a network of ethnic institutes, schools, and study groups was created to teach non-Han people; writing projects were developed for some non-written peoples; literature was produced in the languages of non-Han nationalities; a broad survey of the living conditions of non-Han nationalities, levels of education, and medical care was conducted; and the cultural heritage of these peoples was studied.

Some progress has been made in implementing the policy of regional (territorial) national autonomy.

The 1954 Constitution provided for the creation of three levels of national autonomies in places of compact residence of non-Han nationalities: autonomous regions (administratively corresponding to provinces), autonomous districts and autonomous counties.

There are currently 5 national autonomous regions in China: Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (1947), Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (1955), Ningxia Hui (1958), Guangxi Zhuang (1958) and Tibet (1965) Autonomous Regions, 30 autonomous districts and 120 autonomous regions. counties. Of the 55 nationalities, 44 have established national territorial entities (⁷). In addition, there are also 1,173 national parishes.

Such a large number of autonomous units is a consequence of the peculiarities of the territorial distribution of nationalities, many of which are dispersed in various regions of Western China.

In terms of the number of autonomies of various administrative levels, the system of regional national autonomy is a kind of unique phenomenon in world practice. But it should be emphasized that the institution of regional national autonomy in China from the very beginning was distinguished by its purely administrative character and lack of signs of statehood.

The refusal to grant broad autonomy to non-Han Chinese, giving it the status of statehood within the framework of a united China, is explained by the fear of a split in the country and possible attempts by some peoples to use a higher status of autonomy to secede from China. ⁸

This position has been held by the Chinese authorities since the formation of the PRC, and it remains so today.

THE LAW ON AUTONOMY - A STEP FORWARD

The events of the "great leap forward" (1956-1958) and the "cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) negatively affected the national policy of the state and practically nullified some of the achievements of the first years of the PRC's existence in this area.

A return to the positive attitudes and principles of the past years was outlined only by the end of the 70s.

National politics received a new impetus for its development after the XII Congress of the CPC (1982), at which it was noted that the solution of the national question in China "affects the fate of the state itself." The conclusion of the congress was very timely and necessary, since ignoring the national question led to a serious aggravation of interethnic relations.

The conclusion about the special significance of the national question in China's conditions became even more relevant at the XIII Congress of the CPC (1987). At the same time, such factors were taken into account as the inability to solve the problems of modernization without the active participation of non-Han nationalities, in whose territories the bulk of natural resources are concentrated; the vastness of the area of settlement of non-Han peoples, covering more than half of the country's area strategic location of national areas, mostly adjacent to the state border.

In order to streamline national relations and fill the policy of regional national autonomy with concrete content, legislative construction began in the 1980s in the PRC, during which amendments and additions were made to the 1982 Constitution of the PRC concerning some fundamental issues of national policy.

On this basis, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy ⁹ (hereinafter referred to as the Law on Autonomy) was developed and entered into force in 1984. The Law on Autonomy specifies, expands and supplements the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Regional national autonomy was defined as the CCP's" main policy "in dealing with the national question and an important component of the"political system of the state".

The adoption of the Law on Autonomy was preceded by a broad controversy in the leadership circles of China. As noted in Di Rongkun's article, the drafting of the Law was interrupted in the late 50s due to the predominance of leftist tendencies in the Chinese leadership, as a result of which work on the draft Law was resumed only in the early 80's. In the 50s, the draft Law was edited 8 times, and from 1980 to 1984. -22 times. In the process of working on the draft Law, the most difficult thing was to coordinate its provisions with the requirements of the relevant central ministries and departments, which had their own position on working in national districts. ¹⁰

Under the Law on Autonomy, administrative bodies of national autonomous regions were given the opportunity to exercise in practice their rights and powers granted by the Constitution. In this regard, the Law on Autonomy has become a step forward in comparison with the similar legislation of the PRC in the 50s.

The greatest difficulty in implementing the Law on Autonomy was the creation of conditions that would allow the authorities of the regions of national autonomy to actually exercise their rights of self-government.

According to Chinese scientists, self-government bodies usually remained "in the position of passive executors" of orders from higher authorities, and the "autonomy" of the administration of self-governing territories turned out to be "severely constrained".

In addition, it was recognized that higher authorities "excessively interfere in all the details" of the work of self-government bodies. "Such an over - centralized system of government," the media noted, "no longer meets the goals of further political, economic and cultural development of China as a whole." ¹¹ The lack of clearly defined rights of self-government bodies in Chinese legislation and the general strict control from above, especially in the economic sphere, according to the Chinese press, hampers the actions of local authorities the authorities of national regions also make it very difficult for them to exercise their formally granted rights and preferences ¹².

The peculiarity of the Law on Autonomy was that the principles of the policy of regional national autonomy were set out in the most general form, and it was impossible to provide for all the specifics and all the national features of a large number of autonomies (in the 80s there were about 150 of them). To a certain extent, this was offset by the inclusion of an article in the Law on Autonomy, according to which the prerogative of developing local provisions on autonomy was assigned to national regions under the general direction and control of the center.

With the adoption of the Law on Autonomy in National Regions, the process of developing secondary legislation has begun. The documents that have come into force have somewhat expanded the powers of self-government bodies of national autonomous regions and created certain guarantees for their implementation.

local self-government rights, provided greater attention to national specifics and protection of the interests of non-Han nationalities. Thus, it is mandatory for representatives of titular nationalities to replace senior positions in self-government bodies.

The right of self-government bodies to modify instructions, resolutions and other orders of higher State bodies or suspend their execution if they do not meet the realities of the given area of national autonomy is approved. At the same time, the adopted local regulations on autonomy and other local laws should not conflict with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China or the Law on Autonomy and must necessarily be coordinated with higher authorities.

The new legislation provided for protecting the interests of non-Han people in the economic sphere, providing various benefits and benefits to national regions in order to improve the economic situation, increase the cultural level of the non-Han population, and develop education and health care.

By the end of the 1990s, the Assemblies of People's Representatives in 129 districts of national autonomy had adopted provisions on autonomy, in particular in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Autonomy.

In addition, the SNPs of these 129 units, based on the Constitution and the Law on Autonomy, adopted 209 separately valid provisions, which were approved by the SNP PC of the respective provinces and autonomous regions. At the national level, out of 272 laws and regulations of a legislative nature, 62 laws dealt with the national issue. Approximately 1/5 of the administrative legislative provisions approved by the State Council of the People's Republic of China were also aimed at solving national problems, including the 1993 "Regulations on the Work of Government bodies in National Parishes" and "Regulations on Solving Problems of Non-Han Nationalities in Cities"¹³.

Examples of local legislation include the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Supplementary Provision for the Implementation of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China (1983) and the Tibetan version of the Marriage Law (1981), which set the minimum age of marriage for non-Han citizens at 20 years for men and 18 years for women, while for Han Chinese, it is 22 years and 20 years, respectively.

In addition, according to the same laws, Uyghurs and other non-Han nationalities are allowed to have 2 and 3 children in XUAR. And in Tibet, farmers and pastoralists, who make up the bulk of the entire population of the region, are not covered at all by the Central Government's planned parenthood policy, which promotes the birth of one child in a family, since the 1970s. In the district, over 36% of residents have more than three children ¹⁴.

Based on natural and climatic features, the TAR adopted a resolution to reduce the working week to 35 hours, which is 5 hours less than the generally accepted length of the working week in the country. In addition, local Tibetan legislation has added the traditional Tibetan holidays "Tibetan New Year" and "Xuedun Festival"to the list of national holidays.

Thus, in the 1980s, in fact, for the first time in the history of the regional national autonomy, the rights of self-government bodies began to be implemented in practice. This concerns, first of all, the exercise of the right to legislative activity.

Thanks to the reforms and the appearance of local laws, first of all provisions on autonomy, it became possible to really take into account the specifics of national regions and the interests of non-Han nationalities.

(The ending follows)

^{Mou Benli.} 1 Guanyu danjin shijie minzu wenti de ji dian sikao (Thoughts on national problems in the modern world) / / D5. Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2002, N 8, p. 6.

^{Lee Dezhu.} 2 Dan de di-san dai lindao jiti dui makesizhui minzu lilun de xin fazhan xin gongxian (New development and new contribution of the Third generation Party collective leadership to the Marxist theory of the National question) / / D5. Minzu wenti yanju. 2002, No. 9, p. 3.

^{Wang Xinggang.} 3 Shijie zhi jiao shijie minzu wenti ji qi dui wo guo de yingxiang (World national problems on the edge of centuries and their impact on China) / / D5. Minzu wenti yanju. 2003, No. 3, p. 32.

⁴ See: Minzu zhengze wenjian huibian (Collection of National Policy Documents). Vol. 1, Beijing, 1958, pp. 67-72.

^{Mao Zedong} 5 xuan ji. Beijing, 1977. Vol. 5, p. 55.

⁶ Guangming zhibao, 09.11.1980.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Minzu tuanjie. 1958, No. 2, p. 3; see also: Minzu zhengze wenjian huibian, vol. 3. Beijing, 1960, p. 9.

⁹ Zhonghua Renmin Gunghego minzu quyu zizhi fa (The Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy) / / People's Daily, 04.06.1984.

^{Di Rongkun.} 10 Ulanfu yu Zhonghua renmin gunghego minzu quyu zizhi fa (Ulanfu and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy) / / Minzu tuanjie. 1999, N 5, p. 10.

¹¹ Zhongguo shaoshu mingzu. 1990, N 5, p. 32.

¹² Zhongyang mingzu xueyuan xuebao. 1988, N 6, p. 50.

¹³ Minzu tuanjie. 1999, No. 5, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ Xinjiang, China: Past and Present. Xinjiang, 2006, pp. 245-246; The system of regional national autonomy in Tibet. Beijing, 2004, pp. 14-15.